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Übersicht 
 
 
An Verkehrsflughäfen stellt die fälschliche Benutzung von Start- und Landebahnen, 
die man als „Runway Incursion“ bezeichnet, eines der gravierendsten Risiken für die 
Flugsicherheit dar. Der bislang folgenschwerste Unfall in der Zivilluftfahrt, der Zu-
sammenstoß zweier Boeing 747 auf Teneriffa im März 1977 mit 583 Toten, ist auf eine 
solche Runway Incursion zurückzuführen. 
Bereits 1986 kam eine Studie des für die Untersuchung von Flugunfällen und Flug-
zwischenfällen zuständigen amerikanischen National Transportation Safety Boards 
(NTSB) zu dem Schluß, daß nicht technische Defekte, sondern menschliche Faktoren, 
landläufig als „menschliches Versagen“ bezeichnet, ursächlich für Runway Incursi-
ons sind. Dies ist insofern bemerkenswert, als das Rollen am Boden zwar zu den an-
spruchsvollsten Aufgaben im Cockpit gehört, Piloten in dieser kritischen Flugphase 
jedoch bislang nicht über ausgefeilte Assistenzsysteme verfügen, sondern sich nach 
wie vor im wesentlichen auf die Sicht aus den Cockpitfenstern und die Anweisungen 
der Flugsicherung über Sprechfunk stützen müssen. Als gesetzlich vorgeschriebene 
Hilfsmittel stehen zusätzlich lediglich Papierkarte, Kompaß sowie ein Ausdruck der 
den Flughafen betreffenden Nachrichten für Luftfahrer zur Verfügung. 
 
Daher befaßt sich die vorliegende Arbeit mit der Frage, inwieweit sich Runway In-
cursions darauf zurückführen lassen, daß den Besatzungen notwendige Informatio-
nen nicht oder nur in inadäquater Form zur Verfügung gestellt werden, und wie die 
Bordausrüstung von Verkehrsflugzeugen ggf. ergänzt werden müßte, um das Un-
fallrisiko zu minimieren. 
Nach einer Untersuchung der von Piloten und Fluglotsen am Flughafen anzuwen-
denden Prozeduren und Verfahren auf mögliche Schwachstellen erfolgt dazu eine 
eingehende Analyse von 40 Unfällen und schweren Zwischenfällen, anhand derer 
häufig wiederkehrende Kausalfaktoren ermittelt und kategorisiert werden. 
Dabei zeigt sich, daß sich die untersuchten Runway Incursions – abgesehen von eini-
gen Ausnahmen, die eindeutig fehlerhaften Anweisungen der Flugsicherung zuzu-
schreiben sind – hauptsächlich auf mangelndes Situationsbewußtsein der beteiligten 
Piloten zurückführen lassen. Hierfür sind unzureichende Navigationshilfen, fehlen-
de Mittel zur Erfassung des umgebenden Luft- bzw. Bodenverkehrs und möglicher 
Konflikte, ungenügend aufbereitete Informationen über betriebliche Einschränkun-
gen (wie z.B. die Sperrung von Start- und Landebahnen) sowie Mißverständnisse in 
der Kommunikation mit der Flugsicherung verantwortlich. 
 
Um diese Defizite zu beheben, wird im Rahmen dieser Arbeit ein umfassendes An-
zeige- und Warnkonzept erstellt, das alle für die Vermeidung von Runway Incursi-
ons notwendigen Informationen integriert, auf intuitive Weise darstellt und die Pilo-
ten warnt, sofern die reine Anzeige, beispielsweise aufgrund der Dynamik der Situa-
tion, nicht ausreicht, um drohende Gefahren abzuwenden. Als Grundlage dient mit 
der Airport Moving Map eine bereits kommerziell verfügbare datenbankgestützte 
digitalen Flughafenkarte. Eine prototypische Realisierung dieses Anzeige- und 
Warnkonzepts wird in Feldversuchen an den Flughäfen Frankfurt und Prag sowie 
abschließend im Flugsimulator des Instituts für Flugsysteme und Regelungstechnik 
der TU Darmstadt einer Validierung durch Verkehrspiloten unterzogen. 
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Abstract 
 
 
At airports sustaining commercial operations, Runway Incursions, defined as the 
incorrect presence or manoeuvre of an aircraft, vehicle or person on a runway, consti-
tute the most severe hazard to flight safety. In fact, the worst-ever accident in civil 
aviation to date, the collision of two Boeing B747s on Tenerife in March 1977 with 583 
fatalities, was caused by a Runway Incursion. 
As early as 1986, a special investigation report of the National Transportation Safety 
Boards (NTSB), which is responsible for investigating aviation incidents and acci-
dents in the USA, concluded that Human Factors issues and not technical malfunc-
tions were the primary causal factors of Runway Incursions. This is remarkable, be-
cause although surface movement is one of the most challenging cockpit tasks, pilots 
are currently not supported by sophisticated assistance systems in this critical phase 
of flight, but still mainly rely on visual acquisition of their environment and Air Traf-
fic Control (ATC) instructions conveyed via radio. The only mandatory additional 
equipment consists of paper charts, compass and Notices to Airmen (NOTAM). 
 
Consequently, the goal of this thesis is to investigate to what extent Runway Incur-
sions can be attributed to an inadequate presentation or lack of required information 
on the flight deck, and how flight deck instrumentation will possibly have to be sup-
plemented in order to increase safety in the airport environment. 
Following a scrutiny of current procedures for surface movement with respect to po-
tential deficiencies, an in-depth analysis of 40 incidents and accidents is conducted to 
identify and categorize generic, recurring causal factors of Runway Incursions. 
Apart from several exceptions that can be attributed to incorrect ATC instructions or 
clearances, results clearly indicate that the investigated Runway Incursions were 
primarily caused by a lack of pilot situation awareness. The underlying reasons are a 
lack of suitable navigation aids, missing means of acquiring the surrounding traffic 
including potential conflicts, insufficient presentation of information on the airport 
operational environment (such as closed or restricted runways) or misunderstand-
ings in the communication with ATC. 
 
In order to address these deficiencies, a holistic flight deck visualisation and warning 
concept based on Airport Moving Map (AMM) technology, an already commercially 
available database-driven electronic airport chart presentation, is developed in the 
frame of this thesis, integrating all of the information required for Runway Incursion 
avoidance in an intuitive fashion. In case the mere presentation of information is not 
sufficient to prevent a hazardous situation, e.g. due to the dynamics of an emerging 
traffic conflict, pilots are alerted in a manner consistent with current flight deck alert-
ing systems. A prototypic realisation of the resulting onboard surveillance system is 
validated with airline pilots in field trials at Frankfurt and Prague airport, using a 
Navigation Test Vehicle, followed by a further evaluation campaign employing a 
Research Flight Simulator. 
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Definitions 
 
 
 
Accident 
An occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft which takes place between 
the time any person boards the aircraft with the intention of flight until such time as 
all such persons have disembarked, in which: 
 
a) a person is fatally or seriously injured as a result of: 
- being in the aircraft, or 
- direct contact with any part of the aircraft, including parts which have be-
come detached from the aircraft, or 
- direct exposure to jet blast,  
except when the injuries are from natural causes, self-inflicted or inflicted by 
other persons, or when the injuries are to stowaways hiding outside the ar-
eas normally available to the passengers and crew; or 
 
b) the aircraft sustains damage or structural failure which: 
- adversely affects the structural strength, performance or flight characteris-
tics of the aircraft, and 
- would normally require major repair or replacement of the affected compo-
nent, 
except for engine failure or damage, when the damage is limited to the en-
gine, its cowlings or accessories; or for damage limited to propellers, wing 
tips, antennas, tyres, brakes, fairings, small dents or puncture holes in the 
aircraft skin; or 
 
c) the aircraft is missing or is completely inaccessible. 
 
For statistical uniformity only, an injury resulting in death within thirty days of the 
date of the accident is classified as a fatal injury by ICAO. Furthermore, an aircraft is 
considered to be missing when the official search has been terminated and the 
wreckage has not been located [ICA01]†. 
 
Aerodrome 
A defined area on land or water (including any buildings, installations and equip-
ment) intended to be used either wholly or in part for the arrival, departure and sur-
face movement of aircraft [ICA01]. 
 
Aerodrome Traffic 
All traffic on the manoeuvring area of an aerodrome and all aircraft flying in the vi-
cinity of an aerodrome [ICA01]. 
                                                 
†  Unless indicated otherwise, the definitions in this section are quoted verbatim to prevent any unintended 
adulteration of the internationally accepted scope and content. In contrast to the remainder of this thesis, 
where verbatim quotations are presented “with quotation marks and in italics”, the definitions are presented in 
plain font here for improved readability. Any additions or explanations by the author are added after the ref-
erence in this section. 
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Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP) 
A publication issued by or with the authority of a State and containing aeronautical 
information of a lasting character essential to air navigation [ICA04]. 
 
Aeronautical Information Service (AIS) 
A service established within the defined area of coverage responsible for the provi-
sion of aeronautical information/data necessary for the safety, regularity and effi-
ciency of air navigation [ICA04]. 
 
Air Traffic Service (ATS) 
A generic term meaning variously, flight information service, alerting service, air 
traffic advisory service, air traffic control service (area control service, approach con-
trol service or aerodrome control service) [ICA01]. 
 
Aircraft Proximity 
A situation in which, in the opinion of a pilot or air traffic services personnel, the dis-
tance between aircraft as well as their relative positions and speed have been such 
that the safety of the aircraft involved may have been compromised. An aircraft 
proximity is classified as follows: 
 
Risk of collision. The risk classification of an aircraft proximity in which serious 
risk of collision has existed. 
 
Safety not assured. The risk classification of an aircraft proximity in which the 
safety of the aircraft may have been compromised. 
 
No risk of collision. The risk classification of an aircraft proximity in which no 
risk of collision has existed. 
 
Risk not determined. The risk classification of an aircraft proximity in which in-
sufficient information was available to determine the risk involved, or incon-
clusive or conflicting evidence precluded such determination [ICA01a]. 
 
Alternate Aerodrome 
An aerodrome to which an aircraft may proceed when it becomes either impossible 
or inadvisable to proceed to or to land at the aerodrome of intended landing. Alter-
nate aerodromes include the following: 
 
Take-off alternate. An alternate aerodrome at which an aircraft can land should 
this become necessary shortly after take-off and it is not possible to use the 
aerodrome of departure. 
 
En-route alternate. An aerodrome at which an aircraft would be able to land af-
ter experiencing an abnormal or emergency condition while en route. 
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ETOPS en-route alternate. A suitable and appropriate alternate aerodrome at 
which an aeroplane would be able to land after experiencing an engine shut-
down or other abnormal or emergency condition while en route in an ETOPS 
operation. 
 
Destination alternate. An alternate aerodrome to which an aircraft may proceed 
should it become either impossible or inadvisable to land at the aerodrome of 
intended landing [ICA01]. 
 
Apron 
A defined area on a land aerodrome intended to accommodate aircraft for purposes 
of loading or unloading passengers, mail or cargo, fuelling, parking or maintenance 
[ICA01]. 
 
Apron Management Service 
A service provided to regulate the activities and the movement of aircraft and vehi-
cles on an apron [ICA01]. 
 
Cockpit Display of Traffic Information (CDTI) 
A Cockpit Display of Traffic Information (CDTI) provides the flight crew with sur-
veillance information about other aircraft, including their position. Traffic informa-
tion for a CDTI may be obtained from one or multiple sources (including ADS-B, 
TCAS, and TIS-B) and it may be used for a variety of purposes. Any means of com-
municating the information is acceptable (aural, graphical, head-up, etc.) as long as 
the information is conveyed effectively [RTC02]. The CDTI may use a dedicated or a 
shared display device [RTC98]. 
 
Crew Resource Management 
Crew Resource Management (CRM) deals with the cognitive and interpersonal skills 
required to manage flight within an organised aviation system, in particular the ca-
pabilities required to obtain and maintain adequate situational awareness, and tech-
niques for joint problem solving and decision making. In particular, CRM intends to 
counteract a lack of situational awareness or a breakdown of efficient teamwork re-
sulting from inadequate communication. CRM training was created to formalise 
education in these skills. 
 
Incident 
An occurrence, other than an accident, associated with the operation of an aircraft 
which affects or could affect the safety of operation [ICA01]. 
 
Manoeuvring Area 
That part of an aerodrome to be used for the take-off, landing and taxiing of aircraft, 
excluding aprons [ICA01]. 
 
Movement Area 
That part of an aerodrome to be used for the take-off, landing and taxiing of aircraft, 
consisting of the manoeuvring area and the apron(s) [ICA01]. 
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Navigation Accuracy Category (NAC) 
The Navigation Accuracy Category is a parameter detailing the accuracy of a re-
ported position (NACP) or velocity (NACV) to enable surveillance applications to de-
termine whether reported data has an acceptable level of accuracy for the intended 
use. For position accuracy, NACP is bound to the Estimated Position Uncertainty 
(EPU), which defined as the radius of a circle, centred on the reported position, such 
that the probability of the true position being outside the circle is 0.05. When re-
ported by a GPS or GNSS system, EPU is commonly called Horizontal Figure of 
Merit (HFOM). For velocity, a 95% confidence interval is used as well [RTC02]. 
 
Navigation Integrity Category (NIC) 
The Navigation Integrity Category is a parameter between 0 and 15 enabling surveil-
lance applications to determine whether the reported geometric position has an ac-
ceptable integrity containment region for the intended use. The categorised NIC in-
tegrity containment regions are described by the horizontal radius of containment 
(RC) and the vertical protection limit (VPL). RC is the radius of a circle centred on the 
reported position, within which the true position is assured to lie at the reported time 
of applicability. In the same fashion, VPL is the vertical bounding box. NIC is inti-
mately associated with the Surveillance Integrity Level (SIL) [RTC06]. 
 
Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) 
A notice distributed by means of telecommunication containing information concern-
ing the establishment, condition or change in any aeronautical facility, service, pro-
cedure or hazard, the timely knowledge of which is essential to personnel concerned 
with flight operations [ICA04]. 
 
Obstacle 
All fixed (whether temporary or permanent) and mobile objects, or parts thereof, that 
are located on an area intended for the surface movement of aircraft or that extend 
above a defined surface intended to protect aircraft in flight [ICA04]. 
 
Pilot-in-Command (PIC) 
The pilot designated by the operator or owner of an aircraft as being in command 
and charged with the safe conduct of a flight. Irrespective of the crew role as a Pilot 
Flying (PF) or Pilot Not Flying (PNF), the pilot-in-command is ultimately responsible 
for the operation of the aircraft in accordance with the rules of the air, except that the 
pilot-in-command may depart from these rules in circumstances that render such 
departure absolutely necessary in the interests of safety. The pilot-in-command of an 
aircraft shall have final authority as to the disposition of the aircraft while in com-
mand [ICA90]. In most cases, the PIC is seated on the left side of the cockpit in fixed-
wing aircraft. 
 
Pre-flight Information Bulletin (PIB) 
A presentation of current NOTAM and other urgent information of operational sig-
nificance in plain-text language, prepared prior to flight [ICA04]. 
 
Revenue Passenger Kilometres (RPK) 
The number of passengers multiplied by the number of kilometres they fly [Boe04]. 
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Runway 
A defined rectangular area on a land aerodrome prepared for the landing and take-
off of aircraft [ICA01]. 
 
Runway Holding Position 
A designated position intended to protect a runway, an obstacle limitation surface, or 
an ILS/MLS critical/sensitive area at which taxiing aircraft and vehicles shall stop 
and hold, unless otherwise authorized by the aerodrome control tower [ICA01]. 
 
Runway Visual Range (RVR) 
The range over which the pilot of an aircraft on the centre line of a runway can see 
the runway surface markings or the lights delineating the runway or identifying its 
centre line [ICA01]. 
 
Serious Incident 
An incident involving circumstances indicating that an accident nearly occurred 
[ICA01b]. 
 
Standard instrument arrival route (STAR) 
A designated instrument flight rule (IFR) arrival route linking a significant point, 
normally on an ATS route, with a point from which a published instrument approach 
procedure can be commenced [ICA01a]. 
 
Standard instrument departure (SID) 
A designated instrument flight rule (IFR) departure route linking the aerodrome or a 
specified runway of the aerodrome with a specified significant point, normally on a 
designated ATS route, at which the en-route phase of a flight commences [ICA01a]. 
 
Stopway 
A defined rectangular area on the ground at the end of take-off run available pre-
pared as a suitable area in which an aircraft can be stopped in the case of an aban-
doned take-off [ICA01a]. 
 
Surveillance Integrity Level 
The Surveillance Integrity Level (SIL) defines the probability of the integrity con-
tainment region described by the NIC parameter (see definition above) being ex-
ceeded for the selected geometric position source [RTC06]. 
 
Taxiway 
A defined path on a land aerodrome established for the taxiing of aircraft and in-
tended to provide a link between one part of the aerodrome and another, including: 
 
a) Aircraft stand taxi line. A portion of an apron designated as a taxiway and in-
tended to provide access to aircraft stands only. 
b) Apron taxiway. A portion of a taxiway system located on an apron and intended to 
provide a through taxi route across the apron. 
c) Rapid exit taxiway. A taxiway connected to a runway at an acute angle and de-
signed to allow landing aeroplanes to turn off at higher speeds than are achieved 
on other exit taxiways thereby minimizing runway occupancy times [ICA01a]. 
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Terminal Control Area (TMA) 
A control area normally established at the confluence of ATS routes in the vicinity of 
one or more major aerodromes [ICA01]. 
 
Threshold 
The beginning of that portion of the runway usable for landing [ICA01a]. 
 
Visibility 
Visibility for aeronautical purposes is the greater of: 
 
a) the greatest distance at which a black object of suitable dimensions, situated 
near the ground, can be seen and recognized when observed against a bright 
background; 
b) the greatest distance at which lights in the vicinity of 1000 candelas can be 
seen and identified against an unlit background [ICA01a]. 
 
Visibility Condition 
For surface operations, the ICAO Manual on A-SMGCS discriminates the following 
four generic visibility conditions [ICA04a]: 
 
Visibility Condition 1: Visibility is sufficient for the pilot to taxi and to 
avoid collision with other traffic on taxiways and at intersections by visual 
reference, and for personnel of control units to exercise control over all 
traffic on the basis of visual surveillance. 
 
Visibility Condition 2: Visibility is sufficient for the pilot to taxi and to 
avoid collision with other traffic on taxiways and at intersections by visual 
reference, but insufficient for personnel of control units to exercise control 
over all traffic on the basis of visual surveillance. 
 
Visibility Condition 3: Visibility is sufficient for the pilot to taxi, but in-
sufficient for the pilot to avoid collision with other traffic on taxiways and 
at intersections by visual reference, and insufficient for personnel of con-
trol units to exercise control over all traffic on the basis of visual surveil-
lance. For taxiing, this is normally taken as visibilities equivalent to an 
RVR of less than 400 m but more than 75 m. 
 
Visibility Condition 4: Visibility is insufficient for the pilot to taxi by vis-
ual guidance only. This is normally taken as a RVR of 75 m or less♣. 
 
It should be noted that the above visibility conditions apply for both day and night 
operations. The precise criteria for determining the transition between visibility con-
ditions are a function of local aerodrome and traffic characteristics [ICA08]. 
                                                 
♣  According to an airline captain based at Frankfurt Airport (EDDF), Visibility Condition 4 is only encountered 
in approximately 3-4% of all flights. 
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1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Motivation 
 
Surface movement is one of the most challenging phases of flight. Particularly at 
complex airports, at airports the flight crew is not familiar with or in degraded visi-
bility conditions, with airport markings potentially obscured by snow, taxiing an air-
craft may cause excessive workload and thus increase the risk of errors. This does not 
only impair the efficiency of surface operations, but can also lead to serious incidents 
and accidents, of which Runway Incursions are the by far most safety-critical. In fact, 
the worst-ever accident in civil aviation to date, the collision of two Boeing B747s on 
Tenerife in 1977 with 583 fatalities, was caused by a Runway Incursion [ICA80]. 
 
Runway Incursions unquestionably pose the greatest threat to aviation safety at 
aerodromes, particularly in view of the continuous worldwide growth in air traffic. 
In recent years, accidents and a growing number of Runway Incursion incidents, in-
cluding several near-misses, have led to the initiation of various Runway Safety ini-
tiatives and research programmes around the globe, often focusing on ground-based 
measures ranging from (often local) changes in Air Traffic Management (ATM) pro-
cedures and improved surveillance technologies, e.g. multilateration, to airport lay-
out considerations such as perimeter taxiways [Eur04, FAA04]. 
The urgency of the problem is also illustrated by the fact that the National Transpor-
tation Safety Board (NTSB) has had a technical solution to give “immediate warnings of 
probable [runway] collisions/incursions directly to flight crews in the cockpit” on its “Most 
Wanted” list since it was established in 1990, with the measures taken by the Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA) so far still classified as “unacceptable” [NTS07a]. 
 
As early as 1986, an NTSB Special Investigation Report concluded that Runway In-
cursions are a human factors problem, since no single Runway Incursion to date had 
been caused by a technical malfunction [NTS86]. In fact, a detailed analysis of vari-
ous Runway Incursion accident and incident reports yields that deficiencies in flight 
crew situational awareness are almost always a causal factor in these occurrences. 
Crew disorientation due to a lack of situational awareness played a substantial role 
in three recent fatal Runway Incursion accidents in Taipei, Milano-Linate and Lex-
ington [ANS04, ASC02, NTS07]. In the first two cases, crew disorientation was at 
least partially caused by adverse weather conditions and the non-conformance of 
airport lights, signs or markings to ICAO regulations.  
 
In response to the crew disorientation issue, the electronic airport moving map dis-
play as supplement or substitute for conventional paper charts has evolved in re-
search and, subsequently, industry over the past decade. It is now widely accepted as 
the core technology to increase the flight crew’s situational awareness in terms of 
position on the airport surface, and commercially available both as fully integrated 
line-fit solution on the Airbus A380 or as Electronic Flight Bag (EFB) application by 
various manufacturers, such as ACSS or Jeppesen. 
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However, situational awareness on the ground encompasses much more than mere 
position awareness. Awareness of relevant traffic on surrounding taxiways and traf-
fic in the runway environment is essential to understand traffic patterns and to an-
ticipate potential conflicts. Currently, flight crews use a combination of visual acqui-
sition and monitoring Air Traffic Control (ATC) clearances issued to other traffic, the 
so-called ‘party line effect’, to build a mental model of traffic in the airport environ-
ment. If visibility deteriorates such that traffic can no longer be acquired visually, or 
if both local languages and English are used, this becomes increasingly difficult. 
 
Emerging advanced traffic surveillance technologies such as ADS-B and TIS-B 
[RTC02, RTC03], which are now seeing large-scale implementation programs in sev-
eral regions of the world, have the potential of providing surface traffic data with 
high resolution, integrity and accuracy. The availability of traffic surveillance data in 
the cockpit in suitable form could potentially help flight crews to maintain traffic 
situational awareness under adverse weather conditions. In addition to this, it might 
also aid pilots in detecting mistakes made by other flight crews or controller errors. 
In fact, controllers erroneously clearing two aircraft for the same runway were the 
key causal factors in both the 1991 Los Angeles and the 2000 Paris Charles-de-Gaulle 
accidents. In the latter case, the use of two different ATC languages prevented the 
crew of a British Shorts 330 from noticing the controller error [BEA01]. 
 
Furthermore, numerous cases of flight crews deviating from the assigned taxi route, 
failing to hold short of a runway or taking off without clearance illustrate that situ-
ational awareness regarding the ATC clearances assigned by the controller is crucial. 
After all, due to a misunderstanding with Tenerife tower, the captain of KLM 4805 
erroneously believed that his flight had been cleared for take-off [ICA80]. 
Last but not least, there is a third aspect of situational awareness that needs to be ad-
dressed, the operational environment. Currently, like paper charts, the airport mov-
ing map is limited to quasi-static airport information, because the underlying aero-
drome database is envisaged to be updated only every 28 days with the regular 
AIRAC cycle. Nonetheless, information on short-term and temporary changes is es-
sential for flight safety, e.g. when relating to runway closures, because choosing a 
closed runway may have catastrophic consequences, as the Singapore Airlines Flight 
SQ006 accident at Taipei in 2000 shows. In other incidents, such as UPS Flight 896 at 
Denver in 2001 departing from a closed runway, a disaster was only narrowly 
avoided [NTS03]. Today, information on short-term and temporary changes, e.g. 
runway closures, is mainly conveyed through the Pre-Flight Information Bulletin 
(PIB), a plain-language compilation of current Notices to Airmen (NOTAM) and 
other information of urgent character. However, the accessibility of this information 
is limited: a typical PIB for an intercontinental flight often exceeds 30 A4 pages (in-
cluding alternate airports), and the flight crew has to create the mental picture of the 
respective airport environment by locating and combining PIB with aerodrome 
mapping information. 
 
This brief survey clearly indicates that there are, apparently, significant unsolved 
human factors issues with current surface movement operations, which become in-
creasingly problematic once external visual references fail due to visibility limita-
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tions. Consequently, improved flight crew situational awareness should be a key 
element of any attempt to address the problem of Runway Incursions. The motiva-
tion for this thesis is to make a contribution to the mitigation or solution of this prob-
lem. 
 
To obtain a better understanding of the nature and scope of the Runway Incursion 
problem, the next section is dedicated to a survey of existing definitions of what con-
stitutes a Runway Incursion, and performs a down-selection of the definition to be 
used for this thesis. 
 
 
1.2 The Problem of Runway Incursions 
 
In order to maintain safe operations on the runway, strict procedures and rigorous 
surveillance are employed. Current operating procedures on the ground require ex-
plicit approval from ATC to cross or enter the runway surface and its associated pro-
tection zone, and additional clearances are required for line-up and take-off. Outside 
the United States, landing clearances to arriving aircraft may typically only be issued 
if all other traffic has vacated the runway. A violation of these procedures may result 
in Runway Incursions. Until recently, however, there were various diverging and 
evolving definitions of a Runway Incursion, converging only in the point that any 
collision of two aircraft – or an aircraft and a vehicle – on the runway surface consti-
tutes a Runway Incursion. 
 
Systematic investigation of Runway Incursions dates back to the late 70s and early 
80s. After NASA’s Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) had been established in 
1976, systematic studies of “runway transgressions”, defined as “any erroneous occu-
pation of a runway at a controlled airport by an aircraft or other controlled vehicle”, were 
performed by NASA in 1978 and 1984 [NTS86]. The 1984 study concluded that “there 
does not appear to be any pattern to the causes […] other than human errors on the part of 
both air traffic controllers and pilots” and revealed difficulties with clearances, commu-
nications, orientation and preoccupation as key factors in pilot-induced incursions. 
Multiple intersecting runways and restricted visibility frequently appeared as factors 
in both pilot- and controller-induced incursions. The Federal Aviation Administra-
tion (FAA) later narrowed the scope to events involving an at least abstract collision 
hazard, using the following definition in its Runway Safety Reports [FAA05, FAA08] 
until Financial Year 2008: 
 
A runway incursion is any occurrence in the airport runway environment involv-
ing an aircraft, vehicle, person, or object on the ground that creates a collision 
hazard or results in a loss of required separation with an aircraft taking off, in-
tending to take off, landing, or intending to land. 
 
This definition formed the basis of all Runway Incursion statistics in the United 
States for years and dominated the overall perception of the problem well beyond 
North America. It is based on the concept of a protection zone (“bubble”) around any 
aircraft entering the runway, the size of which corresponds to the required separa-
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tion from other aircraft and any other objects. In this concept, any penetration of the 
protection zone is regarded as a Runway Incursion, and the depth of penetration 
serves as a measure for the severity of the incursion [FAA01]. 
However, this definition is not unproblematic, because it requires a loss of separation 
or collision hazard, and thus the presence of at least one other aircraft, vehicle or per-
son. If a flight crew operates the aircraft on a runway without corresponding au-
thorisation by ATC (as e.g. in case of erroneous runway entry) and there is no other 
traffic in the vicinity, this does not constitute a Runway Incursion according to this 
FAA definition, but is merely considered as a general surface movement incident. 
 
It is important to note, however, that an erroneous runway entry or usage, and not a 
loss of separation, is the crucial step leading to a Runway Incursion, because the 
presence of and the distance to any other aircraft – and thus the collision hazard – is 
largely determined by chance, especially in low visibility conditions or whenever 
visibility is impaired due to a particular airport layout (e.g. runway profile)1. In these 
cases, neither pilot nor controller might be able to detect an impending danger visu-
ally. In other words, the collision risk is the ultimate consequence of a Runway Incur-
sion, not the cause. 
 
Since November 2004, a more global definition of Runway Incursions by the Interna-
tional Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) is effective [Eur04], replacing the various 
local definitions: 
 
Any occurrence at an aerodrome involving the incorrect presence of an aircraft, 
vehicle or person on the protected area of a surface designated for the landing and 
take off of aircraft. 
 
The wording chosen is somewhat reminiscent of the FAA definition, but due to the 
use of “incorrect presence” instead of “collision hazard” and “loss of separation”, the 
ICAO definition emphasizes the main cause of Runway Incursions, albeit at a generic 
level, whereas the FAA definition is merely descriptive of the incursion symptoms. 
The term “incorrect presence” also takes into account controller errors, such as the vio-
lation of separation minima set forth in ICAO Doc 4444 [ICA01a].  
Consequently, the ICAO definition significantly extends the scope of Runway Incur-
sions compared to the FAA definition: taking off or landing on a wrong (and poten-
tially unsuitable) runway or using a closed runway is now also considered a Runway 
Incursion, even if there is no traffic hazard. 
 
However, there is an important case that is not explicitly covered by the ICAO defi-
nition: taking off without clearance, as in the Tenerife accident [ICA80]. If line-up has 
been approved, the presence of the aircraft on the runway is both intended and cor-
rect. Nonetheless, a Runway Incursion is caused by the unauthorised take-off. There-
fore, it may be necessary to amend the ICAO definition slightly, e.g. to “…incorrect 
presence or manoeuvre of an aircraft...”, to incorporate this case explicitly. 
                                                 
1  As an example, at Rome-Ciampino Airport (CIA), RWY 15/33 is sloped such that aircraft lined up on RWY 15 
cannot see any aircraft at the other end of the runway. 
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In conclusion, this thesis will apply the ICAO definition, under the assumption that 
incorrect runway manoeuvres are implicitly covered as well. Furthermore, as an ex-
tension of the ICAO definition, the case of erroneously using a taxiway for take-off or 
landing will be considered, because this may result in situations equally hazardous 
as Runway Incursions. 
 
 
1.3 Other Surface Incidents and Accidents 
 
Due to the high speeds involved in take-off and landing, Runway Incursions are as-
sociated with a significantly higher risk of multiple fatalities than other surface 
movement incidents outside the runway, and can thus be regarded as the by far most 
serious threat to flight safety in the airport environment. By contrast, with the excep-
tion of erroneously using a taxiway as a runway, there is only a small probability that 
collisions on the taxiway system will lead to fatal injuries among aircraft passengers 
and crew2. 
 
However, incidents and accidents outside the runways occur more frequently than 
Runway Incursions. In the calendar years 2000 and 2001, for example, there were 
1391 and 1250 surface incidents at airports in the US National Airspace System, com-
pared to 423 and 328 Runway Incursions, respectively [FAA02, FAA02a]. 
 
Aircraft damage resulting from collisions outside the runways is tremendous, and 
besides, any collision will have a severe operational impact for airlines. The aviation 
insurance industry estimates that the damage to aircraft during ground operations is 
in excess of US $4 billion per year alone for the direct costs (spare parts and repair), 
which corresponds to a weekly sum of US $77 million. A conservative estimate is that 
the indirect costs (e.g. revenue losses) are at least as high as the direct costs. The ma-
jority of ground mishaps resulting in major damage in 2004 involved large jet aircraft 
and occurred predominantly in Europe. Although there were no fatalities, there is 
clearly a large potential for serious or fatal injuries to persons in or around the air-
craft [IAT05]. 
 
It is also noteworthy that, in contrast to the ICAO definition, the FAA definition of a 
Runway Incursion includes foreign objects on the runway as well. This, however, 
violates the fundamental distinction between human-controlled, consciously moving 
traffic on one side and inanimate, non-fixed obstacles on the other side. Although the 
consequences of foreign objects on the runway can be dire, as the loss of the Air 
France Concorde near Charles de Gaulle airport in 2000 [BEA00] shows, this type of 
runway incident/accident will not be considered here, since there are virtually no 
commonalities with Runway Incursions caused by aircraft, vehicles or persons, 
which are generally the result of erroneous surface movement operations. 
                                                 
2  Nonetheless, abrupt braking to avoid a collision or the impact itself will most likely lead to injuries among the 
cabin crew, who might not be seated and buckled up yet if the aircraft is taxiing out. The risk of fatalities in-
creases with relative speed and cannot be fully excluded, e.g. if the wing of an aircraft damages the forward 
fuselage of another one, or if the collision results in a fire, particularly if an aircraft taxiing to the runway for a 
long-distance flight, and thus heavily loaded with fuel, is involved. Generally, though, the risk of severe or 
even fatal injuries is much higher for vehicle drivers involved in collisions with aircraft [IAT05]. 
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1.4 Statistical Data on Runway Incursions 
 
 
Figure 1: Comparison of reported annual Runway Incursions in Europe, Canada and the USA 
 
To obtain a better understanding of the magnitude of the overall problem, this sec-
tion is dedicated to a review of Runway Incursion statistical data and an analysis of 
their implications and limitations. Both the absolute number of occurrences and the 
rate of incursions per million operations are valid metrics for a quantitative assess-
ment of the severity of the Runway Incursion problem and its development in recent 
years. 
First of all, it should be noted that there are no Runway Incursion statistical data cov-
ering worldwide operations, comparable to the data published by Boeing for com-
mercial jet airplane accidents, cf. [Boe07]. Consequently, the analysis in this section is 
based on data for selected individual countries and regions. Figure 1 shows the de-
velopment of reported Runway Incursions in Europe, Canada and the United States, 
as far as data is available. 
 
1.4.1 United States 
In the United States, Runway Safety Reports have been published on an annual basis 
since 2001 by the FAA’s Office of Runway Safety [FAA01], providing the best and 
most exhaustive statistical coverage of Runway Incursions in the world. Data are 
continuously and consistently available over the whole 1994 – 2007 period, although 
a change of the reporting period from Calendar Year (CY) to Fiscal Year (FY) in the 
Runway Safety Reports published after 2002 necessitates the use of data from the 
FAA Administrator’s Fact Book for the years 2002 – 2007 to prevent double counting 
of events [FAA02a]. It is evident from Figure 1 that the number of Runway Incur-
sions was steadily rising from 1994 to 1999, and exhibiting a steep increase in 2000.  
Sources: FAA Runway Safety Reports, FAA Administrator’s Fact Books, Eurocontrol Performance & Safety Review Reports 
DFS Mobilitätsbericht, Transport Canada, NAV Canada 
 
Change to ICAO definition 
Ramp-up in reporting 
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The decline in 2001 and 2002 can be partially attributed to the post-9/11 crisis of US 
aviation, which resulted in fewer flight operations, but also to the first immediate 
measures taken in the scope of the US Runway Incursion Prevention programmes. 
Since 2002, incursion numbers have stabilized, albeit at a high level, which is a clear 
indication that the measures taken so far are insufficient to achieve a significant re-
duction in the number of Runway Incursions. On the contrary, on a smaller time 
scale, there are even signs that the situation is deteriorating again. Between FY 2004 
and FY 2007, the Runway Incursion rate has risen from an average 5.2 to 6.1 Runway 
Incursions per million operations, which corresponds to an increase of 17%, thus ex-
ceeding the 12% increase in the absolute number of incursions in the same period, 
because the total number of operations dropped by roughly two million operations 
to 61,131,629 in 2007 [FAA08]. 
While there appears to be another dramatic surge in the number of incursions from 
2006 to 2007, the true reason behind this apparent increase is the adoption of the 
ICAO definition of Runway Incursions with the beginning of FY 2008, starting Octo-
ber 1st, 2007 [FAA08]3. When comparing data on a FY basis, the increase is even more 
prominent, from 370 incursions in FY 2007 to 1,009 in FY 2008, corresponding to an 
increase of at least 273 %. Until FY 2008, consequently, all Runway Incursions involv-
ing just one aircraft or vehicle are statistically shrouded in the general “surface inci-
dent” category. The ramp-up after the change to the ICAO definition, however, gives 
an impression of the magnitude of the dark figure of events previously not listed in 
the Runway Incursion statistics. 
 
1.4.2 Europe 
Unfortunately, there is no holistic publication comparable to the Runway Safety Re-
port in Europe. Statistical data on Runway Incursions has to be retrieved from vari-
ous sources, such as the Eurocontrol Performance Review Reports, cf. [Eur08], and 
the Annual Safety Reports by the Safety Regulation Commission (SRC), cf. [Eur08a]. 
Due to the fragmentation and various national responsibilities, the data presented in 
Figure 1 are heavily influenced by the completeness of reporting. The fact that Paris 
Charles-de-Gaulle Airport alone registered 20 Runway Incursions between January 
and June 2000 [BEA01] provides strong evidence that the 99 incursions reported in 
Europe for the whole year do not portray the situation adequately. Likewise, the 
huge increase in the number of incursions between 2002 and 2004 does not reflect an 
actual deterioration of runway safety, but merely an improvement in the coverage of 
incidents through the unified reporting schemes enforced by Eurocontrol. Prior to 
November 25th, 2004, when the new ICAO definition of Runway Incursions became 
effective, there were at least 14 different definitions of a Runway Incursion in use in 
the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) area alone. Since neither the report-
ing rate nor the exact definition used by the individual states are known, European 
Runway Incursion data up to 2004 are not usable for a statistical comparison with US 
or Canadian data, and do not permit any conclusion on the actual development of 
runway safety in Europe. Due to the uncertainty about the homogeneity of defini-
tions and reporting rate, it is also unclear whether the increase from 2004 to 2005 can 
be attributed to the change of definition or other factors. As a result, the only reliable 
                                                 
3 The FAA had originally planned to change its definition to comply with ICAO in 2006 [IAT05]. 
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information deducible from Eurocontrol statistics is that there were 667 Runway In-
cursions in Europe in 2006, a significant increase over the 629 incidents registered in 
the previous year. 
For Germany, Deutsche Flugsicherung (DFS) GmbH reports between 87 and 125 
Runway Incursions for the 2003 to 2007 period in its mobility report [DFS08], as 
shown in Figure 1. By contrast, the annual reports of the Bundesstelle für Flugunfal-
luntersuchung (BFU) list between three and nine Runway Incursions per annum for 
the 2003 – 2007 period, with the maximum in 2005. The apparent contradiction is due 
to the fact that BFU covers severe incidents only and is limited to aircraft with a 
Maximum Take-off Weight (MTOW) above 5.7 t, i.e. aircraft typically used for com-
mercial operations. 
While there is no clearly observable tendency towards fewer or more frequent inci-
dents, and there is too few data for a sound statistical analysis, a total number of 27 
Runway Incursions rated as severe incidents within five years is certainly non-
negligible. In this context, it is noteworthy that the BFU still uses a definition close to 
the FAA’s, mandating a collision hazard as prerequisite for categorization and re-
porting of an incursion as a severe incident [BFU04, BFU05, BFU06, BFU07, BFU08].  
 
1.4.3 Canada 
Transport Canada could not identify any single factor or combination of factors that 
could serve as an explanation of the dramatic increase in the number of Runway In-
cursions at Canadian airports between 1996 and 1999 [TC00]. Using a definition close 
to the one later officialized by ICAO, a dedicated sub-committee on Runway Incur-
sions collected and analysed statistical data for the 1993 to 1999 period from various 
sources. Since older data did not appear to be sufficiently detailed and reliable, the 
analysis focussed on the 1997 – 1999 period and the first five months of 2000. It was 
found that the trend towards more Runway Incursions was valid and real, and not 
caused by more diligent reporting due to the increased focus on Runway Incursions. 
Further data presented in Figure 1 have been extracted from the monthly Opera-
tional Performance Reports issued by NAV Canada, cf. [NAV08]. Generally, the 
situation is comparable to the United States with incursion numbers stagnating at a 
high level. 
 
1.4.4 Conclusion 
The statistical data show that Runway Incursions are generally on the rise in the 
United States and Canada. Due to the different definitions in use until October 2007 
and the reporting ramp-up artefacts in the European data, a comparison of the situa-
tion in Europe and the USA is currently not possible, and the number of valid con-
clusions to be drawn from European Runway Incursion statistics in general is very 
limited. There is a Runway Incursion problem in Europe, and there is no proof that 
the countermeasures so far, such as the European Action Plan for the Prevention of 
Runway Incursions [Eur04, Eur06], have led to any reduction or at least stabilisation 
of incursion numbers. 
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1.5 Runway Incursions and Air Traffic Growth 
 
The general tendency that Runway Incursions are on the rise, as identified in the 
previous section, raises the fundamental question whether and to what extent this 
correlates with the development of air traffic over the same period. 
 
Since the late 1950s, the rate of fatal aviation accidents has dropped considerably in 
spite of a significant increase in air traffic. Averaged over the last decade, there were 
0.5 fatal accidents per million departures in scheduled commercial operations, with 
only slight annual variations [Boe07]. Since the accident rate – which is a valid objec-
tive safety metrics – appears to have stabilized at this very low level, it can be ex-
pected that further air traffic growth will, in the absence of additional safety efforts, 
lead to an increasing number of incidents and accidents. This constitutes a significant 
challenge to aviation, because the ultimate goal of safety efforts is the prevention of 
individual accidents. Besides, the public, which is highly sensitive to aviation safety 
issues4, will perceive a deterioration of flight safety. Therefore, the objective is 
achieving a reduction of accidents with the number of flight operations increasing. 
However, the considerations above are based on the assumption that the current 
level of flight safety (in terms of accident rate) can be maintained even though more 
and more aircraft operate at the same time. Potential interaction effects due to in-
creased traffic density are completely neglected. For aspects of technical reliability, 
maintenance and basic flight training standards, this seems appropriate. But with 
respect to ATM incidents in general, there is considerable evidence that their number 
increases with traffic, cf. Figure 3 [Eur08]. Given the complex influence of human 
factors aspects on the problem of Runway Incursions, it is necessary to take a closer 
look at the development of air traffic and its impact on airports, and to analyze po-
tential correlations between Runway Incursions and traffic growth. 
 
1.5.1 Background: Air Traffic Growth  
In the age of globalisation, the interdependence of trade and industries from all 
around the world tightens. While the aviation industry has always assumed a pio-
neering role in internationalisation5, even industry branches traditionally nationally 
oriented in terms of the supply chain, like e.g. the automotive industry6, experience 
an increase in international ties. 
                                                 
4  This high degree of sensitivity can be deemed almost irrational compared to the sensitivity for safety issues 
regarding other modes of transport. In 2005, more people (986) were killed in road accidents in the state of Ba-
varia [StB06] than in commercial airplane accidents (805) worldwide [Boe06]. Due to the large average number 
of fatalities in airline accidents, airline accidents usually receive international media coverage, whereas public 
information on road accidents scarcely goes beyond the level of the local newspaper. 
5  The Junkers F13, the world’s first all-metal passenger aircraft, which first flew in 1919, was exported, among 
others, to Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Ecuador, 
Finland, Hungary, Japan, Persia, Poland, South Africa, the Soviet Union, Turkey, Uruguay and the USA. Hugo 
Junkers co-founded several airlines, among them a Persian airline, and, of course, Junkers Luftverkehr AG 
(ILAG). In 1925, with 178 aircraft, 100,000 passengers and shares in no less than 29 national and international 
airlines, Junkers Luftverkehr AG – which was subsequently fused with Deutscher Aero Lloyd (DAL) on Janu-
ary 6, 1926 to form the Deutsche Lufthansa – was de facto the world’s largest airline [Wag96]. 
6  The production plants of the major German car manufacturers are embedded in regional clusters of suppliers. 
This spatial proximity ensures a smooth flow of production and makes the roughly 5,500 suppliers of the 
automotive industry in Germany competitive in spite of comparatively high wages [IDW04]. However, the 
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Both global trade and modern manufacturing strategies such as the just-in-time stock 
distribution concept rely on the ability of airlines, particularly specialized cargo car-
riers, to deliver freight to almost any international destination within 24 hours.  
As a consequence, the annual volume of goods transported by air has tripled be-
tween 1970 and 2002, when scheduled airline flights and dedicated air cargo opera-
tors handled 30.2 million tonnes, 18.2 million of which on international routes. There 
was an average annual increase in air cargo of 7% since 1980, and today, its overall 
share in worldwide transport, measured by value of the world’s manufactured ex-
ports, lies around 40% [ICA02]. Production processes and trade are so deeply inter-
woven internationally that high-priced goods are usually transported by aircraft and 
not by ship. High-tech goods airlifted from Asia to Europe and North America repre-
sent 40% of total exports by tonnage, but account for almost 75% by value [Air04]. 
Furthermore, air transport of perishables has fundamentally changed consumption 
patterns – typical summer fruits and vegetables are now available all year. To a cer-
tain extent, the availability of air cargo transport can thus be regarded as a pre-
requisite and driver of globalisation. 
Nonetheless, with just 1,644 dedicated freighter aircraft in service at the end of 2005, 
compared to 17,153 passenger aircraft, the vast majority of commercial flight opera-
tions are scheduled passenger flights. However, their cargo component, belly-loaded 
freight, currently accounts for 42% of the world’s air cargo transport [Air06]7. 
In spite of increasingly sophisticated means of electronic communication, it seems 
business travel remains an elementary need of all industry branches worldwide. Fur-
thermore, recreational travel also contributes significantly to the overall growth in air 
traffic. As air travel became more affordable and the number of holidays increased in 
the course of the last decades, people started to prefer holiday resorts far away and to 
travel more than once per year. While travelling across the Alps with their private 
Volkswagen beetle car to Italian holiday resorts epitomised the holiday dream for 
many Germans in the 1950s and 1960s, Caribbean and Far Eastern beaches are reality 
for millions today. Even European holiday regions are mostly reached by airplane, 
and for some places like the Canaries, the existence of affordable air travel was a pre-
condition for their success in mass tourism. In 2001, almost 40% of all international 
tourists used air transport [ICA02]. 
 
As a result, air travel reached a first peak in 2000, when more than 1.63 billion pas-
sengers (equivalent to 26% of the world’s population) boarded scheduled flights, 181 
times the 9 million airline passengers carried on scheduled services in 1945. For the 
1970–2002 period, the volume of worldwide domestic traffic increased four times, 
from 298 million Passenger Kilometres Performed (PKP) in 1970 to 1.2 billion PKP in 
2002. International air traffic experienced an even more dramatic growth of roughly 
11 times in the same period, from 162 million PKP to 1.7 billion PKP. As a result, the 
share of international air services in total passenger traffic rose from 35% to almost 
60% during the same period [ICA02]. In view of these facts, Airbus claims that air 
travel has become a basic human need [Air04]. 
                                                                                                                                                        
share of national suppliers in the procurements of the Volkswagen Group is slightly larger than 50% in recent 
years [VW05]. 
7  Combi aircraft, another option to combine freight and passengers in a single aircraft, are not mentioned by the 
quoted Airbus document, which explicitly refers to “belly holds” only; neither are mail flights of airliners. 
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Even terrorist activities 
and major international 
crises, like the terrorist 
attacks of September 11th, 
the two Iraq Wars and the 
SARS epidemic, had only 
a temporary impact on the 
growth in air traffic and 
did not mitigate the over-
all rate of increase, but 
merely shifted the curve 
of growth (i.e. the long-
term demand) by 1.5 
years [Air03]. In 2004, for 
example, airlines trans-
ported a little more than 2 
billion passengers with some 18,000 jet aircraft of western origin, which corresponds 
to an estimated increase of 6% in comparison to 2003 [IAT05]. Other sources even 
speak of an increase in Revenue Passenger Kilometres (RPK) of 11.4% from 2003 to 
2004 [Air04]8, and an overall annual growth in air traffic of 14% in 2004, the largest 
within the last 25 years [Air06], which they mainly attribute to a powerful rebound 
from the 9/11/2001 and Iraq war crisis. 
The reasons for this growth are comparatively simple. First of all, there is a lack of 
competitive alternative modes of transport, except for the short-haul segment, where 
road and rail transport represent viable alternatives. In other words, air travel is the 
only practically feasible option for intercontinental travel, and there is a choice be-
tween car, rail and airplane only for short distances. Second, air fares have dropped, 
initially also due to the lack of demand, but mainly because of the emergence of low 
cost carriers, which stipulated interest while making airline customers increasingly 
sensitive to the ticket price at the same time.  
Consequently, overall air travel increased by nearly 30% from 2000 to 2006, a recov-
ery unprecedented in aviation history, driven mainly by a strong economy, new air-
lines, emerging markets and increasing liberalisation [Air06]. 
 
1.5.2 Impact of Traffic Growth on Airports 
The growth of air traffic poses an immense challenge to civil aviation. Since the ca-
pacity of the Air Traffic Management (ATM) system, particularly airports, is limited, 
larger traffic volumes must be managed while maintaining both safety and efficiency 
in spite of the increasing traffic density, and under almost all weather conditions. 
 
With growing demand for flights, airports have increasingly turned into the bottle-
necks of the air transport system. According to recent ATC studies, cf. [Eur08], the 
share of delays generated by airports has risen compared to delays attributable to the 
                                                 
8  It should be noted, though, that the Airbus statistics is based on ICAO data for the first three quarters of 2004, 
figures for the last quarter are extrapolated. Note also that the basis for the IATA numbers appears to be the 
absolute number of passengers, while the ICAO/Airbus data are based on RPK. 
 
Figure 2: Development of passenger air travel in ICAO con-
tracting states from 1945 to 2000 [ICA02] 
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en-route sectors. Admittedly, though, the introduction of Reduced Vertical Separa-
tion Margins (RVSM) has helped to create more capacity in the en-route sector, with 
a positive impact on delays. 
 
Within the last decade, the number of flights in Europe has increased with an aver-
age rate of 3.5% per year. At the same time, average en-route Air Traffic Flow Man-
agement (ATFM) delays for the summer period (May – October), of which 77% were 
capacity-related, have significantly decreased from 5.5 minutes in 1999 to 1.6 minutes 
per flight in 2007 [Eur08]. Nonetheless, absolute overall ATFM delay increased by an 
average 3.7% p.a., which at first glance suggests that delay grows at essentially the 
same rate as traffic. A second glance, however, shows huge annual variations which 
eventually cancel one another. By contrast, airport-related ATFM delays9 exhibit an 
average annual growth of 6.3%, almost 1.8 times the average traffic growth. 
Thus, airport ATFM delay grows faster than both traffic and overall traffic delay. 
Consequently, the share of airport ATFM delay has increased considerably from 23% 
in 1997 to 44% in 2007. With 91%, nearly all of this airport ATFM delay was attrib-
uted to arrival [Eur04a]. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that 15 European airports ac-
counted for 69% of airport delays in 2007 [Eur08]. 
 
Additional capacity on the ground requires substantial investments. Nonetheless, 
limited funding is not the main reason why airport enhancements cannot keep pace 
with air traffic demand. In Western democracies, airport expansion programmes face 
high bureaucratic hurdles and are subject to an often decade-long decision making 
process. The amount of time and money involved in this process is tremendous, of-
ten dwarfing the actual construction effort. Since airport needs must be balanced 
fairly against overall societal needs considering environmental, noise abatement and 
legal factors, or any combination of these, this effort is justified. Frequently though, 
airport extension plans are blocked by politics or non-governmental organisations, 
who exploit the subject for political or ideological reasons. One of the most promi-
nent examples is the planned expansion of Frankfurt Airport [Fra07]. 
Consequently, particularly short- and medium term capacity enhancements can only 
be achieved through a more efficient utilization of existing airport infrastructure and 
optimized processes, cf. e.g. [Fra07]. Generally, if actual or forecast traffic demand 
exceeds the capacity of an ATM system, the first step is thus always to maximize the 
use of existing system capacity, before measures to increase capacity by other means 
are taken [ICA01a]. In 2007, 93 airports were already capacity constrained: these air-
ports accommodate 64% of worldwide air traffic [Air07], with a majority located in 
Europe. 
As a consequence, particularly the big hub airports will see a significant increase in 
air traffic over the next decades which cannot fully be balanced by a corresponding 
enhancement of their infrastructure. Demand is thus quickly outgrowing capacity 
gains through potential expansions. Therefore, the resources of airports are ex-
hausted and brought to their limits first when air traffic increases, and consequently, 
                                                 
9  Airport ATFM delays occur when flights have to be delayed due to capacity limitations. Arrival ATFM delays 
are experienced at the departure airport, but are in fact caused by a lack of capacity at the destination airport. 
As a consequence, flights are held on the ground at the departure airport until arrival capacity at the destina-
tion airport is assured. 
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the only feasible way of coping with increasing air traffic at airports is to increase the 
efficiency of the existing infrastructure. Even high-level strategy papers such as Vi-
sion 2020, although expecting threefold air traffic by 2020 and demanding 99% punc-
tuality, state that the construction of new airports and runways should be avoided as 
far as possible [Bus01]. 
If there is, as Airbus predicts, an increase in hub-and-spokes operations for economic 
and logistic reasons, the bottleneck role of the hub airports will be intensified far be-
yond the basic structural level outlined above. Even if the Airbus prognosis that 
ticket price will be the driving factor proves wrong eventually, the development of 
large metropolitan areas with more than 20 million inhabitants will necessitate high-
capacity airports at these cities to satisfy travel demand, which will increase further 
with growing wealth of these areas. As an example, it is expected that aircraft 
movements at Beijing airport will grow from 250,000 per annum today to about 
700,000 by 2023, making it one of the world’s busiest airports [Air04]. 
The bottleneck role of airports, however, is not limited to efficiency, but also encom-
passes safety. Although only 18% of the flight time is typically spent on the ground 
and in the airport vicinity, 80% of hull losses and/or fatal accidents occur in the cor-
responding flight phases [Boe04a]10. There is a dominance of landing accidents (45%), 
which encompasses both runway incursions and excursions. 
 
1.5.3 Analysis of Correlations between Traffic Growth and Runway Incursions 
Based on empirical 1990s data from the United States, it has been suggested that the 
rising number of Runway Incursions correlates with traffic growth [Lou99]. Like-
wise, Transport Canada (TC) attributed the observed increase in Runway Incursions 
to traffic growth [TC00]. Recent data for 15 European States, cf. Figure 3, apparently 
also support this model [Eur08]11. 
 
However, a direct correlation be-
tween the development of air traf-
fic and Runway Incursions is dif-
ficult to prove for current data 
from the United States concerning 
the 1999 to 2007 period [FAA03, 
FAA08]. Since the FAA’s statistics 
is limited to occurrences involving 
traffic conflicts, any traffic-related 
effects should be clearly evident 
in this data.  
But, as an example, the number of 
Runway Incursions in the USA 
increased by 12.1% from previ-
ously 330 to 370 in 2007, while the number of operations decreased by -0.3% in the 
same period. On average, there was a slight reduction in traffic (-1.3%) between 1999 
                                                 
10  It should be noted, though, that Boeing’s Statistical Summary of Commercial Jet Airplane Accidents excludes both 
CIS-manufactured aircraft and regional jets or turboprops with a mass less than 60,000 lbs (27,200 kg). 
11  Only the 2004-2006 period is considered due to the reliability issues discussed in Section 1.4. 
 
Figure 3: Development of reported ATM incidents 
in 15 European States [Eur08] 
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and 2007, whereas the number of Runway Incursions increased by 2.1% over the 
same period. This indicates that there is no simple mathematical relation between 
Runway Incursions and the development of traffic, all the more as Runway Incur-
sions are, compared to the number of operations, relatively rare events, and annual 
variations in the number of Runway Incursions in the USA are well within 2σ of the 
mean value. 
 
Furthermore, a closer look at the Transport Canada study quoted above reveals that 
its findings are solely based on a theoretical model for the number of potential Run-
way Incursion scenarios as a function of traffic. However, the predictions of this 
model, that the potential for Runway Incursions increases more rapidly than traffic 
itself, were not systematically validated with the empirical data collected by Trans-
port Canada. The only conclusion drawn was that the model could potentially ac-
count for the trend observed [TC00]. 
 
Figure 4 shows the annual Runway Incursion rates per million operations, averaged 
over the 2003 – 2006 period for the so-called Operational Evolution Partnership 
(OEP) airports, i.e. the 35 airports that form the backbone of U.S. commercial avia-
tion. Together, they account for 32% of all Runway Incursions and 25% of all opera-
tions [FAA07]. In the figure, airports are sorted by decreasing overall number of op-
erations. 
If the number of Runway Incursions were proportional to traffic volume, one would 
expect to see a constant incursion rate in the figure. This would mean that the prob-
ability for Runway Incursions is independent of traffic density, which is, at least in 
first approximation, a reasonable assumption, since the rules of the air and applicable 
separation minima are not changed as traffic increases. 
 
 
Figure 4: Development of average Runway Incursion Rates at OEP-35 airports [FAA07] 
 
mean incursion rate 
+ σ 
– σ 
In
cu
rs
io
ns
 p
er
 m
ill
io
n 
op
er
at
io
ns
 
1.5   RUNWAY INCURSIONS AND AIR TRAFFIC GROWTH 
 15 
Conversely, any hypothesis that runway incursions grow larger than proportional 
with traffic density is based on the assumption that larger traffic volumes result in 
higher – and potentially excessive – workload for both pilots and controllers, and 
thus degrade performance to the point where errors become more frequent. In Figure 
4, this would correspond to a decreasing incursion rate of some sort12. 
 
Although the number of values within one σ (dashed red line) of the mean incursion 
rate (solid red line) is consistent with a normal distribution, a simple linear model 
cannot account for the oscillatory behaviour exhibited by the actual incursion rates. 
While statistical noise is to be expected due to the low numbers of incursions com-
pared to literally millions of operations, particularly the upward spikes for Los Ange-
les (LAX), Philadelphia (PHL), Newark (EWR) and Boston (BOS) are remarkable. An 
analysis of the airport diagrams reveals that there are no simple structural factors, 
such as the number of runways or runway intersections, that could account for the 
observed differences. As an example, Chicago O’Hare Airport (ORD) has seven run-
ways and four runway intersections, and is one of the most complex airports in the 
United States. Nonetheless, its incursion rate is only slightly above average. Fur-
thermore, only one of the three fatal U.S. Runway Incursion accidents involving air-
liners within the last 30 years occurred at an airport with a significantly above aver-
age incursion rate, Los Angeles.  
 
This suggests that the occurrence of Runway Incursions depends on a more complex 
combination of factors. While some of them could potentially be site-specific, particu-
larly the impact of flight crew situational awareness outlined initially could be de-
pendent on factors independent of, or beyond the control of individual airports, such 
as flight deck instrumentation or visibility. Besides, some of the human factors as-
pects – such as disorientation – are not dependent on traffic density at all. 
 
1.5.4 Conclusion 
In conclusion, there is an observable tendency that the number of Runway Incursions 
is increasing, but no statistically sound evidence that this development is strongly 
coupled to the variations in the number of flight operations, let alone for a simple 
interrelation of traffic growth and rising numbers of Runway Incursions. Nonethe-
less, the fact that even fewer operations may eventually result in a higher number of 
incursions is alarming, and illustrates the criticality and urgency of the problem. 
In line with this observation, a 1986 study by the NTSB revealed that 12 of 17 incur-
sion incidents classified as controller-induced occurred in light traffic, and only two 
in heavy. Frequently, a lack of coordination between controllers contributed to incur-
sions. Combined with the findings of a 1984 NASA study that multiple intersecting 
runways and restricted visibility frequently appeared as causal factors in both pilot- 
and controller-induced incursions [NTS86], this suggests that the complexity of op-
erations and infrastructure – and thus a derivative of traffic demand – is an impor-
tant factor as well. Further – albeit theoretical – evidence for the influence of opera-
tional complexity can be found in the aforementioned Transport Canada study, 
                                                 
12  Since the change in overall operations is not equidistant between airports, obtaining a valid functional relation 
is not possible. 
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which analytically determined that airports operating near the capacity limit are par-
ticularly vulnerable to the occurrence of Runway Incursions, especially when capac-
ity-enhancing procedures are applied at aerodromes with intersecting runways 
[TC00]. This could explain why the number of incursions is apparently not influ-
enced by small variations in the number of operations. Nonetheless, a more detailed 
analysis of Runway Incursion causal factors is required. 
In view of the historic development of air traffic and the expected further increase, 
chances to limit the complexity of air traffic operations and infrastructure are low. It 
is therefore worthwhile to focus on the human factors aspects of the Runway Incur-
sion problem, in order to give stakeholders better tools to handle complex opera-
tions. In line with the research focus of the Institute of Flight Systems and Automatic 
Control, this thesis approaches the problem from the perspective of the flight crew. 
The particular challenge of this approach is that the solution must be sufficiently ge-
neric to be applicable for myriads of different airport configurations and local proce-
dures. 
 
 
1.6 Goals, Scope and Structure of this Thesis 
 
The goal of this thesis is to identify potential deficiencies of current flight deck in-
strumentation contributing to Runway Incursion incidents and accidents, and to as-
sess the conditions and the extent to which onboard systems can contribute to en-
hanced safety in the airport environment. While the idea of onboard systems for the 
prevention of Runway Incursions is anything but new, cf. Kubbat et al. [Kub99], a 
holistic concept for an onboard functionality encompassing all aspects relevant for 
Runway Incursion avoidance is still missing. 
 
Therefore, focussing on runway safety13, advantages and disadvantages of an on-
board solution are weighed against other technological approaches such as ground-
based systems, and scenarios requiring air-ground cooperative systems are identi-
fied. Based on an analysis of causal factors in Runway Incursion incidents and acci-
dents, requirements for onboard technologies are developed, leading to the concept 
for a novel surveillance-type onboard Surface Movement Awareness and Alerting 
System (SMAAS).  
 
Since the primary goals of such a holistic system approach are improved situational 
awareness and pro-active conflict detection, and not necessarily the addition of new 
alerts to the flight deck, particular emphasis is given to possibilities to improve the 
flight crew’s situational awareness to avoid hazardous situations strategically and 
proactively. Nonetheless, because there could be situations in which the flight crew is 
busy with other crew duties or otherwise distracted, the feasibility of safety-net type 
tactical alerting in cases where increased situational awareness alone might not be 
sufficient to maintain flight safety or to prevent conflicts must be studied as well. 
                                                 
13  As discussed previously, runway safety is not limited to Runway Incursions, but also includes issues such 
foreign objects or debris on the runway surface, wildlife straying onto the runway, and birds on meadows sur-
rounding the runway. However, this thesis focuses on traffic, i.e. the controlled, deliberate movement of air-
craft, vehicles, or persons. 
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The problem of Runway Incursions is an urgent one, requiring immediate attention 
and countermeasures to be put in place. In view of the number of near-misses, one 
should not be deceived by the fact that the number of fatal airliner accidents is cur-
rently at a historic minimum [Boe07], since this might be accidental, because it is well 
within statistical noise. 
 
Consequently, the concept for a future onboard system for Runway Incursion avoid-
ance will have to satisfy various constraints. While avoiding the pitfalls of a quick fix, 
it must have a realistic operational perspective, which limits the technologies to be 
used to existing and near-future ones, while maximizing the use of technologies 
available today. Another important aspect is that the approach must be evolutionary 
rather than revolutionary, enabling integration into both existing airliner cockpits 
and the present ATM system, both from a technical and procedural perspective. Fur-
thermore, the concept must be modular, such that it can be tailored to the potentially 
distinct requirements and constraints of different airframe classes. Additionally, a 
modular system also allows a gradual or step-wise transition from today’s systems. 
Wherever in this thesis a model or straw man aircraft was required, the Airbus single 
aisle/long range family was used, mainly because it is well proven in millions of 
flight hours, with thousands of aircraft on the market and on order, enabling both a 
retrofit and line-fit perspective on system integration. Besides, sufficiently detailed 
technical information on these aircraft is readily available. 
 
In the frame of this thesis, the envisaged components of the SMAAS were realised as 
software prototypes. The goal of this realisation was a proof of concept for the novel 
surveillance system and its individual interrelated and interacting components. Ac-
cordingly, this thesis primarily tries to validate the necessity and impact of having an 
information or alert in a certain condition, rather than validating that this informa-
tion or alert is conveyed in an optimum manner. Consequently, the assessment of the 
Human-Machine Interface (HMI) itself is only a secondary objective. However, in 
practice, making this distinction can be very difficult. Since information is necessarily 
perceived through an HMI, special care must be exerted in designing the prototypic 
HMI. It must be sufficiently well-designed to enable an evaluation of the concept 
without disturbances due to issues related to immature HMI design. Otherwise, 
there is a significant risk that an inadequate HMI distorts and falsifies the results on 
the concept itself. 
Subsequently, the prototypic SMAAS setup was validated with pilots using two dif-
ferent evaluation platforms, the Institute’s Navigation Test Vehicle and the Fixed-
Base Research Flight Simulator, mainly to gather feedback on the operational rele-
vance and desirability of the proposed solution, in line with the objectives stated 
above. 
 
This first chapter has given an introduction to the problem complex of Runway In-
cursions as the most safety-critical example of surface movement incidents in gen-
eral. Potential impacts of increasing air traffic, high-capacity operations and the bot-
tle-neck role of airports were reviewed, and the necessity for a more detailed analysis 
of causal factors identified. 
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Figure 5: Structure of this thesis 
 
Therefore, Chapter 2, “Causal Factors of Runway Incursions”, aims at a detailed 
analysis of current operations at aerodromes to identify the underlying causes, 
mechanisms and schemes leading to Runway Incursions and other surface move-
ment incidents. It commences with an analysis of current ground operations from a 
procedural point of view and scrutinizes them for potential deficiencies. A survey of 
existing high-level reports focussing on Runway Incursion, e.g. the FAA and Euro-
control, is used as a starting point for a classification of Surface Movement Incidents 
and Runway Incursions in particular. Eventually, an analysis of selected accidents 
and incidents is used to conclude on the common, generic causes of Runway Incur-
sions with special emphasis on the role of situational awareness, communication and 
surveillance. This results in five High-Level Requirements on information required 
for Runway Incursion avoidance from an operational perspective. 
 
Chapter 3, “State of the Art”, starts with a survey of existing solutions for better 
situational awareness on the ground and Runway Incursion avoidance. Current on-
board traffic surveillance technologies (TCAS, ADS-B and TIS-B) are addressed as 
well. Some of these systems will later be used as building blocks or supporting tech-
nologies for the solution devised by this thesis. The remainder of the chapter is dedi-
cated to brief review of current ATM surveillance technologies and concepts, such as 
the Advanced Surface Movement Guidance and Control System (A-SMGCS). 
 
Chapter 4, “Towards an Integrated Solution”, derives the functionality required for 
a holistic, onboard-centric solution for Runway Incursion avoidance and identifies 
areas where research is required to realise it. The chapter commences by devising 
strategies for Runway Incursion avoidance, which subsequently serve as a frame-
work for addressing the individual deficiencies and limitations of current flight deck 
instrumentation identified in Chapter 2. For each of the operational High-Level Re-
quirements, Chapter 4 then discusses the advantages and disadvantages of onboard 
versus ground-based technologies, and identifies scenarios in which an air-ground 
cooperative approach is required. The backbone of air-ground cooperative systems is 
a digital communication between flight deck and Air Traffic Control (ATC), the so-
called Controller Pilot Data Link Communication (CPDLC). These considerations on 
a useful distribution of future Runway Safety Net functionality between the onboard 
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and ground domain start at the situational awareness level and progress towards 
flight deck alerting aspects. In this context, the issue whether alerting should provide 
the flight crew with TCAS-style resolution advisories and whether there are valid 
evasive strategies in every situation is of paramount importance. 
  
Chapter 5, “Experimental Surface Movement Awareness and Alerting System”, is 
the central chapter of this thesis. Based on the requirements and constraints identi-
fied in the previous chapters, the system concept for the novel Surface Movement 
Awareness and Alerting System (SMAAS) proposed by this thesis is outlined and 
discussed. Subsequently, the individual components of the SMAAS are described in 
detail, with focus on functionality and crew interface. The discussion commences 
with a description of the modular sub-functions dedicated to an improvement of 
situational awareness, and then progresses to a discussion of the alerting parts. This 
chapter provides a detailed rationale for trigger conditions and alert design. 
 
Chapter 6, “Considerations on Verification and Validation”, commences by outlin-
ing the generic validation objectives applicable to both the campaign with the Navi-
gation Test Vehicle and the Research Flight simulator, as well as the overall strategy 
selected to achieve these. After considerations on participants and experimental fac-
tors, this chapter concludes with a survey of existing methods and metrics for meas-
uring e.g. situational awareness and workload, and scrutinizes them for applicability.  
 
Chapter 7, “Field Trials with a Navigation Test Vehicle”, is dedicated to the valida-
tion campaign conducted with the Institute’s Navigation Test Vehicle at Frankfurt 
Airport (EDDF) and Prague Airport (LKPR). Following a brief description of the ob-
jectives, the validation platform, its particular setup for the evaluation and the sce-
narios are outlined. The results obtained in the evaluation are then presented, ana-
lysed and discussed. 
 
Chapter 8, “Evaluation on a Research Flight Simulator”, describes the evaluation 
campaign with the Institute’s fixed-base Research Flight Simulator, which partially 
re-validated the results of the field trial campaign while already taking into account 
some refinements resulting from the assessment on the Navigation Test Vehicle. 
However, the focus of this second campaign was on the traffic alerting functionality, 
which had already been conceived, but not yet been realised at the time of the field 
trials. After an overview of the objectives, the validation setup and the scenarios, the 
results of this evaluation campaign are presented, analysed and discussed. 
 
Chapter 9, “Conclusion”, summarizes the findings of this thesis and concludes on 
the results, with particular emphasis on the findings of the evaluation campaigns 
from the previous chapters. 
 
Finally, this thesis is complemented with three appendices. 
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2 Causal Factors of Runway Incursions 
 
This chapter, which is dedicated to a detailed analysis of Runway Incursion causal 
factors, commences with a review of current surface operations from an organisa-
tional and procedural perspective (Section 2.1). Apart from an identification of poten-
tial deficiencies inherent in the way surface operations are presently conducted, this 
review also sets the scene for an in-depth analysis of surface movement incidents and 
accidents in the following section (Section 2.2), which - in the absence of technical 
defects and malfunctions - can be equated to an at least partial breakdown of proce-
dures and/or organisational structures. 
 
While this thesis focuses on Runway Incursions, the whole context of airport opera-
tions must be considered. Otherwise, there is a high risk that important contributing 
factors are excluded by an a-priori limitation to the immediate runway environment. 
After all, runways are not isolated, foreign objects within the aerodrome structure, 
but an integral, central part of the airport. Since there is considerable evidence that a 
large number of Runway Incursions is caused by disorientation, cf. [ICA07], the se-
quence of events for most runway-related incidents and accidents consequently be-
gins on the manoeuvring area. 
 
In the second part of this chapter, an incident and accident analysis is performed 
with the ultimate goal of identifying Runway Incursion causal factors and the under-
lying mechanisms. As a first step, a review of existing incident and accident classifi-
cations is conducted (Section 2.2.1). Then, selected individual incidents and accidents 
are investigated, focussing on flight crew Human Factors aspects (Section 2.2.2). 
 
The causal factors thus identified are subsequently further categorized, and the re-
sults serve as basis for an analysis of potential deficiencies in current avionics and 
flight deck instrumentation (Section 2.3). However, it is essential to determine the 
limitations of a technology-oriented approach, since there may very well be domains 
where a change of procedures or other measures could be superior to the introduc-
tion of additional systems. Another important aspect in this context is an assessment 
to what extent Runway Incursions and other surface movement incidents have 
common causes and may thus be mitigated through similar solutions. 
 
Eventually, based on these considerations, five High-Level Requirements for the pre-
vention of Runway Incursions from a flight deck perspective are derived and dis-
cussed. These High-Level Requirements will subsequently be used as basis for a dis-
cussion of potential mitigations and solutions. 
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2.1 Analysis of Current Surface Operations 
 
When navigating on the airport surface, both pilots and vehicle drivers rely on visual 
aids, such as airport markings, signage and lighting (see Appendix II: Visual Aids to 
Surface Navigation), for guidance along an assigned route and the identification of 
intersections and holding positions. Visual aids are usually complemented by the 
respective paper chart in the cockpit (cf. Section 2.1.3.2) and Notices to Airman 
(NOTAM, cf. Section 2.1.3.1). Combined with information from previous experience 
(if available), this is intended to ensure that they have sufficient understanding of 
their environment. If these sources of information are correctly provided and suita-
bly embedded in flight crew procedures, they add multiple layers of redundancy and 
thus safety to an aviation system.  
 
Irrespective of the type of operation, the class of aircraft and the phase of flight, 
ICAO Annex 2, Rules of the Air, requires pilots to use visual observation as the fun-
damental method of acquiring the surrounding traffic and detecting potential con-
flicts [ICA90]. As an additional challenge, surface traffic encompasses not only other 
aircraft, but also vehicles performing a large variety of functions, often on the ma-
noeuvring area, i.e. on taxiways and runways. 
Consequently, independent of whether an airport is controlled or not, pilots and 
other surface traffic operators use visual observation as the primary cue for orienta-
tion, navigation and collision avoidance (‘see and avoid’). This principle, which is 
often also referred to as ‘see and be seen’, forms the foundation of ground operations 
today. Since the majority of airline aircraft operate predominantly from controlled 
airfields, the description in this chapter will focus on controlled aerodromes. 
 
Generally, the primary goal of air traffic services is the prevention of collisions be-
tween aircraft, both airborne and on ground. In the latter case, collisions between 
aircraft, vehicles and obstructions on the ground are in the scope as well. Expediting 
and maintaining an orderly flow of air traffic is an essential, but secondary objective 
of air traffic services, which usually comprise Air Traffic Control (ATC), Flight In-
formation Service (FIS) and alerting service14. At controlled airfields, the ATC ser-
vices applicable to ground operations are mainly the aerodrome control service and, 
to a lesser extent, the approach control service [ICA01].  
 
A consistent description of ground operations today is a formidable task, because 
there are, despite international standardisation, myriads of variations in the organisa-
tion and procedures of handling traffic on the ground, particularly outside the ma-
noeuvring area, i.e. on the apron. However, ICAO Annex 11, Air Traffic Services 
[ICA01], the PANS-ATM [ICA01a] and various other ICAO documents describe a 
common framework, which is briefly presented in the following. 
                                                 
14  The scope of the alerting service as defined by Annex 11 is the alerting of rescue units on the ground when an 
aircraft is known to have technical or other significant problems (i.e. when it is in the uncertainty, alerting or 
distress phase), and the management of the corresponding emergencies from an ATC point of view. The provi-
sion of alerts to the flight crew via voice communication of an imminent collision is apparently not in the scope 
of this definition of ‘alerting’ [ICA01]. Therefore, on the ground, the alerting service is currently limited to a 
mobilization of the rescue and fire-fighter units if deemed appropriate by the controllers or on explicit flight 
crew request [ICA01a]. 
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2.1.1 Organisation of ATC at the Airport: Aerodrome Control Service 
At controlled airports, Aerodrome Control Service is provided by the aerodrome 
control tower (‘tower’). The tower is responsible for issuing clearances and informa-
tion to all aircraft under its control “to achieve a safe, orderly and expeditious flow of air 
traffic on and in the vicinity of an aerodrome”. This responsibility also extends to vehicles 
and personnel on the manoeuvring area. Surveillance of all traffic is generally per-
formed by visual observation. In low visibility conditions, surveillance is augmented 
by radar15 where available [ICA01a]. However, this does not preclude the use of ra-
dar as supplement in excellent visibility. 
 
Nonetheless, visual acquisition dominates current surveillance, as evidenced e.g. by 
the aircraft lighting procedures suggested as part of Advisory Circular AC 120-74A 
[FAA03a], which recommends using different combinations of exterior aircraft lights 
not only to make aircraft operating on the airport surface more conspicuous, but also 
to convey the location (taxiway or runway) and intent. As an example, different light 
combinations are proposed to signal whether an aircraft is on the runway but hold-
ing for take-off clearance, crossing an active runway, or taking off. However, an im-
portant drawback of these lighting procedures is that they are not an agreed interna-
tional standard and voluntary even in the USA. 
 
According to the PANS-ATM [ICA01a], the functions of an aerodrome control tower 
are often performed by different control or working positions, such as: 
 
 aerodrome controller, normally responsible for operations on the runway and 
aircraft flying within the area of responsibility of the aerodrome control 
tower16; 
 ground controller, normally responsible for traffic on the manoeuvring area 
outside the runways; 
 clearance delivery position, normally responsible for the delivery of start-up 
and ATC clearances to departing IFR flights. 
 
Depending on airport complexity and traffic density, these positions can be subdi-
vided further. For example, where parallel or near-parallel runways are used for si-
multaneous operations, individual aerodrome controllers are usually responsible for 
operations on each of the runways or sets of runways. 
The responsibility of ATC on an aerodrome is limited to the manoeuvring area. Ser-
vices on the aerodrome aprons, known as Apron Management Services (see Section 
2.1.2.3), are usually performed by a separate unit, but may also be assigned to the 
aerodrome control tower, depending on the local situation. 
 
The aerodrome control tower is also responsible for the selection of the runway-in-
use, i.e. the runway considered to be most suitable for use by the types of aircraft ex-
pected to be operated at the airport. Usually, aircraft land and take off into the wind, 
unless safety, runway configuration, available instrument approaches, weather con-
ditions or the general traffic situation render a different direction preferable. Of 
                                                 
15 Radar can be supplemented by more recent surveillance technologies such as Mode S multi-lateration. 
16 In the United States, the aerodrome controller is commonly referred to as ‘local controller’. 
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course, several runways can be in use at the same time, and it is common at most air-
ports that separate runways are designated as runway-in-use for arriving and de-
parting aircraft. At any rate, flight crews may ask for take-off or landing on a differ-
ent runway if they consider the current runway-in-use not suitable. If circumstances 
permit, crews should then be cleared to use the runway of their choice [ICA01a]. 
In addition to essential information on aerodrome conditions, ATC also has to pro-
vide the flight crew of any arriving or departing aircraft with timely information on 
so-called “essential local traffic”. Any other aircraft, vehicle or person on the ma-
noeuvring area or in the aerodrome vicinity that might constitute a collision hazard 
must be reported in a fashion allowing an easy identification of the traffic concerned. 
 
Likewise, the aerodrome controller has to take action in case a Runway Incursion 
occurs or wildlife is detected on the runway after take-off or landing clearances have 
been issued. Unless other action is deemed favourable, the controller will typically 
react as follows [ICA01a]: 
 
a) The controller informs all aircraft concerned by the Runway Incursion or other 
obstruction of the situation and location of the obstacle/obstruction. 
b) The controller cancels the take-off clearance for an aircraft which has not 
commenced its take-off roll. 
c) The controller instructs any landing aircraft to go around, if still considered 
possible. 
 
2.1.2 Procedures for Aerodrome Control Service 
2.1.2.1 Communication and Phraseology 
In the vicinity of aerodromes, communication between ATC and aircraft is generally 
established by two-way VHF radiotelephony (RT). The aerodrome control service 
has to be capable of communication with aircraft at any distance within 25 NM (45 
km) of the airport [ICA01a]. Since ICAO recommends using separate channels for 
traffic on the manoeuvring area, aerodrome control service typically encompasses 
several distinct frequencies, reflecting the organisational structure of ATC at a par-
ticular airport [ICA01]. Consequently, separate frequencies are commonly used for 
controlling different parts of the airport. In times of light traffic, e.g. during the night 
hours, several controller working positions may be combined and worked by a single 
controller, but different controllers never share a single frequency. 
 
For brevity, clarity and unambiguous mutual understanding, voice communication 
between ATC and flight crews follows formalized procedures [ICA06]. The standard-
ized curriculum of prescribed words and phrases to be used in communication is 
referred to as phraseology [FAA04b]. Any station on the ground serving interna-
tional air traffic must provide ATC services in English on request. Generally, radiote-
lephony communications are conducted in either English or “in the language normally 
used by the station on the ground” [ICA01d]17. 
                                                 
17  In several countries, such as France and Italy, this leads to a situation where a controller uses English for in-
structions to foreign aircraft and the local language to control the aircraft of national operators. Since this may 
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Compared to normal language, ATC phraseology is simplified, truncated to the es-
sential information, and employs fixed semantics. Phraseology includes specific rules 
for pronunciation of numbers and letters, and sometimes re-defines the meaning of 
words to disambiguate communication. As an example, ‘NEGATIVE’ is used in lieu 
of ‘NO’ [ICA01d]. However, phraseology is not intended to cover every conceivable 
situation that may arise. Therefore, while phraseology should always be used where 
applicable [ICA06], this does not preclude using plain language where appropriate to 
establish efficient communication [FAA09]. ICAO explicitly encourages the use of 
plain language in non-routine situations, and mandates sufficient plain language 
proficiency for users [ICA06]. Phraseology and communication procedures are de-
fined in ICAO Annex 10, Vol. 2 [ICA01d], and the PANS-ATM [ICA01a].  
As part of these communication procedures, the flight crew has to read back safety-
relevant parts of ATC clearances to the controller. Route clearances and instructions 
to enter, land on, take off on, hold short of, cross taxi and backtrack on any runway 
always have to be read back [ICA01a]. Likewise, any conditional clearances and any 
critical information, such as altimeter settings or runway-in-use have to be confirmed 
by the crew. 
Data link technology is emerging as means of ATC communication and currently 
used for en-route clearances in oceanic airspace, departure clearances or to convey 
ATIS information. However, unless specified otherwise by the responsible ATS unit, 
Controller Pilot Data Link Communication (CPDLC) messages are not read back by 
voice, i.e. there is no mix of data link and voice [ICA01a]. 
 
2.1.2.2 Manoeuvring Area Control 
Use of the manoeuvring area is, with few exceptions, restricted to aircraft, and the 
capability to establish two-way radiotelephony communication with ATC is a pre-
requisite for all traffic. 
 
2.1.2.2.1 Taxi Instructions 
Taxi instructions should be as precise and concise as possible to provide the flight 
crew with adequate information to follow the assigned route correctly. Collisions 
with other aircraft or objects and inadvertent entry of an active runway have to be 
avoided under all circumstances. Therefore, if a taxi clearance contains a taxi limit 
beyond a runway, it has to contain an explicit clearance to cross or an instruction to 
hold short of the respective runway18. Wherever practicable, the authorities should 
define standard taxi routes and publish them in the corresponding national Aeronau-
tical Information Publication (AIP). If no standard taxi routes are available, a taxi 
clearance will usually be described by a sequence of taxiway and runway designa-
tors. It is also quite common that information on aircraft to follow or to give way to is 
included in a taxi clearance. 
                                                                                                                                                        
lead to a situation where particularly foreign pilots will not be aware of clearances issued to other aircraft in 
the local language, this procedure is frequently criticized, and has been cited as causal factor in the Paris acci-
dent in 2000 (cf. Appendix I-8) and the Linate disaster (cf. Appendix I-11). 
18  In the United States, non-active runways may be crossed without explicit ATC approval [FAR07], but the 
NTSB re-iterated a safety recommendation to require explicit ATC authorisation for all runway crossings in the 
wake of the Comair accident [NTS07]. 
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Under special circumstances, and provided that no risk or delay to other aircraft will 
occur, aircraft may be permitted to taxi on the runway-in-use in order to expedite the 
flow of traffic. A special case is the so-called ‘back-tracking’ on a runway, where an 
aircraft taxis to the end of the runway, turns and takes off in the opposite direction. 
An aircraft using an active runway as a taxiway will usually be requested to report 
when it has vacated the runway. This report should be made when it is well clear of 
the runway [ICA01a]. 
 
2.1.2.2.2 Take-off and Landing Clearances 
The take-off clearance is not issued until the ATC en-route clearance, which is re-
quired prior to take-off in most cases, has been transmitted to and acknowledged by 
the flight crew. Therefore, an initial ATC clearance is typically requested before an 
aircraft starts to taxi [ICA01a]. 
Once a departing aircraft has reached the assigned runway and is ready for take-off, 
it is usually first instructed to line up and wait on the runway, and then cleared for 
take-off in a second step. To reduce the potential for misunderstanding, line-up and 
take-off clearances must include the designator of the departure runway. However, 
to expedite traffic, a clearance for immediate take-off may be issued to an aircraft be-
fore it enters the runway. When accepting such a clearance, the aircraft is obliged to 
taxi onto the runway and take off in one continuous movement [ICA01a]. 
 
Take-off clearances may only be issued if the traffic situation permits, i.e. if there is 
reasonable assurance that there will be sufficient separation. Typically, the preceding 
departing aircraft should have crossed the end of the runway-in-use or started a turn, 
and any preceding landing or crossing aircraft must be clear of the runway. 
Approach control typically guides arriving aircraft to the designated runway-in-use 
via Standard Instrument Arrival Routes (STARs). Where necessary, radar vectoring is 
used to establish aircraft on the desired approach with at least the required minimum 
separation from preceding traffic. After transfer to the tower, aircraft on final ap-
proach are cleared to land once all other traffic is clear of the runway; conditions are 
the same as for departing aircraft [ICA01a]. Only in the United States, current proce-
dures permit controllers to clear more than one arriving aircraft for landing if suffi-
cient separation is anticipated [FAA04a]. 
 
To expedite traffic flow, a landing aircraft may be requested to hold short of an inter-
secting runway after landing (so-called LAHSO operations requiring dedicated au-
thorisation), to land beyond the touchdown zone of the runway or to vacate the 
runway at a specified exit taxiway. When requesting a landing aircraft to perform a 
specific landing/roll-out manoeuvre or to expedite vacating the runway, the control-
ler needs to consider the prevailing weather conditions, the type of aircraft, runway 
length and the reported braking action. However, if the pilot-in-command considers 
it impossible to comply with the requested operation, it can be rejected, provided 
that the controller is advised without delay. 
Whenever a runway is in use for landing operations, no aircraft may enter the ap-
proach end of this runway for line-up whenever another aircraft is approaching, 
unless the landing aircraft has passed the point of intended holding [ICA01a]. 
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2.1.2.2.3 Handling of Vehicles 
As a general principle, no vehicles or pedestrians are allowed on the manoeuvring 
area without prior authorisation by the aerodrome control tower, and the entry to a 
runway or any deviation from the authorised operation requires explicit permis-
sion19. If an aircraft is landing or taking off, vehicles must either respect the currently 
applicable holding position or, if located elsewhere near the runway, maintain a 
separation at least equal to that of the runway holding position.  
Although aircraft generally20 have the right of way over vehicles and pedestrians 
[ICA01a, ICA04b], there are numerous cases where visibility restrictions and/or a 
lack of conspicuousness of either aircraft or vehicles has lead to the breakdown of 
visual traffic acquisition, and thus accidents and incidents, cf. Section 2.2.2. 
Therefore, the number of vehicles permitted on the manoeuvring area should be 
strictly limited to vehicles essential from an operational point of view, such as 
 
 ATS or aerodrome operational vehicles (e.g. runway inspection) 
 emergency vehicles (e.g. fire fighters, rescue vehicles), 
 aircraft tugs, 
 follow-me cars, and 
 runway maintenance vehicles (e.g. friction testing) or sweepers [ICA04a]. 
 
Depending on the season and region, however, there will also be an armada of snow 
clearing vehicles on taxiways and runways. At some airports, de-icing takes place 
close to the runway, and the corresponding vehicles are thus seasonally also allowed 
on the manoeuvring area. An additional aspect is that vehicles authorised to operate 
on the manoeuvring area must be expected to operate not only on taxiways, runways 
and dedicated vehicle roads, but also on unhardened areas like grass strips [Ber04]. 
Most airports feature a network of dedicated vehicle roads, which may also run 
through parts of the manoeuvring area. When authorised vehicles operate on these 
roads, they are typically not controlled by the tower. In Low Visibility Procedures, 
however, vehicle operation on certain roads may be restricted or suspended, depend-
ing on local arrangements [ICA04a]. 
 
2.1.2.3 Apron Management Service 
ICAO defines Apron Management Service as a service providing apron instructions 
to regulate the activities and movement of traffic and any other vehicle operating on 
the apron (typically handling services). While the aerodrome control tower can be 
assigned to perform the Apron Management Service, it is quite common that it is per-
formed by a separate unit. Depending on local arrangements, apron management can 
be solely performed by the local Air Navigation Service Provider (ANSP), the airport 
authority or joint operations, and sometimes even the airlines themselves. At Mem-
phis Airport (KMEM), for example, the main airport users, Federal Express and Delta 
Airlines, provide apron management for their respective aprons. 
                                                 
19  Vehicles not equipped with two-way radio communication must either be accompanied by another vehicle 
with the required communication capabilities (e.g. a follow-me car), or there has to be a special pre-arranged 
procedure not requiring voice communication for these operations [ICA01a]. 
20  Only emergency vehicles responding to an emergency have priority [ICA04b]. 
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2.1.2.4 Low Visibility Procedures (LVP) 
At aerodromes, Low Visibility Operations are conducted in conditions of visibility 
that prevent the control tower from applying visual separation between aircraft or 
between aircraft and vehicles [ICA01a].  
Consequently, to ensure that these operations can be undertaken safely, additional 
measures are required. The special procedures defined to support these operations 
are known as Low Visibility Procedures (LVP) [ICA08]. These procedures are put in 
effect through the aerodrome control tower when the Runway Visual Range (RVR) 
decreases to a predetermined value, which is typically between 400 m and 600 m 
[ICA04a]. Additionally, LVP are required whenever CAT II/III precision approach 
and landing operations or departure operations in RVR conditions of less than 550 m 
are in progress21. Consequently, a key objective of LVP is to protect the physical area 
around the runway, including any landing system guidance signals that may be used 
during these operations [ICA01a, ICA08]. Therefore, Low Visibility Operations typi-
cally require specific additional markings and lighting, such as Stop Bars at runway 
access points and Runway Guard Lights, as specified in Annex 14, cf. [ICA04b]. 
 
Aerodromes must be certified for Low Visibility Operations. When designing LVP, a 
safety assessment must be carried out to ensure that the level of safety is maintained 
during these operations. In doing so, the probability of hazards such as Runway In-
cursions must be considered, taking into account the increased difficulty for aircraft 
and vehicles to navigate in low visibility [ICA08]. Generally, where LVP are in effect, 
persons and vehicles operating on an apron must be restricted to the essential mini-
mum [ICA04b]. Due to the more demanding nature of Low Visibility Operations, 
additional measures are typically required to maintain the safety of operations. A 
common approach to achieve this is to restrict the operation of the aerodrome, e.g. by 
limiting the choice of taxi-routing or, additionally, number and type of movements. 
The predominating factor limiting the movement rate in approach and landing op-
erations is that the previous aircraft must have vacated the landing system sensitive 
area, which is substantially larger than in CAT I. Particularly at aerodromes where 
traffic density is high, such restrictions will lead to a dramatic reduction of capacity 
while LVP operations are in force.  
 
However, the precise measures required to establish LVP will significantly vary from 
aerodrome to aerodrome, depending on the physical layout, size and complexity, as 
well as on the availability and sophistication of surveillance technologies. Other fac-
tors include the characteristics of the aircraft using the aerodrome and the movement 
rate required. As a general principle, the necessity for restrictions can be reduced or 
removed by technological means [ICA01a, ICA08]. 
Visibility at an airport may be subject to considerable local variations, particularly in 
low visibility conditions. Consequently, even before the RVR drops below 550 m, the 
visual range may be significantly lower in other parts of the movement area. Fur-
thermore, for aerodromes covering large areas, visibility may vary so much that dif-
ferent types of CAT operations could be applicable for different runways [ICA08]. 
                                                 
21  It should be noted that some aircraft operators employ Low Visibility Take-Off Procedures only when the RVR 
falls below 400 m. In any case, the departure runway does not have to be equipped for CAT II/III approach 
and landing [ICA08]. 
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Last but not least, it should be noted that not only aerodromes, but also aircraft and 
flight crews need authorisation to conduct Low Visibility Operations. For aircraft, 
this mainly encompasses equipage with CAT II/III certified Instrument Landing Sys-
tem (ILS) technology, and crews are specifically trained for these approach types and 
low visibility operations on the ground. 
 
2.1.3 Dissemination of Aeronautical Information 
Airline operations take place in an environment that is subject to rapid change, with 
conditions varying on a daily basis, hourly or even more frequently. Obviously, 
weather has a major share in these operational variations, but the air traffic infra-
structure itself is not static, either. To cope with these changes, all relevant aeronauti-
cal information, irrespective of whether it is distributed electronically or on paper, is 
updated every 28 days at fixed common dates agreed within the framework of Aero-
nautical Information Regulation and Control (AIRAC). Consequently, significant op-
erational changes can only become effective at these previously fixed dates, and the 
corresponding information must be available at the airline (or any other recipient) at 
least 28 days in advance of the effective date. Furthermore, it is recommended that all 
major changes are distributed 56 days in advance. 
 
However, it is not possible to cover all operationally relevant changes through this 
system. In the airport environment, for example, construction work to maintain in-
stallations, to refurbish traffic-worn pavements or to improve and expand the aero-
drome often takes place in parallel to normal flight operations, because this is virtu-
ally the only way airport operators can handle current demand, keep the aerodrome 
serviceable and prepare for the expected increase in commercial air traffic. As a re-
sult, frequently changing temporary closures or restrictions of runways and taxiways 
are reality at many airports. To minimize impact on traffic throughput, both sched-
uled maintenance and urgent repairs are often carried out during night hours or 
whenever demand for flight operations is low. It is unrealistic to assume that all of 
this work can always be planned weeks ahead, since it might become necessary on 
very short notice (equipment failure etc.). 
 
Consequently, all short-term and temporary changes22 not persisting for the full 28 
day period are explicitly excluded from the AIRAC distribution, and must be han-
dled differently. The same applies to operationally relevant permanent changes oc-
curring between AIRAC effective dates [ICA04]. 
 
2.1.3.1 Current handling of short-term and temporary changes 
Today, information on short-term changes and temporary changes to infrastructure 
or operational procedures is typically conveyed by publication via the following ser-
vices, depending on the timeframe of validity and the available ahead-warning time 
(shortest to longest): 
 
                                                 
22 Short-term changes are alterations that occur between AIRAC effective dates; the changes may be either of 
temporary or permanent nature. 
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 Air Traffic Control (ATC): Short-term, tactical notification of the crew, either 
via conventional Radio Telephony (R/T) or Controller Pilot Data Link Com-
munications (CPDLC), e.g. in case a runway is closed because of snow clear-
ing activities, urgent repairs, accidents etc. This service is commonly used to 
relate information on changes immediately after they have occurred, i.e. when 
pilots have no other way of knowing. 
 Automatic Terminal Information Service (ATIS): Continuous service provid-
ing information on the operational status of an aerodrome, such as the run-
ways currently in use for take-off and landing, and prevailing meteorological 
conditions. ATIS service, which is updated whenever significant changes oc-
cur, can either be provided as a pre-recorded voice transmission on a dedi-
cated frequency, via data link (D-ATIS), or both. ATIS may also contain infor-
mation on runway closures and other important restrictions of the aerodrome 
movement area23, see Section 3.4.2 for details. 
 Notices to Airmen (NOTAM)24: Notification of all relevant short-term 
changes (temporary or permanent), typically as Pre-flight Information Bulletin 
(PIB) during the pre-flight briefing [ICA04]. Unless they relate to equipment 
failures and other unforeseen events, NOTAM are typically released several 
hours before the changes they announce become effective. Information con-
veyed by NOTAM may be valid for several hours, days or weeks, and is thus 
mainly used at a strategic level. 
 Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP) Supplements: temporary 
changes of longer duration (3 months and beyond), e.g. runway closure for 
several months due to pavement replacement. 
 
If temporary changes are valid for three months or longer, they are published as an 
AIP Supplement. Alternatively, in case extensive text and/or graphics is required to 
describe information with shorter validity, this will also require an AIP Supplement. 
AIP supplements often replace NOTAMs and then reference the corresponding serial 
number of the NOTAM [ICA04]. 
 
The information from the services above, the first three of which are routinely di-
rectly available to flight crews, is complementary and partially redundant, since e.g. 
runway closure information might be reported by all of the services listed above. 
NOTAM information, however, forms the strategic baseline for flight planning, flight 
preparation and decision making, and therefore deserves special attention. 
With the exception of some AIP Supplements, all of these services provide textual 
(or, in the case of ATC, verbal) information only. 
                                                 
23  In this context, it should be noted that D-ATIS as defined by ICAO Doc 9705 already contains machine-
readable information on the runways in use and potential runway contaminations, whereas closure informa-
tion is still provided via the free-text section of the transmission only. Furthermore, it should be noted that 
runway closure information is optional, not mandatory content of ATIS transmissions, irrespective of whether 
voice or data link are used. 
24  According to ICAO Annex 15, NOTAM should preferably be distributed by means of telecommunications, but 
a list of all valid NOTAM in plain text must be provided in print on a monthly basis. NOTAM transmitted via 
telecommunications are usually referred to as Class I, whereas those distributed in print are Class II. 
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2.1.3.2 Aerodrome Charts 
To facilitate surface movement of aircraft, flight crews must be provided with Aero-
drome Charts, which also have to provide essential operational information on the 
airport. ICAO Annex 4, Aeronautical Charts, gives guidance on the contents of 
Aerodrome Charts, which have to depict, among others, 
 
 all runways including those under construction with designation number, di-
mensions, directions, type of surface and markings; 
 all taxiways with designations, width, lighting, markings, including runway-
holding positions and stop bars or other visual guidance and control aids; 
 all aprons with aircraft stands, lighting, markings and other visual guidance 
and control aids, including location and type of visual docking guidance sys-
tems; 
 aircraft servicing areas and buildings of operational significance; 
 location and type of the visual approach slope indicator systems; 
 radio communication facilities; 
 the boundaries of the air traffic control service; 
 obstacles to taxiing; and 
 any part of the depicted movement area permanently unsuitable for aircraft. 
 
Additionally, the coordinates of the 
aerodrome reference point as well as the 
elevations of all precision approach 
runway thresholds and touchdown 
zones have to be supplied. 
Where, due to congestion of informa-
tion, details necessary for surface 
movement along taxiways and between 
taxiways and aircraft stands cannot be 
shown with sufficient clarity on the 
Aerodrome Chart, a supplementary 
Aerodrome Ground Movement Chart 
with a larger scale is required to support 
aircraft movement to and from the air-
craft stands, including the park-
ing/docking process. 
For airports where, due to the complex-
ity of the terminal facilities, this still 
does not provide sufficient detail for 
aircraft parking and docking operations, 
an additional Aircraft Parking/ Docking 
Chart providing additional detail has to 
be supplied [ICA01e]. 
The main commercial providers of 
aeronautical charts with worldwide ac-
tivities are Jeppesen Sanderson and Luf-
thansa FlightNav. 
 
Figure 6: Sample Aerodrome Chart of Frank-
furt/Main Airport (EDDF) by Jeppesen 
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2.2 Analysis of Runway Incursion Incidents and Accidents 
2.2.1 Classification of Surface Movement Incidents and Accidents 
This section surveys existing classification schemes for surface movement incidents 
and accidents, focussing on Runway Incursions. The objective of this analysis is to 
assess whether and to what extent these classifications provide additional insight 
into common causal factors and the mechanisms leading to mishaps. This is based on 
the assumption that any useful categorization requires an at least basic understand-
ing of a problem and its scope, and may thus serve as a starting point for a solution, 
or at least help to identify the domains where improvement is most urgently needed. 
 
2.2.1.1 Classification by Stakeholder 
The FAA suggests to divide Runway Incursions into three “error types”, resulting in 
the categories “Operational Errors/Deviations” (i.e. ATC errors), “Pilot Deviations” 
and “Vehicle/Pedestrian Deviations” [FAA01]. This classification has its origin in the 
FAA’s incident reporting requirements. Until 1986, the FAA did not study Runway 
Incursions systematically, since there was no corresponding common database; inci-
dent reports were, accordingly, either categorized as operational error reports, con-
troller deviation reports or Near Mid-Air Collision (NMAC) reports [NTS86]25. 
 
Between 2000 and 2003, 57% of all Runway Incursions in the US were classified as 
pilot deviations, whereas only 23% were attributed to operational errors/deviations 
[FAA04]. For the percentage of pilot deviations, there was only a slight change to 
55% within the FY 2004 to FY 2007 period, whereas the fraction of ATC errors rose to 
29% [FAA08]26. Based on this data, one might be tempted to conclude that the major-
ity of Runway Incursions is caused by pilots and vehicle operators. ATC errors, by 
contrast, seem to play only a minor role, although they appear to be on the rise, while 
the share of incursions due to vehicle/pedestrian deviations has been reduced. 
 
The only further subdivision the FAA provide in statistics based on this classification 
is by type of operation, commercial or general aviation27. However, categories such 
as “Runway Incursion Types Involving at Least One Commercial Aircraft” in the FAA’s 
Runway Safety Reports (cf. e.g. [FAA02]) are of little more than taxonomic value, 
because there is no distinction to what extent the commercial aircraft, the general 
aviation aircraft, the controller or the interactions between these three contributed to 
the Runway Incursion, which is important to know for an identification of structural 
or system-immanent problems and a subsequent development of countermeasures. 
                                                 
25  The NTSB found that human performance aspects were not covered by the operational error reports, and that 
pilot deviation reports often relied, contrary to FAA requirements, on informal counselling [NTS86]. 
26  It should be noted that the underlying data cover both general aviation and commercial aviation operations at 
towered airports.  
27  While commercial aviation operations form a relatively uniform group, consisting of jet and commuter aircraft 
scheduled or chartered for the transport of passengers and cargo flown by individuals with at least a Commer-
cial Pilot License (CPL), general aviation operations represent a very inhomogeneous group, as they encom-
pass all activities from leisure flying with a single-engined propeller aircraft to business travel with highly so-
phisticated jet aircraft, often adaptations of airliners. The level of education and professionalism of the pilots 
involved can vary on an equally large scale. Conversely, aircraft typically intended for General Aviation use 
may be operated commercially as well [FAA04]. 
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These considerations indicate that a classification of Runway Incursions according to 
the FAA’s scheme is not necessarily an indication of the actual causes, and might 
only be of limited use when it comes to their identification. 
First of all, the categorization by error type typically refers to the last event in a chain 
of controller, pilot, and/or vehicle operator actions that eventually led to the Runway 
Incursion, cf. [FAA04]. Aviation incidents and accidents, however, usually have no 
single cause, but result from a combination of several technical and/or procedural 
errors, often in conjunction with deviations from Standard Operating Procedures 
(SOP)28. Further complexity is added by the fact that causal factors are often not iso-
lated, but may have an interdependence of some kind, like e.g. visibility and situ-
ational awareness. There are, however, several generic incident/accident models in 
the literature, which can be employed after some adaptation. 
 
One of the most famous of these generic accident models is the so-called “Swiss 
Cheese” model described by Reason [Rea90, Rea00], cf. Figure 7. A number of safety 
barriers, which can be either technical, procedural or organisational, offer protection 
against a hazard, e.g. of a Runway Incursion. However, these barriers are not perfect, 
but have occasional holes, like a Swiss Cheese. Reason imagined, however, that 
unlike in a real cheese, these holes are not stationary, but rather opening, shutting 
and shifting location permanently. As a result, the presence of a hole in any one of 
the barriers, or even successive barriers, does not present an issue. An inci-
dent/accident can only occur when the holes are momentarily arranged in such a 
fashion that all of the safety barriers simultaneously fail, permitting a so-called “tra-
jectory of opportunity” to pass through [Rea00]. In a way, therefore, Reason’s model 
is a visualisation of the term “unfortunate sequence of events”. 
Causal factors can be seen as holes in the safety barriers in this model, thus increas-
ing the probability that a particular barrier fails. Of course, certain causal factors 
could influence more than one barrier. 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Swiss Cheese accident model (after [Rea90, Rea00]) 
                                                 
28  As an example, aircraft can be dispatched without certain equipment due to malfunctions, which is, on the one 
hand perfectly within the limits prescribed by the Minimum Equipment List (MEL), but might on the other 
hand require special attention and altered procedures from the crew. Likewise, shutting down and re-starting 
the engines at a de-icing station causes additional workload for the crew. These non-standard situations may 
divert the crew’s attention and thus increase the risk of oversight and errors. 
Safety Barriers 
Runway Incursion 
Hazard 
Runway Incursion 
Incident/Accident 
Я 
ТИГРЁНОК! 
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Since only the last element is considered, the combination of events leading to a 
Runway Incursion is not reflected by the FAA classification, not even within the 
flight crew, vehicle driver or controller domain. It is therefore poorly suited to model 
the complex interactions between controllers, pilots and other stakeholders in surface 
operations. As early as 1986, accordingly, the National Transportation Safety Board 
(NTSB) expressed its concern that 26 Runway Incursion incidents and accidents clas-
sified by the FAA as either “pilot-induced” or “controller-induced” actually involved 
combinations of pilot and controller factors [NTS86]. 
 
The most serious limitation of the FAA classification scheme, which was temporarily 
also adopted by Transport Canada and Eurocontrol, however, is that it limits itself to 
assigning “human error” to different types of individual operators, rather than giv-
ing an indication why the corresponding deviation from an ATC instruction or an-
other type of error occurred, and what the effects of interaction between the stake-
holders were in this process.  
Consequently, there is a significant risk that potential systemic issues underlying 
“human errors” such as a pilot deviation are masked by the FAA classification, and 
that the true reasons for the incursion remain in the darkness. This inadequacy to 
determine causes and to derive requirements for potential solutions, in turn, might 
prevent the development of efficient countermeasures, or even lead to fallacious, su-
perficial “solutions”. 
 
Although surface movement incidents and accidents outside the runway have a large 
commercial impact, there do not seem to be any coordinated initiatives specifically 
dealing with taxiway or apron incidents and accidents so far. Consequently, there are 
neither internationally harmonized definitions nor classifications. A mere sub-
division into “runway incursions” and “non-runway-incursions” as proposed by the 
first FAA Runway Safety Report [FAA01] is not sufficient. 
 
2.2.1.2 Classification by Severity 
Runway Incursions can also be classified by the severity of individual incidents, 
which, in turn, raises the question of suitable metrics. 
Commonly, the severity of Runway Incursions is assigned in proportion to the risk of 
an accident. This is based on the assumption that the structural, system-inherent 
causes of Runway Incursions are best reflected by, or are more apparent in, accidents 
and serious incidents, while they might be masked by sporadic errors and general 
“noise” in minor incidents. The deficiencies thus identified could then be used to de-
duce design criteria and guidelines for a solution intended to avoid Runway Incur-
sions. This purely descriptive approach, would, in other words, use the intensity of 
the symptoms to determine severity. 
When dealing with incursions involving traffic conflicts, various external parameters 
such as speed, separation, visibility and the level of remedial action that was taken to 
avoid an accident could be used to calculate the potential of an accident.  
 
Since there can be a significant accident hazard even without the presence of another 
aircraft or vehicle, e.g. if the flight crew uses a closed or otherwise unsuitable run-
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way, one could look at the chain of events as an alternative, and determine incursion 
severity by the number and interdependence of operational errors, equipment fail-
ures and ineffective safety mechanisms that caused the incident. This more analytic 
approach would yield a theoretical potential for a hazardous or catastrophic event. 
Clearly, this potential is higher if a pilot error remains undetected by a controller, in 
comparison to a situation where both parties are aware of the mishap and can take 
remedial action. 
 
With its first Runway Safety Report in 2001, the FAA introduced new metrics to as-
sess the severity of Runway Incursions. Five key parameters were selected to assess 
the relative severity of Runway Incursions and to determine the margin of safety as-
sociated with each event [FAA01]: 
 
• Available Reaction Time: considers how much time pilots, controllers and/or 
vehicle operators had to react to the situation based on aircraft type, phase of 
flight and separation distance 
• Evasive or Corrective Action: considers the need for and the type of evasive 
or corrective manoeuvre required to avoid a collision. 
• Environmental Conditions: considers visibility, surface conditions and light 
conditions (e.g. night/day). 
• Speed of Aircraft and/or Vehicle: considers speed as a function of aircraft 
type and phase of flight (taxi, take-off, landing) 
• Proximity of Aircraft and/or Vehicle: considers the proximity, or the separa-
tion distance from one another. 
 
Over the years, additional factors to be considered were apparently added to this 
original severity categorization [FAA04]: 
 
• Location of aircraft: considers whether aircraft or vehicle were on the runway 
itself or on a taxiway inside the runway holding position markings 
• Knowledge of the other party’s location 
• Status of radio communications 
 
Using these parameters, the FAA suggests four categories of severity, labelled A to 
D, ranging from near collisions or accidents to minor incidents. Categories A and B 
represent major Runway Incursions with a significant collision risk, while categories 
C and D contain minor incursions with little or no danger of collision. An official de-
scription of these categories follows below [FAA05]: 
 
Category D  Category C  Category B  Category A 
Little or no chance of 
collision, but meets 
the definition of a 
Runway Incursion 
 Separation decreases, 
but there is ample 
time and distance to 
avoid a potential col-
lision 
 Separation decreases 
and there is a signifi-
cant potential for 
collision 
 Separation decreases 
and participants take 
extreme action to 
narrowly avoid a 
collision, or the event 
results in a collision 
 
Table 1: Runway Incursion Severity Categories [FAA05] 
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However, the collision risk is the ultimate consequence of a Runway Incursion, not 
the cause, and thus not suitable as sole metrics for severity, as it would filter all 
events not involving the presence of a second aircraft. 
Since FY 2008, a slightly modified variant of the FAA safety classification is effective. 
Category A is now supplemented by an additional “accident” category. Category B is 
largely unchanged, while the new category C now encompasses all incidents previ-
ously rated as either C or D. The new severity category D encompasses all incursions 
involving only one movement, with “no immediate safety consequences” according to 
the FAA [FAA08]. Nonetheless, the accidents at Taipei and Lexington, prove that 
safety may very well be compromised even if there is no risk of colliding with an-
other aircraft, vehicle or person. 
Another criticism concerning the FAA classification scheme is that the severity cate-
gories above leave the individuals classifying the incidents some room for interpreta-
tion. While a tool for calculating the severity category from a set of spatial proximity 
and visibility parameters, supplemented by a number of discrete scenarios and error 
types, has been developed and validated [She04], an important missing step in this 
approach is the transition from estimates to data directly extractable from the Flight 
Data Recorder (FDR). On the other hand, a post-hoc severity classification of Runway 
Incursions cannot solely rely on the availability of FDR data, which may not have 
been downloaded at the time. 
 
2.2.1.3 Conclusion on Existing Classification Schemes 
In conclusion, the existing classification schemes do not provide much insight into 
Runway Incursion causal factors, and thus cannot be used to derive guidelines for 
the development of future Runway Incursion avoidance functionality or the alloca-
tion of its components between air and ground. 
 
To obtain this insight, the complete chain of events leading to an incident or accident 
has to be analysed, focusing on factors contributing to what seem to be, in hindsight, 
procedural deviations and errors. It is therefore necessary to analyse individual inci-
dents and accidents in detail, see Section 2.2.2. 
 
Although the FAA classification of incursions according to stakeholder oversimpli-
fies the situation, the finding that “Pilot Deviations” apparently account for more 
than half of all Runway Incursions provides further evidence that it is particularly 
worthwhile to investigate flight deck-related causal factors in Runway Incursions. 
Accordingly, the interdependency of these factors with aircraft equipment and flight 
training aspects, such as Crew Resource Management (CRM), must be considered. 
Last but not least, operating procedures themselves have to be scrutinized for sys-
temic errors. 
 
Notwithstanding the above, the analysis in this section has also clearly shown that, in 
developing a solution, it may not be sufficient to support the stakeholders involved 
in surface movement within their respective domains, but that additional measures 
to improve the interaction between these stakeholders might be required as well. 
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2.2.2 Analysis of Selected Incidents and Accidents 
2.2.2.1 Principles of Incident & Accident Investigation 
The main paradigm of aviation safety research is that a thorough analysis of acci-
dents and incidents will help to reveal the underlying causes and contributing fac-
tors, thus giving indications where improvement is necessary to avoid similar occur-
rences in the future. Accordingly, ICAO Annex 13, “Aircraft Accident and Incident In-
vestigation”, states that the sole objective of an accident or incident investigation is the 
prevention of further accidents and incidents, not a determination of blame or liabil-
ity [ICA01b]. In fact, any judicial or administrative proceedings to that extent should 
be conducted completely separately from the investigation under the provisions of 
Annex 13. This is intended to ensure that a non-punitive environment is maintained 
throughout the investigation to ensure full cooperation of the individuals involved, 
without fear that the information they relate may be used for subsequent discipli-
nary, civil, administrative or criminal proceedings. As a result, since limited access to 
relevant information on account of potential judicial activity impedes the investiga-
tion process and might even prevent an efficient determination of the causes, with 
serious impact on flight safety, accident and incident investigation is given priority29.  
 
Another principle of Annex 13 is to carry out investigation with all key stakeholders 
involved to ensure an optimum flow of information between them. While the state 
where the accident or incident occurred (State of Occurrence) usually conducts the 
investigation30, the state in which the aircraft was registered (State of Registry), the 
State of the Operator, the State of Design and the State of Manufacture may appoint 
accredited representatives to the investigation commission. Furthermore, the key 
stakeholders are required to provide all relevant information available on aircraft 
and flight crew involved in the accident or serious incident to the State of Occur-
rence. Besides, the involvement of aircraft designers and manufacturers eventually 
ensures an optimum dissemination of the investigation findings, particularly if they 
are related to technical failure. Likewise, the institution concerned with the investiga-
tion may issue safety recommendations to airlines, manufacturers or other aviation 
authorities if the findings point towards structural or organizational deficiencies in 
aviation that are of general interest. 
The generalisation of investigation findings beyond the local context of the individ-
ual event, in which they are unquestionably valid, is another important paradigm, 
because there is no formal system-theoretical approach proving that the analysis of 
aviation accidents and incidents is a suitable means of systematically identifying 
structural deficiencies in aviation, or that these general deficiencies should become 
especially evident in serious incidents and accidents. Since aviation accidents and 
severe incidents are fortunately very rare events, with only few occurrences per mil-
lion flight operations, it is also very difficult to employ statistics to validate the gen-
eral significance of investigation findings. Nonetheless, this generalisation is reason-
                                                 
29  Unfortunately, though, this principle is not universally applied by all ICAO member states. 
30  The State of Occurrence is responsible for instituting and conducting the investigation, but may partially or 
even completely delegate the investigation to another ICAO state by mutual agreement and consent. As an ex-
ample, the read-out of flight recorders is often delegated to authorities of another state if the state in charge of 
the investigation does not have the appropriate facilities. 
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able and commonly accepted particularly when it comes to technical defects. If, for 
example, structural fatigue of a certain aircraft component is identified as causal fac-
tor in an accident, an inspection of this component in other aircraft of the same type 
is often ordered as a precautionary measure by the authorities and/or the manufac-
turer. It should be noted, however, that this strategy is ultimately only able to pre-
vent copycat occurrences of an incident/accident, whereas further effort is required 
to characterize the superordinate problem, such as hitherto unknown effects in mate-
rial science, manufacturing or maintenance issues. 
 
2.2.2.2 Human Factors in the Investigation Process 
Nonetheless, the brief initial survey of Runway Incursion incidents and accidents 
conducted in Chapter 1 as well as the review of the high-level literature such as the 
FAA Runway Safety Reports leads to the initial hypothesis that Runway Incursions 
are virtually never the result of technical problems or structural failures, but always 
result from inadequate application of safety procedures or erroneous decisions taken 
by the flight deck, the tower or by airport personnel (e.g. vehicle drivers). In either 
case, it is assumed that Human Factors aspects play a key role. In the Human Factors 
domain, however, a generalisation, let alone an identification of higher level defi-
ciencies, is even more difficult to achieve than in the field of technology. In fact, the 
validity of Human Factors conclusions drawn from the current investigation process 
has been challenged, e.g. by Dekker [Dek06], because there is substantial evidence 
that outcome knowledge affects the perceived relevance and judgement of factual 
information; this general psychological phenomenon is called “hindsight bias” 
[Fis75], and it was found that its intensity increases with the complexity of the sce-
nario studied [Pen81]. 
 
In aviation incident/accident investigation, meticulous, in-depth scrutiny of factual 
evidence is required to identify the probable cause. This typically encompasses both 
technical aspects and human performance. However, when analysing crew behav-
iour, investigators commonly have several weeks or months to assess potential alter-
native courses of crew action that might have helped to realise a problem and to pre-
vent an incident/accident, whereas the flight crew actually had to make their deci-
sions within seconds or minutes. This additional temporal dimension further in-
creases the innate vulnerability of the investigation process to confirmation bias. 
 
Ultimately, this may lead to an inadequate, biased conclusion, because investigators 
usually attempt to determine a crew behaviour that would – in hindsight – have pre-
vented the accident, and then identify deviations from this ideal course of action as 
“human error” in the actual sequence of the flight crew’s actions and decisions, in-
stead of explaining why certain decisions were eventually taken by the crew, i.e. why 
they seemed reasonable from the flight crew’s perspective at the time (this is often 
referred to as local rationality). However, only the latter can help to identify the de-
ceptions, misperceptions or lack of information that led to the – in hindsight – erro-
neous decisions/actions, whereas the first approach gives rise to the common misbe-
lief that further automation is the panacea to eliminate human error from aviation. 
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In identifying, understanding and classifying Human Factors issues in aviation inci-
dents or accidents, a number of concepts from behavioural science and cognitive 
psychology, such as situational awareness, cognitive fixation or confirmation bias/ 
plan continuation, have proven to be particularly helpful. 
 
The most famous and most important of these is clearly situational awareness. While 
there are myriads of definitions for situational awareness and the term has been criti-
cized as “the buzzword of the 90s”, cf. [Wie93], Endsley’s somewhat abstract definition 
of situational awareness as “the perception of the elements in the environment within a 
volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their 
status in the near future” [End95] is most commonly used today. 
 
However, employing this generic definition of situational awareness in an aviation 
context leads to difficulties, mainly because it is undefined which of the elements in 
the environment are relevant for the flight task at hand. 
This elusiveness of the basic term ‘situational awareness’ is perhaps best character-
ised by the fact that it is virtually never used by itself, but always in conjunction with 
additional explanatory attributes. Accordingly, Endsley claims that “maintaining a 
high level of situation awareness” is critical for “achieving successful performance in avia-
tion” [End99]. Conversely, in the context of incidents and accidents, frequent refer-
ence is made to ‘a lack of situational awareness’ or even “a loss of situation awareness” 
(e.g. in [NTS07]). 
 
In line with these considerations, Endsley states that in an aviation context, situ-
ational awareness can be regarded as “internalized mental model of the current state of 
the flight environment”, which forms the basis for all decisions and actions. In aviation, 
therefore, situational awareness is related to the perception of “critical factors” and 
comprehending what they mean “in relation to the flight crew’s goals” [End99]. This 
constitutes a significant extension of the original definition, because it implies that 
the task at hand defines the critical elements in the environment to be perceived and 
comprehended. Consequently, situational awareness is meaningful only in the spe-
cific context of a certain task or goal. 
In this context, it should be noted that the frequently used term ‘loss of situational 
awareness’ is misleading and should not be used, cf. [Dek06], since an individual can 
only lose situational awareness by becoming unconscious or incapacitated in a simi-
lar manner. Even the realisation that one is ‘lost’ implies a certain level of situational 
awareness. In fact, while situational awareness may be inadequate to achieve certain 
task, a correct self-assessment of one’s level of situational awareness implies a higher 
degree of situational awareness than an unrecognized, unreflected erroneous percep-
tion and mental model of the environment. 
With regard to the interrelation of situational awareness and mental model, most of 
current literature suggests a significantly more intricate interdependency than the 
simple equivalence claimed by Endsley, cf. [BR04], but a more detailed discussion is 
beyond the scope of this thesis. Additionally, the precise interrelation is highly de-
pendent on the nature of the task, particularly on the dynamics and the degree to 
which the long-term memory is involved. Consequently, there will be differences 
between an airport navigation and a traffic surveillance task. 
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With these clarifications, situational awareness is an extremely powerful concept to 
characterise a flight crew’s perception and understanding of their situation, includ-
ing the resulting mindset. In this thesis, the following conventions have been 
adopted: ‘adequate situational awareness’ is always used in the meaning of having 
(an) adequate (level of) situational awareness for the flight task at hand (including a 
correct self-assessment of one’s level of situational awareness); a ‘lack of situational 
awareness’ will be used to characterise an inadequate level of situational awareness 
(and inadequate self-assessment). Furthermore, e.g. ‘situational awareness with re-
spect to position’ will be abbreviated as ‘position awareness’. Furthermore, a term 
like ‘lack of situational awareness’ is used in a purely factual sense in this thesis and 
does not imply blame, i.e. the term is not used as a synonym for ‘pilot error’. 
 
Cognitive fixation refers to an unbalanced diversion of attentional resources to a cer-
tain task, resulting in a lack of attention to other and potentially more pertinent tasks. 
Confirmation bias is a tendency to interpret and to obtain information in such a fash-
ion that it confirms an existing preoccupation or hypothesis, and to systematically 
overlook or neglect any evidence providing contradictory indications. In other 
words, the mind tries to fit new or additional information into the current concept, 
rather than scrutinizing the concept itself. Essentially, a flight crew subject to confir-
mation bias might subconsciously only search for information that confirms their 
present understanding of the situation. There is evidence that this phenomenon is 
caused by emotional constraints on rational thinking31. 
 
2.2.2.3 Overview of Incidents and Accidents Analysed  
As outlined previously, it is essential to analyse individual incidents and accidents to 
obtain insight into Runway Incursion causal factors with the goal of determining 
general, recurring patterns. Aside from the severity-of-symptoms aspects outlined 
above, it must be noted that typically only accident reports and some incident reports 
provide sufficient detail on the sequence of events and the prevailing conditions to 
enable a meaningful post-hoc analysis on Human Factors and flight deck instrumen-
tation aspects; this finding is also confirmed by ref. [EEC04]. In contrast to accident 
investigation, where flight data recorder (FDR) and cockpit voice recorder (CVR) 
data are typically one of the main sources of information for investigators, the corre-
sponding data are frequently not even secured for analysis of severe incidents, cf. 
[BFU09], which limits the reconstruction of events in the cockpit to the flight crew’s 
recollection. 
 
Starting with the Tenerife accident, an analysis of all major fatal Runway Incursion 
accidents within the last 30 years involving airline aircraft was performed in the 
frame of this thesis, with focus on Europe and North America. In addition, a number 
of noteworthy incidents were also covered by this analysis; these were mainly se-
lected based on the availability of suitably detailed investigation reports allowing a 
thorough analysis of the sequence of events and causal factors. 
                                                 
31  Recent neurophysiologic studies have shown, albeit for the field of politics, that confirmation bias and related 
phenomena can be attributed to activity in brain areas predominantly responsible for emotion, whereas do-
mains associated with analytical thinking remain inactive [WBH06]. 
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Figure 8: Runway Incursion accident at Tenerife’s Los Rodeos Airport (1977) 
 
Table 2 provides a synopsis and an overview of the key findings for the 24 selected 
Runway Incursion incidents (grey background) and accidents (beige background) 
that form the backbone for the determination of causal factors within this thesis. In 
the table, causal factors are in bold face, whereas important contributing factors are 
underlined. 
 
A more detailed analysis of these occurrences can be found in Appendix I, where the 
sequence of events is briefly presented for each accident32, strictly following the offi-
cial reports33. By contrast, the corresponding analysis and probable cause part pro-
vides a summary and critical review of the investigation results, focussing on Human 
Factors aspects. This is supplemented by a conclusion on flight deck instrumentation 
aspects for each accident. 
 
In total, investigation reports on 40 incidents and accidents in the 1977 – 2007 period 
were reviewed. For six incidents, however, the data available did not contain suffi-
cient detail for an unambiguous analysis of causal factors. These are briefly surveyed 
in Appendix I-17, along with several incidents that bore so many similarities with 
others already presented in detail that providing an exhaustive description of those 
would have been of little additional value. Furthermore, one incident was analysed 
solely on the basis of a personal account, and is therefore not part of Table 2, either.
                                                 
32  The only accident that is not discussed in detail in Appendix I is the 1990 runway collision at Atlanta-
Hartsfield International Airport [NTS91b], because the scenario is very similar to the Los Angeles accident, 
which was far more severe in terms of fatalities and therefore selected for detailed presentation. 
33  The structure of this presentation is similar to that of an accident report, which typically also contains a presen-
tation of the sequence of events, an analysis of the gathered facts and the determination of the probable cause 
as individual chapters in this order. 
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2.3 Key Findings & Flight Deck Instrumentation Aspects 
 
The analysis of Runway Incursion incidents and accidents presented in the previous 
section yields the important result that limited visibility, particularly due to fog or 
other meteorological phenomena, is a predominant factor in all fatal accidents exam-
ined, cf. Table 2. None of these occurred in daytime VMC conditions: the Tenerife, 
Madrid, Anchorage (Korean Airlines), Detroit and Linate accidents happened in 
foggy conditions, the Taipei disaster was in heavy rain and darkness, and the At-
lanta, Lost Angeles, St. Louis, Paris and Lexington accidents occurred at night. Lim-
ited visibility prevented at least one of the flight crews involved in each of these mis-
haps from maintaining adequate situational awareness with respect to their position 
and/or the location of other relevant traffic. By contrast, in all those incidents where 
collisions on the runway could be averted, there was sufficient visibility for a last-
minute visual detection of the emerging collision hazard. 
 
This may serve as substantial evidence that conventional airport navigation and traf-
fic acquisition techniques are prone to failure in adverse visibility, even if flight 
crews are familiar with an airport, and that current flight deck instrumentation does 
not provide pilots with adequate support for operations under these meteorological 
conditions. Another recurring problem in this context are deficient airport signs and 
markings, being cited as causal factors e.g. in the Madrid, Anchorage (Korean Air-
lines), Detroit, Taipei and Linate accidents. This is consistent with earlier findings of 
the NTSB, which identified not only limited visibility, but also inadequate signs and 
markings as recurring causal factors in an analysis of 26 Runway Incursion incidents 
[NTS86]. 
 
A further remarkable finding is the significant role of communication deficiencies, 
which encompass a broad spectre of causal and contributory factors. Within the ATC 
domain, deficient coordination between controllers has frequently resulted in Run-
way Incursions through erroneous instructions and clearances, as in the Anchorage 
(Japan Airlines) and Paris accidents or the Minneapolis, Amsterdam and Boston in-
cidents. Nevertheless, the primary concern in this context is the communication be-
tween pilots and ATC. Inefficiencies resulting from the use of multiple languages in 
an ATC environment have contributed to both the Paris and Linate accident. While a 
complete breakdown of communication between pilots and controller as in Linate is 
relatively rare, not sharing essential information or concerns has frequently either led 
to a misinterpretation of ATC instructions/clearances or missed opportunities to 
prevent accidents. Even in accidents with other primary causes, communication is-
sues have aggravated the situation and worsened the outcome. Several accidents 
were caused by insufficient information on the operational configuration of the air-
port, in particular on the operational use and availability (or closure) of runways. 
 
Generally, most of the Runway Incursion causal factors identified through the inci-
dent and accident analysis are not independent, but exhibit an intricate interrelation. 
This insight permits to categorize causal factors in a hierarchical structure, such that 
each incident and accident can be attributed to at least one of the following high-level 
root cause categories, which are introduced and explained below: 
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2.3.1 Runway Incursions caused by Disorientation 
Nearly all Runway Incursions involving inadvertent entry into an active runway, 
runway confusion or take-off and landing operations on taxiways can be attributed 
to spatial disorientation. In the fatal accidents in Madrid (see Appendix I-2 for de-
tails), Detroit (Appendix I-5), Taipei (Appendix I-9), Linate (Appendix I-11) and Lex-
ington (Appendix I-12), crew disorientation due to a lack of situational awareness 
played a substantial role. Essentially, the impact of limited visibility on flight crews is 
that it degrades situational awareness of ownship position due to a lack of external 
“landmark” references and limited overview, both caused by restricted visual range, 
which may eventually result in spatial disorientation. Inadequate airport signs, 
markings and lights can be confusing or deceptive, thus catalysing disorientation. 
Additionally, they may aggravate emerging disorientation or prevent crews from 
noticing that their mental model of the aircraft’s position is not correct. Last but not 
least, the Lexington accident demonstrates that discrepancies between charted and 
actual taxiway designations also have the potential to induce confusion (cf. Figure 9).  
 
Another very noteworthy aspect derivable from the accident reports is that the pilots 
involved did not use all available instrument cues for consistency checks on their 
position. The NTSB report on the Detroit accident notes that the pilots did not refer 
to heading for an identification of their position. Likewise, the flight crew of the acci-
dent aircraft in Lexington failed to note the heading discrepancy that would have 
told them they were on the wrong runway. Due to the VFR character of surface op-
erations, it seems that visual cues, however sparse they may be, dominate on the 
ground, whereas heading, apparently, is not always intuitive enough in combination 
with paper charts to enable fail-safe airport navigation. More subtle cues such as the 
misalignment of the Para-Visual Display (PVD) in the Taipei accident, which could 
have told the flight crew they had made the wrong choice of two parallel runways, 
were not correctly interpreted by the flight crew, either. 
 
 
Figure 9: Take-off from wrong runway at Lexington Blue Grass Airport (2006)  
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Recently, regulators and airports have devoted their attention to improved, more 
conspicuous markings, such as the enhanced taxiway centreline markings in the vi-
cinity of the runway proposed by the FAA [FAA08], or at least tried to make existing 
signs and markings compliant with ICAO standards. While this is certainly a valid 
and worthwhile approach, full efficiency is only achieved in fair visibility conditions. 
No matter how much effort is invested into perfecting signs and markings, visibility 
restrictions caused by heavy precipitation or fog will limit their readability, and addi-
tionally, the reflectivity of wet pavements generally decreases the conspicuity of 
markings. Besides, snow, slush or a thin layer of ice may easily render markings en-
tirely unreadable, as evidenced e.g. by the 1983 Korean Airlines Anchorage accident 
(Appendix I-3). Consequently, the efficiency of signs and markings can be easily an-
nihilated, particularly in conditions when they would be needed most. Last but not 
least, they do not provide an independent source of position information. 
It is furthermore noteworthy that with the exception of the Linate accident, disorien-
tation occurred when flight crews made required turns too early (as in Lexington) or 
did not turn far enough to intercept the intended taxiway. The resulting angular er-
ror was small in most cases, resulting in a situation where a shallow angle error in 
heading eventually resulted in disorientation. Since the printed airport diagrams cur-
rently used for surface navigation rely on the availability of visual cues and 
signs/markings for reference and position identification, they may easily fail, as the 
analysis of selected incidents and accidents has shown. 
 
In conclusion, current cockpit and ground-based aids to surface navigation cannot 
provide adequate support in all weather conditions, and are actually prone to fail in 
limited visibility or otherwise adverse weather conditions, when they would be 
needed most. Even worse, it is evident that the detection and isolation of surface 
navigation errors is even harder to achieve in these conditions. 
Consequently, the main systemic issue is not the occurrence of disorientation, but the 
inadequacy of current flight deck instrumentation and procedures to reliably detect, 
manage and resolve surface navigation errors, irrespective of their cause, i.e. inde-
pendent of whether they result from e.g. low visibility, operational distractions, non-
standard aerodrome signage or erroneous aeronautical information. In fact, all acci-
dents involving disorientation could have been prevented by a means of indicating 
ownship position with respect to the aerodrome layout to the flight crews involved. 
 
What flight crews need, consequently, is an independent source of airport mapping 
and position information that can help to overcome visibility limitations and poten-
tial airport signage/marking (conspicuousness) issues (High-Level Requirement I). 
 
At first glance, the occurrence of Runway Incursions due to disorientation seems to 
be entirely unrelated to traffic density, since the surrounding traffic obviously has no 
impact on a flight crew’s ability to navigate in an airport environment. Nevertheless, 
there is a subtle interrelation: airport complexity, which certainly has an impact on 
disorientation, is a result of traffic demand. Nonetheless, since airports evolve over 
longer periods of time, short- or medium-term variations of traffic density do not 
have any impact on incursions due to disorientation. Even if the number of traffic 
operations changes, airport complexity will still remain the same. 
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2.3.2 Runway Incursions due to Undetected Traffic Conflicts 
Degraded visibility not only increases the risk of disorientation, but also hampers 
visual traffic acquisition, which is currently the only means of traffic surveillance for 
flight crews on the ground. Nevertheless, it is important to note in this context that 
not only meteorological limitations to visibility, such as fog, are a factor. Particularly 
the Paris accident (Appendix I-8) and the Munich incident in 2004 (Appendix I-16) 
demonstrate that view restrictions resulting from either airport or cockpit geometry, 
or a combination of both, can also lead to the breakdown of collision avoidance by 
“see and avoid”. 
 
While additional information on surrounding traffic may be obtained from the so-
called party line effect, i.e. radio transmissions of other aircraft under the control of 
the same ATC unit, and TCAS information on arriving and departing aircraft34, this 
information is not continuously available and does not provide the same degree of 
coverage and reliability as direct visual observation. Apart from the volatile nature of 
R/T transmissions, obtaining traffic information via the party line effect has the addi-
tional disadvantage that building up an accurate mental image of the surrounding 
traffic in this way requires familiarity with the airport or airspace (location of taxi-
ways, waypoints etc.) and the procedures being used35. 
Additionally, the investigation of the 
Atlanta, Los Angeles (cf. Appendix I-6) 
and St. Louis (Appendix I-7) accidents 
revealed that bright runway lighting 
may easily outshine standard aircraft 
lights, thus reducing conspicuity and 
detectability of aircraft on runways even 
in night VMC conditions. While strobes 
considerably increase aircraft conspicu-
ity even in a runway environment with 
high-intensity lighting, their use is typi-
cally delayed until the take-off clearance 
has been received in consideration to 
other pilots’ night vision [NTS95]. Fur-
thermore, particularly in foggy condi-
tions, reflections from ownship strobes 
may cause discomfort. Again, while im-
provements to aircraft lighting are desir-
able, it requires at least some residual 
visibility to be efficient. 
 
Traffic conflicts may result from myriads 
of possible scenarios and causes, involv-
ing, among others, disorientation (see 
previous section) and communication 
issues. With the exception of the Taipei and Lexington accidents, which did not in-
                                                 
34 This constitutes an unintended function, since TCAS is certified for airborne collision avoidance only. 
35 Personal communication with EADS flight test department, June 2009. 
 
Figure 10: Accident at Milano-Linate (2001) 
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volve any other traffic, all accidents discussed in the previous section could have 
been prevented, or at least been mitigated in their consequences, if at least one of the 
parties involved had possessed knowledge of the presence and location of the other 
aircraft, irrespective of the cause of the traffic conflict. If they had been aware that 
other traffic was on the runway, the crews of e.g. KLM Flight 4805 in Tenerife (see 
Figure 8 and Appendix I-1), NWA Flight 299 in Detroit or TWA Flight 427 in St. 
Louis would not have commenced take-off, and there might have been a chance for 
the crews of Scandinavian Flight 686 in Milano-Linate (cf. Figure 10), Iberia Flight 
350 in Madrid and USAir Flight 1493 in Los Angeles to take efficient remedial action. 
For all of the collision accidents studied in Section 2.2.2, timely awareness of the 
other traffic on the runway might have prevented the collision. Conversely, for virtu-
ally all of the Runway Incursions involving a traffic conflict that did not result in an 
accident, timely detection of the incursion through visual acquisition of the other 
traffic and appropriate remedial action prevented disaster. 
 
In conclusion, therefore, undetected traffic conflicts in the runway environment have 
the highest potential for an accident. Consequently, an independent source of infor-
mation on the surrounding traffic would have helped the flight crews to establish 
and maintain adequate traffic awareness, particularly concerning the presence of 
other traffic on the runway. Additionally, given the dynamics of the Paris and Linate 
accident or the Munich incident, traffic conflict detection and subsequent alerting are 
certainly an invaluable supplement to traffic information. 
 
Relevant surrounding traffic on the airport surface and the runway environment, 
including potential traffic conflicts, must be brought to the attention of flight crews in 
a suitable form (High-Level Requirement II). 
 
If, for whatever reason, a Runway Incursion occurs, the risk of a collision accident 
increases with the overall number of runway operations and thus the percentage of 
time the runway is used for take-off or landing. However, the probability that a traf-
fic conflict remains undetected does not seem to be directly related to traffic density, 
because visibility, both meteorologically and geometrically, is the dominant factor 
from a flight deck perspective. Additionally, on the ATC side, the availability of air-
port surveillance equipment is an essential factor. Only in situations where excessive 
controller workload decreases performance, the probability of conflict detection may 
depend on traffic density. 
 
2.3.3 Runway Incursions due to Insufficient Airport Information 
The Runway Incursions at St. Louis, Taipei, Denver, Lexington and Newark demon-
strate that additional support in identifying the runway intended for take-off or land-
ing might help to prevent accidents and hazardous situations. Especially the Taipei 
and Lexington disasters, as well as the Denver incident, additionally indicate that up-
to-date information on the airport environment, particularly on the runways in use 
and on short-term or temporary changes, is crucial for safe and efficient flight opera-
tions. Nevertheless, the deficiencies in the current system of communicating short-
term and temporary changes to pilots are well established, cf. [HJK04, Ver08]. 
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Figure 11: Fragmentation of information with conventional Pre-Flight Information Bulletin 
 
Today, crews receive a plain-text language compilation of current NOTAM and other 
urgent information of operational significance prior to flight that is called ‘Pre-Flight 
Information Bulletin (PIB)’ and required by ICAO Annex 1536 [ICA04]. Usually, it is 
prepared by the flight dispatcher and handed out to the crew on paper or an elec-
tronic equivalent such as PDF. Typically, for an intercontinental flight, this conven-
tional NOTAM package consists of some 30 or more A4 pages, because all take-off, 
en-route and destination alternates need to be covered37. This has a variety of disad-
vantages, e.g. that 
 
 the accessibility of the NOTAM information is somewhat limited, particularly if 
the crew has to find a certain information under time pressure, since pilots often 
need to browse several pages to locate information on e.g. a particular alternate 
airport; 
 the information is fragmented, and needs to be combined with other sources like 
paper charts and the flight deck displays to create a complete mental model and a 
sufficient level of situational awareness (cf. Figure 11)38; 
                                                 
36  According to current ICAO regulations, a compilation of current NOTAM and other information of urgent 
character shall be made available to flight crews in the form of plain-language Pre-flight Information Bulletins 
[ICA04]. 
37  In this context, it must be noted that decisions on the necessity of issuing or distributing a NOTAM are not 
purely driven by operational considerations; legal aspects such as liability issues are an important factor as 
well. This may result in a decision in favour of a NOTAM to be legally on the safe side, even if the information 
contained is not essential from an operational perspective. 
38  NOTAMs concerning aerodromes often reference closures or restrictions relative to other airport locations, and 
therefore require either a high degree of familiarity with an airport, or charts for an accurate decoding and in-
terpretation. As an example, the information that taxiway N is closed between taxiways M and H at Frankfurt 
Airport (EDDF) requires knowledge on the location of M and H relative to N. Furthermore, due to the huge lo-
cal variations in taxiway naming conventions, the fact that the closure in the above example encompasses just 
one taxiway segment between the parallel taxiways M and H is not deducible in a logic and intuitive fashion. 
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 the information is not prioritized, and pilots need further knowledge, such as the 
terminal/apron their airline routinely uses and the taxi route to be expected, to 
determine whether a NOTAM is relevant for them or not; 
 the information is not available to any aircraft system, and can thus not be dis-
played or used to create alerts, e.g. for closed runways, malfunctioning Navaids 
or restricted airspaces. 
 
Furthermore, the time the crew commonly has for the briefing is not sufficient for a 
detailed review of all this information. Thus, there is a small, but non-vanishing risk 
that important information, e.g. on runway closures or restrictions, is simply over-
looked [Ver08]. Last but not least, the readability of NOTAM still suffers from the 
extensive use of abbreviations and uppercase letters, which is a relict from the 1930s 
and 1940s, when the original NOTAM format was defined taking into account the 
limitations of teletype technology. Although teletype machines have disappeared, 
the non-intuitive NOTAM format has never been updated substantially [HJK04]. 
 
One of the lessons to be learned is that the current way of conveying runway closure 
information is not the optimum solution. The Taipei accident investigation revealed 
that the flight crew of SQ006 had reviewed NOTAM information and was aware that 
RWY 05R was closed, but the disorientation leading to the assumption that they were 
on RWY 05L while they had, in fact, lined up on RWY 05R rendered this information 
useless (see Figure 12 and Appendix I-9). Likewise, at Denver airport, both controller 
and flight crew of UPS Flight 896 apparently missed the fact that RWY 8 was closed 
due to construction work on an adjacent taxiway, although they had been notified of 
the closure by airport operations personnel and the ATIS broadcast (cf. Appendix I-
10). These two exemplary Runway Incursions, which can also be attributed to inade-
quate flight crew situational awareness39, clearly illustrate the limitations and defi-
ciencies of the current system of conveying short-term and temporary changes. 
 
 
Figure 12: Singapore Airlines Flight SQ006 accident at Taipei airport (2000) 
                                                 
39  Of course, particularly the Denver incident suggests that an integral representation of short-term and tempo-
rary changes is of equal importance for controller situational awareness, but beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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Conveying runway closure and other PIB/NOTAM information in textual form is 
indeed vulnerable to failure, since any disorientation on the airport surface means 
that the flight crew can no longer apply this information correctly. Conversely, even 
if the flight crew is perfectly aware of their precise location on an aerodrome, the 
Denver incident demonstrates that the risk of oversight is reality with the current 
system, and by no means limited to NOTAM as a medium, since e.g. (D-)ATIS 
transmissions suffer from the same limitations. 
 
From a flight safety perspective, however, it is essential for safe and efficient surface 
movement operations that flight crews are aware of the operational status and con-
figuration of an aerodrome and its installations, such as potential runway closures or 
restrictions. Erroneously taking off or landing on a closed or otherwise unsuitable 
runway is extremely likely to have catastrophic consequences, mainly due to poten-
tial collisions with construction equipment, as illustrated by the Singapore Airlines 
Flight SQ006 accident at Taipei in 2000 (cf. Appendix I-9). 
 
Relevant and sufficiently up-to-date information on the operational status and con-
figuration of an aerodrome and its installations must be brought to the attention of 
flight crews in a suitable form (High-Level Requirement III). 
 
2.3.4 Runway Incursions as a Result of Communication Deficits 
Communication between pilot and controller is a critical link in the ATC system, but 
it can be broken with surprising speed and disastrous results [FAA09]. The Tenerife 
catastrophe (cf. Figure 8) is exemplary of a Runway Incursion accident where a mis-
understanding between the flight crew and the air traffic controller was the main 
causal factor. Likewise, ambiguities in the use of conditional clearances, particularly 
with respect to the identification of the other aircraft the clearances referred to, were 
decisive factors both in the Paris accident and the Munich incident. In this context, 
runway-related ATC clearances and instructions are especially critical, because they 
constitute the last line of defence against Runway Incursions. Any failure of this 
safety barrier will immediately result in a hazardous situation, cf. Figure 7, unless a 
comparison with the traffic situation immediately reveals that there must be a mis-
take or misunderstanding. 
 
Furthermore, many of the other Runway Incursions investigated feature indications 
of deficient communication between flight deck and controllers, such as the Detroit 
and Linate accident (Figure 10), in which flight crews were not able to execute the 
clearances assigned by ATC as intended, mainly due to disorientation. Therefore, 
information on the assigned taxi route, potentially including an advisory or alert 
upon deviation, might serve as additional, redundant cue to prevent disorientation 
by making the inevitable discrepancy between the instructed and the actual taxi 
route more palpable. 
 
An important first conclusion from these considerations is that multiple redundant 
sources of information permitting cross-checks are essential in preventing Runway 
Incursions. 
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Beyond the incident and accident analysis, there is further evidence on the significant 
role of communication deficiencies in Runway Incursions. The already quoted mid-
80s NTSB study concluded that miscommunication played a significant role in Run-
way Incursions, with the main issues in this context identified as improper phraseol-
ogy and read-back of clearances not fully understood by the pilots [NTS86]. In the 
period from fiscal years 2000 to 2003, the FAA identified the following most common 
errors contributing to the so-called ‘Pilot Deviations’: 
 
 Pilots read back controllers’ instructions correctly but do not comply with the 
instructions; 
 Pilots fail to hold short of the runway as instructed and cross or taxi into posi-
tion on the runway; 
 Pilots accept clearances issued to an aircraft other than their own [FAA04]. 
 
Investigating Runway Incursion incidents at Paris Charles-de-Gaulle in the first half 
of the year 2000, the BEA arrived at the following remarkably similar error scenarios: 
 
 Aircraft cross the runway or go past a holding point; 
 Aircraft line-up in front of an aircraft on take-off or on final, instead of lining 
up behind; 
 There is a confusion in call-signs, which leads to an aircraft other than the one 
intended by the controller moving. 
 
Furthermore, as one of the main phraseology aspects, it was noted that the holding 
points are not always clearly identified, and that call signs often resemble each other, 
thus promulgating confusion [BEA01]. 
 
In conclusion, this may serve as substantial evidence that situational awareness on 
the ground is not limited to positional and traffic awareness or awareness of opera-
tional aspects, but includes clearance awareness as well. More recently and more 
generally, IATA estimated that deficient flight crew communication played a signifi-
cant role in 28% of all airliner hull losses in 2004, which makes it No. 4 of the most 
significant factors [IAT05]. Generally, radio voice communications between tower 
and crew can be impaired by the following factors: 
 
 white noise, acoustical problems in understanding clearance 
 crowded frequency, confusing call signs 
 language problems in understanding clearances 
 use of non-standard phraseology 
 
Leaving aside technical problems for the moment, these communication deficits can 
be divided into two groups. The first group consists of communication problems due 
to the language used and associated language proficiency. In terms of situational 
awareness, everybody is usually aware of the communication problem and can use 
extra vigilance to avoid incidents. 
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For the second group, the deficiencies are far more difficult to unveil, because com-
munication is apparently working, and the parties involved are not aware that they 
are talking about different things. Such communication deficits can also result from 
incorrect or not internationally accepted phraseology. A major concern in this context 
is the widespread use of “Taxi Into Position and Hold” in North America and by North 
American crews instead of the international ICAO PANS-ATM standard phrase 
“Taxi to the Holding Point, Runway XY”. The resulting confusion has lead to several 
Runway Incursion incidents worldwide [IAT05]. 
 
In view of these shortcomings, one can draw the conclusion that both crew situ-
ational awareness and the interaction of controllers and pilots have to be improved. 
Since communication between flight deck and ATC concerns mainly the assignments 
of routes and clearances, this is, as the above examples show, the domain most se-
verely influenced by a breakdown of communication. A key issue in this context is 
the volatile nature of information related by ATC and pilots through voice communi-
cation. Instructions and clearances are typically transmitted once; they cannot be re-
trieved and reviewed whenever the flight crew feels the need to do so. Of course, 
there is always the possibility to ask ATC again, but this requires awareness that in-
formation is incomplete or has not been understood properly. Particularly when 
dealing with an illusion of efficient communication, information once erroneously 
captured may therefore be extremely difficult to correct. 
 
Both taxi route assignments and clearances related to surface movement or other 
runway operations must be conveyed to flight crews in a fashion unambiguously 
reflecting the controller’s intention. Furthermore, route and clearance information 
must be continuously accessible and robust against phraseology or language profi-
ciency issues, and conditional clearances must unambiguously identify the aircraft 
they refer to (High-Level Requirement IV). 
 
2.3.5 Runway Incursions caused by Surveillance and ATC Errors 
Controllers erroneously clearing two aircraft for the same runway were the causal 
factors in both the 1990 Atlanta (Appendix I-17), 1991 Los Angeles and the 2000 Paris 
accidents. In the latter case, the use of two different languages by ATC prevented the 
crew of a British Shorts 330 from noticing the controller error [BEA01]. Furthermore, 
the Sioux Falls accident (Appendix I-14) occurred because the controller cleared the 
flight crew to land in spite of the ongoing snow removal operation. 
 
Multiple intersecting runways were identified as a factor frequently associated with 
controller-induced Runway Incursions, while traffic was light or moderate in 12 of 17 
Runway Incursions attributed as “controller-induced” by a 1986 NTSB study 
[NTS86]. Another finding was that coordination between controllers, specifically 
ground controller and local controller, was often insufficient in the incidents. 
As an example, in the 1985 Minneapolis incident (Appendix I-4), the controller al-
lowed traffic to build up until the limits of the airport were exceeded. For this inci-
dent, the Boston incident and the Paris accident, a lack of coordination between 
ground controller and local controller was at the root of the Runway Incursions. 
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Likewise, in the Anchorage (Japan Airlines) runway collision, the local controller 
could not recall whether he had given the ground controller permission to cross the 
accident vehicle or not. Last but not least, a misunderstanding during coordination 
between controllers was also the reason for the Amsterdam Runway Incursion inci-
dent (see Appendix I-14 for details). 
As with airport lighting, signage and markings, the issue of potential ATC errors is 
obviously beyond the control of individual flight crews. From the perspective of an 
air carrier supporting worldwide operations, the risk of ATC errors can never be 
fully excluded. 
 
Consequently, a system that enables pilots to anticipate and mitigate potential con-
troller errors, irrespective of whether they result from a lack of appropriate surveil-
lance equipment or controller human factors issues, such as a lack of coordination 
between controllers, is required (High-Level Requirement V). 
 
2.3.6 Impact of Airport Infrastructure & Organisational Deficiencies 
The role of inadequate signs, markings and lighting, which clearly constitutes an air-
port infrastructure deficiency, has already been discussed in conjunction with disori-
entation, cf. Section 2.3.1. 
The most egregious airport organisational deficiencies have been identified in the 
Linate accident, where undocumented holding positions were used, preventing effi-
cient error trapping. Another noteworthy organisational issue concerns intersection 
take-offs, and in particular the use of high-speed exits for line-up. Both the Paris ac-
cident and the Munich incident have shown that the resulting lack of physical visibil-
ity onto the runway from the cockpit in conjunction with conditional clearances re-
sults in an extreme risk of an accident. Other factors identified in the analysis of inci-
dents and accidents were missing surveillance equipment and inadequate local ATC 
procedures. Again, these infrastructure and organisational issues are beyond the con-
trol of individual flight crews. 
 
2.3.7 Conclusion on Runway Incursions and Human Factors Aspects 
As early as 1986, the NTSB concluded that Runway Incursions are a human factors 
problem [NTS86]. To this date, no Runway Incursion accident has been caused by 
technical malfunctions, as evidenced by the analysis earlier in this chapter. This sec-
tion contains some considerations to elucidate why human factors and human per-
formance aspects appear to be the dominant factor in Runway Incursions. 
 
When reading through aviation accident reports, one is confronted with an apparent 
paradox: Airline pilots are among the most carefully selected, best-trained and re-
trained, most thoroughly assessed, medically scrutinized individuals that operate 
technology on this planet. Nonetheless, errors that appear to be basic at first glance, 
e.g. in airport navigation or disorientation occur, such as in the already mentioned 
Lexington and Taipei accidents. Outside the domain of surface movement, the recent 
Helios airways accident (cf. [AAI06]) raises similar questions, in particular when 
considering the following: 
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 Pilots are down-selected in thorough selection process, individuals with high 
cognitive skills. 
 Pilots are scrutinized medically, to ensure that medical problems do not impair 
their performance. 
 Pilots are very carefully trained, probably more than any other operators of tech-
nology. Frequent refreshers, intricate system of proficiency checks, both in the 
simulator and on the line.  
 Apart from the General Aviation aircraft involved in the Linate disaster, all of the 
accidents discussed in this thesis occurred involved aircraft from airlines with a 
high reputation from countries where qualification is generally not considered a 
problem.  
 All pilots in accidents discussed in the previous sections were rated as average or 
above average pilots by their supervisors. 
 
Under the assumption that the assessment system for airline pilots is efficient, and 
that there are no significant deficiencies in pilot training, the number of options offer-
ing a satisfactory explanation for the observed errors shrinks. 
Besides difficulties with clearances, communications, orientation, a 1984 NASA study 
also revealed preoccupation as another key factor in pilot-induced incursions 
[NTS86]. Consequently, the role of pilot distraction should not be underestimated. 
Therefore, the FAA advised with Advisory Circular AC 120-74A that the “sterile 
cockpit” philosophy should be applied. This means that flight crew members must 
be able to focus on their duties without being distracted by non-flight related mat-
ters, such as eating meals, engaging in non-essential conversation, or reading mate-
rial not related to the safe and proper operation of the aircraft [FAA03a]. 
However, the operational context itself can be distracting as well. Rather often, pilots 
have to complete checklists while taxiing simultaneously. In response to the FAA 
recommendations, but going beyond the Advisory Circular AC 120-74A, a major US 
airline mandated that all of its pilots have to complete all checklists before taxiing 
[FAA04]. Furthermore, programming the Flight Management System (FMS) or con-
figuring the aircraft for take-off (or cleaning up the configuration after landing), use 
of the Airborne Communications Addressing and Reporting System (ACARS) and 
radio calls with the airline company might also add to the distraction of pilots. There-
fore, AC-120-74A recommends that all such activity be terminated when approach-
ing the entrance of an active runway. 
Nevertheless, with the exception of the Lexington accident, there are no hints in the 
investigation reports analysed that would make distraction appear as a satisfactory 
explanation of flight crew actions and flight crew performance in Runway Incursion 
incidents and accidents. Additionally, there were no conclusive indications for a 
variability of individual performance due to fatigue or personal problems in any of 
the Runway Incursion accidents investigated. Since surface movement is one the 
least automated phases of flight, it is very unlikely that “complacency”, an issue of-
ten quoted in connection with deficient crew vigilance in during a highly automated 
phase of flight, was of any influence. Additionally, a closer look reveals that errors 
that seem to be basic at first glance often turn out as wrong decisions taken in a de-
ceptive, unforgiving environment on the basis of inadequate and insufficient infor-
mation. 
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Consequently, in view of the information deficits identified in the previous sections, 
the only logical and conclusive explanation for the sometimes seemingly egregious 
pilot errors that remains is the inadequacy of “flight guidance tools” for surface 
movement. The deficiencies in flight deck instrumentation, in turn, result in a less 
than adequate situational awareness for the task at hand, and potentially also in ex-
cessive workload and task saturation, as e.g. in the Detroit accident [NTS91]. 
When applied in the aviation domain, situational awareness implies and encom-
passes knowledge and awareness of any relevant factor that might potentially affect 
the safety of the flight. With this and the categories identified above in mind, a lack 
of crew situational awareness on the aerodrome surface can be subdivided further 
into: 
 
• Lack of position awareness. The crew is either not sure of the position on the air-
field and gets lost, or believes the aircraft to be elsewhere on the airport, particu-
larly in situations of poor visibility. Especially the latter case can lead to inadver-
tent entry into a runway (e.g. entering or crossing the wrong runway, e.g. 30L in-
stead of 30R). 
• Lack of traffic awareness. The crew lacks awareness of the position, intention and 
cleared manoeuvres with respect to relevant traffic in the vicinity of the aircraft. 
• Lack of operational awareness. The crew lacks awareness of the operational envi-
ronment and configuration of the airport, i.e. they are not aware of closed run-
ways or taxiways, or of the runways in use. 
• Lack of clearance awareness. The crew is not fully aware what the current clear-
ance mandates or allows them to do, or whether an appropriate clearance for the 
intended manoeuvre has been requested or issued. This includes the crew being 
in the wrong ‘mindset’ and failing to request clearance for the manoeuvre; having 
a false impression of being cleared for the manoeuvre (e.g. to enter runway, to 
land or to take-off) and failure to correctly execute an ATC sequencing instruc-
tion. 
 
It is essential to note that the factors identified above may exacerbate each other: in 
bad visibility, a breakdown of communication between pilot and controller may start 
out from a subtle misunderstanding, but subsequently cause an air disaster, cf. 
[ICA80]. 
 
In conclusion, this proves the initial hypothesis that there are indeed deficiencies in 
flight deck instrumentation with respect to surface movement, and that inadequate 
reference to human performance limitations in the selection of current means (paper 
charts, visual acquisition) is the main high-level cause of Runway Incursions. 
Thus, the main goal to be achieved from an onboard perspective is a global increase 
in crew situational awareness, supplemented by alerting in situations where the en-
hanced awareness is not sufficient to avoid hazardous situations. This approach is in 
line with the European Action Plan [Eur04]. 
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2.3.8 Summary of High-Level Requirements 
This chapter concludes with a brief summary and overview of the high-level re-
quirements identified:  
 
Flight crews need an independent source of airport mapping and position informa-
tion that can help to overcome visibility limitations and potential airport sign-
age/marking (conspicuousness) issues (High-Level Requirement I). 
 
 
Relevant surrounding traffic on the airport surface and the runway environment, 
including potential traffic conflicts, must be brought to the attention of flight crews in 
a suitable form (High-Level Requirement II). 
 
 
Relevant and sufficiently up-to-date information on the operational status and con-
figuration of an aerodrome and its installations must be brought to the attention of 
flight crews in a suitable form (High-Level Requirement III). 
 
 
Both taxi route assignments and clearances related to surface movement or other 
runway operations must be conveyed to flight crews in a fashion unambiguously 
reflecting the controller’s intention. Furthermore, route and clearance information 
must be continuously accessible and robust against phraseology or language profi-
ciency issues, and conditional clearances must unambiguously identify the aircraft 
they refer to (High-Level Requirement IV). 
 
 
Consequently, a system that enables pilots to anticipate and mitigate potential con-
troller errors, irrespective of whether they result from a lack of appropriate surveil-
lance equipment or controller human factors issues, such as a lack of coordination 
between controllers, is required (High-Level Requirement V). 
 
While many incidents and accidents could have been prevented with just one of the 
above High-Level Requirements fulfilled, it is important to note in this context that 
redundancy is essential in preventing Runway Incursions, given the criticality and 
severity of the issue. Relying on a single source or measure will often fail to prevent 
hazardous or catastrophic situations, particularly in case of erroneous or misunder-
stood ATC instructions/clearances. Only cross-checking with the surrounding traffic 
can detect the error in this case. 
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3 State of the Art in Industry and Research 
 
3.1 Onboard Systems for Better Ground Situational Awareness 
 
The idea of onboard systems for the prevention of Runway Incursions is anything 
but new, cf. [Kub99]. Over the past decade, the electronic Airport Moving Map 
(AMM) has evolved in research and, subsequently, industry and is now widely ac-
cepted as the core technology to increase the flight crew’s situational awareness in 
terms of position on the airport surface. In a comprehensive Runway Incursion risk 
mitigation study, the Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST) found airport mov-
ing map displays to be a highly effective safety enhancement for reducing the risk of 
Runway Incursions caused by pilot error [FAA04]. Furthermore, research by the 
Cargo Airline Association (CAA) and NASA, not surprisingly, concluded that effi-
cient surface traffic awareness is hardly possible in the absence of an airport moving 
map [BAO00]. In addition, it has been argued that an airport moving map integrated 
into the aircraft’s Electronic Flight Instrument System (EFIS) should form the basis of 
any surveillance-type system providing Runway Incursion alerting [Ver07]. 
Consequently, it is not surprising that accident investigators have already suggested 
its large-scale introduction, e.g. in the wake of the SQ006 accident [ASC02] and, more 
recently, after the Comair Flight 5191 disaster [NTS07] to address the issue of flight 
crew disorientation on the airport surface. 
 
At present, there are three airport moving map solutions of industrial relevance. On 
the Airbus A380, the so-called Onboard Airport Navigation System (OANS) provides 
an airport moving map display on the Navigation Display (ND) screen, as detailed in 
Section 3.1.1. Furthermore, Boeing subsidiary Jeppesen offers an airport moving map 
as an Electronic Flight Bag (EFB) application, which is discussed in Section 3.1.2. Last 
but not least, Aviation Communications and Surveillance Systems (ACSS), a joint 
venture of L-3 Communications and Thales, has recently developed another EFB ap-
plication named SafeRoute encompassing airport moving map and CDTI functional-
ity (Section 3.1.3). 
 
Generally, Electronic Flight Bags are electronic display systems intended to reduce or 
eliminate the need for paper and other reference materials in the cockpit by replacing 
hard copy material, such as paper charts, that pilots typically find in their flight bags. 
According to FAA Advisory Circular 120-76A, EFB devices can be subdivided into 
three different classes [FAA03b]: 
 
 Class 1 EFB: Portable Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS)-based computer sys-
tems used for aircraft operations, such as flight crew laptops, that are not in-
terconnected to aircraft systems, and do not require certification. 
 Class 2 EFB: Portable and typically COTS-based systems connected to the air-
craft during normal operations. As a minimum, data connections to aircraft 
systems, power supply and mounting devices require formal certification. 
 Class 3 EFB: Fully installed equipment that requires formal certification. 
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Initially, airport moving map applications showing ownship position were limited to 
Class 3 EFB devices [FAA03b, FAA03c]. However, in view of the high number of 
Runway Incursions and the safety benefits expected by the use of airport moving 
map technology, the FAA eventually revised its policy in 2007 and now also permits 
airport moving maps with an ownship symbol on Class 2 EFBs [FAA07a]. This can be 
expected to result in a more widespread application of EFB-based airport moving 
maps, and has already lead to an increasing number of products on the market. 
 
3.1.1 A380 Onboard Airport Navigation System (OANS) 
The Airbus A380 is the 
first airliner offering an 
airport moving map 
integrated into the Elec-
tronic Flight Instrument 
System (EFIS). 
The so-called Onboard 
Airport Navigation Sys-
tem (OANS) is capable 
of presenting an airport 
moving map supporting 
the conventional ARC, 
ROSE and PLAN modes 
on the Navigation Dis-
play (ND) screen on pi-
lot request. As for the 
classic ND, range and mode are controlled via the corresponding selectors on the 
EFIS control panel in the glareshield. The airport moving map can be viewed in five 
fixed ranges of 5, 2, 1, 0.5 and 0.25 NM. Additionally, using the Keyboard and Cursor 
Control Unit (KCCU), pilots can call up a dedicated tab menu with additional soft 
controls in the display area immediately below the airport moving map, as shown in 
Figure 14. Among others, this menu enables pilots to select a different airport for 
display by entering ICAO code, IATA code or city name. 
On the A380, the airport moving map can be used in conjunction with the so-called 
Taxi Camera System (TACS), a composition of several video streams showing an air-
craft overview from the vertical stabilizer and the landing gear. The TACS, which can 
be displayed on the PFD screen on the ground as shown in Figure 14, is intended to 
improve awareness of the location of the aircraft and landing gear with respect to the 
taxiway edges. It was first introduced to support surface movement on the Airbus 
A340-600. 
 
From a conceptual perspective, the A380 OANS is the closest realisation of the air-
port moving map concept proposed by the Institute of Flight Systems and Automatic 
Control since the late 1990s, cf. [Kub99]. Furthermore, in the years to follow, there 
has undeniably been mutual influence and exchange of information between Airbus 
and TUD through various European research projects such as ISAWARE, 
VICTORIA, ISAWARE II, EMMA, EMMA II and FLYSAFE. 
 
Figure 13: A380 Cockpit Overview 
© Andrew Hunt 
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Figure 14: Airbus A380 Onboard Airport Navigation System (OANS) 
The OANS functionality is hosted on a dedicated line replaceable unit supplied by 
Thales and Diehl Aerospace, which feeds the airport moving map image into the 
EFIS via a video link. 
 
3.1.2 Jeppesen Electronic Flight Bag – Taxi Position Awareness 
Jeppesen’s Electronic Flight Bag (EFB) is a solution for a paperless cockpit and 
mainly intended to replace paper charts. It can be hosted on different hardware plat-
forms, depending on customer needs and airframer constraints. The EFB currently 
supports electronic, vector-graphics versions of Approach, Aerodrome and Airspace 
Charts, including Standard Instrument Departure (SID) and Arrival Route (STAR) 
procedures. Furthermore, Jeppesen offers a variety of additional functions for the 
EFB, ranging from cabin video surveillance to electronic aircraft and flight operations 
manuals. In the context of this thesis, however, the most interesting function is an 
airport moving map initially designated ‘Taxi Position Awareness’ (TPA), cf. [Jep05], 
which has been a featured application on Boeing’s Class 3 EFB (Figure 15) since its 
introduction in 2003. At this time, it was the first product of its kind available for 
commercial aviation [Jep08, Psc08]. It is intended to support flight crews in orienting 
on the aerodrome surface by displaying the aircraft’s position on the ground in rela-
tion to runways, taxiways and airport structures. In addition, the product brochure 
states that the airport moving map could contribute to a reduction or elimination of 
runway incursions by enhanced position awareness and decreased pilot workload, 
and also enhance the efficiency of ground operations [Jep05]. 
 
If the aircraft is on the ground, the Jeppesen airport moving map application is capa-
ble of auto-loading the AMDB for the appropriate airport, which is determined using 
the aircraft position from the Flight Management System and/or the GPS signal. 
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Figure 15: Boeing Electronic Flight Bag (EFB) 
with Jeppesen airport moving map on a B-777 
Figure 16: Jeppesen airport moving map 
of Paris Charles-de-Gaulle Airport on EFB 
 
Pilots can choose between two basic modes, a Track-up Mode displaying the aircraft 
position at the centre of the screen, with the map beneath appropriately moved and 
rotated, or a stationary Planning Mode in North-up orientation without ownship po-
sition [Jep05]. Figure 16 details the Human-Machine Interface (HMI) of the Jeppesen 
airport moving map on a Boeing Class 3 EFB in a Boeing 777. The display, manufac-
tured by Astronautics, features a series of fixed-function keys on the upper and lower 
display frame, whereas the side frames are equipped with multi-functional keys 
(MFKs). These may be associated with different functions, depending on the chosen 
mode or the operational context. 
 
Using the keys on the lower frame, the flight crew can zoom and pan the airport 
moving map as desired. Panning is presumably limited to the Planning Mode. 
For zooming, there is a choice of four discrete ranges (0.5, 1, 2 NM and ’all airport’) 
[Psc08]. With the lowest MFK on the right display frame, a menu with the main ap-
plication options can be displayed and hidden. When activated, the applicable menu 
items are displayed in text boxes next to the MFKs, partially overlaying the airport 
moving map. Pilots can then use the MFKs to alternate between Track-up and Plan-
ning Mode, to show range rings or to search and select other airport maps available 
on board. 
 
In 2008, Boeing had delivered Class 3 EFB to 48 customers for 345 aircraft; the precise 
fraction of aircraft also equipped with the Jeppesen airport moving map was not 
made public. However, after the FAA revised its policy to allow the visualisation of 
ownship position on airport moving maps hosted on Class 2 EFB devices, Jeppesen 
was also the first company to receive formal approval for an airport moving map 
application hosted on a NavAero Class 2 EFB, with Continental Airlines as launch 
customer [Jep08]. It can therefore be expected that the Jeppesen solution will see 
more widespread application in the retrofit market in the future. 
© F. Mistral © Jeppesen 
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3.1.3 ACSS SafeRoute 
ACSS offers an EFB-based application 
named SafeRoute, which provides an 
airport moving map called Surface Area 
Movement and Management (SAMM) 
and a series of ADS-B based functions, 
including a Cockpit Display of Traffic 
Information (CDTI), a Merging and 
Spacing (M&S) application for arrival 
management and CDTI-assisted visual 
separation (CAVS). The use of TIS-B 
data as back-up is also possible. 
Airport moving map and CDTI are 
hosted on a Boeing Class 3 EFB supplied 
by Astronautics Corporation of America, featuring software also developed by As-
tronautics according to ACSS specifications. The system uses databases supplied by 
Jeppesen. 
On the ground, the EFB display can be switched to the airport moving map presenta-
tion, which visualises the aircraft’s precise position/heading and the surrounding 
traffic. SafeRoute features a basic Runway Incursion prevention functionality based 
on ADS-B or TIS-B traffic data. Whenever ownship is approaching a runway that is 
used for take-off or landing, its outline is highlighted in red. The outline is changed 
to yellow when a landing aircraft is decelerating after touchdown40. Figure 17 shows 
the initial SafeRoute design presented when development was officially announced 
at the Paris Air Show in 2005 [ACS05]. SafeRoute received a supplementary type cer-
tificate in 2007 [ACS07]. 
 
Currently, the main SafeRoute cus-
tomer is United Parcel Service (UPS), 
who was also strongly involved dur-
ing the development phase. UPS is 
planning to install the system on its 
entire Boeing B-757 and B-767 fleets by 
the end of 2009. Figure 18 illustrates 
the location of the EFB with the Saf-
eRoute application in the cockpit of a 
UPS Boeing 757 [Ger07]. Additionally, 
UPS intends to use the application to 
decrease taxi delays or inefficient rout-
ing to and from the parking positions 
at its Louisville (KSDF) hub [Flt07].  
 
It is important to note that the Saf-
eRoute HMI has evolved considerably and in parallel to the work performed in the 
scope of this thesis. This aspect is discussed further in Section 9.2 on p. 384. 
                                                 
40  This suggests that position information and a speed-based threshold are used to determine whether a runway 
is being used by traffic. 
 
Figure 17: Initial SafeRoute Design (2005) 
 
Figure 18: EFB with SafeRoute in a UPS B-757 
© ACSS 
Electronic Flight Bag (EFB) 
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3.1.4 Aerodrome Mapping Databases (AMDB) 
A crucial prerequisite for the development of the airport moving map from initial 
concepts to an operationally usable product was the availability of sufficiently stan-
dardised airport databases, which evolved in parallel to the airport moving map 
format concepts, cf. [Fri08]. In the future, these airport databases will also increas-
ingly be used in the production of aerodrome charts [Psc08]. 
 
In order to achieve international standardisation and to enable an industrial-scale 
production of Aerodrome Mapping Databases (AMDBs), a number of standards 
have been created in recent years. The fundamental standard, RTCA 
DO-272/EUROCAE ED-99 “User Requirements for Aerodrome Mapping Informa-
tion” [RTC01], predominantly influenced and created by the Institute of Flight Sys-
tems and Automatic Control, defines AMDB requirements regarding airport features 
and related attributes to be considered (i.e. content), including quality and process-
ing. It has recently been superseded by a version A [RTC05]. 
This standard is supplemented by RTCA DO-291/EUROCAE ED-119 “Interchange 
Standards for Terrain, Obstacle, and Aerodrome Mapping Data” [RTC04], which de-
fines in the meta-data and feature catalogue coding standards for the data, which 
enables data integrators and data originators to exchange AMDBs, provided that the 
database complies with these specifications [ARI06]. 
Based on these two standards, ARINC Specification 816 “Embedded Interchange 
Format for Airport Mapping Database” [ARI06] defines both coding, pre-processing 
(triangulation) and a physical file format for embedded avionics systems with the 
aim to give airlines as end-users a choice of different database providers irrespective 
of the avionics supplier. 
 
In ARINC 816, the individual AMDBs (destinations and alternates) required for the 
operation of a defined fleet within an airline are assembled in a so-called “Airport 
Database” (ADB), which consists of the AMDB files of the individual airports and a 
configuration file containing available data. The configuration file is supplemented 
by a Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) file that also contains the CRCs of the individ-
ual AMDB files. As with the FMS navigation database, the aircraft always carries two 
AIRAC cycles of AMDB data. It is estimated that two AIRAC cycles of some 300 air-
ports in medium resolution will roughly require 200 MB of storage space [ARI06]. 
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3.2 Onboard Traffic Surveillance and Alerting Systems 
3.2.1 Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS) 
To prevent airborne mid-air collisions, all turbine-engined aircraft with a maximum 
certified take-off mass in excess of 15,000 kg or authorisation to carry more than 30 
passengers must be equipped with an Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS 
II) since January 1st, 2003. As of January 1st, 2005, this worldwide mandate was ex-
tended to aircraft with a maximum take-off mass greater than 5,700 kg or more than 
19 passengers, and ICAO recommends equipping all aircraft [ICA01c]. 
 
ACAS is a system based on air traffic control transponder technology. It interrogates 
the transponders of aircraft in the vicinity, analyses the replies to determine potential 
collision threats, and generates a presentation of the surrounding traffic for the flight 
crew. If other aircraft are determined to be a threat, appropriate alerts are provided 
to the flight crew to assure separation. Basic performance criteria for ACAS are de-
fined in ICAO Annex 10 [ICA02a]. Currently, there are three ACAS versions: ACAS I 
is limited to the visualisation of proximate traffic and alerting to potential collision 
threats, whereas ACAS II is additionally capable of providing vertical escape ma-
noeuvres to avert a collision. ACAS III is a projected future system offering horizon-
tal escape manoeuvres as well.  
 
Currently, the only ACAS implementation fulfilling the criteria of the ICAO ACAS 
mandate is the Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS II), version 7, as 
described in RTCA DO-185A [RTC97]. It requires a Mode S transponder, but offers 
some backward compatibility with the older Mode A/C transponders. Therefore, the 
discussion in subsequent sections focuses on TCAS II as the current state-of-the-art41. 
 
3.2.1.1 Technical Realisation and Capabilities 
Each Mode S transponder has a unique ICAO 24 bit address, which serves two pur-
poses, unambiguous identification and the possibility to address communication to a 
specific aircraft. Interrogations from secondary surveillance radars (SSR) are trans-
mitted on the 1030 MHz uplink frequency, whereas transponder replies and other 
transmissions are made on the 1090 MHz downlink frequency. Mode S communica-
tion occurs via 25 different up- and downlink formats (UF/DF) of either 56 or 112 bit 
overall length, serving the various surveillance purposes [ICA02a]. Mode S also en-
compasses data link capabilities with a maximum bandwidth of 4 Mbit/s [RTC97]. 
 
3.2.1.1.1 Traffic Surveillance 
TCAS uses the Mode S and Mode C interrogation replies of other aircraft to calculate 
bearing, range and closure rate for each so-called ‘intruder’. By combining this data 
with altitude information from transponder replies where available, three-
dimensional tracks for at least 30 surrounding aircraft are established. Vertical speed 
estimates are derived from the change in altitude [RTC97]. These tracks are then used 
                                                 
41  For the remainder of this thesis, all references to ACAS/TCAS without detailing a version are understood to 
relate to ACAS II or TCAS II, version 7, respectively. 
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to create a representation of the surrounding traffic for the flight crew (see Section 
3.2.1.2) and analysed to determine potential collision threats. 
 
Depending on aircraft configuration and external conditions, TCAS detection is typi-
cally limited to a range of 30…40 NM and encompasses a maximum vertical range of 
± 9,900 ft (± 3,000 m) above and below ownship [Air05]42. TCAS ranges are fairly ac-
curate and usually determined with errors less than 50 m. However, the bearing er-
ror may be quite large: for elevation angles within ± 10°, the maximum permissible 
bearing error is 27°, and it may be as high as 45° for higher elevation values [RTC97]. 
 
3.2.1.1.2 Conflict Detection and Resolution 
By extrapolating the acquired tracks for the surrounding traffic, TCAS calculates the 
Closest Point of Approach (CPA) and the estimated time τ before reaching this point 
for each intruder. Alerts are generated if the CPA for an intruder is within a certain τ 
and altitude threshold such that it might represent a collision hazard. To take into 
account the situation where aircraft tracks converge with low closure rates, there are 
additionally small fixed minimum distances (< 2,500 m) at which alerts are triggered 
irrespective of τ. For aircraft not reporting altitude, it is assumed that they are flying 
at the same altitude as ownship. 
 
TCAS features two alert levels. It typically first generates a so-called Traffic Advisory 
(TA), a caution alert that there is potentially conflicting traffic. If the collision threat 
becomes real, TCAS determines an appropriate vertical evasive manoeuvre and trig-
gers a Resolution Advisory (RA) warning, which identifies the intruder causing the 
conflict as well as the vertical manoeuvre and vertical rate required to resolve the 
conflict. In certain situations, depending on the geometry of the encounter or the 
quality and age of the vertical track data, an RA may be delayed or not selected at all. 
RAs are only generated for intruders reporting altitude. 
The decision whether a Traffic Advi-
sory or a Resolution Advisory alert is 
triggered essentially depends on the 
τ and relative altitude values pre-
sented in Figure 19. 
The τ thresholds for triggering TA or 
RA alerts are dependent on aircraft 
altitude and vertical separation with 
the intruder at the CPA to obtain an 
optimum balance between efficient 
protection and a limitation of unnec-
essary alerts. To achieve this, seven 
discrete TCAS Sensitivity Levels (SL) have been defined, as shown in Figure 19. Sen-
sitivity Level 2 only triggers Traffic Advisories for τ ≤ 20 s. Sensitivity Level 1 can 
only be selected manually by the crew (see below) and constitutes a special case, 
since TCAS interrogations are entirely inhibited. 
                                                 
42  The required minimum values are 14 NM and ± 3,000 ft (± 1,000 m) [RTC97]. 
 
Figure 19: τ thresholds for TCAS TA and RA 
alerts as function of altitude [Air05] 
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The collision avoidance logic used in determining nature and strength of the vertical 
evasive manoeuvre for Resolution Advisories is very complex due to the numerous 
special conditions. Additional complexity originates from the fact that TCAS is capa-
ble of handling multiple threat encounters. An exhaustive description of the TCAS 
logic can be found in Volume 2 of DO-185A [RTC97]. 
 
For intruders identified as threats, an appropriate Resolution Advisory evasive ma-
noeuvre is determined, depending on the precise geometry of the encounter and a 
variety of other factors, such as range/altitude thresholds and aircraft performance. 
The evasive manoeuvre eventually chosen is instructed using one of the aural an-
nunciations in Table 3, and the vertical rate range required to obtain safe separation 
is indicated on the vertical speed indicator, as detailed in Section 3.2.1.2 below. 
Initially, TCAS will issue positive instructions, i.e. instruct a vertical rate to be flown, 
typically ± 1,500 ft/min. If necessary, e.g. if one of the flight crews involved fails to 
respond to the alert, the initial RA will be modified as required. This may result in 
negative instructions, e.g. in limiting the vertical speed, an increase of the climb or 
sink rate to 2,500 ft per minute. Even a complete reversal of the RA sense is possible. 
Eventually, when safe separation has been achieved, an explicit ‘CLEAR OF 
CONFLICT’ advisory is issued [FAA00, RTC97]. 
 
All Resolution Advisories are automatically converted into Traffic Advisories below 
1,100 ft (340 m) radio altitude in climb and 900 ft (270 m) in descent. Furthermore, 
any TCAS callouts are inhibited below 500 ft (150 m) radio altitude. Additionally, in 
case of degraded performance (e.g. engine failure) or when operating in the vicinity 
of closely spaced runways, the flight crew can manually select a TCAS operational 
mode allowing only Traffic Advisories (Sensitivity Level 2). In this case, τ is set to a 
fixed value of 20 s, irrespective of altitude, and no vertical speed commands are gen-
erated. This TA-only mode is typically also selected automatically in the presence of 
the higher-prioritized windshear, stall or Terrain Awareness and Warning System 
(TAWS) warnings; in this case, all audio callouts are inhibited [Air05]. 
 
3.2.1.1.3 Coordination of Resolution Advisories 
TCAS is capable of coordinating conflict resolution with other TCAS-equipped air-
craft. To achieve this, the vertical sense selected for conflict resolution will be trans-
mitted in negative form. As an example, the other aircraft will be sent a ‘DON’T 
CLIMB’ complement if ownship TCAS intends to solve the conflict by climbing, in 
order to restrict the other aircraft’s choice of vertical sense. 
Since TCAS-equipped aircraft will, for the vast majority of cases, classify each other 
as threats at slightly different points in time, coordination is usually straightforward: 
the first aircraft selects and transmits its geometry-based sense and, slightly later, the 
second aircraft, taking into account the first aircraft’s coordination message, selects 
and transmits the opposite sense. In certain special cases such as simultaneous coor-
dination, both aircraft may select and transmit a sense independently based on the 
perceived encounter geometry. If these senses turn out to be incompatible, the air-
craft with the higher Mode S address will reverse its sense, displaying and announc-
ing the reversed RA to the pilot [RTC97]. 
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3.2.1.2 Flight Crew Interface 
The flight crew interface of TCAS encompasses three major components, the traffic 
display, a control panel and means of presenting resolution advisories. 
 
3.2.1.2.1 Traffic Display 
The TCAS traffic display is in-
tended to aid pilots in the visual 
acquisition of traffic, including the 
differentiation of intruder threat 
levels, to provide situational aware-
ness and to instil confidence in the 
presented resolution advisories. 
The traffic display function must be 
capable of displaying at least eight 
other aircraft, called ‘intruders’ in 
TCAS terminology. Since all traffic 
tracked by TCAS is ranked by the 
collision avoidance logic, intruders 
are sent to the display in a priori-
tized order, thus ensuring that 
those intruders most relevant to collision avoidance are displayed. 
Traffic is displayed in relation to a symbol reflecting ownship position44, on a display 
featuring range rings, see Figure 21. The representation of other traffic is typically 
limited to a vertical volume of ± 2700 ft, and the symbology used depends on alert 
state and proximity of the corresponding traffic, as shown in Figure 20. 
 
 
Figure 21: Airbus A320 family EFIS with TCAS traffic presented on ND 
                                                 
43  The preferred colour, where specified, is underlined. 
44  DO-185A specifies cyan as the preferred colour for the ownship symbol, but neither Airbus (yellow), Boeing 
(magenta), Bombardier nor Embraer (white) comply with this standard. However, at least the basic require-
ment that ownship symbol must be coloured differently than other/proximate traffic is fulfilled. 
 
 
 
Other Traffic: Basic TCAS traffic sym-
bol, a white43 or cyan diamond. 
 
 
 
 
Proximate Traffic: Traffic within 5 NM 
horizontally and 1500 ft vertically, a 
filled white or cyan diamond. 
 
 
 
 
Traffic Advisory: All traffic for which a 
TA is pertinent shall be presented by an 
amber or yellow circle.  
 
 
 
 
Resolution Advisory: Traffic causing a 
resolution advisory shall be indicated by 
a red square. 
Figure 20: TCAS symbology (after [RTC97]) 
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Traffic symbols are supplemented by a two-digit altitude data tag in the same colour 
as the intruder symbol, indicating the altitude of the intruder aircraft relative to own-
ship in hundreds of feet. For traffic above the own aircraft, the tag is placed above the 
traffic symbol and preceded by a ‘+’, whereas other aircraft below ownship feature 
the tag below the symbol with a ‘–‘ as prefix. For traffic at the same altitude, ‘00’ is 
displayed, and the position of the tag depends on whether the respective traffic has 
closed in from above or below45. The absence of the altitude data tag indicates a non-
altitude reporting intruder. Optionally, on pilot selection, the reported intruder alti-
tude may be indicated in lieu of the relative altitude. Actual altitude tags are be posi-
tioned above or below the traffic symbol in a manner consistent with the relative alti-
tude data tags. If other traffic is climbing or descending with a rate of 500 ft/min or 
more, an upward or downward arrow in the same colour as the intruder symbol is 
displayed to the right of the symbol. 
 
In case bearing information is unavailable for traffic generating either a TA or RA 
alert, alpha-numeric information is presented on the traffic display for up to two in-
truders, usually centred below the ownship symbol. Information is presented in the 
format threat level – range (in NM) – altitude (in 100 ft, consistent with abso-
lute/relative altitude setting) and, if applicable, an intruder vertical speed arrow. As 
an example, “TA 5.2 –06↑” represents an intruder causing a TA at 5.2 NM with a rela-
tive altitude of –600 feet, which is climbing with 500 ft/min or more46. 
 
With a TA or RA in progress, the aircraft causing the alert and all proximate traffic 
within the selected display range is shown. However, it is recommended that all 
other traffic is displayed as well to increase the probability that pilots visually ac-
quire the aircraft actually causing the alert. 
 
3.2.1.2.2 TCAS Control Panel 
Flight crews must be provided with 
controls to select an automatic mode of 
operation for ACAS, a mode in which 
only TAs can be issued (SL 2), and a 
standby mode (SL 1), which inhibits 
interrogation of other traffic. Controls 
for ACAS may be integrated with 
those for the Mode S transponder, 
provided that a transponder-only 
mode is available [ICA02a].  
On Airbus A320 family and A330/340 aircraft, TCAS operation and the display of 
TCAS traffic are controlled by the so-called ATC/TCAS panel located in the centre 
pedestal, cf. Figure 22, which integrates transponder and ACAS controls. Apart from 
controls for the TCAS mode of operation as described above (1), the panel contains 
another selector (2) providing the crew with three pre-defined settings to adjust the 
                                                 
45  If no trend information is available, the co-altitude altitude data tag is displayed below the traffic symbol. 
46  For a non-altitude reporting intruder, the corresponding part of the string is removed, i.e. “TA 5.2” would be 
displayed in the above example. 
 
Figure 22: Airbus A320 ATC/TCAS Control 
Panel [Air05] 
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vertical extension of the traffic “volume” to be displayed, ‘ABOVE’, ‘ALL’ (also 
called ‘NORMAL’ on some other aircraft) and ‘BELOW’; turning the selector to 
“THREAT” will only show traffic in case a TA or RA alert is present [Air05]. 
 
3.2.1.2.3 Presentation of Alerts 
Resolution Advisory Type Aural Annunciation Visual Alert47 
Corrective Climb Climb, Climb CLIMB 
Corrective Descend Descend, Descend DESCEND 
Altitude Crossing Climb 
(Corrective) 
Climb, Crossing Climb — 
Climb, Crossing Climb CROSSING CLIMB 
Altitude Crossing Descend 
(Corrective) 
Descend, Crossing Descend — 
Descend, Crossing Descend CROSSING DESCEND 
Corrective Reduce Climb Adjust Vertical Speed, Adjust ADJUST V/S 
Corrective Reduce Descent Adjust Vertical Speed, Adjust ADJUST V/S 
Reversal to a Climb (Corrective) Climb, Climb NOW — Climb, Climb NOW CLIMB NOW 
Reversal to a Descend (Corrective) Descend, Descend NOW — Descend, Descend NOW DESCEND NOW 
Increase Climb (Corrective) Increase Climb, Increase Climb INCREASE CLIMB 
Increase Descent (Corrective) Increase Descent, Increase Descent INCREASE DESCENT 
Initial Preventive RAs Monitor Vertical Speed MONITOR V/S 
Non-crossing, maintain rate RAs 
(Corrective) Maintain Vertical Speed, Maintain MAINTAIN V/S 
Altitude crossing, maintain rate RAs 
(Corrective) 
Maintain Vertical Speed, 
Crossing Maintain MAINTAIN V/S CROSSING 
Weakening of Corrective RAs Adjust Vertical Speed, Adjust ADJUST V/S 
Clear of Conflict Clear of Conflict CLEAR OF CONFLICT 
Table 3: TCAS RA Aural Annunciations and Visual Alerts [RTC97] 
 
Table 3 details the aural annunciations for the different types of Resolution Adviso-
ries. In some implementations, aural annunciations are supplemented by textual 
messages (essentially repeating the callout) at a prominent location in the flight deck. 
In the presence of multiple RAs, the presenta-
tion of alerts to the flight crew is combined, 
such that the most demanding active RA is 
displayed. Figure 23 shows a TCAS vertical 
speed range indicated on the vertical speed 
scale of a PFD. The presentation details 
whether an RA requires corrective action, or 
merely warns against initiating an action that 
could lead to inadequate vertical separation.  
All positive RAs are displayed with a green 
“fly-to” indication detailing the corrective 
action. By contrast, vertical speed ranges to be 
avoided, including all negative RAs, are rep-
resented in red [RTC97]. In the example 
shown, the flight crew would have to (main-
tain) descent with 2,500 ft/min. 
                                                 
47 A visual indication of these text messages is not mandatory. 
 
Figure 23: TCAS vertical speed com-
mand indication on a PFD [FAA00] 
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3.2.2 Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B) 
Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B) is a function enabling air-
craft, irrespective of whether they are airborne or on the ground, and other relevant 
airport surface traffic, to periodically transmit their state vector (horizontal and verti-
cal position, horizontal and vertical velocity) and other surveillance information for 
use by other traffic in the vicinity or users on the ground, such as Air Traffic Control 
or the airline. This surveillance information, which is dependent on data obtained 
from various onboard data sources, such as the air data or navigation system, is 
broadcast automatically and does not require any pilot action or external stimulus. 
Likewise, the aircraft or vehicle originating the broadcast does not receive any feed-
back on whether other users within range of this broadcast, either aircraft or ground-
based, decode and process the ADS-B surveillance information or not. ADS-B was 
conceived to support improved use of airspace, reduced ceiling and visibility restric-
tions, improved surface surveillance, and enhanced safety, such as conflict manage-
ment [RTC03]. As an example, ADS-B may extend surveillance coverage and provide 
ATS services in airspace currently not served by radar-based surveillance systems, or 
support advanced concepts, such as Free Flight, in all airspace while maintaining a 
high level of flight safety [RTC02]. 
There will be ADS-B mandates in Australia, Canada, Europe and the United States in 
the foreseeable future [Eur08b, FAA07b], since ADS-B is a core technology for the 
future ATM concepts currently under development, as discussed in Section 3.5.3. 
 
3.2.2.1 Technical Realisation and Capabilities 
In principle, ADS-B defines a set of data to be exchanged and is independent of any 
particular type of data link. The only requirement on the data link is that it must be 
capable of all-weather operations and fulfil the basic ADS-B capacity and integrity 
requirements. ADS-B system capacity was derived based on 2020 traffic estimates for 
the Los Angeles basin. It is assumed that, for a high density scenario, there will be 
approximately 2,700 other aircraft within 400 NM, of which 1,180 are within the core 
area of 225 NM, and 225 on the ground. The nominal ADS-B range is between 
10…120 NM, depending on the type of emitter. ADS-B integrity, i.e. the probability 
of an undetected error in an ADS-B message although source data are correct, must 
be 10-6 or better on a per report basis [RTC02]. 
 
3.2.2.1.1 Implementation via Mode S Extended Squitter 
The ADS-B implementation that will eventually become an international standard is 
based on the Mode S transponder. Apart from the normal, periodically transmitted 
Mode S squitters (DF = 11), which are, among others, used by multi-lateration instal-
lations and ACAS, there is an additional 112 bit Mode S Extended Squitter (ES) mes-
sage (DF = 17), which is broadcast via the 1090 MHz downlink frequency48. Apart 
from the broadcasting aircraft’s unique ICAO 24 bit address and a capability code, it 
contains a 56 bit message field (ME) that can be filled with one of the following sub-
messages, according to the schedule and the conditions specified below [RTC03]: 
                                                 
48 For this reason, the Mode S implementation of ADS-B is commonly referred to as “1090 ES”. 
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 Airborne Position Message (0.4…0.6 s49): As soon as the aircraft is airborne, it 
automatically transmits its position, encoded via latitude/longitude, and altitude. 
Position information is supplemented by a Horizontal Containment Radius Limit 
(RC), expressed via the Navigation Integrity Category (NIC). 
 Surface Position Message (0.4…0.6 s): While the aircraft is on the ground50, it 
broadcasts this message containing a specifically encoded ground speed, heading 
or track, latitude /longitude and the Containment Radius (RC), instead of the 
Airborne Position Message. If the aircraft’s position changes by less than 10 m in 
30 s, the transmission interval is increased to 4.8 … 5.2 s. With increasing ground 
speed, the quantisation interval increases from 0.125 kts to 5 kts, and the highest 
encodable ground speed is 175 kts. Up to 70 kts, speed resolution is 1 kt or better; 
this halves until 100 kts, and speed resolution degrades to 5 kts above 100 kts. 
 Aircraft Identification and Type Message (4.8…5.2 s): Irrespective of flight 
status, a message containing an 8 character field for the aircraft flight-plan call-
sign (e.g. an airline flight number) if available, or the aircraft registration, is 
broadcast. For surface vehicles, the radio call sign is used. The message also con-
tains the ADS-B emitter category, permitting a distinction between aircraft (in-
cluding different wake vortex categories), gliders/balloons and vehicles, where 
e.g. service and emergency vehicles can be distinguished. When the surface posi-
tion message is broadcast at the low rate, the transmission rate of this message is 
lowered to once every 9.8…10.2 s. 
 Airborne Velocity Message (0.4…0.6 s): While airborne, ADS-B equipped aircraft 
transmit their vertical and horizontal velocity, including information on the 
Navigation Accuracy Category (NACV). For subsonic aircraft, horizontal speed is 
encoded using heading/track and groundspeed, providing a resolution of 1 knot 
between 0 and 1021 kts. 
 Target State and Status (conditional, 1.3…1.4 s): This message conveys an air-
craft’s target heading/track, speed, vertical mode and altitude. In addition, it con-
tains a flag detailing ACAS operational status, and an emergency flag that can be 
used to announce presence and type of an emergency (i.e. medical, minimum 
fuel, or unlawful interference). However, the message is only transmitted when 
the aircraft is airborne, and if target status information is available and valid. 
 Aircraft Operational Status (conditional, every 2.4…2.6 s): This message pro-
vides an exhaustive overview of an aircraft’s operational status, including both 
equipment aspects (such as the availability of a CDTI) and navigation perform-
ance, e.g. the Navigation Integrity Category (NIC), the Navigation Accuracy 
Category (NAC) and the Surveillance Integrity Level (SIL). This is intended to en-
able surveillance applications to determine whether the reported position etc. has 
an acceptable accuracy and integrity for the intended function. On the ground, 
the transmission interval is reduced to 4.8…5.2 seconds, but can also be increased 
for 24 seconds following a significant change. 
 
                                                 
49  The ADS-B message update rate specified in this fashion means that messages are sent at random intervals (in 
relation to the preceding transmission), which are uniformly distributed over the specified time range, using a 
time quantization of no more than 15 ms [ICA02a, RTC03]. 
50  Typically, an aircraft’s air/ground logic or switch is used to determine that it is on the ground. Alternatively, 
with either groundspeed or airspeed smaller than 100 kts, or radio altitudes below 50 ft, the aircraft is sup-
posed to be on the ground, and the Surface Position Message is broadcast [RTC06]. 
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In addition, besides status and test messages, several further formats are envisaged 
for future growth potential, such as the exchange of trajectory data. Non-transponder 
broadcasters, such as airport vehicles, use a different downlink format (DF = 18), and 
DF=19 is reserved for military aircraft and applications. 
Since transponders must currently be limited to 6.2 ADS-B messages per second, 
there are on average two Airborne Position Messages, two Airborne Velocity mes-
sages and 0.2 Identification messages, supplemented by up to two event-driven mes-
sages. Position messages have priority over velocity, identification and conditional 
messages [RTC03]. 
 
For surface operations, a positional accuracy of 2.5 m (root mean square, from the 
certified navigation centre of the aircraft) and a velocity accuracy of 0.3 m/s (RMS) 
are required. The ADS-B latency of the reported state vector information must be less 
than 1.2 s with 95% confidence, except for high accuracy/integrity reports 
(NACP ≥ 10 or NIC ≥ 9), where latency is required to be below 0.4 s [RTC02]. 
 
3.2.2.1.2 Limitations 
The main issue with the 1090 MHz Extended Squitter ADS-B implementation is the 
undesirable overlap with other ATC transponder transmissions. Although sophisti-
cated message reception techniques detailed in DO-260A provide a high probability 
of correct reception even when the desired squitter is overlapped with an interfering 
Air Traffic Control Radar Beacon System (ATCRBS) reply of equal or greater power. 
Nonetheless, in some high interference environments, such as Los Angeles or Frank-
furt, there is a relatively high probability that the desired squitter signal will be over-
lapped with two or more ATCRBS replies, thus reducing the effective air-to-air range 
as a result of this interference [RTC03]. 
 
3.2.2.1.3 Alternative realisations and variants 
This section gives a very brief overview of alternative ADS-B realisations and vari-
ants that are considered for General Aviation or were tested as alternatives to Mode 
1090 ES [RTC02]. 
U n i v e r s a l  A c c e s s  T r a n s c e i v e r  ( U A T )  
In the United States, the so-called Universal Access Transceiver (UAT) is foreseen as 
the general aviation ADS-B implementation, because the associated equipment is 
more affordable than the 1090 ES solution. UATs operate at a frequency of 978 MHz. 
A D S - R  
The fact that two different ADS-B implementations, UAT and Mode 1090 ES, will co-
exist in the United States for different types of aircraft operating in the same airspace 
raises the question of how particularly onboard ADS-B users will be capable of ob-
taining a complete traffic surveillance picture. The solution envisaged by the FAA is 
to use ADS-B Re-Broadcast (ADS-R). Ground-based transceivers will be used to 
broadcast ADS-B messages received via Mode S Extended Squitter over the UAT fre-
quency, and vice versa. Conceptually, ADS-R is therefore sometimes seen within the 
scope of Traffic Information Service – Broadcast (TIS-B), cf. Section 3.2.3. 
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V D L  M o d e  4  
An ADS-B implementation using VDL Mode 4 was primarily used in European re-
search programmes, such as the NEAN project family [RTC00a]. The obvious advan-
tage of a VDL Mode 4 solution is that it relieves the Mode S channel, which might 
become increasingly crowded in terminal airspace (cf. Section 3.2.2.1.2), since it uses 
an entirely different frequency band. However, this results in the obvious disadvan-
tage that additional radio equipment and antennas are required for an ADS-B im-
plementation via ADS-B, which is the reason why the 1090 ES solution was eventu-
ally favoured and has become the de-factor standard. 
  
3.2.2.2 Proposed Applications 
3.2.2.2.1 Cockpit Display of Traffic Information (CDTI) 
The basic ADS-B application from an onboard perspective is a CDTI, which is mainly 
intended to improve awareness of proximate traffic, both in the air and on the 
ground. In addition, depending on how complete the coverage of surrounding traffic 
is, a CDTI may also serve as an aid to visual acquisition, thus supporting normal “see 
and avoid” operations. A CDTI is not limited to a single or particular source of traffic 
data. Therefore, information from TIS-B or TCAS can be integrated as well. 
It is important to note that a CDTI is conceptually not limited to traffic presentation, 
but can also be used to visualise weather, terrain, airspace structure, obstructions, 
detailed airport maps or any other static information deemed relevant for the in-
tended function. Last but not least, a CDTI is required for a number of envisaged fu-
ture onboard applications (see below), particularly Free Flight operations [RTC02]. 
 
3.2.2.2.2 Airborne Collision Avoidance 
ADS-B is seen as a valuable technology to enhance operation of Airborne Collision 
Avoidance Systems (ACAS), e.g. by increased surveillance performance, more accu-
rate trajectory prediction, and an improved collision avoidance logic. In particular, 
the availability of intent information in ADS-B is seen as an important means of re-
ducing the number of unnecessary alerts. Furthermore, DO-242A proposes extended 
collision avoidance below 1000 ft above ground level and the ability to detect Run-
way Incursions as potential ADS-B applications and benefits [RTC02]. 
 
3.2.2.2.3 Conflict Management and Airspace Deconfliction 
Aircraft conflict management functions are envisaged to be used in support of coop-
erative separation whenever responsibility has been delegated to the aircraft. Air-
space deconfliction based on the exchange of intent information will be used for stra-
tegic separation. Since pilot and controller share the same surveillance picture, reso-
lution manoeuvres are expected to be better coordinated [RTC02]. 
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3.2.2.2.4 ATS Conformance Monitoring 
ATS conformance monitoring is the process of ensuring that aircraft maintain on the 
assigned or agreed trajectory, both in the air or on the ground, with an acceptable 
degree of deviation. Conformance monitoring occurs for all controlled aircraft or air-
space, and includes monitoring of simultaneous approaches or departures to/from 
multiple runways and surface operations [RTC02]. 
 
3.2.2.2.5 Other Applications 
Other potential ADS-B applications mentioned in DO-242 A include general aviation 
operations control, improved search and rescue, enhanced flight following, and addi-
tional functions addressing Aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighting (ARFF) or other airport 
ground vehicle operational needs [RTC02]. 
 
3.2.3 Traffic Information Service – Broadcast (TIS-B) 
The fundamental idea behind TIS-B is to extend the use of traffic surveillance data 
readily available on the ground, which are typically derived from ATC surveillance 
radars, multi-lateration installations or other ground-based equipment, to enhanced 
traffic situational awareness and surveillance applications aboard aircraft or airport 
vehicles. Essentially, TIS-B is therefore a function in which transmitters on the 
ground provide aircraft, airport vehicles or other users with information about 
nearby traffic [RTC03]. 
 
When based on ATC surveillance data, TIS-B enables pilots, vehicle drivers and con-
trollers to share the same traffic picture, which is important in the context of ATM 
concepts promulgating collaborative decision making. Likewise, TIS-B addresses the 
essential problem of non-cooperative traffic, and thus the issues concerning the com-
pleteness and quality of the traffic surveillance picture available onboard, particu-
larly in a transition phase with ADS-B equipage levels still low. In fact, TIS-B is some-
times regarded only as an interim or back-up solution [RTC03]. 
 
Apart from ground-based surveillance sensors, TIS-B information might also be 
based on received ADS-B Messages originally transmitted on a different data link 
[RTC03]; from this perspective, TIS-B would include ADS-R. For the purpose of this 
thesis, however, these services are considered separately, under the notion that 
ADS-R is a simple repeater function, whereas TIS-B typically involves sophisticated 
sensor data fusion. 
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3.2.3.1 Technical Realisation and Capabilities 
Originally, like ADS-B, TIS-B is a data exchange concept not specifying a particular 
data link or exchange protocol. However, as for ADS-B, the use of the Mode S data 
link capability is defined in RTCA DO-260A [RTC03]. 
 
Consequently, TIS-B data are broadcast via the Mode S downlink frequency of 1090 
MHz, using 112 bit messages (DF = 18). TIS-B ground-to-air transmissions use essen-
tially the same signal formats as 1090 MHz ADS-B and can therefore be accepted by a 
1090 MHz ADS-B receiver: 
 
 TIS-B Fine Airborne Position Message: corresponds to the ADS-B Airborne Posi-
tion Message 
 TIS-B Fine Surface Position Message: corresponds to the ADS-B Surface Position 
Message 
 TIS-B Identification and Type Message: corresponds to the ADS-B Identification 
and Type Message, but will only be used for targets with a 24 bit aircraft address 
 TIS-B Airborne Velocity Message: corresponds to the ADS-B Airborne Velocity 
Message 
 TIS-B Coarse Airborne Position Message: this message does not correspond to 
any ADS-B message. 
 TIS-B Coarse Airborne Velocity Message: this message does not correspond to 
any ADS-B message. 
 
Technically, the main difference between ADS-B and TIS-B is that the aircraft address 
field can also contain a 12 bit Mode A address and a 12 bit track file number in case 
the target transmitted via TIS-B is not equipped with a Mode S-transponder and was 
acquired by radar. 
 
Each TIS-B message contains information on a single aircraft or vehicle, i.e. the 
Mode S message load increases dramatically in high-density airspace. 
Another concern related to TIS-B is that its update rate will typically be significantly 
lower than the ADS-B update rate, because secondary surveillance radars, depending 
on their rotation speed, only provide updates every 5-12 seconds. Additionally, it is 
believed that latency effects will limit the operational usability of TIS-B data. 
 
TIS-B should not be confused with Traffic Information Service (TIS), another Mode S 
data link service capable of providing information on up to eight traffic targets 
within 5 nautical miles and 1,200 ft (370 m) AGL, which seems to have become obso-
lete with the advent of TIS-B [RTC97a, RTC98]. With a possible range quantisation of 
1/8 NM (~ 230 m) and bearing encoded in 6° steps, TIS is obviously not a suitable 
source for aerodrome traffic surveillance. 
 
3.2.3.2 Proposed Applications 
The proposed applications are essentially the same as for ADS-B; see Section 3.2.2.2. 
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3.3 Onboard Systems for Runway Incursion Avoidance 
3.3.1 Honeywell’s Runway Awareness and Advisory System (RAAS) 
In the domain of alerting systems, Honeywell offers a Runway Awareness and Advi-
sory System (RAAS), packaged as an add-on to EGPWS that provides aural adviso-
ries and alerts with respect to runway operations. The RAAS provides the flight crew 
with five ‘routine’ advisories intended to reduce the risk of a Runway Incursion, 
three of which are triggered regularly during normal operations. These include an 
“Approaching Runway” and “On Runway” aural advisory that is immediately fol-
lowed by an announcement of the corresponding runway identifier. Furthermore, 
the third routine aural advisory announces the runway distance remaining. Addi-
tionally, a feature intended to prevent flight crews from taking off on a taxiway pro-
vides an alert if a certain speed limit is exceeded outside the runway [Hon03]. Last 
but not least, the system is also capable of alerting flight crews if the available run-
way distance is not sufficient for take-off. 
 
One of the main features of RAAS is the fact that it interfaces with the flight crew 
solely through the audio channel. This poses the risk of an undesirable level of inter-
ference with crew procedures during the taxi phase (check lists, cabin report etc.) and 
communication with ATC over R/T. In addition to this, the advisories are unspecific 
and do not take into account the operational situation and clearances, i.e. the crew 
will hear the “Approaching Runway” and “On Runway” audio messages irrespec-
tive of whether they are cleared to enter the runway in question or not. This might, 
eventually, result in crew complacency towards the advisory. 
 
3.3.2 NASA’s Runway Incursion Prevention System (RIPS) 
Last but not least, more in the field of research, NASA’s Runway Incursion Preven-
tion System (RIPS) has to be mentioned. Using the FAA definition of Runway Incur-
sions as a starting point, it focuses on the detection of potential traffic collision haz-
ards on the runway and provides visual and aural alerts in case of conflict. 
The underlying Runway Safety Monitor (RSM) algorithm uses information on the 
runway and a customizable, three-dimensional protection zone around it to deter-
mine whether ownship is in conflict with other ADS-B equipped traffic on the same 
runway, a crossing runway or an intersecting flight path. If this is the case, a single 
alert is issued irrespective of the hazardous situation triggering it, and the system is 
not yet capable of providing conflict resolution guidance [Gre06]. 
 
Alerts when deviating from a taxi route assigned via CPDLC or crossing a holding 
position without appropriate clearance were briefly reported in connection with the 
RIPS recently, but these seem to have played a minor role in recent flight test evalua-
tions carried out with the RIPS [Jon05]. Flight test results for the RIPS indicate that 
onboard alerting for conflicting runway traffic is feasible, and RIPS is certainly one of 
the most advanced projects in this domain, with first flight tests back in 2000. 
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3.3.3 Honeywell/Sensis Uplink of ASDE-X Alerts via Mode S 
ATC surveillance systems like AMASS or the ASDE-X Safety Logic are capable of 
alerting air traffic controllers of potential Runway Incursions, see Sections 3.5.1.3 and 
3.5.1.4. Currently, however, these alerts are presented to controllers only, who must 
subsequently warn pilots via voice, which results in less than optimal response times. 
 
In an effort to overcome this limitation, Honeywell and Sensis demonstrated the fea-
sibility of up-linking Runway Incursion alerts generated on the ground by the 
ASDE-X Safety Logic directly to the flight deck in August 2007.  
With the demonstrated technology, a Runway Incursion detected by ASDE-X will 
not only be conveyed to the air traffic controller, but also be up-linked to the aircraft 
involved in the conflict via unused existing Mode S message fields. Upon receipt, the 
modified TCAS software aboard the aircraft will trigger an aural alert to warn pilots 
of the potential Runway Incursion. Details on the callouts or operational procedures 
envisaged for using the system are currently not publicly known, and it appears that 
there are currently no plans to develop a product based on this technology demon-
stration. 
 
A benefit of the demonstrated solution is that it allows a simultaneous presentation 
of Runway Incursion alerts to both air traffic controllers and pilots. An additional 
advantage of this solution is that it uses existing ground and avionics systems, which 
limits the required equipment changes to software modifications. However, a presen-
tation of the conflicting traffic in the cockpit is not possible, and the alerting capabil-
ity would initially only be available at the 35 high traffic density airports that are in 
the progress of receiving ASDE-X installations [Sen07]. 
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3.4 Existing and Emerging Data Link Functionality 
 
This section is dedicated to a brief review of existing and emerging data link func-
tionality currently in use to exchange information between aircraft systems and 
ground installations. Generally, the use of data link services aboard aircraft can be 
grouped in two categories, communication with Airline Operations Control (AOC) 
and interfacing data link Air Traffic Services (ATS), the latter consisting of Control-
ler-Pilot Data Link Communication (CPDLC), Automatic Dependent Surveillance 
(ADS) and Data Link Flight Information Services (FIS). Along with aviation routine 
weather reports (METAR), D-ATIS is currently the only data link FIS of practical 
relevance [ICA99]. In virtually all cases, the introduction of data link communication 
is driven by the need to decrease frequency congestion and communication work-
load. The latter also encompasses the automation of routine status messages, as in the 
case of ADS, which enables automated position reporting to ATC based on a Global 
Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) in areas inaccessible to radar surveillance with-
out flight crew interaction. 
 
The usage of data link was pioneered in the domain of AOC communication by the 
Airborne Communications Addressing and Reporting System (ACARS), which was 
introduced in 1978 using a low-speed Very High Frequency (VHF) data link and a 
character-based transmission protocol limited to a bandwidth of 2.4 kBit/s, which is 
also referred to as VHF Digital Link (VDL) Mode A [Air04a]. ACARS applications 
can be customized and may encompass automated on block/off block messages, 
flight plan upload, the exchange of brief text messages between cockpit and AOC, or 
the automatic transmission of maintenance data. Due to bandwidth constraints, an 
alternative VHF data link protocol, VDL Mode 2, nominally operating at 31.5 kBit/s, 
was eventually developed. However, since VHF is limited to line-of-sight coverage 
with a range of approximately 240 NM (440 km) at 30,000ft, additional ACARS im-
plementations via High-Frequency Data Link (HFDL), featuring only 1.8 kBit/s, but 
a range of more than 4000 km and better availability than HF voice, as well SATCOM 
(64 kBit/s or more) were subsequently introduced to satisfy airlines’ worldwide 
communication needs. 
In parallel, the ICAO council tasked its special committee on Future Air Navigation 
Systems (FANS) to make recommendations concerning the upgrade of communica-
tions, navigation and surveillance systems to cope with increasing world wide air 
traffic [Air04b]. Among others, these activities resulted in the definition of a stan-
dardised Aeronautical Telecommunication Network (ATN) for ATS applications, 
also based ob VDL Mode 2. Nevertheless, the development and introduction of the 
ATN was delayed; it is currently entering service in Europe. Consequently, ACARS 
has been used in the meantime to obtain ATIS and METAR information from ATS 
via AOC. Besides, the ACARS infrastructure is even used for initial CPDLC applica-
tions [Air04a]. 
 
The following two sections give a brief overview of the current status of the two data 
link applications of highest relevance for this thesis, CPDLC and the retrieval of in-
formation on the operational environment, which is illustrated using the FANS A/B 
CPDLC implementation (see Figure 25) and D-ATIS as most prominent examples. 
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3.4.1 CPDLC and Future Air Navigation System (FANS) 
Concerning the interaction with Air Traffic Services, CPDLC and ADS first emerged 
in an operational context over the South Pacific Ocean, cf. [Bil96], an area inaccessible 
to the means of Air Traffic Control commonly employed in continental airspace. Pre-
viously, the absence of radar surveillance and the fact that aircraft operate beyond 
the range of VHF stations required procedural ATC using HF radio, which only has 
very poor voice quality due to fading, and relying on crew reports at certain pre-
defined waypoints. This resulted in an inflexible system necessitating very large 
safety distances between adjacent aircraft. 
By contrast, CPDLC permits to sustain data link communications between pilot and 
controller, particularly in areas where voice communications are difficult. Like con-
ventional R/T, CPDLC is based on the exchange of standardized message elements, 
which can be combined to complex messages if necessary. The philosophy that the 
crew is obliged to read back all safety-related ATC clearances is retained in a CPDLC 
environment [ICA01a] by the implementation of a dedicated acknowledgement 
process [FAN06]. The approximately 180 pre-formatted CPDLC message elements 
defined for the FANS A (via ACARS) and B (ATN) implementations are analogues of 
the existing ICAO phraseology, with the important difference that CPDLC messages 
are machine-readable. This is achieved by allocating a certain identification code to 
each individual message element, and permitting certain parameters such as flight 
level, heading or waypoint names to be transmitted separately as variables [FAN06]. 
Until today, the main application of CPDLC is in oceanic airspace. Besides, it is 
widely used in conveying pre-departure clearances to aircraft at airports to avoid 
radio frequency congestion and to reduce the chances of errors in the clearance de-
livery process. It is important to note that operational use is currently limited to 
fields where the interaction between pilot and controller is not time critical. 
In Europe, CPDLC is currently envisaged as supplementary means of communica-
tion and not intended to replace voice as primary means of communication. Rather, it 
will be used for an exchange of routine, non-time critical instructions, clearances and 
requests between flight crew and controller. 
 
 
Figure 24: Location of DCDU equipment in an Airbus A330 cockpit 
© www.christiangalliker.com 
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Figure 25: FANS B architecture for CPDLC and AOC communication (after [Air08]) 
Initially, it will be applied to upper airspace control above FL 285 [Eur09]. Accord-
ingly, initial trials using the ATN are taking place at Maastricht UAC. From 2013 to 
2015, the ATM-side introduction will take place. For aircraft, a forward fit of new 
airframes is foreseen from 2011, and retrofit by 2015. In any case, the operational de-
cision to use CPDLC rests with the flight crew and the controller. 
Figure 25 shows a typical FANS B architecture. Aboard the aircraft, a so-called Air 
Traffic Services Unit (ATSU) manages communication with AOC and ATC via the 
various available data links, some of which are customer options. The main differ-
ence compared to FANS A is that communication with ATC occurs via the ATN in-
stead of ACARS. In the cockpit, the flight crew is notified of a new incoming ATC 
message by an indicator on the glareshield and a ringing sound. Pilots may then re-
view the ATC instruction and acknowledge it, reject it or ask for more time to assess 
its impact. On the Airbus A320/A330/A340 aircraft families, the so-called Datalink 
Control and Display Unit (DCDU), illustrated in Figure 24, is used to review and ac-
knowledge ATC CDPDLC messages. In case the flight crew need to initialize a re-
quest to ATC, the Multipurpose Control Display Unit (MCDU) is used to compose 
the CPDLC message, which is the forwarded to the DCDU for review prior to trans-
mission [Air08, FAN06]. 
Advantages and drawbacks of CPDLC have been discussed at length for some years. 
CPDLC reduces misunderstandings and errors pertaining to poor voice quality, fad-
ing or language issues, and ensures that flight crews do not erroneously react to in-
structions intended for another aircraft (e.g. due to similar callsigns). Furthermore, 
the possibility to recall messages makes ATC clearances and instructions continu-
ously accessible, and transcription errors are reduced by the possibility to transfer 
CPDLC information directly to the FMS. On the other hand, particularly the prepara-
tion of a request to ATC takes much longer with CPDLC, and any party line informa-
tion (see e.g. Section 2.3.2) is lost. Last but not least, the introduction of CPDLC trans-
fers additional information to the already heavily loaded visual channel [Air04b]. 
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3.4.2 D-ATIS 
According to ICAO Annex 11, Automatic Terminal Information Service (ATIS) has to 
be provided at aerodromes whenever there is a need to reduce frequency congestion 
and air traffic controller workload in the terminal area. ATIS contains information 
pertaining to operations relevant to all aircraft, such as meteorological conditions, 
runway(s) in use and further information which may affect the departure, approach 
and landing phases of flight, thus eliminating the need of transmitting the corre-
sponding items individually to each aircraft as part of ATC communication. ATIS 
messages are updated at fixed intervals (usually 30…60 min) and whenever a change 
of meteorological or operational conditions results in substantial alterations to their 
content. In order to make consecutive ATIS transmissions distinguishable and to en-
able controllers to confirm with flight crews that they have the most recent informa-
tion available, each ATIS broadcast is identified by a single letter of the ICAO spell-
ing alphabet, which is assigned consecutively in alphabetical order [ICA99, ICA01]. 
Conventional ATIS transmits a voice recording typically lasting less than one minute 
over a published VHF frequency in the vicinity of the aerodrome [ICA99]. To ensure 
that broadcasts do not exceed, wherever practicable, 30 seconds, larger airports offer 
different ATIS services for departing and arriving aircraft [ICA01]. Wherever D-ATIS 
and voice ATIS are provided simultaneously, both content and format of the mes-
sages should be identical, which also implies that they must be updated at the same 
time [ICA01]. 
 
Mandatory content encompasses 
aerodrome identification (ICAO), 
a departure or arrival indicator 
and the already mentioned ATIS 
designator, followed by the run-
way-in-use, the types of approach 
to be expected, significant runway 
surface conditions and – if appro-
priate – braking action as well as 
visibility and, when applicable, 
RVR. Furthermore, a summary of 
present weather must be provided, including clouds below 1 500 m (5 000 ft) or be-
low the highest minimum sector altitude (whichever is greater). Besides, any cumu-
lonimbus has to be reported and, if the sky is obscured, vertical visibility when avail-
able. Additionally, surface wind direction and speed, air temperature, dew point 
temperature and altimeter setting need to be provided [ICA01]; see Figure 26 for an 
example. This compulsory information can be supplemented by free-text information 
on significant meteorological phenomena in the approach and climb-out areas, in-
cluding wind shear and observations on recent weather of operational significance. 
It is expected that D-ATIS will result in reduced flight crew workload, because ATIS 
information does not need to be copied by hand any longer, and pilots do not have to 
divert attention from ATC frequencies to listen to the ATIS broadcast. Besides, there 
should be reduced ambiguity in the transmitted information, since D-ATIS elimi-
nates potential misinterpretation resulting from poor transmission quality. Last but 
not least, D-ATIS might increase the accessibility of ATIS information. 
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Figure 26: Sample D-ATIS for Bremen airport 
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3.5 Air Traffic Management Technology and Concepts 
3.5.1 Airport ATC Surveillance Technology 
Air Traffic Controllers are supported in visual traffic acquisition by surveillance 
technologies of varying sophistication, to which this section gives a very short intro-
ductory overview. 
 
3.5.1.1 Surface Movement Radar (SMR) 
In the aerodrome area, an X-band Primary Surveillance Radar (PSR) called Surface 
Movement Radar (SMR) is commonly used to provide situational awareness to the 
controller. However, due to the nature of the environment, the SMR does not provide 
adequate separation awareness in manoeuvres conducted in confined spaces such as 
those in the gate area and in queuing before take-off. As the policy of most airports 
was51 to have transponders turned to standby when aircraft are on ground52, SSR 
techniques were not used at airports [ICA04a]. 
 
3.5.1.2 Airport Surface Detection Equipment (ASDE) 
ASDE is a high resolution ground surveillance radar system capable of displaying 
aircraft and vehicle traffic on the airport surface on one or more displays in the con-
trol tower. The system is designed to augment visual acquisition of traffic to enable 
controllers to detect, locate and track surface activity. ASDE–3 was the first surface 
detection system to become operational [NTS95]. 
 
3.5.1.3 Airport Movement Area Safety System (AMASS) 
AMASS is a software enhancement to the Airport Surface Detection Equipment 
(ASDE), providing a logic for predicting the path of departing and landing aircraft, 
as well as aircraft and/or vehicle movements on runways. When a potential collision 
is detected, visual and auditory alerts to the controller are activated. As an example, 
AMASS will alert controllers to a potential collision when an aircraft or vehicle is oc-
cupying a runway and when arriving or departing aircraft cross a certain threshold 
or attain a certain speed. The system processes surveillance data from ground radar, 
predicting possible conflicts based on the position, velocity, and acceleration of arriv-
ing or departing aircraft and vehicles [NTS07e]. In 2008, AMASS was operational at 
34 airports in the United States [FAA08]. 
                                                 
51  Airports equipped with ASDE-X in the U.S. require pilots to leave the transponder “ON” because ASDE-X 
uses SSR / multi-lateration techniques. 
52  The reason for this is to avoid that aircraft are still displayed as airborne on the SSR used for approach. ICAO 
Document - Annex 10 - Volume 4, Amendment 77 [ICA02a], states as recommendation in § 3.1.2.10.3.10.2 that 
Mode A/C replies should be inhibited when the aircraft is on the ground to prevent interference when in close 
proximity to an interrogator or other aircraft. However, Mode S discretely addressed interrogations do not 
give rise to such interference and may be required for data link communications with aircraft on the airport 
surface. Acquisition of squitter transmissions may be used for passive surveillance of aircraft on the airport 
surface (Mode S multi-lateration). Most modern aircraft have the transponder connected to a Weight-on-
Wheels switch. When the aircraft is on the ground and the transponder set to “ON”, Mode A/C replies are in-
hibited, while the Mode S reply capability as well as extended squitter ADS-B messages remain enabled 
[ARI89]. 
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3.5.1.4 Airport Surface Detection Equipment - Model X (ASDE-X) 
ASDE-X is a multi-sensor next-generation surface surveillance system which the 
FAA is acquiring for airports in the United States. At the end of 2008, it was in use at 
12 airports and projected to be operational at 35 airports by the end of 2010 [FAA08]. 
The system is designed to provide high resolution, short-range, clutter free surveil-
lance and identification information on both moving and stationary traffic located on 
or near the airport surface under all weather and visibility conditions. 
ASDE–X introduces multi-lateration transponder-based surveillance capability, both 
ground-based and airborne, which allows the system to provide much more reliable 
overall surveillance than the ASDE–3 AMASS system. By processing sensor reports 
into a single target, which is then displayed on a high resolution colour monitor, 
ASDE-X provides controllers with a seamless picture of all operations on the airport 
surface. This sensor data fusion ensures that the most accurate information about 
aircraft or vehicle location is received in the tower, which is intended to increase sur-
face safety and efficiency [FAA09]. ASDE-X also contains a so-called Safety Logic, 
which is an additional software functionality capable of alerting air traffic controllers 
of potential traffic conflicts, including Runway Incursions [Sen07]. 
 
3.5.2 Surface Movement Guidance and Control System (SMGCS) 
Today, most aerodromes employ some form of a Surface Movement Guidance and 
Control System (SMGCS) as described in the corresponding ICAO Manual on 
A-SMCGS (Doc 9476) [ICA86]. In their simplest form, these systems hardly go be-
yond standard ICAO aerodrome markings. However, more advanced installations 
use switched taxiway centrelines (‘follow the greens’) and illuminated stop bars at 
holding positions, which emphasize the instruction to hold given to crews via radio 
by a series of red lights [ICA04a]. Unless these lights are switched off, pilots must 
never cross such a stop bar [ICA08]. 
However, in Low Visibility Operations, LVP as described in Section 2.1.2.4 are em-
ployed. These procedures may differ from airport to airport, but in general, pilots 
and vehicle drivers feel that their ability to apply ‘see and be seen’ is severely im-
paired under these conditions. Although current procedures allow aircraft to land in 
conditions down to zero visibility, and take-off is possible in a RVR down to ap-
proximately 75 m, Doc 9476 does not contain any concept beyond the provisions for 
standard LVP to facilitate safe and expeditious operations in all weather conditions. 
This is the major shortcoming of the SMGCS concept [ICA04a]. 
 
3.5.3 Advanced SMGCS (A-SMGCS) 
In recent years, the well-known limitations of SMGCS and the necessity for major 
airports to invest in more efficient use of the existing infrastructure have lead to the 
development of new ATM concepts, since both increased traffic and infrastructural 
complexity require a more efficient organisation of traffic flows on the ground. These 
improved SMGCS concepts are commonly designated as Advanced Surface Move-
ment Guidance and Control Systems (A-SMGCS). Initial steps towards an interna-
tional standardization of A-SMGCS have taken place and are documented in ICAO 
Doc 9830, the Manual on A-SMCGS [ICA04a]. 
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A-SMGCS aims at increasing both safety and efficiency of operations on the aero-
drome surface. From an economic point of view, it is expected that A-SMGCS will 
significantly contribute to increased capacity and reduced delays in all weather con-
ditions, even when taking into account the predicted increase in surface movement 
operations. However, the presentation in this section focuses on safety aspects. 
In this context, one of the high-level goals behind A-SMGCS is to provide increased 
situational awareness to controllers, pilots and vehicle drivers regardless of visibility 
conditions, traffic density or aerodrome layout. This implies better surveillance, im-
proved guidance and enhanced visual aids. 
Another major innovation is that A-SMGCS should be capable of conflict prediction, 
detection and resolution, which also includes Runway Incursion avoidance. The 
ICAO manual requires that an A-SMGCS should assist ATC at least in the prevention 
of incursions of aircraft and vehicles onto runways and taxiways, as well as collisions 
between aircraft, vehicles and obstructions on the manoeuvring area in all visibility 
conditions. 
 
3.5.3.1 The A-SMGCS Concept 
To achieve the goals outlined above, A-SMGCS has to provide more precise guidance 
and control for aircraft and vehicles in the movement area in all weather conditions, 
and should also be able to ensure spacing between all moving aircraft and vehicles, 
especially in conditions which prevent manual spacing. 
 
Unless the total number of aircraft and vehicles permitted to operate on the move-
ment area at a given time is strictly limited, such a task is beyond the capability of a 
controller even if aided by conventional surface movement radar (SMR), cf. [ICA04a]. 
New surveillance technology will therefore be required in order to provide a better 
situational awareness to all airport movement stakeholders. Most likely, this will 
lead to reallocation of responsibilities for various system functions, as less reliance is 
placed on the ability of the pilot or control authority to provide visual surveillance. 
Furthermore, the ICAO manual explicitly states that A-SMGCS design should not be 
constrained by existing allocations of responsibility. The use of automation to assist 
controllers in their tasks is therefore envisaged, but the ultimate responsibility for the 
safety of an aircraft will always remain with the pilots. This implies that pilots must 
be provided with the means of exercising this authority. The four primary A-SMGCS 
functions surveillance, routing, guidance and control, which are intended to satisfy 
all of the above requirements, are briefly outlined below: 
 
Surveillance 
The A-SMGCS surveillance function provides accurate information on the position 
and the identity of all aircraft and vehicles operating within the airport movement 
area, irrespective of weather conditions. Not only moving, but also static aircraft and 
vehicles should be covered. The surveillance function is the fundamental A-SMGCS 
function, as it provides the three other functions with essential input; they cannot 
work if surveillance data is not available. Furthermore, the surveillance information 
is intended to be used in refining the traffic planning functions associated with pre-
dicting taxi throughput and arrival/departure times. 
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Routing 
The A-SMGCS routing function, which can be operated manually or automatically, 
assigns a route to each aircraft and vehicle within the movement area. Of course 
changes to this assigned route and the destination have to be possible at all times. 
Furthermore, the routing function should not constrain the crew’s choice of a suitable 
runway exit after landing. If the routing function is automatic, both controllers and 
crew should have sufficient possibilities to interfere manually. An additional goal of 
this function is to minimize both taxi distances and crossing conflicts, the former 
clearly with a focus on economical aspects. 
 
Guidance 
The main purpose of the guidance function is to provide clear indications to pilots 
and vehicle drivers to allow them to follow the route that has been assigned to them, 
and to enable them to maintain situational awareness of their position on this route. 
Of course, the guidance functions should also be capable of accepting route changes 
any time, and it should be able to indicate routes and areas restricted or not available 
for use. 
 
Control 
The control function is the most complex A-SMGCS function. It should be capable of 
detecting conflicts, providing alerts and suggesting resolutions for all kind of surface 
movement conflicts, most prominently Runway Incursions, while keeping control-
lers, pilots and vehicle drivers in the loop. Alerting should cover both short and me-
dium term alerts. Furthermore, this function is responsible for longitudinal spacing, 
taking into account various parameters such as speeds, jet blast effects, human and 
system response times, deceleration performance and aircraft dimensions. 
 
The introduction of these A-SMGCS functions should not result in an overall risk 
level in excess of the probability of one fatal accident per 107 operations53. 
A-SMCGS is conceived as a modular system to facilitate tailoring and adaptation to 
all types of aerodromes and their specific needs, and to permit a gradual transition 
from SMGCS to A-SMGCS. As part of this modular approach, five different imple-
mentation levels are defined by the ICAO Manual on A-SMGCS, which mainly differ 
in the level of automation used in conflict detection, conflict resolution, routing and 
guidance [ICA04a]. Changes of operational procedures with the introduction of 
A-SMGCS are desired to achieve clearly defined roles and responsibilities for con-
trollers, pilots and vehicle drivers in order to eliminate procedural ambiguities. Ad-
ditionally, particularly the more sophisticated functions might require that aircraft 
have to be suitably equipped to benefit from A-SMCGS.  
 
With the introduction of A-SMGCS, it is expected that communication will migrate 
into a mix of voice and data link usage. Controller-Pilot Data Link Communications 
(CPDLC) will be introduced to supplement radiotelephony for clearances and rout-
                                                 
53  Given the fact that the current fatal accident rate, averaged between 1996 and 2007, is 0.5 per one million de-
partures, and that three of 89 fatal accidents in this period were attributed to Runway Incursions, cf. [Boe07], 
this is not a particularly ambitious goal, since the current Runway Incursion-related fatal accident rate is con-
sequently already as low as 1.7 per hundred million departures. 
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ings that are not subject to time critical transmission or do not require instantaneous 
action. Thus, there will be a general decrease in voice communication, but it will still 
be used where necessary [ICA04a], e.g. in case urgent matters need to be addressed. 
 
3.5.3.2 Considerations on Flight Crew Awareness 
According to the ICAO Manual on A-SMGCS, pilots should be provided with the 
following information to safely taxi the aircraft in all operational conditions and to 
enhance flight crew situational awareness [ICA04a]: 
 
a) information on location and direction at all times; 
b) continuous guidance and control during the landing roll-out, taxiing to the 
parking position and from the parking position to the runway-holding posi-
tion, to line up at any take-off position and the take-off roll; 
c) indication of the route to be followed, including changes in direction and indi-
cation of stops; 
d) guidance in parking, docking and holding areas; 
e) indication of spacing from preceding aircraft, including speed adjustments; 
f) indication of spacing from all aircraft, vehicles and obstacles in Visibility Con-
dition 4; 
g) indication of the required sequencing; 
h) information to prevent the effects of jet blast and propeller/rotor wash; 
i) identification of areas to be avoided; 
j) information to prevent collision with other aircraft, vehicles or known obsta-
cles; 
k) information on system failures affecting safety; 
l) the location of active runways; 
m) alert of incursion onto runways and taxiways; and 
n) the extent of critical and sensitive areas. 
 
Surprisingly, the manual states in a note that most of these requirements might be 
satisfied by ground visual aids. Generally, the A-SMGCS concept, like SMGS, is a 
concept focussing on the ground infrastructure side, as it considers all issues from an 
aerodrome and ATC perspective. Improved visual aids are regarded as the primary 
concept for enhanced surface guidance in A-SMGCS. This ground infrastructure per-
spective is particularly evident when a note in the ICAO Manual on A-SMGCS states 
that “the guidance function will primarily be based on standardized ground visual aids”, and 
rather diffusely mentions that “additional equipment or systems” aboard aircraft to 
supplement these visual aids are only required in Visibility Condition 4. Conse-
quently, additional avionics, like an airport moving map, a Cockpit Display of Traffic 
Information (CDTI) or an enhanced vision system are, according to the ICAO Man-
ual, only envisaged for low visibility operations [ICA04a]. 
 
This is, of course, highly questionable from a conceptual point of view, because the 
capabilities of such onboard displays to provide the crew with an optimum situ-
ational awareness and other benefits of this technology would lie idle in good visibil-
ity if this principle was strictly applied. 
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Although the list of information requirements above is originally intended for 
ground systems, it will subsequently have to be compared to the findings of Chapter 
2, “Causal Factors of Runway Incursions”. This analysis will yield to what extent the 
items listed may serve as an additional requirements for an onboard system for sur-
face movement support and Runway Incursion avoidance. 
 
3.5.3.3 Prediction and Detection of Conflicts 
Since one of the main objectives of A-SMCGS is the prevention of collisions between 
aircraft, vehicles and objects on the manoeuvring area, an alerting functionality is 
envisaged as part of the control function. However, alerting is not limited to traffic 
conflicts, but also encompasses intrusion into restricted areas, e.g. the runway protec-
tion zone, or deviations from assigned routes. In the corresponding requirements, the 
ICAO Manual on A-SMGCS distinguishes detected conflicts, which require immedi-
ate action to prevent a collision, and predicted conflicts, which necessitate expedi-
tious action to avoid the development of an imminent situation. A-SMGCS should be 
capable of providing alerts to controllers for the following types of runway conflicts:  
 
1. aircraft arriving to, or departing aircraft on, a closed runway 
2. arriving or departing aircraft with traffic on the runway (including aircraft be-
yond the runway holding positions) 
3. arriving or departing aircraft with moving traffic to or on a converging or in-
tersecting runway 
4. arriving or departing aircraft with opposite direction arrival to the runway 
5. arriving or departing aircraft with traffic crossing the runway 
6. arriving or departing aircraft with taxiing traffic approaching the runway 
(predicted to cross the runway-holding position) 
7. arriving aircraft exiting runway at high speed with converging taxiway traffic 
8. arriving aircraft with traffic in the sensitive area (when protected) 
9. aircraft exiting the runway at unintended or non-approved locations 
10. unauthorised traffic approaching the runway 
11. unidentified traffic approaching the runway 
 
As the Manual admits, this list merely contains several possible conflict scenarios 
and is not exhaustive. The same is true for the taxiway conflicts that have to be han-
dled: 
 
1. aircraft on a closed taxiway; 
2. aircraft approaching stationary traffic; 
3. aircraft overtaking same direction traffic; 
4. aircraft with opposite direction traffic (head-on conflict); 
5. aircraft approaching taxiway intersections with converging traffic; 
6. aircraft taxiing with excessive speed; 
7. aircraft exiting the taxiway at unintended or non-approved locations; 
8. unauthorised traffic on the taxiways; 
9. unidentified traffic on the taxiways; 
10. crossing of a lit stop bar. 
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Last but not least, the A-SMGCS should also provide alerts for further conflicts on 
both aprons and taxiways, such as the loss of wing-tip spacing due to manoeuvring, 
unauthorised entry to a taxiway or apron, or failure to comply with instructions to 
hold or to give way to other traffic. In this context, the Control function should also 
be able to handle deviations from assigned routes and events imposing operational 
changes, such as runway changes or closure of taxiways for maintenance. Addition-
ally, prediction should also cover route conflicts, i.e. the situation where there are at 
least two routes prone to cause a conflict. Nevertheless, Runway conflict alerting is 
given priority over taxiway and apron alerting [ICA04a]. 
 
It is noteworthy in this context that the concept of alerts outlined by the manual 
shows little familiarity with the alerting concepts commonly applied in aircraft cock-
pits. As an example, the manual suggests “a warning” alert associated with a pre-
dicted conflict, while, in the cockpit, the correct corresponding alert level would be 
an advisory or caution, depending on the severity. 
Likewise, it is surprising that, while calling for a minimization of false and nuisance 
alerts, the Manual also prescribes general ‘reminder’ alerts to controllers in situations 
where more than one aircraft or vehicle is detected within the monitored runway 
area at the same time, irrespective of the precise traffic constellation [ICA04a]. 
 
In conclusion, the alerting functionality proposed by A-SMGCS is entirely based on 
use cases, since it merely defines a minimum set of conflict situations to be covered. 
The risk associated with such an approach is that the solution might eventually work 
sufficiently well only for traffic scenarios covered by the use cases, and exhibit sub-
standard performance or fail for all other situations. Additionally, while it is envis-
aged that flight crews involved in traffic conflicts are alerted via controllers by voice 
or even directly by up-linking A-SMGCS-generated alerts to the aircraft systems, the 
alerting concept proposed by A-SMGCS exhibits a lack of harmonisation and com-
patibility with the way alerts are handled on the flight deck today. 
 
Therefore, although A-SMGS envisages several onboard functions, it nevertheless 
remains a concept centred on ground-based systems, ranging from improved ATC 
surveillance to advanced, automated surface guidance by lighting systems on the 
ground. Only the Level 5 A-AMGCS includes mandatory onboard functions for 
guidance, but these are seen in the context of ground installations and highly de-
pendent on these from a functional perspective. Consequently, their usability is lim-
ited by the required availability of a corresponding ground infrastructure; this is the 
reason why A-SMGCS is not used as a starting point for this thesis. 
 
3.5.4 Airborne Separation Assistance System (ASAS) 
The Airborne Separation Assistance System (ASAS) is an Air Traffic Management 
(ATM) concept for future operations based on additional aircraft capabilities, ena-
bling flight crews to maintain separation to other aircraft and providing flight infor-
mation concerning surrounding traffic. The primary means of ASAS traffic surveil-
lance is ADS-B (see Section 3.2.2), which may be supplemented by TIS-B (Section 
3.2.3) traffic data for non-ADS-B equipped traffic where necessary. 
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However, the main focus of ASAS is on operational procedures for controllers and 
flight crews, so-called ASAS applications, which employ these future aircraft systems 
for better traffic situational awareness, for achieving and maintaining an assigned 
spacing with other aircraft, or for a delegation of separation responsibility from the 
controller to the flight crew in certain well-defined scenarios [Eur01]. 
Since these ASAS applications have different levels of maturity and are associated 
with different operational issues, it was decided to allocate them to different imple-
mentation packages. ASAS Package 1 is a coherent set of Airborne and Ground Traf-
fic Surveillance applications that can realistically be realised within the next 5-10 
years [Eur02]. It encompasses various Airborne Traffic Situational Awareness 
(ATSA) applications aimed at enhancing the flight crews’ knowledge of the sur-
rounding traffic situation both in the air and on the airport surface, and thus improv-
ing the flight crew’s decision process for the safe and efficient management of their 
flight. For these awareness applications, no changes in separation tasks or responsi-
bility are intended [Eur01]. 
For the purposes of this thesis, the most important ASAS Package 1 function is en-
hanced traffic situational awareness on the airport surface (ATSA-SURF), which aims 
at improving traffic awareness on the airport surface for both taxi and runway opera-
tions in all weather conditions. Its objectives are to improve safety, e.g. at taxiway or 
runway intersections, and to reduce taxi time particularly during low visibility con-
ditions or at night 
For a realisation of ATSA-SURF, it is envisaged that at least position and identifica-
tion of the surrounding traffic, which could include both aircraft and airport vehicles, 
are displayed to flight crews on a Cockpit Display of Traffic Information (CDTI). It is 
explicitly stated that traffic needs to be displayed on an airport moving map. Fur-
thermore, an onboard functions advising flight crews when approaching an active 
runway, e.g. in case traffic is located on the runway, is envisaged [Eur02]. 
 
Consequently, in contrast to the A-SMCGS concept, the ASAS Package 1 function 
ATSA-SURF is an onboard-centred concept relying on the availability of an onboard 
moving map and traffic data via ADS-B or TIS-B. Alerting, allocated to ATC as 
ground-based functionality in A-SMGCS, is seen as an onboard function in the scope 
of ATSA-SURF. However, both the onboard airport moving map and the associated 
traffic presentation are foreseen in both ASAS and A-SMGCS. 
 
3.5.5 Runway Status Lights 
Runway Status Lights automatically switched by the airport’s surveillance system 
are currently being studied. They are intended to indicate to flight crews whether it 
is safe to enter a runway, or to take off and land. At runway-taxiway intersections, 
taxiway centreline lights are supplemented by so-called red Runway Entrance Lights 
that will illuminate whenever traffic is taking off or landing on the runway. Likewise, 
the runway centreline near the thresholds features red Take-Off Hold Lights that will 
be switched on whenever other traffic on the runway makes it unsafe to take off or 
land. The concept has been evaluated using RWY 18L/36R at Dallas-Fort Worth Air-
port (KDFW) and RWY 09/27 at San Diego Airport (KSAN). An installation is also 
scheduled for Boston Logan International Airport (KBOS) [FAA09]. 
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4 Towards an Integrated Solution 
 
One of the main goals of this thesis is to analyse the features required for future on-
board systems to enable a significant contribution to Runway Incursion avoidance 
and thus enhanced safety in the airport environment. As a first step towards this 
goal, the analysis of accidents and incidents in Chapter 2 has revealed areas where 
the unavailability or a lack of readily accessible information, and in consequence a 
lack of flight crew situational awareness, has been a causal factor in Runway Incur-
sions. Particularly with respect to Runway Incursions caused by inadequate position 
awareness, there is substantial evidence that current flight deck instrumentation does 
not provide pilots with adequate assistance to prevent, detect and resolve disorienta-
tion in all weather conditions. 
 
Generally, the findings in Section 2.3 suggest that enhanced flight deck instrumenta-
tion might have prevented virtually all of the investigated occurrences, or at least 
averted a catastrophic outcome. In fact, the necessity to improve flight crew situ-
ational awareness in the airport environment to prevent Runway Incursions is well-
established and frequently quoted, particularly in connection with airport moving 
maps [RTC03a, RTC05], and the idea of employing onboard systems for the preven-
tion of Runway Incursions is not new, with first concepts emerging more than a dec-
ade ago, cf. Kubbat et al. [Kub99]. 
However, as the brief review in Chapter 3, “State of the Art”, has shown, the various 
existing and emerging onboard solutions only address isolated aspects of the Run-
way Incursion problem. There appears to be a focus on position awareness, traffic 
visualisation and traffic conflict detection. A holistic, systematic concept for an on-
board functionality encompassing all aspects relevant for Runway Incursion avoid-
ance, as identified by the High-Level Requirements in Chapter 2, is still missing. 
Based on the fundamental considerations on Runway Incursion avoidance below and 
the High-Level Requirements, this chapter therefore derives the functionality re-
quired for a holistic onboard solution and identifies areas where research is neces-
sary to realise it. The main goal is to enhance and to complement current operations, 
with neither core roles nor responsibilities of controllers and flight crews changed. 
Nevertheless, procedures may be adapted or enhanced where necessary to enable a 
safe and efficient use of the additional systems on the flight deck and at ATC facili-
ties, or to ensure that the system is used according to its intended function. Con-
versely, it is not intended that technology replaces current safety procedures and 
good airmanship in routine operations, such as the visual check the crew performs to 
ensure that the approach areas are clear before entering a runway. 
 
Nonetheless, in developing mitigations for the issues identified in Chapter 2, a nar-
row focus on entirely aircraft-based solutions must be avoided. First of all, there is no 
reason to develop a complex and potentially expensive onboard technology if there is 
a relatively simple ground-based or procedural solution. More importantly, though, 
Runway Incursions involving a breakdown of communication or misunderstanding 
between flight crew and air traffic controller cannot be addressed by an onboard so-
lution alone, because taxi route assignments and clearances related to runway opera-
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tions may hardly be conveyed to flight crews in an efficient way in the absence of a 
data link between aircraft and ground systems. Likewise, ATIS, NOTAM or other 
information on the operational configuration of the aerodrome must necessarily have 
its origins in the respective facilities on the ground. Hence, there is a clearly identi-
fied intrinsic need for an air-ground cooperative system in the domains where com-
munication with ATC or short-term and temporary changes to the operational condi-
tion of the aerodrome are concerned. 
 
Additionally, a key external driver for air-ground cooperative systems is the need for 
interoperability with future ATM installations and procedures. The majority of Run-
way Safety initiatives and emerging ATM concepts focuses on either ground-based 
measures or systems consisting of both ground-based and onboard elements. 
As an example, U.S. and European Runway Safety programmes propose a variety of 
airport enhancements from improved surveillance technologies such as multi-
lateration to enhanced markings and perimeter taxiways [Eur04, FAA04]. Further-
more, cooperative ATM concepts like A-SMGCS and ASAS employ ground-based as 
well as onboard technologies (cf. Section 3.5), which raises and drives the issue of 
standardization. In addition, some ground-based surveillance systems such as 
ASDE-X, its predecessor ASDE-3 with AMASS supplement and A-SMGCS comprise 
ground-generated alerts to the controller if there is a risk of a Runway Incursion. As 
discussed in Section 3.3, there has already been a technology demonstration up-
linking these alerts directly to the flight deck. 
 
In view of these concurrent onboard and ground-based technology developments, a 
fundamental research issue is the distribution and allocation of future Runway Safety 
Net functionality between the ground and onboard segment, and the required inter-
action. Nevertheless, since the target level of safety in civil aviation is to reduce the 
probability of a catastrophic failure to 10-9 per flight hour, every effort to incorporate 
redundancy should be made. The coexistence of onboard solutions and ATM sys-
tems serving essentially the same purpose is therefore desirable in principle, pro-
vided that this does not eventually result in conflicting instructions to flight crews. 
However, with respect to the goals and scope of this thesis (Section 1.6), the findings 
on incident and accident causal factors (Section 2.3), and for the reasons laid down in 
the following section, this thesis pursues an onboard-centric approach for Runway 
Incursion avoidance functionality. The major challenge associated with the distribu-
tion of functionality concerns the capability of onboard systems to support both 
stand-alone and air-ground cooperative operation. In this context, ‘stand-alone’ 
means that the onboard system can be operated independently of any specific ATM 
ground infrastructure with at least basic features available. Consequently, both ne-
cessity and scope of stand-alone functionality for onboard systems have to be estab-
lished. Additionally, from a human factors perspective, a key issue is how the flight 
crew can unambiguously discern whether the onboard system (or part thereof) is 
operating in a standalone or air-ground cooperative mode. To address these issues, 
this chapter first devises strategies for Runway Incursion avoidance. Subsequently, 
by relating these strategies to the previously identified High-Level Requirements, it is 
analysed whether they can best be met by onboard or ground-based technologies, 
and where air-ground cooperative solutions are required. 
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4.1 Rationale for an Onboard-Centric Approach 
 
Runway Incursions are a worldwide problem and can, in principle, occur every-
where. From a flight crew or aircraft operator perspective, therefore, the level of pro-
tection against Runway Incursions should have no or only minimal dependence on 
the airports served. 
 
Consequently, if the distribution of Runway Incursion avoidance functionality be-
tween aircraft and ground-based systems is shifted towards ATM technology as with 
A-SMGCS (see Section 3.5), full functionality can only be provided as long as the cor-
responding ground infrastructure is available on a worldwide basis. If the ground-
based part does not exist or is inoperative at a particular airport, the overall system is 
increasingly likely to become ineffective, and the fundamental criterion above cannot 
be fulfilled. 
 
Conversely, from an ATM or airport operator perspective, a system focussing on 
ground-based technologies as core elements of a future Runway Safety Net may 
solve the problem of Runway Incursions at the particular airports where it is in-
stalled, but from a pilot or airline perspective, the worldwide deployment of the re-
quired ground installations at aerodromes of all categories is indeed a major concern. 
After all, airlines have only very limited influence on airport infrastructure outside 
their major hubs. Potential deficiencies in airport signage, markings and air traffic 
control, let alone the introduction of sophisticated ground-based surface movement 
systems such as A-SMGCS, are therefore very often, if not nearly always, beyond the 
influence of aircraft operators. By contrast, the deployment of e.g. an airport moving 
map, which has emerged as basic onboard Runway Incursion avoidance functional-
ity, cf. Section 3.1, is completely under an airline’s control and it can be used at any 
airport, provided that an appropriate aerodrome mapping database (AMDB) and 
Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) coverage, e.g. GPS, are available. 
 
Although it is predictable that most of the large hub airports of the so-called ‘West-
ern Hemisphere’ will see a full-scale deployment of A-SMGCS or equivalent candi-
date technologies for the ground part of the Runway Safety Net in the near future, 
one of the most interesting trends in aviation is that more and more low-fare carriers 
and regional airlines push onto the market [FAA03]. Their business model usually 
includes offering point-to-point travel to small airfields close to the tourist regions or 
to reliever airports (as opposed to large hub airports) in order to save airport fees. It 
is unlikely that these airfields will be among the first A-SMGCS equipped aero-
dromes, because one may argue that only large and complex airports will gain sig-
nificant operational and economic benefit from A-SMGCS. At the same time, hub 
airports will most probably either have sufficient financial resources of their own, or, 
alternatively, enough political weight to acquire this technology. 
 
Irrespective of whether Boeing’s direct connection philosophy, the hub-and-spoke 
concept of Airbus or a mixture of both will eventually prevail, at least one airport 
will not be a hub for a significant share of future airline flights. However, many of 
these smaller airfields with low traffic density and simple structure will most likely 
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be equipped with a more basic A-SMGCS implementation and lower priority, if at 
all. In addition, it can be assumed that several more decades will pass until these 
technologies will reach all the international airports of developing nations54. 
Nevertheless, particularly the Tenerife accident suggests that the danger of Runway 
Incursions is lurking everywhere. Likewise, a more recent development, the advent 
of large numbers of Very Light Jets (VLJs), does not only have the potential to re-
shape the aviation market even more dramatically than low cost carriers, but will 
also require additional effort in terms of flight safety at small airports. 
 
Furthermore, as the Tenerife disaster and the closure of US airspace following the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 show, even carriers shuttling between hubs 
equipped with every imaginable ground-based technology for Runway Incursion 
avoidance may suddenly find themselves diverting to small airfields due to terrorist 
threats. Moreover, further occurrences such as ATC strikes, weather hazards, vol-
canic activity, medical emergencies or a technical problem aboard the aircraft might 
also cause such a diversion. 
In the event of a mass-diversion to a small airfield, there is subsequently a high risk 
that neither airport infrastructure nor controllers will be able to handle this sudden 
increase in traffic properly. Even if advanced ground-based technology is available, 
the site-specific tailoring may not cover the mass-diversion case, which could lead to 
incomplete surveillance, nuisance alerts or complete outages. Additionally, control-
lers working at smaller airports will gradually lose their capability of handling 40 a/c 
per hour, even if their original training covered high-density airports. 
 
Consequently, for Runway Incursion avoidance, pilots and aircraft operators cannot 
rely on enhanced ATC surveillance in all visibility conditions and ground-based 
alerting tools everywhere in the world. Likewise, advanced services such as Control-
ler-Pilot Data Link Communications (CPDLC) services or fused traffic data broadcast 
by Traffic Information Services (TIS-B) might not be available, either. 
By contrast, the main advantage of an aircraft-based solution is that it is, at least in 
principle, available and usable everywhere, providing crew support independently 
of systems on the ground. Although limitations to this independence apply, this ap-
proach is fundamentally different from looking at onboard systems from an ATM 
perspective as with A-SMGCS, where the perception of aircraft-based technology is 
more that of an onboard front-end of the global air-ground infrastructure. 
                                                 
54  If one takes the availability of the Instrument Landing System (ILS), which was commercially introduced in 
Europe and the United States in the sixties, as an indicator, several generations will pass until all international 
airports support A-SMGCS. Some major African airports, among them e.g. Alexandria/Egypt (HEAX), are still 
not equipped with ILS. 
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4.2 Strategies for Runway Incursion Avoidance 
 
This section analyses which strategies for avoiding Runway Incursions, and particu-
larly potential subsequent accidents, are available in principle. The advantages and 
limitations of these strategies are discussed, permitting an identification of the impli-
cations for a holistic approach towards an integrated solution. Concerning the resolu-
tion of runway traffic conflicts, the avoidance manoeuvres feasible in principle are 
sketched, and examples of their successful application from the incident analysis in 
Section 2.2 are reviewed to obtain initial insight into the feasibility of and the mar-
gins available for providing system-generated conflict resolution guidance. 
 
4.2.1 Prevention of Ownship Runway Incursions 
By definition, as discussed in Section 1.2, taking effective countermeasures against 
the incorrect presence or manoeuvre of an aircraft, vehicle or person on the protected area of a 
surface designated for the landing and take off of aircraft will prevent Runway Incursions. 
From this perspective, Runway Incursions are not primarily, but only in last conse-
quence, a problem of conflicting traffic [Ver06]. 
This insight shifts the focus of Runway Incursion avoidance, i.e. the prevention of 
Runway Incursion incidents and accidents, from the detection of runway traffic con-
flicts to the elimination of the operational and procedural errors causing the incur-
sion. After all, at least at controlled airfields, the occurrence of Runway Incursions 
implies a failure of the invisible safety net that procedures and surveillance span 
around the runway. Besides, detecting a dangerous situation instead of preventing it 
in the first place might be taking the second step before the first. 
 
Consequently, preventing Runway Incursions before they develop into a traffic con-
flict situation potentially resulting in a significant collision hazard is the first and 
crucial step to improve runway safety. Instead of attempting to cure the symptoms, 
traffic conflicts, flight crews must be prevented from actively causing Runway Incur-
sions, e.g. by entering a runway or the associated protection zone without the re-
quired authorisation, by using a closed or otherwise unsuitable runway, or by taking 
off or landing without clearance. 
 
To achieve this, the flight crew has to be provided with sufficient and adequate situ-
ational awareness concerning position (High-Level Requirement I), operational envi-
ronment (High-Level Requirement III) and ATC instructions/clearances (High-Level 
Requirement IV). Apparently, it is much easier and safer to prevent Runway Incur-
sions at this stage than to cope with a subsequent traffic conflict on the runway, with 
potentially few options and little margin for resolution, as evidenced by the discus-
sion in Section 4.2.3 below. 
 
4.2.2 Reaction to Existing and Emerging Runway Incursions  
Nonetheless, measures for Runway Incursion prevention alone are not sufficient to 
avoid accidents, because they do not cover the case where a Runway Incursion is 
emerging or has already occurred. Particularly if other traffic is incorrectly present or 
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operating within the confines of the runway or its associated protection zone, it is 
essential for flight safety that any resulting traffic conflicts and collision hazards are 
immediately brought to the attention of the flight crew (High-Level Requirement II). 
 
Although it may seem at first glance that equipping all aircraft with preventive 
Runway Incursion avoidance functionality should eliminate such situations, this as-
sumption proves to be neither realistic nor correct. In view of the experience with 
TAWS/ACAS, an equipment level of 100% is unrealistic even after the end of the 
transition period towards a mandate, because there are typically exceptions for cer-
tain types of operation and aircraft below a given threshold mass (cf. Section 3.2.1), 
which usually affect General Aviation aircraft. In view of the accidents at Atlanta, St. 
Louis or particularly Linate, and taking into account that 72% of the Runway Incur-
sions in the United States between 2003 and 2006 involved at least one General Avia-
tion aircraft, similar limitations are clearly unacceptable for effective Runway Incur-
sion prevention. Additionally, more than 10% of Runway Incursions in the same pe-
riod were attributed to vehicles [FAA07]. Thus, a mandate would not only have to be 
more restrictive with respect to exceptions, but also need to be extended to vehicles. 
More importantly, though, Runway Incursion prevention functionality does not offer 
protection against controller errors (High-Level Requirement V), since even a better 
awareness of ATC instructions and clearances does not necessarily reveal such mis-
takes to the flight crew. 
 
Therefore, once the preventive approach has failed – e.g. if surrounding traffic or a 
controller error has caused a Runway Incursion – the focus shifts to the mitigation of 
the consequences. As a result, to avoid accidents, Runway Incursion prevention func-
tionality must be complemented by a reactive component capable of detecting and 
eliminating – or at least mitigating – potential traffic collision hazards. Runway In-
cursion (accident) avoidance therefore encompasses not only prevention, but also 
this reactive component. 
 
In conclusion, there are two key research issues for the reactive Runway Incursion 
avoidance functionality. The primary question is how Runway Incursions involving 
conflicting traffic and potential collision hazards can be detected reliably. For obvi-
ous reasons, the system should neither miss critical situations nor bring false or spu-
rious conflict indications to the attention of flight crews – both would at least under-
mine pilots’ confidence, if not prevent certification of the system for operational use 
altogether. The second key issue is how reactive Runway Incursion avoidance func-
tionality can subsequently contribute to the mitigation or resolution of the detected 
conflicts. This encompasses not only the desirability from an operational point of 
view, but particularly the feasibility from a technical and airworthiness perspective. 
Therefore, to understand the implications of conflict resolution for this functionality, 
the following section reviews the options a flight crew currently has for avoiding an 
accident when encountering a Runway Incursion involving conflicting traffic. 
Both of the above issues are also closely related to the question of whether alerting 
functionality is required. Since this is also of paramount importance for preventive 
Runway Incursion avoidance functionality, this question is addressed in a dedicated 
subchapter, Section 4.4 “Considerations on Alerting”. 
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4.2.3 Options for the Resolution of Runway Traffic Conflicts 
4.2.3.1 Runway Incursion while ownship is airborne 
In case a Runway Incursion occurs on final approach while the aircraft is still air-
borne, the execution of the missed approach procedure is the standard conflict reso-
lution today. If the controller observes a Runway Incursion or any other obstruction 
on the runway after the landing clearance has been issued, the landing aircraft must 
be advised of the imminent danger and will be instructed to go around [ICA01a]. 
Likewise, the standard procedure for flight crews is also to initiate a go-around if 
they detect a Runway Incursion themselves. This has actually helped to prevent acci-
dents, as evidenced e.g. by the 2007 Denver incident, cf. Appendix I-16.5. 
There might be rare situations, such as an emergency landing due to an engine fire, 
or an aircraft low on fuel, where this manoeuvre could lead to disaster, but in these 
cases, the runway is usually reserved for the landing aircraft, cf. [ICA01a], thus 
minimizing the risk of an additional Runway Incursion. It can thus be regarded as 
proven that a valid Runway Incursion conflict resolution exists for virtually all sce-
narios in which ownship is airborne. 
 
4.2.3.2 Runway Incursion during ownship take-off 
The situation is completely different for Runway Incursions occurring while ownship 
is manoeuvring on the ground, especially for traffic conflicts emerging during the 
take-off run. Both the severity of the conflict and feasible resolutions depend on posi-
tions, speeds and closure rate of the traffic involved. Conflict resolutions fall in two 
categories, centred around the fundamental decision to continue take-off or to abort. 
 
4.2.3.2.1 Rejected Take-Off 
Currently, if conflicting runway traffic is visually detected in the early stages of the 
take-off roll, the flight crew will typically decide to abort take-off; this manoeuvre is 
commonly referred to as a ‘Rejected Take-Off’ (RTO). It is usually also performed if 
ATC advises pilots of a Runway Incursion or cancels the take-off clearance for other 
reasons, cf. [ICA01a]. In general, aborting take-off can be regarded as the most ad-
vantageous conflict resolution for low speeds, and has been credited with preventing 
collisions in the Runway Incursion incidents at Philadelphia (1985), Amsterdam 
(1998) and Hamburg airport (2004), see Appendices I-14.3 and I-17. 
 
Nevertheless, rejecting take-off is a viable option only up to the so-called take-off de-
cision speed V1, which is determined as part of the take-off performance calculations. 
Attempting to stop the aircraft beyond V1 is very likely to result in a runway excur-
sion, which is associated with a significant risk of a hull loss, injuries and fatalities 
among passengers or crew. 
In an accident of a Kalitta Air Boeing 747-200 at Brussels airport in May 2008, for ex-
ample, the flight crew’s decision to reject take-off six seconds after the V1 callout re-
sulted in a runway overrun and hull loss of the aircraft. While the take-off speeds 
had been determined for a wet runway, aborting take-off in dry conditions at a speed 
12 kts above the calculated V1 of 138 kts, together with a reduction of the effective 
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take-off distance available by 300 m to ~90% of the overall runway length (line-up 
from an intersection), resulted in an accident [AAU09]. This may serve as an illustra-
tion of the narrowness of the margins involved. At speeds greater than V1, an RTO is 
therefore only performed if the aircraft is not considered flyable at all [FAA93]. 
In general, the risks associated with an RTO significantly increase with speed. For 
better risk assessment and decision making, the take-off roll is divided in a low-
speed and a high-speed regime, which typically begins at 80 or 100 kts. While still in 
the low-speed regime, pilots may reject take-off whenever they encounter unex-
pected environmental situations or system malfunctions, such as tyre failures, un-
usual noise or vibration [Air05a]. By contrast, in the high-energy regime, an RTO is 
only performed in a very limited number of situations, which are usually defined in 
the Airplane Operations Manual (AOM) and typically encompass [DLH97]: 
 
 Airplane not controllable or flyable 
 Sudden loss of engine thrust 
 Engine or APU fire warning 
 Unsafe configuration 
 Runway Incursion/Intrusion 
 Bird strike danger (flocks of birds) 
 Windshear 
 
Although the transition at 80 or 100 kts seems somewhat arbitrary at first glance, it 
has been demonstrated in the frame of a worst case calculation that full braking as 
required for a RTO might already result in damage to the brakes/tyre system slightly 
above 100 kts, with potentially significant operational consequences [DLH97]. As the 
speed approaches V1, damage to brakes and tyres is almost inevitable. The most criti-
cal situation, a rejected take-off initiated at the V1 and take-off mass combination re-
sulting in maximum kinetic energy, has to be demonstrated during aircraft certifica-
tion with the brakes worn55 (§25.10956). The braking disks usually absorb so much 
energy that the tyres are destroyed within minutes, mainly by heat radiation. Regula-
tions require that the parking brake remains functional for three minutes and that 
neither wheels, tyres nor brake assembly catch fire57 for at least five minutes to en-
sure a safe evacuation of the aircraft (§25.735). Tyres have to maintain pressure for 10 
minutes before they deflate, because aircraft should be able to vacate the runway un-
der their own power [EAS06, FAR07]. 
Nevertheless, the main concern associated with a rejected take-off in the high-speed 
regime is the risk of runway excursions and overruns. Particularly if the take-off is 
limited by the available acceleration-stop distance58, past experience has confirmed 
this risk even for an RTO below V1 with all performance calculations correct [Air05a]. 
                                                 
55  The brakes must be within 10% of the allowable wear limit for all wheels. 
56  Part 25 of the US Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) [FAR07] and the EASA Certification Specification for 
Large Transport Aeroplanes (CS-25) [EAS06] are virtually identical in structure and content. For reasons of 
simplicity, the more compact US-style referencing, e.g. §25.101, is used synonymously with CS 25.101, instead 
of an awkward ‘CS/§25.101’ notation. Significant discrepancies between FAR and EASA are noted explicitly. 
57  To ensure that tyres are not inflamed easily, they must be inflated with dry nitrogen or another inert gas con-
taining less than 5% oxygen on aircraft with certified MTOW above 34.119 kg (75.000 lbs) according to §25.733. 
58  According to the provisions of §25.109 for the accelerate-stop distance, a distance equivalent to 2 seconds at v1 
is added in take-off speed calculations to account for the operational variability in the time it takes the flight 
crew to deploy the retarding devices (e.g. brakes, thrust reduction/reversers, spoilers) [EAS06, FAR07]. 
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One of the reasons is that the actual braking performance - and thus the achievable 
stopping distance - depends on a multitude of different factors. These include (but 
are not limited to) runway braking action or contamination level, condition and tex-
ture of the runway pavement (e.g. bumps, dents, and attrition from aircraft tyres), 
runway slope, wind speed and direction, as well as wear of aircraft tyres and brakes.  
 
To add further complexity, most of the runway-related parameters are not homoge-
nous over the whole length of the runway, but may show considerable variation. In 
convective weather or otherwise swiftly changing meteorological conditions, these 
parameters may be subject to rapid change on the timescale of minutes or even sec-
onds. This does not only concern turning or gusting wind, but also runway contami-
nants. 
 
With current ATIS or ATC reports typically limited to a categorized description of 
braking action, ‘dry’ (not reported), ‘good’, ‘medium/fair’, ‘poor’ and ‘nil’, which are 
largely based on subjective pilot reports, and objective methods to derive braking 
action directly from aircraft data still in their infancy, cf. [RW02], an accurate predic-
tion of braking performance in all meteorological conditions therefore still constitutes 
a major unsolved challenge. 
 
In conclusion, therefore, rejecting take-off is an often viable, but by no means univer-
sally valid method of resolving a runway traffic conflict. It is only feasible if the re-
maining distance to the conflicting traffic is still sufficiently large. From a take-off 
performance perspective, a Runway Incursion by other traffic corresponds to a sud-
den decrease of the available acceleration-stop distance compared to the unob-
structed runway; the maximum speed at which take-off can be successfully aborted 
is therefore lower than the calculated V1 in most cases. 
However, as e.g. the 2004 Munich incident (cf. Appendix I-16) shows, completely 
stopping the aircraft may not always be required to avoid a collision. Depending on 
the type of intruder, its precise location and the runway width, a substantial decel-
eration could be sufficient for a controlled swerve around the conflicting traffic or a 
diversion into a taxiway/high speed exit, if available. 
 
Nevertheless, at a high closure rate and with little distance to the intruding traffic, 
there might be no margin left to resolve the conflict in this manner, if at all. Under 
these circumstances, even unorthodox conflict resolutions, like vacating the runway 
into the grass and their consequences need to be assessed very carefully. However, in 
view of the fact that the Kalitta Boeing 747 left the runway surface at a speed of ap-
proximately 80 kts, this involves a high risk of injuries to passengers/crew and at 
least substantial damage to the airframe, if not a total hull loss. Close to V1 the conse-
quences of leaving the runway could be equally catastrophic for passengers and crew 
as colliding with the intruder. 
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4.2.3.2.2 Continued take-off 
Continuing take-off is the second fundamental option to resolve runway traffic con-
flicts for departing aircraft, and in fact the only viable conflict resolution beyond V1. 
Particularly in the high-speed regime, it will be safer than attempting to bring the 
aircraft to a stop in certain cases even for speeds below V1. 
 
Generally, the decision to continue take-off means that ownship must become air-
borne sufficiently early to be able to climb free of the intruding traffic, which appar-
ently cannot be relied upon to leave the runway in time. Consequently, from a flight 
performance perspective, the presence of an intruder on the runway results in an in-
stantaneous additional requirement to achieve a certain minimum altitude at a given 
distance from the runway threshold. 
 
However, most take-off operations use reduced thrust or de-rated take-off thrust to 
minimize operating costs as well as tear and wear on the engine. Furthermore, this 
has substantial benefits in terms of engine reliability. Consequently, there is typically 
some performance margin in terms of available thrust. Additionally, it has to be 
demonstrated during certification that an aircraft can successfully rotate 7% or 10 kts 
(whichever is less) below the calculated rotation speed VR without marked increase 
of the take-off distance (§25.107). Nevertheless, since it is desirable to climb free of 
intruding traffic on the runway with maximum vertical margin, it is assumed that 
the maximum available thrust will be set as soon as the decision to continue take-off 
has been made. 
 
Continuing take-off and climbing over the intruding traffic has been successful in 
avoiding accidents in several cases, such as the Minneapolis incident involving two 
DC-10s in March 1985 (cf. Appendix I-4), another occurrence at the same airport in 
June 1985, and a Runway Incursion at Chicago Midway Airport also in 1985, with 
vertical margins between 15 and 60 m (see Appendix I-17 for details on these and the 
incidents below). 
Nonetheless, rotating earlier or stronger than usual inherently bears the risk of a tail-
strike, as evidenced e.g. by an incident at Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport in 
2001. During take-off, a Delta flight crew observed a Boeing 737 taxiing across the 
runway. They succeeded in avoiding a collision by applying full power and rotating 
early, but their aircraft sustained minor damage due to a slight tailstrike. 
 
However, an early rotation may not be sufficient in all cases to avoid a collision, and 
an additional lateral manoeuvre might be required. In an incident at Chicago O’Hare 
International Airport in 1999, the captain of a Korean Air Boeing 747 lifted off earlier 
than normal and banked left to avoid striking an Air China Boeing 747 that had erro-
neously taxied onto RWY 14R. 
Banking at low altitude is, nevertheless, an inherently dangerous manoeuvre. Fur-
thermore, an additional problem with both the early rotation and the banking ma-
noeuvre is that they may, depending on the precise situation, require exceptional 
pilot skills for a safe completion, and are even then associated with a significant risk 
of failure with narrowing margins, whereas §25.101 requires that all procedures as-
sociated with take-off and landing must be flyable by crews with average skills. 
4.2   STRATEGIES FOR RUNWAY INCURSION AVOIDANCE 
  103 
Additionally, since these manoeuvres will typically bring the aircraft close to the 
boundaries of its flight envelope, it will become more vulnerable to any gusts, varia-
tions in wind direction or engine performance, and windshear encountered during 
take-off. 
 
Nevertheless, as for the rejected take-off, there may be insufficient margin to prevent 
an accident. In the Tenerife accident, the KLM flight crew attempted to climb over 
the PanAm Boeing 747, cf. Appendix I-1, but failed. Likewise, at Linate, the SAS pi-
lots immediately pulled up the nose of their aircraft when they spotted the Cessna 
during rotation, but since they detected the other aircraft only seconds before the col-
lision due to the fog, this was not successful, either (Appendix I-11). 
 
In conclusion, therefore, there may be situations in which neither rejecting nor con-
tinuing take-off will prevent an accident. This once more confirms the necessity of 
preventing Runway Incursions before they result in traffic conflicts, and underlines 
the importance of detecting emerging conflicts as early as possible to maximise the 
chances that there is sufficient margin for conflict resolution. 
Table 4 summarizes the options a crew has to resolve a Runway Incursion conflict 
during the take-off run. Manoeuvres are listed with the respective constraints of ap-
plicability and the definite consequences associated with their application. Addi-
tional risks caused by the avoidance manoeuvre are specified as well. The main un-
derlying danger for all of these manoeuvres is that they fail to prevent a collision 
with the traffic causing the Runway Incursion, either due to a situation that will in-
evitably lead to an accident, or due to an inappropriate choice of the evasive ma-
noeuvre. 
 
4.2.3.3 Runway Incursion during ownship landing and roll-out 
If a runway incursion traffic conflict develops once the aircraft has touched down 
and decelerated such that a go-around remains no longer possible, the options for 
conflict resolution are essentially the same as for the abort scenarios of the take-off 
case, see previous section and Table 4. Consequently, the same considerations con-
cerning risk apply, particularly with respect to vacating the runway in the grass. 
 
In 1979, a landing Flying Tiger Boeing 747-F veered off RWY 9R at Chicago O’Hare 
International Airport, and thus successfully avoided a collision with a Delta Boeing 
727 which had erroneously been cleared across the runway. However, the Boeing 747 
incurred substantial damage due to the excursion. In several other cases, though, 
such as the 2006 Frankfurt incident and a 2007 Denver incident involving a snow-
plough on the runway, flight crews were able to prevent a collision by increasing 
deceleration only, see Appendix I-17. 
 
Generally, the chances of avoiding a collision are, for any given aircraft type, speed 
and distance, somewhat higher during the landing roll-out compared to the take-off 
run, because the aircraft is already decelerating and commonly significantly below 
MTOW. Additionally, an aircraft produces more drag in the landing configuration 
with its flaps extended and aerodynamic retarding devices typically deployed. 
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Runway Incursion Conflict Resolution Options (Take-off) 
 Manoeuvre Constraints Consequences Risks 
Abort Bring aircraft to a full stop on the runway 
Distance to 
conflicting traf-
fic must be 
sufficiently 
large 
 v < 100 kts 
— — 
 v > 100 kts 
— Damage to brakes and tyres 
 v ~ v1 
Damage to brakes and 
tyres 
Runway excursion 
Injuries to passengers 
and flight crew  
 
Brake and exit runway 
at high-speed exit or 
taxiway 
 
Brake and swerve 
around conflicting traf-
fic 
Availability of 
suitable exit or 
taxiway 
 
Sufficient run-
way width and 
space for eva-
sion 
 v < 100 kts 
— Collision with traffic on taxiways 
 v > 100 kts 
Damage to brakes and 
tyres 
Damage to landing gear 
due to overstress 
Runway/taxiway excur-
sion 
 v ~ v1 
Damage to brakes and 
tyres 
Damage to landing gear 
due to overstress 
Runway/taxiway excur-
sion 
Injuries to passengers 
and flight crew  
 Vacate runway into the grass — 
 v < 100 kts 
Runway excursion 
Damage to landing gear 
Damage to airframe 
Injuries to passengers 
and flight crew 
 v > 100 kts 
Runway excursion 
Damage to airframe 
Hull loss 
Injuries to passengers 
and flight crew 
Fatalities 
 v ~ v1 
Runway excursion 
Damage to the airframe 
Hull loss 
Injuries to passengers 
and flight crew 
Fatalities 
Complete loss of control 
and collision with other 
traffic or buildings 
Continue 
Continue take-off as 
planned, potentially 
with added thrust if 
available 
Distance to 
conflicting traf-
fic must be 
sufficiently 
large 
— — 
 
Continue take-off with 
early rotation/steep 
climb 
Distance to 
conflicting traf-
fic must be 
sufficiently 
large 
v > vR – 10 kts 
— 
Tailstrike 
Loss of control 
Crash 
Hull Loss 
Fatalities 
 Avoid conflicting traffic by rotating and banking 
Distance to 
conflicting traf-
fic must be 
sufficiently 
large 
v > vR – 10 kts 
— 
Loss of control 
Crash 
Hull Loss 
Fatalities 
 
Table 4: Options for Runway Incursion conflict resolution during take-off 
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4.2.3.4 Runway Incursion during ownship line-up, crossing or back-track 
Conflicting runway traffic may not only occur during take-off and landing, but also 
when ownship is backtracking, crossing or lining up on a runway. 
With ownship already on the runway surface, it will be best in the majority of cases 
to expedite crossing or to vacate the runway. If exiting the runway via an adjacent or 
nearby taxiway is not feasible, leaving the runway surface anywhere must be consid-
ered as well. The considerations concerning vacating the runway into the grass re-
main essentially the same as in all other situations. Typically, though, the speeds 
achievable in such a vacation manoeuvre are sufficiently low to prevent serious inju-
ries among passengers and flight crew.  
 
With ownship beyond the applicable holding position, but not yet physically on the 
runway surface, conflict resolution becomes more subtle. Depending on whether 
crossing or line-up is intended, there might be situations in which an expedited 
crossing may be favourable over an attempt to stop. Resolution options are also de-
pendent on airport geometry in this case. As an example, the possibility to turn an 
intended line-up manoeuvre into a runway crossing to avert a collision with conflict-
ing traffic is dependent on the availability of a suitable taxiway opposite of the taxi-
way used for line-up. Again, there may be situations in which conflict resolution is 
not possible irrespective of the manoeuvre chosen, or requires unorthodox manoeu-
vres. 
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4.3 Compensation of Existing Deficiencies and Limitations 
 
Compensating the existing deficiencies and limitations in flight deck instrumenta-
tion, as outlined by the five High-Level Requirements in Section 2.3, is crucial for 
Runway Incursion avoidance. Nevertheless, individually addressing each require-
ment may eventually yield a patchwork solution, which is clearly not desirable. For a 
holistic approach, it is therefore essential to scrutinize the High-Level Requirements 
in the light of the strategies for Runway Incursion avoidance devised in Section 4.2 - 
they provide structure and context for the derivation of the required onboard, 
ground and cooperative functionality. The following sections survey candidate tech-
nologies for an integrated solution and identify the associated key research issues. 
 
4.3.1 Prevention of Disorientation and Enhanced Position Awareness 
Disorientation due to insufficient flight crew position awareness, mostly in adverse 
weather conditions, is one of the most frequent causal factors in Runway Incursion 
incidents and accidents, as discussed in Section 2.3. Consequently, according to 
High-Level Requirement I, an independent source of aerodrome mapping and posi-
tion information that can help to overcome visibility limitations and potential issues 
with airport signage, markings and lights (conspicuousness, adherence to standards) 
is required. This cannot be achieved with ground-based measures, cf. Section 2.3. 
 
Based on the analysis in section Sections 2.2.2 and 2.3, the only area where cues cur-
rently available on the Flight Deck were not efficiently used by incident or accident 
flight crews concerns heading. To facilitate double-checking whether current heading 
is consistent with the perceived location on an aerodrome, it seems useful to relieve 
flight crews from mental arithmetic. But apart from adding taxiway orientation in-
formation to airport charts, there seems to be hardly any room for improvement 
within the current system. Besides, while possibly improving a detail of current op-
erations, this clearly would not address all of the identified issues. 
 
By contrast, an independent source of aerodrome mapping information can be 
achieved by extending the scope of navigational information currently displayed on 
electronic moving map displays. In line with the concepts proposed by Kubbat et al. 
[Kub99], and taking into account the recommendations issued by investigators in the 
wake of the Taipei and Lexington accidents, an airport moving map imposes itself as 
basic solution for the disorientation and position awareness issue. This approach is 
consistent with the current State of the Art (cf. Section 3.1) and ongoing activities in 
the field of Synthetic Vision. Furthermore, there is a substantial number of references 
outlining the potential of an airport moving map in preventing Runway Incursions 
by enhanced flight crew situational awareness, cf. [RTC05], but only very few elabo-
rate on this subject or provide a rationale. 
According to DO-257A [RTC03a], the intended function of an Aerodrome Moving 
Map Display (AMMD) is “to assist flight crews in orienting themselves on the airport sur-
face by enhancing the pilots’ awareness of ownship position on the airport surface and to im-
prove pilot position awareness with respect to taxi operations”, which is in reasonable 
agreement with High-Level Requirement I.  
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An airport moving map display is, in principle, usable at every airport, provided that 
an Aerodrome Mapping Database (AMDB) according to RTCA DO-272A [RTC05] 
can be made available, and provided that Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) 
coverage is available, conditions which can be presumed as fulfilled for all airports 
used by commercial aviation. It is therefore independent of any particular ATM in-
frastructure on the ground, i.e. a stand-alone onboard system. 
Nonetheless, like paper charts or their electronic equivalents, it is dependent on the 
availability, validity and currency of Aeronautical Information Services (AIS) data, 
particularly with respect to the designations of taxiways and other aerodrome fea-
tures. 
 
For the purpose of Runway Incursion avoidance, however, an airport moving map is 
believed to be more robust against taxiway charting discrepancies than paper charts, 
provided that it offers sufficient positional integrity. 
As long as information concerning the location of the runway(s) is correct and the 
presented airport structure is not substantially changed, even occasional errors in 
taxiway, stand or apron naming should not significantly hamper the value of this 
independent source of airport information for Runway Incursion prevention, al-
though usability for airport navigation will be significantly degraded. Nonetheless, 
provided that the flight crew can trust the presented ownship position, it is assumed 
that this will enable pilots to detect the perceived inconsistencies as charting discrep-
ancies, instead of attempting to reconcile the inconsistent information with the per-
ception of their position. 
 
The main concern associated with the use of this technology, a potential increase of 
head-down times, frequently expressed by flight crew members participating in pre-
vious airport moving map assessments [RM01] or when discussing the technology 
[And95], has been somewhat rebuted by eye-tracking experiments performed by 
Graeber and Andre [GA99] and, both more recently and more conclusively, by Biella 
[Bie05]. Biella could demonstrate that the presence of an airport moving map display 
in the cockpit merely shifts attention from the conventional paper charts to the dis-
play, but does not increase overall head-down time. In designing the system and, 
even more importantly, the associated procedures, it must be nonetheless ensured 
that any potential tendency of the crew to focus on the displays in limited visibility 
conditions, thus possibly missing external cues that are not shown on the display for 
whatever reason, is addressed appropriately. 
 
In conclusion, therefore, the airport moving map is regarded as the core element of 
onboard functionality for the prevention of disorientation and, thus, Runway Incur-
sions; this must be validated in a representative environment (see Chapter 6). 
The technology itself already has a high degree of maturity (cf. Section 3.1), and most 
fundamental issues from a systems and Human Factors perspective have been ad-
dressed. Consequently, the main research interest in the frame of this thesis concerns 
the repercussions and implications an integrated solution for Runway Incursion 
avoidance has on airport moving map design, particularly in terms of display for-
mats and flight deck integration. 
4   TOWARDS AN INTEGRATED SOLUTION 
 108
4.3.2 Enhanced Traffic Awareness and Traffic Conflict Detection 
High-Level Requirement II mandates 
that relevant surrounding traffic on 
the airport surface and the runway 
environment, including potential 
traffic conflicts, must be brought to 
the attention of flight crews in a suit-
able form. 
Improving traffic awareness by en-
hancing visual acquisition is certainly 
a valid approach. In this context, en-
hanced aircraft lighting procedures, 
cf. [FAA03a], or improved lighting 
can doubtlessly increase aircraft con-
spicuity on the ground. 
Nonetheless, as shown in Figure 27, 
the flight crew’s field of view is lim-
ited by cockpit geometry, which may physically prevent the visual acquisition of 
relevant and potentially conflicting traffic. Additionally, geometrical restrictions re-
sulting e.g. from sloped runways or buildings must be taken into account. As the ac-
cident at Paris Charles-de-Gaulle (LFPG) in 2000 (Appendix I-8) and the Munich in-
cident in 2004 (Appendix I-16) clearly demonstrate, approaching traffic can be virtu-
ally impossible to acquire visually if high-speed taxiways are used to feed runway 
operations. Likewise, when lined up on a runway, landing traffic approaching from 
behind as in the case of the Los Angeles accident (Appendix I-6) is clearly outside the 
flight crew’s field of view. In conclusion, therefore, visual acquisition is not only lim-
ited by meteorological conditions, but also by geometrical restrictions. Enhancing 
aircraft conspicuity is consequently not sufficient to fulfil High-Level Requirement II. 
 
4.3.2.1 Methods of conveying traffic information to flight crews 
Classic airport signs and markings are static and therefore apparently not suitable for 
conveying dynamic traffic information. However, as the example of Runway Status 
Lights (see Section 3.5.5) illustrates, switchable airport lights can in principle be used 
to indicate occupancy of runways, taxiways or other airport areas, and thus provide 
indirect traffic awareness. Runway Status Lights are automatically switched on by 
the airport’s surveillance system to inform pilots that it is unsafe to enter a runway, 
to take off or to land due to other traffic. While initial evaluation results were appar-
ently positive, cf. [FAA09], indicating both runway traffic status and ATC instruc-
tions (as with stop bars) by red in-pavement lights may potentially be confusing. Fur-
thermore, since the Runway Status Lights as envisaged provide exclusively negative 
feedback, the presence of these lights at some airports and their absence at others 
might eventually result in crews erroneously perceiving runway operations as safe if 
the system is not installed (or not working) at an airport. Besides, the effectiveness of 
Runway Status Lights in advising aircraft approaching in CAT II/III conditions that 
there is runway traffic must be questioned. Last but not least, Runway Status Lights 
only provide information on the presence of traffic, not on its precise location. 
 
Figure 27: Airbus A380 Cockpit Field of View 
© Airbus 
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Another aspect is that airport lighting and light colour can be deceptive, particularly 
in foggy conditions. In fact, in the wake of the Madrid accident, a study on colour 
perception under foggy conditions conducted with 100 air transport pilots revealed 
that 88% of the participants failed to identify the colour white correctly. The partici-
pants, who had been carefully selected by filtering for normal vision and colour per-
ception, most commonly mistook white for yellow (42%), light brown (10%) and 
green (9%). When white was shown in combination with either red or green, the er-
ror rates were 70% and 77%, respectively. The most frequent error was to identify 
only a single colour in the combination, i.e. either red (56%) or green (61%) [CIA84]. 
 
In conclusion, there is no solution based on ground-based visual aids that can pro-
vide adequate traffic awareness on relevant surrounding traffic. Consequently, an 
onboard solution is mandatory to fulfil the traffic awareness part of High-Level Re-
quirement II. Furthermore, if relevant traffic is displayed in the cockpit, crews may 
be able to anticipate potentially hazardous situations themselves. 
As discussed in Section 3.2.2.2, the main goals of any Cockpit Display of Traffic In-
formation (CDTI) application are improved traffic situational awareness and en-
hanced visual traffic acquisition, compared to unaided visual search. Thus, taking 
into account the current state of the art and the emerging ASAS Package 1 concept 
ATSA-SURF (cf. Section 3.5.4), a CDTI presenting operationally relevant traffic in 
relation to an airport moving appears to be the solution of choice, cf. [BAO00, RTC02, 
SAE03]. Accordingly, a US study by the Cargo Airline Association (CAA) and NASA 
concluded that efficient surface traffic awareness is hardly possible in the absence of 
an airport map [BAO00]. In this case, it is very difficult - if not impossible - for the 
crew to identify the exact position of surface traffic presented on the display if visibil-
ity is reduced. 
 
The introduction of a CDTI for aerodrome traffic can therefore be regarded as a fur-
ther rationale for an airport moving map. Consequently, DO-242A explicitly requires 
an “airport surface moving map as underlay” when using a CDTI for enhanced situ-
ational awareness of airport traffic (including runway and final approach occupancy 
awareness). Additionally, this standard outlines the need for sufficiently detailed 
display ranges and resolutions to determine unambiguously whether a traffic target 
is on the runway or not. Nevertheless, it is emphasized that a CDTI is not intended to 
replace visual navigation and traffic acquisition on the airport surface [RTC02]. 
 
4.3.2.2 Suitable sources of traffic data 
The choice of a CDTI immediately leads to the question of potential sources of traffic 
data. Due to the large maximum permissible bearing angle of 27° [RTC97], TCAS is 
not suitable for traffic surveillance on the ground, even if TCAS traffic surveillance 
was not, as currently, suppressed on the ground, cf. Section 3.2.1.1. Assuming, with 
ownship lined up on the runway, a bearing error of 27° and a standard runway pro-
tection zone extending 75 m from the runway centreline (see Appendix II-2), basic 
geometric considerations yield that for intruder distances of approximately 150 m 
and beyond, TCAS traffic data is too inaccurate to indicate whether an intruder is 
within the runway protection zone or not. 
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While active sensors such as radar would allow truly autonomous onboard traffic 
surveillance, they can be excluded as potential source of airport surface traffic data 
for several reasons. Assuming an installation collocated with the weather radar in the 
aircraft nose, the only installation not requiring extensive airframe modifications, a 
radar sensor will suffer from similar geometrical limitations as cockpit vision. Other 
arguments against radar sensors are equipment costs, potential radiation hazards or 
undesirable electromagnetic interference. Electro-optical sensors, irrespective of 
whether they are active or passive, are not capable of working in all relevant atmos-
pheric conditions due to signal attenuation [Jur85]. 
 
By contrast, ADS-B and, where available, TIS-B, are by design capable of providing 
traffic data with sufficient accuracy and integrity to enable a traffic awareness repre-
sentation on an airport moving map, cf. Sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3. Furthermore, since 
an ADS-B mandate is emerging in several countries, among them the key players in 
aviation, it can be regarded as the traffic surveillance technology of the future in civil 
aviation [Eur08b, FAA07b]. Although equipment and adherence to the published 
ADS-B standards are still voluntary, many aircraft are already equipped with ADS-B 
out capability. This enables an avionics approach to aerodrome traffic awareness 
and, subsequently, traffic conflict detection independent of ground-based infrastruc-
ture. 
However, a key issue for the effectiveness of such a solution is equipage of other air-
craft (and vehicles), especially in the transition phase towards a mandate. Particu-
larly in the United States, TIS-B is seen as a ‘gap filler’ technology in terminal air-
space and on the ground until all transport category aircraft are equipped. Nonethe-
less, in view of the emerging ADS-B mandate, the following assumptions regarding 
the availability of traffic surveillance data are made in this thesis: 
 
 All transport category aircraft are equipped with an ADS-B out installation that is 
capable of providing the ADS-B messages described in Section 3.2.2. Likewise, 
any other aircraft operating at airports serving scheduled airline operations are 
presumed to either feature these ADS-B out capabilities, or be included in TIS-B. 
 For airborne traffic, both ADS-B and TCAS data are available, whereas aircraft on 
the ground transmit only ADS-B data. 
 Additionally, TIS-B traffic information may be available at certain airports or in 
selected airspaces, irrespective of whether traffic is on the ground or in the air. 
 Since it is highly undesirable to display a single traffic target multiple times, it is 
assumed that aircraft are equipped with a traffic computer capable of fusing 
ADS-B, TIS-B and ACAS traffic data and providing a consolidated best position 
estimate; corresponding devices are already available on the market, cf. [ACS07]. 
 All airport vehicles operating on the manoeuvring area are equipped with ADS-B 
transmitters, and covered by ground traffic surveillance and included in the TIS-B 
traffic broadcast where available. In either broadcast, they are unambiguously 
identified as vehicles (DF = 18), cf. Section 3.2.2.1. 
 Any other airport vehicles, such as service vehicles operating on the apron only, 
may also be equipped to transmit ADS-B data, but it is assumed that there will 
not be an ADS-B out mandate for all airport vehicles. 
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 All aircraft under electrical power continue to transmit ADS-B signals (position 
and identity) even when parked at a gate or parking stand59 and during 
pushback. In the long term, it is expected that information on unpowered parked 
aircraft could be included in TIS-B broadcasts, either based on SMR data or be-
cause the airport operator’s logistics systems have the information which aircraft 
is parked where, and can forward this information to the TIS-B service provider. 
In the short term, the absence of data on some parked aircraft may be an issue. 
 For unpowered aircraft under tow, only primary radar can currently make the 
distinction between a tug and a tug-aircraft combination. 
 
Aside from accuracy, there is a fundamental difference between ADS-B, TIS-B and 
TCAS traffic data: accuracy and integrity of ADS-B and TIS-B data depend on the 
equipment installed aboard 3rd party aircraft or on the ground, whereas TCAS traffic 
data are calculated onboard and only require a working transponder aboard the sur-
rounding aircraft, i.e. equipment that is already mandatory. Therefore, although 
TCAS traffic data is unusable for display on an airport moving map, it could be used 
to perform consistency checks on the ADS-B or TIS-B data received. 
 
4.3.2.3 The issue of traffic conflict detection  
When a Runway Incursion results in a traffic conflict and potential collision hazard, 
immediate awareness, ideally of both involved flight crews and controllers60, of this 
potentially very dangerous situation is essential, and appropriate countermeasures 
are crucial. As an example, another aircraft or vehicle could enter, fail to vacate or 
otherwise operate within the runway protection zone while ownship is cleared for 
take-off or landing on the same runway. Furthermore, there could be conflicting traf-
fic taking off or landing on the runway while pilots are approved to cross or to per-
form a line-up. Additionally, there are a number of potential conflict scenarios for 
intersecting runways, including LAHSO operations. 
For this reason, High-Level Requirement II explicitly includes enhanced awareness of 
potential traffic conflicts. Therefore, apart from collecting further evidence that a 
CDTI is a suitable means of increasing traffic awareness, a key research issue is how 
traffic conflicts can be detected, in particular whether a mere presentation of the sur-
rounding traffic enables pro-active traffic conflict detection, or if alerting is required 
in addition. In this context, it is noteworthy that all of the CDTI guidance documents 
referenced above state that traffic alerting might be necessary, but do not give any 
details on potential alert conditions or Human-Machine Interface (HMI) require-
ments. This confirms the necessity to restudy traffic conflict alerting in an aerodrome 
environment in more detail. 
Nevertheless, the question whether providing enhanced situational awareness is suf-
ficient to prevent hazardous situations in the aerodrome environment is not endemic 
to conflicting traffic, but also applies to the domains addressed by the other High-
Level Requirements. It is therefore addressed in a dedicated subchapter, Section 4.4. 
                                                 
59  This behaviour could be confirmed during trials with ADS-B live traffic at Frankfurt airport (EDDF) for the 
European project EMMA, see Chapter 7. 
60  The ICAO Manual on A-SMGCS acknowledges the need to raise the corresponding alerts to both pilots and 
controllers, but does not provide any further details on this matter [ICA07]. 
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A further important research issue concerning the presentation of traffic and poten-
tial traffic alerts is the impact on airport moving map design. In this context, there are 
a number of very interesting HMI issues resulting from the need to integrate the 
CDTI with existing flight deck systems, particularly how consistency with TCAS as 
existing mandatory traffic surveillance system can be achieved in terms of symbol-
ogy while, at the same time, utilising the enhanced traffic information provided by 
ADS-B and TIS-B. 
Likewise, the influence of an incomplete traffic surveillance picture resulting from 
less than 100% equipage on the usability of a CDTI and traffic alerting (if required) 
must be established. Another important aspect concerns the down-selection of opera-
tionally relevant traffic that might be necessary in high density traffic environments 
to limit display clutter. 
 
4.3.3 Improved Information on Aerodrome Operational Status and Configuration 
For safe and efficient surface movement operations, it is essential that relevant and 
sufficiently up-to-date information on the operational status and configuration of an 
aerodrome and its installations, such as potential runway closures or restrictions, is 
brought to the attention of pilots in a suitable form (High-Level Requirement III). 
 
Due to the strategic nature of this information and its importance in decision making, 
current international standards necessitate the availability of a compilation of current 
NOTAM and other information of urgent character on the flight deck in the form of a 
plain-language Pre-flight Information Bulletin (PIB) [ICA04]. Nevertheless, the PIB 
and all other current sources of short-term and temporary aeronautical information61 
are either text-based or verbal, and not sufficiently intuitive. These and other limita-
tions have been discussed extensively in Section 2.3.3. 
 
In most cases, though, information on construction areas or runway closures is also 
conveyed by on-site ground based means, such as signs, lights, barricades and mark-
ings, but these may be absent particularly in case of short-term and temporary clo-
sures, as discussed in Appendix II-2.1, and suffer from the same limitations as any 
airport signs, lights and markings even when present. 
 
4.3.3.1 Challenges associated with an onboard presentation 
In conclusion, therefore, an onboard solution is required to overcome the limitations 
of the current system with its immanent hazards and to bring this information to the 
attention of the flight crew in a suitable form. 
However, like paper charts, the airport moving map is currently limited to quasi-
static airport information, because the underlying aerodrome database is envisaged 
to be updated only every 28 days with the regular AIRAC cycle [ARI06]. This is a 
significant limitation when it comes to short-term and/or temporary changes typi-
cally conveyed by NOTAM. 
                                                 
61  Short-term changes are alterations that occur between AIRAC effective dates; the changes may be either of 
temporary or permanent nature. A runway, for example, could be closed for several months due to pavement 
refurbishment, while a permanent taxiway closure might be published on short notice. 
4.3   COMPENSATION OF EXISTING DEFICIENCIES AND LIMITATIONS 
  113 
In this context, it has been argued that the advent of AMM technology might 
represent a further challenge to the conventional PIB/NOTAM system: particularly 
when integrated with flight deck displays, an airport moving map provides informa-
tion at a quality and level that is far more compelling than a paper chart. Employing 
disparate media for aerodrome mapping and PIB/NOTAM information could thus 
lead to a strong difference in its respective conspicuousness to the flight crew. Con-
sequently, a runway displayed on the airport moving map without any indication of 
closure might be perceived as open even if contrary NOTAM information exists 
elsewhere in the cockpit. As a result, the absence of integrated operational status in-
formation, particularly when pertaining to runway closures or restrictions, is be-
lieved to be an even more severe limitation than for paper charts [Ver08]. 
 
Accordingly, to enhance the flight crew’s situational awareness, a graphical overlay 
of ATIS and NOTAM information on an electronic display has already been outlined 
as a potential application of AMDBs [RTC01, RTC05], and SAE ARP 5364 specifically 
mentions a NOTAM overlay as a potential add-on to an airport moving map display 
[SAE03]. Nevertheless, neither of these references contains material beyond initial 
ideas and artists’ impressions. Concerning symbology, a first proposal for the visu-
alisation of construction areas on airport moving maps was presented in [Kub99]. 
 
Consequently, in contrast to airport moving map and CDTI, there is very little exist-
ing material to build on, and the required functionality must be studied from scratch. 
Therefore, a key research issue is an analysis of the prerequisites for an onboard 
visualisation of short-term/temporary information on an aerodrome’s operational 
status and configuration. Evidently, this results in an intrinsic focus on the HMI, par-
ticularly the required level of integration with the airport moving map. In this con-
text, the issue of whether an overlay or an integral representation is preferable must 
be resolved before adequate symbology can be derived. 
 
4.3.3.2 Considerations on data handling and operational concept 
Nevertheless, as outlined previously, PIB/NOTAM and ATIS data have their origins 
on the ground and need to be transferred to the aircraft avionics in a suitable form to 
enable an onboard solution. Consequently, a crucial step towards a flight-deck based 
visualisation of NOTAM, ATIS and other aerodrome status/configuration informa-
tion is the availability of an underlying data handling and operational concept.  
 
For ATIS, this is comparatively straightforward and encompasses decoding and 
presentation of the successively received D-ATIS transmissions. By contrast, with 
respect to PIB/NOTAM information, a suitable operational concept for the onboard 
functionality, which subsequently determines the necessary data handling, remains 
to be established. The fundamental issue in this context is whether the transmission 
of NOTAM to the flight deck systems is merely to be considered as part of routine 
flight preparation and data-loading on the ground, or whether in-flight updates - and 
thus full air-ground cooperativity - are required. 
While it is doubtlessly important that flight crews have access to the most recent 
NOTAM information available, there is no evidence from the incident & accident 
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analysis in Section 2.2 that unavailability of NOTAM emerging during the flight was 
causal in one of the occurrences. This finding needs to be reassessed, though, in view 
of emerging ultra long-haul flights with a duration of 16 hours and more. Nonethe-
less, the operational necessity of in-flight NOTAM updates remains to be established. 
 
With respect to potential in-flight NOTAM transmission, one of the possibilities out-
lined by the references above is that dedicated xNOTAM or FIS-B services are avail-
able via a specialized aeronautical data link, such as ACARS, VDL or SATCOM, pro-
vided either by the Air Navigation Service Provider (ANSP) or the AIS unit in charge 
of supplying this data. 
However, the availability of such services does not eliminate the need for adequate 
flight preparation and the Pre-Flight Information Bulletin, irrespective of its current 
limitations. Besides, it is neither intended nor desirable to shift the dispatcher role to 
the flight deck. Additionally, there are, at least in a U.S. scheduled airline operations 
environment, important regulatory constraints regarding the in-flight update or ad-
dition of NOTAM. Dispatchers are responsible for issuing information necessary for 
the safety of the flight in the USA, according to FAR §121.533 and §121.535 [FAR07]. 
Since dispatchers are involved in decision making, for which NOTAM might contain 
important relevant information, a direct NOTAM transmission from the AIS/ANSP 
provider to the flight deck is only possible if the dispatcher is simultaneously pro-
vided with the same information, i.e. if information is shared system-wide. Conse-
quently, a fundamental requirement for NOTAM upload, including but not limited 
to in-flight updates, is that this process must be handled via the airline’s Airline Op-
erational Control (AOC) to ensure that the dispatcher is involved in decision-making 
where necessary. Data handling via AOC or with AOC in the loop also ensures that 
an airline keeps track of the database configuration of its aircraft. 
 
4.3.3.3 Conclusion 
In conclusion, pre-processing and combining PIB/NOTAM information with the air-
port moving map to aid the flight crew in creating an adequate mental picture of the 
aerodrome, including all short-term and temporary changes as well as other opera-
tionally relevant information, emerges as the most promising solution to address 
both the previously discussed shortcomings of conveying PIB/NOTAM convention-
ally and the additional concern associated with airport moving map technology it-
self. In the frame of this thesis, the focus is on closures or restrictions of runways, tax-
iways and apron areas. In principle, fixed obstacles could also be visualised on the 
airport moving map, employing the initial symbology defined by the author for the 
project described in [TUD06]. However, fixed obstacles on or in the vicinity of the 
aerodrome are of virtually no importance for Runway Incursion prevention accord-
ing to the definition in Section 1.2, and thus not further discussed. 
Any data handling and operational concept for NOTAM and other relevant short-
term or temporary information will have to address both the issue of dispatching 
aircraft with information consistent with the conventional PIB, as well as the han-
dling of potential updates or additions of NOTAM while the aircraft is in flight. 
Eventually, the overall onboard functionality (including data-handling) must be 
validated against High-Level Requirement III in a representative environment. 
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4.3.4 Taxi Route Assignments and Other Clearances 
The worst accident in aviation history, the Tenerife disaster, was essentially caused 
by a misunderstanding concerning the take-off clearance. In many other incidents 
and several accidents, a breakdown of communication between flight crew and con-
troller was also causal. To aid flight crews in dispelling any potential doubts about 
the controller’s intentions, therefore, both taxi route assignments and clearances re-
lated to surface movement or other runway operations must be conveyed to flight 
crews in a suitable form. Additionally, High-Level Requirement IV demands that 
route and clearance information has to be continuously accessible and robust against 
phraseology or language proficiency issues, and that conditional clearances must 
unambiguously identify the aircraft they refer to. Essentially, therefore, High-Level 
Requirement IV calls for improved awareness of taxi route assignments and runway-
related clearances. 
 
4.3.4.1 Taxi route 
Several current SMGCS and most emerging A-SMGCS installations heavily rely on 
ground-based aids, mainly sophisticated ground guidance using advanced lighting 
functions which are controller-selectable or even automated, to enhance pilot aware-
ness of taxi route assignments and applicable (intermediate) holding positions, as 
discussed in Sections 3.5.2 and 3.5.3. 
 
However, particularly with respect to the assigned taxi route, it is important to note 
that ground-based systems are in principle not capable of providing complete situa-
tional awareness of the route to be followed. Any ‘follow-the-greens’ approach can 
only provide segment-wise guidance, but not a general overview of the assigned 
route, because the presence of other aircraft usually prohibits that the complete in-
tended route can be lighted up. Even without this constraint, flight crews would typ-
ically not be able to see the entire intended route or route segment at a glance in per-
fect visibility conditions due to airport geometry and the presence of other airport 
lights. 
 
In this context, it is essential to take into account that effective guidance, which can 
doubtlessly be provided by airport lights, does not necessarily create (and is not 
equivalent to) an adequate level of situational awareness. In fact, a strong focus of 
attention on the guidance provided may even be detrimental to situational aware-
ness through effects such as cognitive tunnelling. Anybody who has ever ‘blindly’ 
followed another car to an unfamiliar location and tried to find the way back inde-
pendently afterwards will be able to confirm this effect. Besides, dense fog, snow and 
slush can easily jeopardise the efficiency of ground-based guidance systems. 
 
Consequently, a visualisation of the assigned taxi route on the flight deck, i.e. an on-
board solution, appears as the most promising way of fulfilling all aspects of High-
Level Requirement IV with respect to situational awareness, and has previously been 
suggested, cf. [Kub99, RTC01, RTC05, SAE03]. Again, considerations on the practical 
realisation in these references typically end at the level of stating that the taxi route 
will be up-linked to the flight deck via data link. 
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While Controller-Pilot Data Link Communication (CPDLC) appears to be the pre-
ferred variant of obtaining the data required for an onboard taxi route visualisation, 
both the technical details, such as machine-readable encoding of the corresponding 
data, and potential alternative solutions need to be investigated in detail. Indeed, a 
fundamental question to be assessed is whether, in absence of CPDLC service for taxi 
routes, flight crews should be provided with tools enabling them to manually create 
the taxi route to be displayed based on R/T controller instructions, or whether this 
only creates additional hazards to surface movement. Further important aspects to be 
researched encompass a consistent graphical and textual representation of the as-
signed taxi route, applicable holding positions and conditional clearances involving 
other aircraft throughout the flight deck, with focus on the associated HMI issues. 
 
In conclusion, it is expected that an onboard a taxi route visualisation should help to 
prevent Runway Incursions due to flight crew disorientation and runway confusion. 
Nonetheless, a representation of only the taxi route might not be sufficient to create 
the clearance awareness required to avoid all types of Runway Incursions. Therefore, 
making the crew aware of runway-related clearances using e.g. the airport moving 
map display has to be considered as well. 
 
4.3.4.2 Runway-related clearances 
For Runway Incursion prevention, it is essential that flight crews correctly under-
stand and comply with approval to line-up, cross or back-track on a runway, as well 
as take-off or landing clearances. In low visibility conditions, stop bars currently pro-
vide effective safe-guarding against inadvertent runway entry by indicating that ap-
proval to enter the runway has not (yet) been given. Switching off a lighted stop bar 
constitutes an extremely powerful ground-based means of conveying approval to 
line-up or to cross a runway by visually reinforcing the verbal ATC instruction. In 
principle, this concept can be extended to all-weather operations and other types of 
holding instructions. 
 
By contrast, standardized operational means of conveying take-off clearances by 
ground-based lighting are currently not available, but feasible in principle. A corre-
sponding solution was evaluated in the wake of the Tenerife accident, but not pur-
sued further because it could not be demonstrated that it enhanced safety [FAA81]. 
Besides, the effectiveness of similar ground-based visual means in conveying a land-
ing clearance must be questioned at least for low visibility operations, since the 
minimum required RVR for CAT III B approaches is 75 m, and the decision height (if 
specified) may be as low as 15 m. Enhanced awareness of landing clearances there-
fore requires an onboard solution, and it is also highly desirable to have an onboard 
presentation of take-off clearances, particularly in view of the ease with that colours 
may be confused in foggy conditions, as discussed in Section 4.3.2. 
 
It is imperative that any runway-related ATC instruction or clearance intended for 
presentation on the flight deck originates from a CPDLC service. In contrast to taxi 
routes, therefore, a solution permitting pilots to manually enter such instructions or 
clearances based on information received via R/T can be excluded a priori. Other-
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wise, in view of the Tenerife accident, there is an unacceptable risk that a crew mem-
ber under the erroneous impression that approval to enter the runway or a take-
off/landing clearance has been received, feeds this false information into the aircraft 
systems. Once visualised, this may not only reinforce the erroneous impression of the 
crew member entering the information, but will also result in a presentation of haz-
ardously misleading information to fellow crew members. This, in turn, could make 
it even more difficult for pilots to challenge their mental model of the situation62. 
 
The main problem in this context is that runway-related clearances and instructions 
provide a last line of defence against Runway Incursions, leaving virtually no margin 
to trap and correct the errors resulting from a faulty manual clearance entry. By con-
trast, both flight crew and controller have ample time and opportunity to detect the 
inevitable discrepancies resulting from erroneously entered taxi instructions aboard 
the aircraft before a hazardous situation emerges, if at all. 
 
Consequently, from a flight safety perspective, CPDLC service for runway-related 
ATC instructions and clearances emerges as the by far most important exchange of 
data between aircraft and ground-based ATM installations. Its potential value can 
hardly be overestimated, because it might enable not only a visualisation of runway-
related clearances in the cockpit, but is also prerequisite for system-based monitoring 
of adherence to ATC instructions. With information on clearances available to both 
ATC and aircraft systems, it becomes possible to generate preventive advisories or 
alerts if the crew is in danger of disregarding them. 
 
However, there are various operational, several technical and Human Factors issues 
with respect to the use of CPDLC for runway-related ATC instructions and clear-
ances. First of all, runway-related clearances are tactical and thus highly time-critical 
clearances, especially in an airport environment with high traffic density. Conse-
quently, this results in rigorous performance requirements for the CPDLC infrastruc-
ture, as there must be virtually no delay in exchanging clearance and read-back. Po-
tential delays of CPDLC messages could otherwise decrease runway throughput and 
create confusion for air traffic controllers and flight crews if messages are delayed or 
lost. Likewise, the acknowledgement process in the cockpit, i.e. the time the crew 
needs to receive and acknowledge the clearance, must be such that it does not in-
crease workload or induce delays compared to current R/T. 
 
Apart from these performance issues, a fundamental problem is that using CPDLC 
for runway-related clearances would deprive the crew of the so-called party line ef-
fect, which is particularly important in this situation. Since all runway-related ma-
noeuvres (including runway crossings) are typically coordinated on a single fre-
quency today, flight crews can listen to the R/T communication of the controller 
with other traffic and employ this information in building a mental picture of traffic 
in the runway environment. 
                                                 
62 If flight crews exchange clearance information verbally, as today, it may be possible for both pilots to detect 
whether the other is sure of the information he or she is conveying, mainly from subtle cues in the voice, and it 
is easy to voice concerns.  
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Nevertheless, the party line effect goes beyond mere traffic awareness, because it en-
ables pilots to anticipate the intent of other aircraft and vehicles, based on the ATC 
instructions and clearances that have been issued to this traffic, which makes it the 
sole means of detecting controller errors today. To date, there is no conclusive con-
cept how this crucial party line information could be compensated for in a CPDLC 
scenario. Concerning the location of the surrounding traffic, it is believed that a CDTI 
as proposed in Section 4.3.2 would provide more than adequate compensation in a 
CPDLC environment, whereas this solution is obviously not sufficient to address the 
missing intent information. 
Last but not least, an operationally viable scenario for a transition period from con-
ventional R/T clearances to CPDLC must be developed. While this is not an issue for 
taxi instructions, there is a clear need to address the related transition and obsoles-
cence/legacy issues for runway-related clearances. This transition might be achieved 
e.g. by segregating CPDLC and legacy operations at airports with multiple runways. 
In addition, it should be taken into account that R/T is foreseen as both for emer-
gency use and as fallback solution in case of CPDLC failure. 
 
Nevertheless, to gain more insight in the operational and human factors issues re-
lated to the use of CPDLC for runway-related ATC instructions and clearances, it is 
assumed that these issues can – at least in principle – be resolved. In parallel, the im-
pact of not having a corresponding CPDLC service any time in the foreseeable future 
has been studied as well. The main research issue concerning the presentation of 
runway-related ATC instructions and clearances on the airport moving map was to 
validate its operational necessity and perceived relevance for Runway Incursion pre-
vention. Apart from this, another key interest was to determine an adequate and con-
sistent visualisation of runway-related clearances. 
 
4.3.4.3 Assumptions on CPDLC 
The key challenge with respect to CPDLC and surface movement is how the corre-
sponding clearances63 can be obtained a suitable machine-readable format that per-
mits bringing them to the attention of flight crews as required. This section discusses 
the assumptions and the resulting conceptual or technical issues related to the 
transmission and processing of CPDLC clearances for taxi routing and runway op-
erations. 
 
For the purposes of this thesis, it is assumed that the existing Future Air Navigation 
System (FANS) CPDLC communication protocol, avionics equipment and interfaces 
(see Section 3.4.1) are also used for CPDLC clearances related to aerodrome opera-
tions. Consequently, this thesis employs, extends or adapts the associated HMI and 
interaction principles and does not strive to determine an optimum solution. In par-
ticular, this means that the Datalink Control and Display Unit (DCDU) and the Mul-
tipurpose Control Display Unit (MCDU) are used for interaction with clearances, i.e. 
to display and acknowledge CPDLC clearances, or to initialize crew requests 
[FAN06]. With this technology, which is currently available as option, clearances are 
                                                 
63  For simplicity, ‘CPDLC clearance’ is used as a generic term for CPDLC ATC instructions and clearances in this 
section. 
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therefore generally transmitted in textual format, with the possibility to define cer-
tain items as variables that can subsequently be used by other aircraft systems. 
 
This choice has the important implication that the textual part of any received 
CPDLC clearance will always be presented on the DCDU, irrespective of other means 
of visualisation on the flight deck. Since FANS mimics the conventional read-back 
process, this raises the issue whether only clearances already acknowledged by the 
crew should be displayed on other flight deck displays, or whether clearances as-
signed by ATC should be represented as well. 
However, since pilots might find themselves unable to comply with an ATC instruc-
tion, it can be assumed that they would therefore potentially want to review a clear-
ance before acknowledging or rejecting it, and will – particularly in the case of a taxi 
route – benefit from the graphical representation of clearances on the airport moving 
map in this process. Consequently, it is presumed that the distinction between a 
clearance assigned by ATC and a clearance already acknowledged by the crew must 
be visualised. Therefore, the concept pursued was to represent read-back status on 
the airport moving map in a CPDLC environment at minimum for all clearances that 
would require a read-back in a conventional R/T environment. 
 
At large airports, aerodrome control is usually shared between tower controllers re-
sponsible for the runways and ground controllers responsible for the remainder of 
the manoeuvring area [ICA01a]. It is assumed that this separation will be maintained 
in a CPDLC environment. Consequently, all runway-related manoeuvres will still be 
coordinated by the tower controller, which means that all pilots, irrespective of 
whether they only want to cross a runway or intend to take off, will have to change 
to the tower when reaching the holding position or stop bar. Therefore, all runway-
related clearances will typically be addressed by a separate CPDLC clear-
ance/approval and acknowledgement process. With the exception of crossing non-
active runways in a U.S. operational environment, runway-related clearances will 
therefore not be implicitly contained in the assigned CPDLC taxi route. It should be 
noted, though, that this concerns CPDLC data handling and interaction only, and is 
independent of the way clearances are eventually presented on the airport moving 
map. 
 
4.3.5 Safeguarding Against ATC Errors 
At a conceptual level, it is straightforward that both controllers and pilots should be 
provided with tools providing better situational awareness, advising or alerting them 
if they are at risk of causing a hazardous situation, or if a dangerous situation has 
evolved otherwise. Of course, this does by no means preclude providing flight crews 
with means of detecting controller errors and vice versa, but in principle any prob-
lems should first be addressed in the domain in which they occur. Nonetheless, in 
view of the role that controller errors played in some of the Runway Incursion inci-
dents and accidents studied, a means of enabling pilots to anticipate and mitigate 
potential ATC errors is required according to High-Level Requirement V. 
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Since a controller error leading to a Runway Incursion will most likely result in a 
traffic conflict of some form, it appears that the most powerful tool for the detection 
of controller errors from a flight crew perspective is the traffic conflict detection func-
tionality. As outlined previously, the issue whether a mere visualisation of traffic as 
with a CDTI is sufficient to detect potential conflicts remains to be studied in this and 
the following sections. 
For illustration, consider the case that a take-off clearance is issued to an aircraft 
while other traffic is erroneously still on the runway. A representation of traffic on an 
airport moving map could give the flight crew the opportunity to detect the problem 
even in reduced visibility and to check back with ATC, or if the other traffic is just 
vacating, delay take-off for a few seconds. In case of visual acquisition of an intruder, 
this is precisely what a crew would do today, thus this proactive conflict detection 
does not imply a change of the overall procedures, let alone a shift of responsibilities. 
By contrast, it is straightforward that a visualisation of ATC instructions and clear-
ances for ownship alone will not reveal controller errors. However, a combined visu-
alisation of traffic and clearances might enable intuitive consistency checks. As a fur-
ther example, approval to cross a runway is inconsistent with traffic taking off or 
landing on that same runway. While this does not point to the source of error and 
cannot distinguish controller errors or flight crew mistakes, which is irrelevant at this 
stage from a flight safety perspective, any visualisation or alerting based on consis-
tency checks between traffic and clearance data, where available, is implicitly also 
capable of safeguarding against ATC errors. 
 
In conclusion, it is therefore presumed that there is no need for an onboard function-
ality specifically aimed at the detection of controller errors. Rather, the considera-
tions above suggest that integrating traffic and CPDLC information might be a viable 
approach to detect ATC errors through visual or automated consistency checks. The 
expected benefit compared to an approach purely based on traffic surveillance is that 
this consistency analysis might enable the identification of ATC errors before they 
result in an acute collision hazard. 
 
From an ATM perspective, a solution solely based on runway-related CPDLC service 
could be used to support controller decision making, and to advise or alert control-
lers if they attempt to assign incompatible clearances or instructions. As an example, 
with a take-off clearance assigned to an aircraft on a given runway, the controller 
interface could prevent assigning a crossing approval to other aircraft for the same 
runway while the aircraft taking off is still on the runway. However, such support 
would then also require the presence of A-SMGCS or ASDE-X traffic surveillance. 
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4.4 Considerations on Alerting 
4.4.1 The Need for Alerting 
The main purpose of the envisaged integrated Runway Incursion avoidance func-
tionality is to enable the flight crew, by means of improved situational awareness, to 
avoid potential Runway Incursions proactively at a strategic or pre-tactical level, and 
not necessarily the addition of new alerts to the flight deck. By nature, to minimize 
any undesirable interference with flight crew tasks in normal operations, cf. [SAE88], 
alerts have to occur comparatively late, which in turn means that the level of safety is 
already very close to unacceptable when they are triggered. Consequently, alerts are 
typically associated with recovery procedures, which may raise crew workload dra-
matically. Last but not least, alerts create awareness of a specific problem rather than 
of the global situation. 
 
However, the High-Level Requirements were deliberately worded in a neutral fash-
ion. Bringing a certain aspect to the attention of the flight crew merely means that 
information must be conveyed; this does not dictate whether information is visual-
ized only or whether alerting is additionally required. Nonetheless, from a flight 
deck perspective, according to the standardized categorization of information pre-
sented in Table 5, any information requiring immediate flight crew awareness or re-
action necessitates a caution (Level 2) or warning (Level 3) alert. By contrast, Levels 0 
and 1 are typically referred to as advisories [SAE88a]. 
 
Alert 
Level A/C condition Criteria 
Attention-Getter (AG) 
Visual AG Aural AG 
3 EMERGENCY Situation 
Emergency operational or aircraft system 
conditions which require immediate correc-
tive or compensatory action by the flight 
crew 
Red 
Voice 
or 
sound 
2 ABNORMAL Situation 
Abnormal operational or aircraft system con-
ditions which require immediate flight crew 
awareness and subsequent corrective or 
compensatory flight crew action 
Amber 
Voice 
or 
sound 
1 RECOGNITION Situation 
Operational or aircraft system conditions 
which require flight crew awareness and may 
require flight crew action 
Highlighted 
symbology 
(e.g. pulsing) 
None 
0 INFORMATION Situation 
Operational or aircraft system conditions 
which require flight deck indication None None 
Table 5: Alert classification scheme (after [SAE88a]) 
 
In line with these considerations, the NTSB specifically requires a technical solution 
providing “immediate warnings” of potential Runway Incursion or runway collision 
hazards directly to the flight crew [NTS07a] in its ‘Most Wanted’ list, without speci-
fying the source of alerts. Likewise, current Air Traffic Management (ATM) proce-
dures require controllers to alert the flight crews concerned whenever they detect a 
Runway Incursion involving conflicting traffic [ICA01a]. 
Indeed, an important argument in favour of alerting is that monitoring the onboard 
visualisation of information provided for enhanced situational awareness is not the 
only flight crew task, and that attentional resources are limited. Consequently, even 
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in case the information presented is in principle sufficient for intuitive and pro-active 
conflict detection, system design should take into account the possibility that the 
flight crew is busy with other crew duties or otherwise momentarily distracted. 
 
Additionally, as particularly the Paris accident (Appendix I-8) and the Munich inci-
dent (Appendix I-16) show, conflicting traffic must in principle be expected to enter 
the runway at any time during take-off or landing, causing a highly dynamic situa-
tion that may be difficult to perceive even if the corresponding cockpit display is ap-
propriately configured and in the flight crew’s routine scanning pattern. Besides, if 
the onboard solution chosen encompasses a configurable multifunctional display, the 
selected range or zoom level, mode and display options may not always be appro-
priate for a visual detection of an emerging hazard; conflicting traffic could be hid-
den due to range settings. 
 
Furthermore, due to limited display resolution, particularly emerging Runway In-
cursions due to traffic entering the runway may be virtually impossible to detect at 
an early stage solely based on the visualisation, even if the display is suitably config-
ured. For a display resolution of 768 x 768 pixels, which is quite typical for current-
generation aircraft, a range selection showing a 4,000 m runway in its entity means 
that one pixel will correspond to a distance of at least 5 m. Consequently, an aircraft 
or vehicle moving at a speed of 5 kts (2.5 m/s) will, on average, only move by one 
pixel every two seconds. With ownship moving at high speeds, as in the case of take-
off, final approach or landing, this difference will be impossible to perceive for the 
flight crew, and they will consequently most likely fail to note that the other traffic is 
not stopped. In case this particular traffic was expected to hold short of a runway 
used for take-off or landing by ownship, valuable margin for conflict resolution will 
be lost without alerting. 
 
In conclusion, it is therefore presumed that efficient Runway Incursion avoidance 
requires tactical onboard alerting for last resort conflict avoidance, and to attract the 
attention of the flight crew whenever a mere presentation of information is not suffi-
cient to prevent a hazardous situation and to ensure flight safety. In analogy to the 
tactical alerts triggered by existing surveillance systems such as the Airborne Colli-
sion Avoidance System (ACAS) or the Terrain Awareness and Warning System 
(TAWS), the alerting part of the onboard system can therefore be regarded as a 
backup or safety net function. 
Nevertheless, alerts could also originate from the ASDE enhancement AMASS, 
ASDE-X or an A-SMGCS installation, which encompass functionality to alert control-
lers, as discussed in Sections 3.5.1 and 3.5.3. However, conveying Runway Incursion 
alerts to pilots via controllers is highly inefficient, because valuable time for conflict 
resolution is lost due to the fact that controllers have to alert pilots verbally via R/T. 
Apart from the issue that pilot and controller reaction times are additive in this 
communication chain, the need to include aircraft callsigns in the corresponding 
transmission results in an added time penalty of ~ 2 seconds64 until the essentials of 
                                                 
64  This assumes that, even under the strain of the conflict situation, the controller manages to recall the correct 
callsign immediately, and that the aural communication of the alert is efficient at first attempt, i.e. neither gar-
bled, otherwise unintelligible nor truncated. 
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the alert can be related. Since pilots (and vehicle drivers) are literally at the controls 
and thus capable of taking immediate remedial action, there is a clear need to alert 
flight crews (and vehicle drivers) directly65, irrespective of the source of the alert. 
 
4.4.2 Preventive and Reactive Runway Incursion Alerting 
Based on the fundamental considerations on Runway Incursion avoidance in Section 
4.2, alerts can be subdivided in two classes, because the scope of alerting encom-
passes not only the detection and potential mitigation of Runway Incursion traffic 
conflicts, but also the prevention of inadvertent or unauthorised runway operations. 
 
Accordingly, Runway Incursion prevention focuses on rigorous ownship surveil-
lance and enhancing situational awareness. However, provided that this fails to pre-
vent erroneous surface movement for one of the above reasons, a timely and ade-
quate alerting concept consistent with today’s flight warning principles is intended 
to catch the crew’s attention if they are at risk of causing a Runway Incursion, with 
the goal of preventing them from entering the runway protection zone. These alerts 
can therefore be categorized as preventive Runway Incursion alerting. 
 
Nonetheless, as discussed above, situations in which a Runway Incursion has already 
occurred and resulted in a potentially hazardous traffic conflict must be covered by 
alerting as well. If a potential Runway Incursion caused by conflicting traffic is de-
tected, appropriate alerts and, in a second step, potential conflict resolutions, could 
be given to flight crew, enabling them to react to this dangerous situation. This is 
therefore referred to as reactive Runway Incursion alerting. 
From a flight deck perspective, assuming that the preventive measures are efficient 
for ownship, reactive alerting will typically address dangerous situations caused by 
others. Irrespective of whether a traffic conflict is caused by another aircraft, vehicle 
or the controller – pilots are confronted with a Runway Incursion they have not 
caused. 
 
In principle, the concept of preventive and reactive alerts could be generalised to all 
kinds of aerodrome incursions. Nonetheless, the runway is a special case of surface 
movement where, due to the procedures employed, virtually no collision can occur 
that is not preceded by an incursion. After all, access to and usage of the runway is 
usually limited to one aircraft at a time, except for runway crossing, back-tracking 
and line-up. While the concept of protection zones can be extended to all airport ar-
eas, a risk of collision might exist independently of an incursion within these areas, 
especially on the apron or when aircraft are queuing for take-off on a taxiway. 
Nevertheless, since alerting might not be limited to the immediate runway environ-
ment, but at least cover the manoeuvring are, the generic term ‘Surface Movement 
Alerting’ seems more appropriate to include also alerts triggered while ownship is 
operating on taxiways or the aprons. 
                                                 
65  Considerations on systems for airport vehicles are beyond the scope of this thesis, but this subject has already 
been addressed exhaustively, cf. [Kra04]. 
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4.4.3 Ground-generated vs. Onboard Alerting 
With the hypothesis that onboard alerting in case of potential Runway Incursions is 
necessary established, a key subsequent issue requiring further research concerns the 
source of alerts. While the considerations on worldwide availability in Section 4.1 
suggest an independent avionics solution for Runway Incursion alerting to ensure 
that the functionality is available everywhere, the source of alerts could also be a 
ground-based surveillance system, as for the Honeywell/Sensis technology demon-
strator described in Section 3.3.3. 
 
Consequently, with a full-scope A-SMGCS or comparable ATM installation in place, 
the issue whether the generation of Runway Incursion alerts for the flight crew 
should be left to a ground-based system, or if an onboard solution is superior in this 
case must be addressed. As a preamble to these considerations, it should be men-
tioned that only tactical safety-net type alerts are discussed here. Strategic advisories 
pertaining to conflicts several minutes or longer ahead are most likely best generated 
by a ground-based system if available, because it has access to all the relevant plan-
ning information, e.g. in the form of electronic flight strips. Likewise, it is not in the 
least questioned that a ground-based system should generate alerts to bring a poten-
tially hazardous situation to the attention of the controller. 
 
However, when it comes to sharing this ground-generated tactical alert information 
with the flight deck, there are some important safety and certification implications. 
From a liability perspective, the Pilot-in-Command, representing the airline, is ulti-
mately responsible for the safe conduct of the flight, not the controller [ICA90]. As 
mentioned before, controllers have to alert the flight crew via conventional radiote-
lephony (R/T) if they detect a Runway Incursion after a take-off or landing clearance 
has been issued [ICA01a]. The flight crew will then consider this information in deci-
sion-making. If a ground-based system detects a Runway Incursion, and alerts the 
controller only, the same procedure can be maintained in principle. In both cases, the 
flight crew can unambiguously identify the source of the alert information, and in-
clude this knowledge in their decision-making; hence there is no issue in this case. 
 
Nonetheless, as discussed previously, conveying system-generated alerts to the flight 
deck via the controller might lead to the loss of valuable seconds required for conflict 
resolution. Therefore, directly up-linking alert information from the ground to the 
flight deck is currently under consideration, cf. Section 3.3.3. However, this would 
constitute a paradigm shift, since all caution and warning alerts on the flight deck are 
currently generated by rigorously certified onboard systems, which have to fulfil 
very high standards with respect to nuisance, false, and undetected or missed alerts 
[SAE88a]. From this perspective, up-linking alert information from the ground, de-
rived from a system with potentially unknown and site-specific system design or 
configuration, to the aircraft avionics constitutes a major certification issue66. 
                                                 
66  Furthermore, regulations require that, depending on the criticality of the onboard function performed, the 
probability of failure and subsequent unavailability must be very low, both from a hardware and software 
point of view. However, numerous ATM applications, especially for ground and apron, are based on conven-
tional desktop computers and workstations today. These can mostly neither fulfil the hardware nor the soft-
ware requirements, particularly when Microsoft Windows is used as operating system. 
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While a potential solution could be to certify the ground-based alerting system ac-
cording to aircraft industry standards, this will only address only part of the prob-
lem. One of the unresolved fundamental questions is the presentation of ground-
generated alerts on the flight deck. If, in analogy to the current way these alerts are 
transmitted, the CPDLC uplink strand and associated crew interfaces are used, the 
alerting character might be lost. Conversely, once ground-generated alerts are seam-
lessly integrated in the flight-deck alerting philosophy of an aircraft – which seems 
necessary from a certification perspective to ensure that, e.g. while landing, ground-
generated Runway Incursion alerts do not interfere with higher-priority windshear 
or stall warnings, cf. [SAE88a] – it will be virtually impossible for the flight crew to 
determine the source of the alert. 
Nevertheless, this discernibility might be essential, because standalone onboard and 
uplinked ground-generated alerting could be available simultaneously in principle, 
which, in turn, raises the issue of prioritisation of potentially contradictory onboard 
and ground-generated alerts. In view of the catastrophe of Überlingen [BFU04a], un-
ambiguous guidance on the precedence of onboard or ground-based systems is re-
quired in this case. 
Another issue with ground-generated alerts are scope, latency and update rate of the 
available traffic surveillance data. A ground-based system will have to use surveil-
lance and/or ADS-B data for the prediction of future positions of two or more con-
flicting aircraft or vehicles in the runway environment solely based on velocities and 
track angles. However, accelerations, which are additionally required for accurate 
predictions of aircraft positions and the determination of a potential conflict, can nei-
ther be determined accurately via secondary surveillance radar, nor are they cur-
rently part of ADS-B messages, and can consequently only be estimated on average. 
 
By contrast, an onboard system will have access to the complete aircraft state vector 
with update rates, compared to ADS-B, higher by roughly one order of magnitude or 
more [ARI06] and negligible latency, which allows accurate and continuously up-
dated predictions at least for ownship. Furthermore, determining the intention of a 
flight crew to take off is straightforward and instantaneous for an onboard system. 
Take-off Configuration Warning Systems, which are mandatory for transport cate-
gory aircraft according to §25.703 [FAR07], alert flight crews whenever the airplane is 
not in a safe configuration for take-off. These systems typically use parameters such 
as thrust lever position, Engine Pressure Ratio (EPR), the number of engine revolu-
tions N1 or a combination thereof to establish that take-off is intended or has com-
menced [FAA93]. Besides, most aircraft types currently employed by airlines feature 
an internal flight phase logic. The triggering of the TAKE-OFF flight phase may 
therefore serve as a further means of determining pilot intent. In both cases, the pre-
cise logic, which may involve additional sensor inputs, varies between aircraft types. 
In conclusion, current aircraft systems are capable of determining the intent to take 
off – which is crucial for detecting conflicts reliably – even before the aircraft starts 
moving or immediately after. By contrast, it is very difficult for a ground system to 
detect whether an aircraft is still lining up on a runway, or whether it is already in 
the initial seconds of take-off, and thus a speed threshold etc. must be employed for 
an unambiguous prediction, which might lead to a loss of valuable time and margin 
for resolution in case of conflict. 
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To achieve the same precision with a ground-based system, scope, latency and up-
date rate of e.g. ADS-B would have to be improved significantly, which is possible in 
principle, but would result in a substantial increase of the data volume to be trans-
mitted and processed by the ground system. 
Moreover, V1, VR and V2 of the aircraft taking off are currently not available to ATC 
and thus ground-based systems, which has two implications: First, these speeds 
mainly depend on available runway length and actual aircraft performance, which, 
in turn, is influenced by airfield elevation and temperature. Consequently, knowl-
edge of these speeds may be crucial to determine, e.g. by comparison to actual speed, 
whether an alert is required. As an example, a nearly empty single-aisle aircraft or 
regional jet might reach vR after less than two thirds of the runway length and thus 
be capable of climbing over another aircraft intruding near the end of the runway 
without problems, while the same situation could be extremely dangerous for a fully 
loaded wide-body cargo aircraft. Likewise, a ground-based system can only very 
roughly estimate the actual braking capabilities of an aircraft, whereas in the majority 
of cases onboard information is already accurate enough to determine whether a cer-
tain runway exit can be taken or not, at least within a given margin of runway con-
tamination [Vil09]. 
The second implication relates to the suppression of alerts in the high-speed regime. 
Like virtually any other alert on the flight deck, all ground-generated alerts – at least 
when seamlessly integrated with the flight deck – would have to be suppressed 
when entering the high-speed regime (usually beyond 80 or 100 kts) or at V1 the very 
latest, cf. [SAE88a], depending on the threat level. Otherwise, there is a substantial 
risk that the ground-based system, ignorant of the V1 speed(s) of the aircraft con-
cerned, issues an alert after V1, and that the flight crew might feel compelled to reject 
take-off nonetheless, with a likely runway overrun as result. 
 
Apart from these theoretical considerations, there is a wealth of evidence that 
ground-based Runway Incursion alerting systems currently do not feature the reli-
ability that would be required to up-link their alerts directly to the flight deck. Unfor-
tunately, there is insufficient information to assess to what extent the issues identi-
fied above were causal for the problems reported below. 
At both Munich and Frankfurt airport, existing ground-based Runway Incursion 
alerting functionality had been de-activated due to an unacceptable number of false 
and spurious alerts when the incidents discussed in Appendix I-16 occurred. 
Likewise, AMASS, which is based on Ku-Band ASDE-3 radar, has been observed to 
malfunction due to precipitation interference in bad weather, i.e. in situations when 
it would be needed most. At Denver International Airport, AMASS failed to detect a 
Runway Incursion involving a landing United Airlines Boeing 737-500 and a snow-
plough [NTS07b]. In a second Runway Incursion incident at the same airport, 
AMASS activated only several seconds after an approaching aircraft had visually 
acquired the conflicting traffic and initiated a go-around. Given that both aircraft 
eventually missed each other by only 15 m, it is somewhat questionable whether 
AMASS would have prevented an accident in this particular situation [NTS07e]. 
Apart from delays in deployment, a major concern with the AMASS successor, the 
ASDE-X Safety Logic, is that controllers may manually remove targets they consider 
false from the system to limit nuisance alerts in precipitation. Furthermore, pilots 
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expect alerts in a consistent fashion, a feature essential to build confidence in a sys-
tem, cf. [Bil96, SAE88a]. However, since particularly the ‘precipitation mode’ of the 
ASDE-X Safety Logic, intended to limit nuisance alerts, requires site-specific tailoring 
and adaptation [FAA07c], which may result in airport-dependent variations in condi-
tions triggering alerts. 
 
In view of these numerous and highly complex issues concerning both reliability and 
uplink of ground-generated alerts to the flight deck, which are clearly beyond the 
scope of this thesis, it was decided to focus on alerts generated by the aircraft avion-
ics. The above considerations suggest that this approach is superior when using cur-
rent and near-future technologies. 
Therefore, instead of uplinking ground-generated alerts to the flight deck, future re-
search should consider sharing Runway Incursion alerts generated by the onboard 
system with controllers, in analogy to present studies concerning the down-link of 
TCAS Resolution Advisories for presentation on controller working positions, cf. 
[Eur06a]. This way of achieving a common situational awareness with respect to 
Runway Incursion hazards, where each suitably equipped aircraft acts as independ-
ent alert sensor, also seems to be advantageous in terms of redundancy and availabil-
ity. Last but not least, it appears worthwhile to recall that the primary research objec-
tive with respect to alerting is a validation of its operational relevance and its poten-
tial to prevent Runway Incursion accidents. 
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4.4.4 Considerations on Conflict Resolution Guidance 
By nature, any aircraft-based Runway Incursion avoidance functionality capable of 
providing alerts, be it preventive or reactive, can be considered as an onboard sur-
veillance system like the Terrain Awareness and Warning System (TAWS), ACAS or 
a windshear warning system, because it addresses threats or unsafe conditions exter-
nal to the aircraft. 
Regarding onboard surveillance systems, pilots typically expect instructions on how 
to react in case of a warning (Level 3) alert. As an example, current TAWS implemen-
tations like the EGPWS urge the pilot aurally and textually to “PULL-UP” [FAA02c] 
or, if a vertical manoeuvre alone is not sufficient, to “AVOID TERRAIN” [Tha04]. 
Likewise, ACAS provides the crew with resolution advisories in case of a traffic con-
flict and might, depending on the situation, advise a climb or a descent, supple-
mented by an indication of safe vertical speed ranges, as presented in Section 3.2.1. 
By contrast, the reactive windshear warning may consist of a mere “WINDSHEAR” 
indication accompanied by a triple callout [FAA96a]67. In this case, conflict resolution 
is entirely procedural: on alert, the flight crew’s expected reaction is to perform a 
windshear escape manoeuvre, which consists of applying full thrust and minimizing 
altitude loss by raising the aircraft’s nose. Training for the windshear escape ma-
noeuvre, which is designed “to keep the airplane flying as long as possible in the hope of 
exiting the windshear”, is mandatory for all flight crews [FAA96]. 
 
These considerations lead to the important question whether the warnings provided 
by Runway Incursion avoidance functionality should merely alert flight crews to the 
existence of potential Runway Incursions hazards, or whether guidance for conflict 
mitigation or resolution might be provided as well.  
Concerning this issue, the example of the reactive windshear warning illustrates two 
essential points. First of all, it is generally permissible from a regulatory point of view 
to have an aircraft alerting system that merely detects conflicts, even at warning 
level, with an entirely procedural recovery manoeuvre. Furthermore, the statement 
above confirms that regulators acknowledge the existence of situations in which an 
external threat can be detected, but not necessarily be mitigated. In this context, the 
discussion on the mitigation of runway incursion traffic conflicts in Section 4.2.3 sug-
gests that similar restrictions may also apply to certain Runway Incursion scenarios. 
From a flight crew perspective, it can be assumed that conflict resolution guidance as 
for TAWS and ACAS would also be desirable for Runway Incursion alerts. Particu-
larly the decision on how to react to conflicting runway traffic is time-critical and 
must be taken in a highly dynamic environment, as discussed in Section 4.2.3; it is 
therefore expected that pilots will appreciate any support in decision-making they 
can get in this situation. However, the crucial question to be answered is whether 
such conflict resolution guidance is technically feasible with sufficient integrity. This 
section addresses some of the challenges and constraints that will have to be dealt 
with when attempting to demonstrate the feasibility of conflict resolution guidance 
for Runway Incursions. 
                                                 
67  However, according to TSO-C117a, so-called ‘Airborne Windshear Warning and Escape Guidance Systems’ 
may additionally provide the flight crew with flight guidance commands to perform a recovery manoeuvre, 
and even automatic recovery autopilot/auto-throttle modes are permissible, provided that they are sufficiently 
independent from the core alerting system [FAA96a]. 
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4.4.4.1 Regulatory prerequisites for conflict resolution guidance 
For any alerting system, regulations require that the conflict resolutions it provides 
do not lead to hazardous (severe-major) or catastrophic situations. Additionally, 
even in the rare event that the system creates false or nuisance alerts, it has to be war-
ranted that the crew’s obedience to these erroneous alerts does not cause hazardous 
or catastrophic failures, either [FAA88].  
 
This has two significant implications. First of all, these criteria must individually be 
fulfilled by all of the potentially dissimilar conflict resolutions an alerting system is 
capable of providing, i.e. it has to be proven that the manoeuvres which can be in-
structed by the system are not hazardous by themselves. Trivially, this will then also 
address the issue of false and nuisance alerts. 
 
Secondly, the criteria above also apply to the capability of the alerting system to 
make an appropriate choice from the available options for conflict resolution. Ac-
cordingly, system design must ensure that the probability of providing a hazard-
ously or catastrophically wrong conflict resolution is less than 10-9 per flight hour, 
respectively. Consequently, the worst case scenario to be avoided is that an alerting 
system provides a wrong conflict resolution, which subsequently causes an accident 
that could have been prevented by another evasive manoeuvre, or by not performing 
a recovery procedure at all. 
 
4.4.4.2 Implications for Runway Incursion alerting 
4.4.4.2.1 Manoeuvres eligible for conflict resolution 
In terms of potential manoeuvres that can safely be instructed by an onboard alerting 
system, the above regulations constrain the options available for runway traffic con-
flict resolution, as discussed in Section 4.2.3, to a go-around, continuing take-off as 
planned (or with full thrust applied), and to rejecting take-off in the low speed re-
gime. In either case, the adverse impact of a nuisance or false positive alert would 
merely be of economical nature, such as higher fuel burn or increased wear on en-
gines, brakes and tyres; apparently, none of these manoeuvres degrades the safety of 
flight. 
However, all of the other manoeuvres mentioned in Section 4.2.3 – particularly the 
unconventional ones – are associated with the risk of aircraft damage and potential 
injuries to passengers and flight crew. It is therefore questionable whether a system 
proposing such conflict resolutions will be accepted by regulators, operators and pi-
lots, even if these manoeuvres might be the only remaining option to avoid a colli-
sion. By contrast, the pilot-in command may deviate from the rules of the air if abso-
lutely necessary in the interest of flight safety [ICA90], and can thus attempt an un-
conventional conflict resolution at his or her own discretion (and responsibility) if a 
runway traffic conflict cannot be resolved otherwise. 
 
Consequently, even without the added complication of conflicting runway traffic, 
certifying an avionics system to the design assurance level required to instruct e.g. 
rejected take-offs for the full spectrum of take-off speeds up to V1 constitutes a for-
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midable challenge. It would have to be demonstrated that the prediction of decelera-
tion distance is sufficiently robust against uncertainties and potential sudden varia-
tions in the parameters critical for its calculation, thus permitting to control the risk 
of a runway excursion inherent in such a manoeuvre within the high-speed regime. 
Additionally, the almost inevitable damage to aircraft brakes and tyres would have 
to be assessed in the light of potential false and spurious alerts, possibly building on 
the analogy with windshear warning systems in terms of the achievable reliability68. 
 
4.4.4.2.2 Determination of the correct evasive manoeuvre 
For Runway Incursions involving conflicting traffic on the runway, an alerting sys-
tem providing conflict resolution guidance will only have to determine the correct 
evasive manoeuvre for take-off scenarios. In view of the considerations above, the 
required recovery procedure is straightforward and essentially without alternative 
for all other scenarios, irrespective of whether it is explicitly instructed or triggered 
by a warning that merely indicates the conflict. 
 
The need for the alerting system to calculate which evasive manoeuvre is best suited 
to resolve or mitigate the conflict is therefore limited to take-off scenarios. However, 
in contrast to ACAS resolution advisories, which may be reversed or amended based 
on continuously reiterated predictions at any time, there will be virtually no possibil-
ity to revise the decision to abort or to continue take-off once the corresponding ac-
tions have been initiated by the flight crew.  
 
In consequence, the worst case scenario that must be avoided is that an aircraft tak-
ing off would routinely be capable of climbing free of an intruder on the runway, but 
the alerting system erroneously instructs to abort take-off. If the flight crew complies 
and cannot stop their aircraft before impacting the conflicting traffic, the outcome 
might be catastrophic and effectively worse than without alerting. 
 
Therefore, the fundamental technological question is whether it is possible to predict 
both take-off and braking performance with the precision and integrity required to 
ensure that this worst case scenario does not occur. It is presumed that real-time on-
board take-off performance functionality, which is currently not available, will be 
required to achieve this. In addition, the associated key issue from an operational 
point of view is whether, given the constraints on evasive manoeuvres and the safety 
margins that will inevitably have to be added to address virtually unpredictable me-
teorological variations such as gusts, changing wind direction or runway contamina-
tion level, the resulting system will eventually be capable of providing more than 
conflict resolutions for a number of straightforward cases, such as large distances to 
conflicting traffic, and low ownship speeds. Furthermore, additional uncertainties 
caused by inaccuracies and latencies in intruder data have to be considered. 
Performing the extensive numerical simulations and error analysis required to ad-
dress these issues is, however, clearly beyond the scope of this thesis. Nevertheless, 
                                                 
68  The use of ‘firewall’ thrust in the windshear escape manoeuvre may result in the need to replace or overhaul 
the engines; therefore, the required robustness against nuisance alerts might serve as a guideline for an on-
board system instructing a rejected take-off in the high speed regime in view of likely brake/tyre damage. 
4.4   CONSIDERATIONS ON ALERTING 
  131 
the number of high-profile take-off and landing runway excursion accidents in recent 
years, such as the overrun of an Air France Airbus A340 in Toronto in 2005 [TSB07] 
or a Kalitta Air Boeing 747-200 at Brussels airport in 2008 [AAU09], may illustrate the 
sensitivity of current performance calculations to variations in operational condi-
tions, meteorological conditions and crew response, and thus the magnitude of the 
challenge. 
Besides, the prospect that even a highly sophisticated alerting system capable of cal-
culating conflict resolutions might eventually not be able to provide mitigation for all 
imaginable conflict scenarios raises additional questions from a human factors per-
spective. One is how an operationally meaningful blend of instructions for evasive 
manoeuvres and merely indicative warnings can be achieved, given the risk that the 
latter might be perceived as announcing imminent doom, when the alerting system 
determines that neither aborting nor continuing take-off will resolve the conflict. 
 
4.4.4.3 Conclusion 
Concerning Runway Incursions alerts, the focus of this thesis is on validating 
whether they are desirable in principle, not on the precise wording or nature of 
warnings. In view of the numerous and complex certification issues outlined above, 
it was therefore decided that the alerts for conflicting runway traffic devised and as-
sessed in the following chapters should not contain any guidance on conflict mitiga-
tion or resolution. 
Rather, as with windshear alerts, the flight crew response to the warnings will be 
entirely procedural. While this indicative warning approach eventually leaves the 
difficult and complex decision on how to react to a detected Runway Incursion traffic 
conflict to the crew, it might also give them more margin for a prudent reaction 
based on good airmanship and the enhanced situational awareness an onboard solu-
tion is expected to provide. As an example, if traffic visually acquired by the crew is 
almost off the runway, but still triggers an alert due to a slight latency in the traffic 
data, the crew can more easily continue than in a situation where the system calls for 
a go-around. Likewise, this approach leaves room for creative solutions, such as the 
decision of a flight crew to delay rotation when facing conflicting traffic on intersect-
ing runways at Boston Logan International airport in 2005 (cf. Appendix I-16.2). 
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4.5 Allocation of Functionality to Onboard and Ground Segment 
 
The analysis on the compensation of current deficiencies and limitations concerning 
surface operations in Section 4.3, which is at the heart of the preventive Runway In-
cursion avoidance strategy, clearly demonstrates that the requirements for improved 
flight crew situational awareness outlined in Chapter 2 can hardly be met by ground-
based systems alone, but rather necessitate an onboard solution as core Runway In-
cursion avoidance functionality, thus confirming the onboard-centric approach pur-
sued by this thesis. 
 
A major benefit expected from an onboard solution is that the situational awareness 
it provides with respect to ownship position (High-Level Requirement I) and other 
traffic (High-Level Requirement II) may enable the crew to detect potential threats 
and conflicts proactively, including those resulting from potential controller errors 
(High-Level Requirement V). The same applies to up-to-date information on the 
aerodrome’s operational status, configuration and present limitations (High-Level 
Requirement III), which requires a data handling and operational concept for 
NOTAM and other short-term or temporary information. Nevertheless, it is assumed 
that alerting is required in addition to this mere presentation of information to en-
sure that information on potentially hazardous situations, in particular conflicting 
runway traffic, is not missed accidentally. For the reasons discussed in Section 4.4.3, 
this alerting functionality should be hosted onboard the aircraft. 
Provided that ADS-B traffic data are used, and that digital NOTAM information is 
uploaded prior to flight, this solution is independent of ATM ground infrastructure, 
and thus forms a core standalone onboard functionality. Indeed, the main limitation 
to the autonomy or independence of an onboard solution is the availability of com-
plete data on traffic in the airport environment in sufficient quality. However, first 
steps in legislation are under way to make ADS-B out mandatory for certain air-
spaces in Australia and the United States, where ADS-B is planned to be used in lieu 
of secondary surveillance radars in some areas, e.g. in so-called Non-Radar Airspace. 
There are similar plans in Canada and Europe. 
 
At the same time, full interoperability with ground-based ATM systems must be en-
sured, particularly with respect to traffic data services (TIS-B, ADS-R) and CPDLC 
(High-Level Requirement IV), but also concerning the exchange and update of short-
term and temporary information with the ground. In the transition period towards 
an ADS-B mandate, and potentially beyond, it is expected that TIS-B and ADS-R act 
as gap fillers completing the traffic surveillance picture available to flight crew and 
aircraft systems, based on information derived from ground-based surveillance. 
From a flight safety perspective, however, runway-related CPDLC service is ex-
pected to be the by far most important air-ground cooperative service, and thus a 
strong driver for air-ground interoperability. It provides the additional advantage 
that it does not require sophisticated ground-based infrastructure. In particular, there 
is no need for an A-SMGCS installation to support this service. It could be realised as 
an extension of the existing FANS controller HMI interfaces since there is generally 
no need for an enhanced visualisation, whereas creating taxi-routes will most likely 
require advanced controller HMI. 
4.5   ALLOCATION OF FUNCTIONALITY TO ONBOARD AND GROUND SEGMENT 
  133 
Nonetheless, it seems reasonable to design the onboard components for Runway In-
cursion avoidance to be capable of operating in a standalone mode. If the aircraft’s 
avionics supports air-ground cooperative services not available for the system on the 
ground, or if the corresponding airport installation is unavailable or inoperative alto-
gether, this should only have minimum impact on the core onboard functionality. In 
particular, crew procedures should be essentially the same, irrespective of whether 
the system is used in an air-ground cooperative or standalone configuration. How-
ever, it must be assessed how each functionality will be reduced compared to the full 
air-ground cooperative setup. 
 
Given the distribution of functionality outlined in this section, the absence of ground-
based services mainly impacts the visualisation of CPDLC clearances for surface 
movement, and potential alerts based on the underlying information, an aspect to be 
investigated by this thesis. Essential elements such as alerting for conflicting traffic 
will always be available, but the impact of an incomplete traffic surveillance picture 
on the usability of alerting is one of the central aspects that needs to be studied. 
 
 
4   TOWARDS AN INTEGRATED SOLUTION 
 134
4.6 Constraints 
4.6.1 Flight Deck Integration Aspects 
The additional onboard functionality proposed for Runway Incursion avoidance 
must be operated in the context of existing aircraft systems and functions. Design 
choices are therefore constrained and limited by the fact that integration with an ex-
isting flight deck has to be achieved.  
 
It is therefore essential that the commonly accepted principles of flight deck design 
are followed in designing the associated Human-Machine Interface (HMI). In par-
ticular, the integration of the additional functions should be consistent with the prin-
ciples and philosophy applied on the overall flight deck design of the host aircraft, 
particularly in terms of display formats (e.g. colour coding or symbology) and flight 
warning system. From a flight deck integration perspective, there is consequently an 
intrinsic focus on the HMI and alerting. Particularly in those two domains, however, 
a rigorous differentiation between functional and HMI requirements is not always 
possible. 
 
For the proposed onboard Runway Incursion avoidance system, an aspect deserving 
particular attention in this context is that both traffic presentation and traffic conflict 
alerting should be integrated seamlessly with ACAS, because ACAS is a mandatory 
function. Besides, ACAS has shaped pilot expectations with respect to the functional-
ity to be expected from a traffic surveillance system, and can therefore be regarded as 
an important guideline for functional requirements. 
 
Another important aspect is that the number of additional controls required for any 
new system must be kept at a minimum; employing available cockpit hardware is 
favourable over new controls. Apart from easier retrofit and line-fit into current pro-
duction aircraft types, this has the additional advantage that crews are already famil-
iar with existing control panels, which would minimize the additional training effort. 
Furthermore, additional controls or control panels result in additional development, 
integration and certification costs, and may interfere with the original flight deck in-
teraction concept, particularly when they are located, due to a lack of available space, 
at sub-optimum locations from an ergonomics point of view. This may significantly 
alter scanning patterns when interacting with the new onboard system, with poten-
tial impact on the efficiency of existing systems. 
 
From the considerations above, one can also deduce that it will be necessary to 
choose a specific aircraft type or family as baseline for a prototype implementation to 
address these integration aspects properly. Whenever a model or straw man aircraft 
was required in this thesis, the Airbus single aisle/long range family was used. It is 
representative of current-generation aircraft with electronic displays (‘glass cockpit’) 
and well proven in millions of flight hours, with thousands of aircraft on the market 
and on order. As an added benefit, this enables both a retrofit and line-fit perspective 
on system integration. Furthermore, in contrast to the more advanced Airbus A380, 
sufficiently detailed technical information on this aircraft family is readily available. 
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4.6.2 Limitations of a Technology Approach 
In the runway environment and on taxiways, the onboard system approach outlined 
in this chapter is expected to solve many of the current safety issues associated with 
surface movement. In this context, an important question is whether this approach is 
only valid for the manoeuvring area, or whether it can be extended to the whole 
movement area, i.e. including aprons.  
A closer look, however, reveals that traffic awareness and alerting has a fundamen-
tally different quality on the apron because of the significantly different scenarios. 
From a technical perspective, all vehicles on the movement area could be equipped 
with ADS-B transponders and GPS at reasonable costs, which means that it would be 
technically possible to display them on a cockpit CDTI with reasonable accuracy. But 
unless the HMI is very carefully designed, this will most likely result in a cluttered 
display due to the large number of service vehicles typically operating on the apron 
and at the aircraft stands. Besides, it must be expected that there will be intrinsic 
sources of display clutter around the ownship symbol. First of all, many vehicles, 
including e.g. refuelling cars or baggage loaders, operate in close proximity to or di-
rectly attached to the aircraft, leading to traffic symbols overlapping with the own-
ship symbol. In addition to this, the layout of the apron and, potentially, the vehicle 
roads may add to the resulting overlap clutter around the ownship symbol. 
 
 
Figure 28: Apron scenario at Frankfurt Airport (EDDF), Spring 2005 
 
All of these issues can be nicely demonstrated using the photo of an apron scene at 
Frankfurt Airport (EDDF) depicted in Figure 28: Several vehicle roads are designed 
such that they run beneath the tails of parked aircraft, as can be seen from the vehicle 
in the yellow circle. The tail of the parked Boeing 747-400 thus protrudes into the ve-
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hicle road in the photo. The same is true for the small bus in the green circle, which 
is, in addition, a bit off the vehicle road painted on the tarmac. Likewise, the Airbus 
A300-600 entering the stand will move over the holding catering truck with its right 
wing (red circle). And depending on the number of baggage carts attached, the little 
train pulled by the tractor in the blue circle has a variable length. Last but not least, 
positional inaccuracies of GPS/D-GPS will, together with the effects described above, 
lead to further overlap of the own-ship symbol with vehicle symbols. 
 
As these examples illustrate, any useful traffic alerting function on the apron would 
require that the correct vehicle dimensions (including height) are broadcast via 
ADS-B, which is currently not the case, because it is highly relevant whether the ve-
hicle in question is a passenger car used by a marshaller or a 20 m bus used to trans-
port passengers to airplanes at remote parking positions. In the absence of vehicle 
height information, it will be very difficult to judge for both crew and alerting system 
whether a vehicle below the aircraft’s tail or wing is a hazard or not. 
When it comes to a flight deck alerting system, the requirements on the content and 
quality of traffic data become even higher, because nuisance alerts have to be 
avoided, and no real alerts should remain undetected. Especially for the case where 
parts of the aircraft extend over vehicles, as shown in the figure, it will be very diffi-
cult to accomplish this, as even typical GPS accuracies of ~5 m will lead to a maxi-
mum additive error of ~10 m for the system vehicle – aircraft, and alerting and pro-
tection zones would have to be dimensioned accordingly. Taking this into account, it 
is very likely that the situation shown in the red circle would lead to a nuisance alert. 
 
In view of these facts, a reasonable and operationally meaningful presentation in the 
aircraft cockpit is very difficult to achieve for all airport vehicles; the same applies to 
traffic alerting. Therefore, the following solution could be envisaged: 
 
 ADS-B equipage should only be mandatory for manoeuvring area vehicle traf-
fic (cf. Section 4.3.2.2), thus enabling its visualisation on a moving map. 
 Apron vehicle traffic hazards near the parking stand should be tackled proce-
durally or by vehicle-based applications, except for follow-me cars or other 
vehicles operating outside the dedicated vehicle roads on the apron or on 
taxiways (excluding the immediate stand area). 
 Vehicles required for safe and efficient airport operations, such as follow-me 
cars and fire engines, may additionally be equipped with an airport moving 
map display with traffic representation, and potentially basic other Runway 
Incursion avoidance functions, cf. [Kra04]. 
 
Even with ADS-B technology, parked and thus unpowered vehicles are not detect-
able. Furthermore, equipment, containers and other objects in the vicinity of the 
parking stand cannot be detected with this technique, either, and it would be very 
costly to survey them accurately in real-time and to transmit the corresponding in-
formation to the flight deck subsequently. This is a further indicator that object and 
vehicle collision avoidance at the ramp and on the apron should be tackled proce-
durally and not by a technological solution. 
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5 Experimental Surface Movement Awareness 
and Alerting System 
 
Since deficiencies in flight crew 
situational awareness are virtu-
ally always a causal factor in 
Runway Incursions and other 
surface movement incidents or 
accidents (cf. Section 2.3)69, it is 
of paramount importance to 
ensure that the flight crew main-
tains an adequate level of situ-
ational awareness at all times. 
From the considerations in 
Chapter 4, it is evident that this 
might be achieved by an inte-
grated onboard-centric solution 
compensating the deficiencies 
and limitations of current flight deck instrumentation concerning surface movement. 
To investigate the research issues identified in the previous chapter, and to validate 
whether an approach focussing on onboard functionality is capable of providing pi-
lots with the required support during ground operations, an experimental Surface 
Movement Awareness and Alerting System (SMAAS) prototype was developed as a 
scientific research tool in the frame of this thesis. It consists of two complementary 
parts (see Figure 29), one aimed at maximizing crew situational awareness in the 
domains identified in Section 2.3, and the other dedicated to alerting in case this is 
not sufficient to prevent a hazardous situation. Due to the fact that Runway Incur-
sions constitute a hazard external to the aircraft, there is a deliberate analogy to exist-
ing onboard surveillance systems such as ACAS and TAWS, which is also mirrored 
by the safety net character of the envisaged alerting functionality. 
 
In view of the holistic approach proposed in Chapter 4, there appears to be a clear 
need for presenting all the required information in an integrated fashion to facilitate 
its assimilation by pilots. Consequently, an airport moving map based on a 
DO-272A/ED-99A compliant Aerodrome Mapping Database (AMDB) [RTC05] was 
chosen as the core element of SMAAS. Apart from providing the crew with enhanced 
position awareness to avoid disorientation on the airfield, thus addressing High-
Level Requirement I, the Airport Moving Map (AMM) is also intended to serve as a 
basis for the visualisation of all other information relevant in an aerodrome opera-
tions context, resulting in a second layer of three further situational awareness ele-
ments in Figure 29: 
By displaying relevant surrounding traffic on the ground and in the take-off or land-
ing phases in relation to the airport moving map, Cockpit Display of Traffic Informa-
                                                 
69 While there are numerous cases where ATC errors (often also due to a lack of controller situational awareness) 
have led to Runway Incursions as well, the focus of this thesis is on flight deck causal factors. 
Surface Movement Awareness & Alerting System
(SMAAS)
Airport Moving Map
(Positional Awareness)
Surface Movement Alerting (SMA)
OAF
(Operational Awareness)
CAF
(Clearance Awareness)
CDTI
(Traffic Awareness)
preventive reactive
Si
tu
at
io
na
l A
w
ar
en
es
s
Al
er
tin
g
©
 V
er
na
le
ke
n/
TU
D
 
Figure 29: Elements of the experimental Surface 
Movement Awareness & Alerting System (SMAAS) 
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tion (CDTI)70 functionality can be added to the basic airport moving map to increase 
traffic awareness, in response to High-Level Requirement II and in line with the con-
siderations in Section 4.3.2. As outlined previously, the necessity of traffic visualisa-
tion in the airport environment can be regarded as further rationale for an airport 
moving map, which was therefore selected to form the backbone of the SMAAS and 
the basis of all additional awareness and alerting functionality. 
In addition, the Operational Awareness Function (OAF) is envisaged to process and 
present relevant information on the operational configuration of the airport, such as 
runways in use, runway closures, whether Low Visibility Procedures (LVP) are in 
force and other information typically contained in Automatic Terminal Information 
Service (ATIS) transmissions (voice or digital) or Notices to Airmen (NOTAM). Fur-
thermore, the take-off or landing runway selected in the Flight Management System 
(FMS) flight plan (referred to as ‘FMS-selected runway’ in the remainder of this the-
sis) is highlighted on the airport moving map to remind the crew of the FMS settings, 
which is intended as another measure to prevent take-off and landing operations on 
the wrong runway, hence addressing High-Level Requirement III. 
Last but not least, the Clearance Awareness Function (CAF) was conceived to raise 
the crew’s awareness of ATC clearances and instructions relating to surface opera-
tions, such as the assigned taxi route, in response to High-Level Requirement IV. 
 
Only if the display of all this information fails to prevent a hazardous situation, the 
second part, the Surface Movement Alerting subsystem, which builds on the same 
information as the awareness part, comes into play. It can be subdivided into two 
integral parts, a preventive and a reactive one. The first goal of the Surface Move-
ment Alerting system is to ensure that ownship does not cause a Runway Incursion, 
i.e. preventive Surface Movement Alerting. To achieve this, the alerting part is armed 
using the same airport, operational and clearance data as the awareness part of the 
SMAAS. In contrast to systems such as the RAAS (cf. Section 3.3.1), this is believed to 
enable specific alerting tailored to the particular operational situation, which is seen 
as a prerequisite for preventive alerts up to Master Warning level (Level 3). Without 
operational and clearance information, it would, for example, be impossible to alert 
the flight crew specifically when they enter a runway that is completely closed, or 
when they enter or try to take off from a runway without the appropriate clearances. 
 
In parallel to this rigorous ownship surveillance, relevant surrounding traffic will 
continuously be monitored to alert the crew if a Runway Incursion caused by others 
poses a significant hazard (Reactive Surface Movement Alerting) during take-off, 
final approach and landing, thus answering to High-Level Requirement V. Likewise, 
alerts are provided if other aircraft are taking off or landing on a runway that is 
about to be entered by ownship. In an environment where runway-related clearances 
are not provided via data link, this function can also be employed to prevent the 
crew from erroneously entering a runway. 
The following sections are dedicated to a detailed description of the individual ele-
ments of the SMAAS and the implementation chosen for this thesis. 
                                                 
70  The term CDTI is used here for an enhanced display of traffic information in the cockpit beyond current 
ACAS. While this may include an additional, separate cockpit display, the preferred solution is an ND-
integrated traffic display. 
5.1   AIRPORT MOVING MAP DISPLAY 
  139 
5.1 Airport Moving Map Display 
 
The analysis of selected incidents and accidents in Section 2.2.2 identified disorienta-
tion on the aerodrome surface due to inadequate position awareness as a common 
precursor of Runway Incursions. Therefore, flight crews need better support to main-
tain awareness of their position on an airfield at all times, especially in adverse 
weather conditions. An independent source of airport navigation information that 
can help to overcome visibility limitations and potential airport signage/marking 
issues (e.g. presence, conformity with regulations and conspicuousness) is conse-
quently required (High-Level Requirement I). 
As the analysis in Sections 2.3.1 and 4.3.1 has shown, this requirement cannot be met 
by ground-based systems. Consequently, a moving map display of the aerodrome 
emerges as the onboard solution of choice. While there is still some dissent about the 
optimum format (see Section 3.1 and the following pages), the Airport Moving Map 
(AMM) has been widely accepted by both research, industry and operations as the 
core technology to increase the flight crew’s situational awareness in terms of posi-
tion on the airport surface. Accordingly, while most of the other SMAAS elements 
have to be conceived from scratch or based on initial research, certified AMM prod-
ucts are already available (cf. Section 3.1), Therefore, this sub-chapter focuses on the 
integration and Human Factors aspects of AMM design resulting from its application 
to Runway Incursion avoidance, including the additional information layers and 
alerts provided by SMAAS. 
 
5.1.1 Concept & Research Issues 
5.1.1.1 Operational concept and procedures 
The operational concept for the basic airport moving map is to support both crew 
members during taxi operations to facilitate surface navigation, to increase situ-
ational awareness and to prevent errors. Generally, it is envisaged that the normal 
crew task sharing between flight crew members will be maintained, in that one pilot 
is in control while the other attends to communication with ATC and aids in operat-
ing and navigating the aircraft71. Today, the pilot not taxiing the aircraft uses paper 
charts to accomplish this, and it is foreseen that instead of referring to paper charts or 
their electronic equivalent, the airport moving map display will be used instead. 
 
Airport navigation encompasses several sub-tasks, such as obtaining an overview of 
the location of ownship on the airport (or the taxi route), monitoring progress along 
the assigned route and required turns, or finding a certain parking position or gate. 
Additionally, in the frame of Runway Incursion Avoidance, the usage of the AMM is 
extended to take-off, final approach and landing, because there is a clear need for 
traffic and runway status surveillance in these phases. To support these navigation 
and surveillance tasks, different ranges and levels of detail are required. 
However, unless take-off performance monitoring or brake-to-vacate functions are 
available, the added value of using an airport moving map during take-off and land-
                                                 
71  While taxi procedures are globally similar, the division of crew duties may differ in detail from airline to air-
line, and thus this section can only give generic information as guideline. 
5   EXPERIMENTAL SURFACE MOVEMENT AWARENESS AND ALERTING SYSTEM 
 140
ing is probably limited if no traffic is displayed. An operational concept and the pro-
cedures associated with airport moving map usage during take-off and landing are 
therefore described in conjunction with the display of surface traffic in Section 5.2. 
At any rate, procedures cannot require crew members to have the airport moving 
map visible at all times while taxiing to departure, since a recapitulation of the take-
off briefing or a scan of the weather or terrain environment may require the usage of 
other modes and ranges if the airport moving map is part of a multifunction display 
or the EFIS. However, the crew should be advised to limit, if possible, such activity to 
taxi route segments not requiring a turn or runway crossing. In view of the consid-
erations in Section 4.3.1, crew procedures must also emphasise the necessity that at 
least one crew member has to focus on the outside environment irrespective of visi-
bility conditions. 
 
5.1.1.2 Separate vs. EFIS-integrated airport moving map 
As outlined in Section 4.3.1, the main research interest in terms of airport moving 
map design concerns the repercussions and implications of a holistic Runway Incur-
sion avoidance functionality on display formats and flight deck integration. Conse-
quently, since commercial airport moving maps are available both on separate Elec-
tronic Flight Bag (EFB) type displays and as EFIS-integrated solutions (cf. Section 
3.1), one of the fundamental choices to be made in setting up the experimental 
SMAAS was between these two options. This section provides the rationale for the 
approach pursued by this thesis. 
 
Separate displays like EFBs are usually installed at sub-optimum locations in the 
cockpit, as illustrated e.g. by Figure 18 on p. 65. Furthermore, EFBs are typically side 
displays not aligned with the aircraft axis, which might become problematic if an 
ownship symbol indicating heading or track information is displayed. In this context, 
it also seems worthwhile recalling that having aerodrome mapping information on 
the side panel has been deemed sub-optimum even for conventional paper charts in 
the context of the Detroit accident [NTS91], cf. Appendix I-5. Last but not least, a 
separate display means that the pilot’s scanning pattern must be extended, which 
could be associated with additional workload. 
 
Nevertheless, there is no reason to question the suitability of an EFB as a retrofit air-
port moving map display. However, several issues from both a cockpit design phi-
losophy and consistency perspective will need to be addressed when considering the 
integration of traffic information and preventive or reactive alerting functionality. 
With respect to the traffic displayed, consistency issues might arise especially in case 
of retrofit. For illustration, consider any classic glass cockpit aircraft featuring a 
Navigation Display (ND) limited to ACAS traffic retrofitted with a side display fea-
turing ADS-B and TIS-B traffic. In normal operations, this will result in two poten-
tially different traffic surveillance pictures in the cockpit, which is clearly undesir-
able. 
This consistency issue is aggravated when taking into account alerts for conflicting 
traffic as well. In case of an alert exclusively based on ADS-B/TIS-B traffic data, such 
as a Runway Incursion alert, the particular traffic target causing the alert might either 
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not be visible on the ND at all (such as ground traffic not present in the ACAS sur-
veillance picture), or be displayed as non-threatening traffic (e.g. conflicting traffic on 
approach that is obviously not identified as threat by the ACAS logic). 
This problem cannot be solved fully even if a new avionics traffic computer feeding 
both the EFIS and the side display is retrofitted, since the conventional EFIS currently 
lacks the range selections required for an uncluttered representation of airport sur-
face traffic. 
 
From a cockpit design philosophy point of view, having different and possibly in-
consistent traffic alerts on two separate displays seems highly questionable, since the 
crew would have to be trained to look primarily at the side display on the ground, at 
the EFIS displays in the air, and potentially at both during final approach when an 
aural alert is triggered.  
In view of these considerations, it is probably not desirable to display Runway Incur-
sion and other surface movement alerts on a separate display. Besides, due to its 
criticality, Runway Incursion alerting is expected to use both Level 2 (Caution) and 
Level 3 (Warning) alerts like ACAS, which necessitates a connection to the aircraft’s 
Flight Warning System to ensure an appropriate presentation and prioritisation of 
alerts, and also requires certification of both the display hardware and software em-
ployed to Level C or higher, cf. [SAE88a]. This might eventually diminish the cost 
benefits of an EFB solution compared to an EFIS-integrated approach. 
 
In conclusion, therefore, it appears favourable to present both airport information, 
traffic information and alerts on the EFIS displays. Consequently, in view of the fact 
that the airport moving map forms the basis for the visualisation of further SMAAS 
functionality, the cockpit concept selected for this thesis consists of extending the 
standard Navigation Display (ND) by additional ranges dedicated to aerodrome op-
erations, which are available in all usual modes, ARC, ROSE and PLAN. The use of 
the ND has the additional advantage that the airport moving map can be operated 
intuitively without additional controls, provided that the range selector is enhanced 
to lower ranges, accordingly. Only more advanced interaction, such as a panning 
function, would require additional controls. However, if the Cockpit Display System 
(CDS) of the target airframe provides advanced interactivity as with ARINC 661 
[ARI02a], the corresponding provisions could be implemented as soft controls. Along 
with the greater variety and configurability of airport views enabled by range and 
mode selections, the improved position awareness provided by airport moving map 
displays is believed to be a huge advantage over conventional paper charts. 
 
5.1.1.3 2D vs. 3D airport moving map 
For an airport moving map integrated in the EFIS as proposed in the previous sec-
tion, the envisaged use for traffic surveillance during take-off and landing raises the 
question of how an intuitive transition to the conventional Navigation Display 
ranges can be achieved. A straightforward approach is to require consistency be-
tween the airport moving map and the ND, which means that scales and symbology 
should be identical or at least similar wherever possible. This is a constraint that lim-
its the usability of 3D exocentric airport moving map formats proposed and studied 
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e.g. by NASA [FAH05], since none of the current or near-future transport category 
aircraft have 3D exocentric ND modes. With respect to these formats, which have 
shown advantages compared to the purely two-dimensional airport moving maps, 
the potential added value compared to 2D displays also has to be seen in the light of 
cost-benefit considerations. 3D does not only require a significantly higher hardware 
performance, it also results in dramatically more complex data requirements for the 
Aerodrome Mapping Databases (AMDB), which must be fully three-dimensional to 
reflect, among others, runway slopes and building heights accurately. An assignment 
of generic heights for buildings and missing runway or taxiway slopes are probably 
prone to lead to confusion. Last but not least, and this is an aspect overlooked by 
most of the studies pushing for 3D exocentric airport representations, the classic 2D 
moving map and exocentric formats are not mutually exclusive, but rather comple-
mentary, i.e. they could easily co-exist as different modes of a future EFIS display. 
 
Furthermore, it should be noted that the choice of a 2D, ND-integrated airport mov-
ing map as the basis of SMAAS does not preclude the additional display of aero-
drome mapping data on other display formats such as Primary Flight Display (PFD) 
or Head-up Display (HUD). A dedicated SVS-PFD taxi mode, including the presenta-
tion of an assigned taxi route and applicable stop bars, has already been developed 
and evaluated successfully in a research flight simulator in conjunction with an air-
port moving map on the ND [Ver05]. In fact, such a display or a HUD might be re-
quired to provide guidance for taxiing an aircraft when visibility is extremely low; a 
basic moving map will most likely not be sufficient in this case. 
 
5.1.2 Design of Airport Moving Map Prototype 
5.1.2.1 General approach 
The existing airport moving map proto-
type available at the Institute of Flight 
Systems and Automatic Control (see 
Figure 30) was used as a starting point 
for the development in this thesis. It had 
been conceived as a demonstrator based 
on the pioneering work of the Institute 
in the field, cf. [Kub99]. From a Runway 
Incursion avoidance perspective, how-
ever, the crucial drawback of this design 
is the absence of taxiway holding posi-
tions and stop bars. Furthermore, there 
is a lack of contrast between apron areas 
and the runways. Its main technical 
limitation was that AMDBs could only 
be visualised after offline processing 
into a single Open Inventor file with 
pre-defined content and colours, which resulted in two major disadvantages. The 
first was that any runtime changes of airport moving map design and features in 
 
Figure 30: The Institute’s AMM prototype at 
the beginning of SMAAS development 
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terms of content or colour scheme could only be realised in a very cumbersome and 
performance-consuming manner, since any such modification required searching the 
whole Open Inventor tree for every instance of the respective airport element. More 
importantly, though, the choice of airports that could be used for testing and proto-
typing was limited to those few for which the time-consuming AMDB offline proc-
essing had already been accomplished. However, to ensure that the AMM design 
devised by this thesis would be sufficiently generic and not optimized to a particular 
airfield layout, different airports72 were eventually used during the development. 
Therefore, the existing AMM prototype was extended by the capability to directly 
load ED-99 or ED-99A compliant AMDBs using ESRI Shape Files as exchange format, 
which gave the application direct control over the individual airport features to be 
displayed, as well as the respective colours, line widths and layering used. 
Taking into account the general Human 
Factors engineering guidelines for elec-
tronic cockpit displays laid down in stan-
dards such as SAE Aerospace Recom-
mended Practices ARP5364 [SAE03] and 
based on the analytical considerations in 
the following sections, an initial refined 
airport moving map design (Figure 31) was 
then drafted and subsequently refined in 
several prototyping sessions with test and 
technical pilots. Prototyping was aimed at a 
fine-tuning of the human-machine interface 
prior to the simulator assessment with air-
line pilots described in Chapter 8. The un-
derlying objective of this iterative valida-
tion approach and subsequent refinements 
was to enable an assessment focussing on 
the actual validation objectives by preventing disturbances resulting from an imma-
ture Human-Machine Interface (HMI) design as far as possible. 
The prototyping core team consisted of two male experimental flight test pilots from 
different manufacturers. Both of these pilots additionally had a significant back-
ground as captains in airline operations. They were joined by a third pilot who was a 
former air traffic controller now responsible for performing Navaid calibration 
flights for a major European ANSP. In one of the final prototyping sessions, two fur-
ther male airline captains active in the International Federation of Airline Pilots’ As-
sociations (IFALPA) Aircraft Design and Operation Committee reinforced the above 
assessment team. Prototyping sessions consisted of free-play surface movement sce-
narios at Frankfurt and Paris Charles-de-Gaulle airport in the Institute’s fixed-based 
flight simulator (see Section 8.3 for a detailed description). Pilots were given the op-
portunity to evaluate and explore the airport moving map and its functionalities at 
their own discretion; their comments during the runs were taken down and subse-
quently consolidated in a debriefing session with all participants. 
                                                 
72  The airports routinely used to assess the design were e.g. Frankfurt (EDDF), Paris Charles-de-Gaulle (LFPG), 
Prague (LKPR), Newark (KEWR), Atlanta (KATL), Dallas-Fort Worth (KDFW), Denver (KDEN), Sydney 
(YSSY), Boston (KBOS) and Cleveland (KCLE). 
 
Figure 31: Initial airport moving map 
design before prototyping 
5   EXPERIMENTAL SURFACE MOVEMENT AWARENESS AND ALERTING SYSTEM 
 144
 
Figure 32 shows the resulting airport moving map design eventually realised and 
assessed for two different range selections. In view of the flight deck integration con-
cept derived in Section 5.1.1.2, ownship symbol, display layout and compass rose are 
virtually identical to the ND of the current Airbus single aisle aircraft family, cf. 
[Air05]. In the background of the display, there is a 2D representation of the airport 
derived from airport elements contained in an DO-272A/ED-99A compliant AMDB 
[RTC05], see Section 5.1.2.2 below for details. 
 
5.1.2.2 Identification of airport features to be displayed 
Unlike for Cockpit Displays of Traffic Information (CDTI), there is no guidance mate-
rial exclusively dedicated to airport moving map displays. Still, there appears to be 
consensus in the applicable literature and guidance material, such as DO-257A on the 
depiction of navigation information on electronic maps, that all runways and taxi-
ways, along with their respective identifiers, are the minimum required content, cf. 
[RTC03a, Yeh04]. Given the multitude of features and information available in Aero-
drome Mapping Databases (AMDBs), the need for a de-cluttering concept is also out-
lined, and benefits and shortfalls of automatic vs. manual de-cluttering are discussed 
[Yeh04]. 
 
Nonetheless, a number of important design considerations and key design guidelines 
are missing in the above references. When considering an airport moving map as 
part of the Synthetic Vision concept [Ver05, Ver06], it emerges that airport features 
should be presented in such fashion that there is sufficient resemblance between real-
ity and the cockpit depiction, because flight crews need to be able to establish a cor-
respondence between the electronic cockpit display and the outside world as seen 
from the cockpit windows. Another conceptual approach towards airport moving 
maps is considering them as animated airport charts, or an extension of the Naviga-
tion Display, in that existing navigation information (waypoints, Navaids, SIDs, 
STARs, etc.) is supplemented by information relevant for airport navigation. 
  
Figure 32: Airport moving map in ROSE mode (left) and ARC mode (right) at 1.25 NM 
5.1   AIRPORT MOVING MAP DISPLAY 
  145 
 
At any rate, since the airport moving map is intended to replace paper charts for the 
surface navigation task, it must provide at minimum the same navigation informa-
tion as paper charts, cf. Section 2.1.3.2. Accordingly, all runways and taxiways need 
to be displayed. Furthermore, all aprons with aircraft stands, aircraft servicing areas 
and buildings of operational significance have to be presented. Consequently, as a 
general principle, all paved surfaces relevant for aircraft operations, including run-
way and taxiway shoulders, must always be visualised. 
By contrast, a comparison of Figure 33a and b confirms that a representation of vehi-
cle roads on an airport moving map intended for aircraft use creates display clutter 
and is of little use for the airport navigation task. Furthermore, as the white arrow in 
Figure 33a indicates, a significant fraction of vehicle roads may be situated behind 
buildings or otherwise obscured from the airside, thus creating exclusively display 
clutter. Due to these considerations, prototyping results and the right-of-way rules 
for aircraft and vehicles (see Section 5.2), it was eventually decided not to visualise 
vehicle roads on the AMM. 
The AMM overview of Paris Charles-de-Gaulle Airport (LFPG) in Figure 34a also 
illustrates the necessity of limiting the number of buildings displayed, because an 
indiscriminate representation of all buildings contained in the AMDB creates signifi-
cant display clutter. In determining a method to limit the buildings displayed to 
those of operational significance, it was found that the most promising approach is 
utilizing the building name attribute defined in ED-99A [RTC05]. By selecting ap-
propriate keywords (such as terminal, concourse, hangar, tower, and fire etc.) and 
displaying only the buildings featuring these keywords in their name attribute, the 
airport moving map can be de-cluttered effectively, as shown in Figure 34b. Com-
pared to alternative de-cluttering methods using e.g. the spatial proximity or adja-
cency of buildings to runways, taxiways and aprons, this ensures that all functionally 
relevant and, depending on keyword selection, all landmark buildings can be repre-
sented. As an example, the aerodrome control tower is both an operationally relevant 
building and an important landmark, but not necessarily spatially close to the paved 
airport surfaces used for aircraft operations. 
  
Figure 33: Airport moving map with (a) and without (b) visualisation of vehicle roads 
a b 
5   EXPERIMENTAL SURFACE MOVEMENT AWARENESS AND ALERTING SYSTEM 
 146
 
While the need to display paved airport surfaces and buildings of operational rele-
vance can be clearly traced back to the airport charting heritage of the AMM (cf. Sec-
tion 2.1.3.2) and DO-257A [RTC03a], it is not immediately apparent whether airport 
markings need to be visualised as well. 
According to the analysis of current procedures in Section 2.1, holding positions and 
stop bars play an essential role in surface navigation and Runway Incursion avoid-
ance, since they delineate the runway protection zone and are used as limits in taxi 
instructions. Consequently, there is a clearly established need for provisions to dis-
play them on the AMM. 
By contrast, for runway markings and taxiway guidance lines, the potential benefit of 
presenting them on an airport moving map remains to be established. Taking into 
account the Synthetic Vision heritage of the AMM, however, it is believed that run-
way markings, which serve as an unambiguous identification of runways, visually 
reinforce the runway presentation in certain AMM ranges. Likewise, taxiway guid-
ance lines not only indicate valid turns and routes on the taxiway surface, but may 
also support the recognition and disambiguation of visualised airport pavements as 
taxiways. Consequently, it is generally relevant to display airport markings on an 
AMM, but in contrast to runways, taxiways, aprons and buildings, the need for visu-
alisation must be carefully balanced against display clutter aspects for each envis-
aged AMM range setting; this is discussed in Section 5.1.2.4 below. 
 
5.1.2.3 Labelling of airport features 
A mere visualisation of airport features as in Figure 34 is not sufficient to create an 
operationally usable AMM display. As a minimum, runways, taxiways and 
gates/parking positions have to be unambiguously identified to the flight crew, who 
will otherwise not be able to perform surface navigation according ATC instructions. 
Consequently, as on conventional paper charts, this identification is achieved by add-
ing labels to the corresponding airport elements. Additionally, it seems appropriate 
to label airport functional zones, such as de-icing areas, and terminal buildings. 
  
Figure 34: Airport moving map with all buildings displayed (a) and de-cluttered solution (b) 
a b 
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Labelling of different airport features raises several issues, such as overlap-
ping/masking effects, priorities and the integration of dynamic elements, particu-
larly the surrounding aircraft. Traffic symbols may also be accompanied by a label 
and additional situation-dependent information (e.g. relative altitude, climb/sink 
arrow). Although seemingly fixed except for PLAN mode, even the ownship symbol 
adds dynamics and can thus virtually always cover any label displayed at a fixed 
position. This could only be avoided by a fully dynamic labelling that would also 
have to consider intruder symbols and labels as part of the optimization process. 
Since this might eventually result in high processor loads and detrimental effects on 
performance, an intermediate solution might consist of linear label ranges and pre-
defined evasive strategies, i.e. sliding/jumping labels in case of overlap. 
However, since labelling algorithms for both paper charts generated from AMDBs 
and AMM displays were the subject of a further PhD thesis at the Institute in parallel 
to this study [Psc08], these issues were not pursued further in the frame of this thesis, 
and only a coarse makeshift algorithm for labelling was devised. Whenever a new 
AMDB was loaded, it would generate a set of labels according to a simple pre-
defined rule set with the aim of marking all taxiway guidance lines with sufficient 
length. Likewise, all parking positions and runways are labelled. 
 
5.1.2.4 Available ranges and range-dependent display of airport features 
One of the key issues in airport moving map design is finding a balanced representa-
tion of airport features providing all of the information required for surface naviga-
tion without creating a cluttered display. This is closely related to the question of 
display range selections available for the airport moving map and their respective 
content and level of detail. 
In fact, from a flight deck integration perspective, the main challenge is that an air-
port moving map needs both smaller ranges and a finer range gradation than a stan-
dard ND to be of operational use. Since the existing ND range controls on the FCU 
should be re-used as far as possible to achieve a logical and consistent solution, the 
AMM ranges must be defined using the ‘classic’ ND ranges of 10 NM, 20 NM, 40 
NM, 80 NM, 160 NM, 320 NM (and sometimes 640 NM) as starting point. The 
straightforward approach eventually taken by this thesis was to continue dividing 
the previous range by two below 10 NM by, leading to additional ND ranges of 5 
NM, 2.5 NM, 1.25 NM and so forth for the AMM, because this is the logical continua-
tion of the conventional ND range series73. 
 
To address de-cluttering and the need for different levels of detail, only runways, 
taxiways, apron areas and selected buildings are always displayed, whereas most 
other airport features and their corresponding labels are displayed only in certain 
ranges. Table 6 summarizes the range-dependent airport feature visualisation con-
cept implemented for de-cluttering and more efficient information access, which was 
established and validated in the course of the prototyping sessions. 
                                                 
73  An equivalent approach would be to use 1/100 of the original ND ranges, i.e. 0.1 NM to 3.2/6.4 NM for the 
AMM. From an integration perspective, the apparent advantage is that the original range selector does not 
need to be modified; the only additional control required for this solution is a switch between the two range 
domains. The corresponding values could be added to the conventional FCU range selector scale in a smaller 
and/or differently coloured font. 
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Due to their importance for runway safety, stop bars, as the only airport markings, 
are maintained in most AMM ranges. By contrast, runway markings, taxiway guid-
ance lines and markings associated with parking stands/gates are successively acti-
vated with decreasing display range, thus increasing the level of detail presented. As 
Table 6 indicates, airport labels are part of the range-dependent de-cluttering con-
cept. For ranges larger than 1.25 NM, only major taxiways, i.e. taxiways beyond a 
length threshold (1000 m), are still labelled. By contrast, runway labelling is main-
tained in all relevant AMM ranges, and parking positions and gates are always la-
belled when displayed. 
 
Feature > 10 NM 10 NM 5 NM 2.5 NM 1.25 NM 0.725 NM ≤ 0.5 NM 
Runways x x x x x x x 
Taxiways x x x x x x x 
Apron Elements x x x x x x x 
Airport Buildings x x x x x x x 
Runway Labels   x x x x x 
Taxiway Labels    major TWYs x x x 
Stop Bars     x x x 
Runway Markings      x x 
Taxiway Guidance 
Lines      x x 
Parking Stand 
Guidance Lines 
      x 
Gate and Parking 
Position Labels 
      x 
Table 6: Overview of range-dependent de-cluttering of AMDB features 
 
5.1.2.5 Symbology for ownship representation 
To fulfil High-Level Requirement I, the ownship position must be displayed on the 
airport moving map, and provide both position and heading/track information. For 
reasons of consistency, the same ownship symbol as for the airborne mode, which is 
always drawn with fixed size, should be used. This symbol is usually significantly 
larger than a representation of the aircraft to scale (cf. in Figure 35a). However, when 
this relation reverses in low ranges, as shown in Figure 35b for an Airbus A38074, 
there might be a risk that the crew will overestimate distances, spacing and e.g. 
wingtip clearance.  
A more realistic symbol displaying the aircraft to scale is therefore envisaged for the 
lowest ranges, because there appears to be the need to display the aircraft in its cor-
rect proportions to the environment to prevent misleading cues resulting from the 
symbolic ownship representation. A concern with this realistic representation is, 
however, that it might indulge head-down taxi operations, with the crew attempting 
to control precision movement of the aircraft just based on the display, which is not 
intended. Nonetheless, this to-scale representation could, in combination with a traf-
fic display, support intuitive conflict detection in high traffic density areas, such as 
the apron, on stand areas or when queuing for take-off. 
                                                 
74  The range at which the reversal occurs is dependent on aircraft type. To improve contrast, the fixed-size sym-
bolic ownship representation has been coloured in magenta in Figure 35 b. 
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The key issues associated with the display of the position of the own aircraft are 
navigational precision and integrity. Therefore, provisions for degraded navigational 
capabilities have to be made. A first step could consist of blocking the lowest taxi 
mode ranges with the realistic symol (RC > 5 m), and further measures might be to 
display a positional error margin (RC > 10 m) or to limit the display to PLAN mode 
centred around ownship, but without displaying the symbol (RC > 15 m). 
 
 
5.1.2.6 Colour and colour concept 
As outlined above, the airport moving map mixes elements of Synthetic Vision and 
conventional flight guidance display design. This dual heritage is epitomised by the 
colour concept. To represent paved airport surfaces, including the runways, different 
shades of grey are used, resembling the colour of actual pavement used at most air-
ports. Likewise, runway markings and taxiway guidance lines use white and yellow, 
respectively, and thus precisely the colours required by ICAO Annex 14 [ICA04b] for 
the real markings. By contrast, taxiway holding positions and stop bars are displayed 
by a single line instead of the actual combination of lines to reduce clutter, and col-
oured in amber by default to achieve a better distinction from the surrounding taxi-
way guidance lines. 
 
Furthermore, distinct functional parts of the movement area, such as aprons or taxi-
ways, are assigned different shades of grey irrespective of whether the actual pave-
ment features this distinction or not. After all, the concept behind Synthetic Vision is 
to create a sufficient resemblance for an intuitive perception of information, not to 
mimic reality exactly. For a more detailed discussion refer to [Ver05]. 
Generally, the presence of labels for runways, taxiways and parking positions is a 
derivate of conventional display and map design. However, the colour coding of the 
taxiway labels, yellow letters on a black square, is an adaptation of the actual taxiway 
signs used. Likewise, white text on blue background for parking position and gate 
labels is inspired by the colouring of the actual signs at Frankfurt Airport (EDDF). 
  
Figure 35: Comparison of fixed-size symbolic and ownship representation drawn to scale 
a b 
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For the runway labels, by contrast, white on black is used instead of white on red, 
since the usage of the colour red for normal indications violates the accepted princi-
ples of colour coding on flight deck displays (cf. [SAE88]). Finally, the use of the col-
our blue for buildings is an ‘artificial’ colour coding, which on the one hand allows a 
clear distinction of three-dimensional structures and two-dimensional pavements at 
a glance, but also avoids confusion with the colours used to visualize terrain (brown, 
and, to a certain extent, green) on NDs on the other hand. 
 
 
Figure 36 shows the preliminary colour concept proposed for the AMM, using vari-
ous shades of slightly bluish grey to reflect the difference between runways, taxiways 
and apron areas. Furthermore, an initially envisaged distinction of parking stand ar-
eas and apron areas (shown only in Figure 31) had been found to increase display 
clutter in a first design review with project test pilots, and thus been discarded. 
 
During the prototyping sessions in the Institute’s flight simulator, this preliminary 
colour concept was rejected by the participating pilots, who criticised that the run-
ways were not displayed with sufficient conspicuousness and that the contrast of the 
display was not acceptable. Therefore, the colour concept was changed, using the 
principle of brightness to reflect the different relative importance of runways, taxi-
ways and apron areas. The resulting final colour concept, which was retained 
throughout the evaluation on the Institute’s Research Flight Simulator described in 
Chapter 8, is shown in Figure 37. Compared to the preliminary colour concept, there 
is a partial inversion. Apron areas are now the darkest airport feature shown, taxi-
ways are displayed slightly lighter, but still darker than before, and runways are 
visualized in the lightest shade of grey. The colour of buildings was just slightly 
darkened. 
  
Figure 36: Preliminary colour concept Figure 37: Final colour concept 
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5.2 Cockpit Display of Traffic Information (CDTI) 
 
Awareness of other traffic in the aerodrome environment, which consists of aircraft, 
vehicles and aircraft under tow, is crucial to understand the traffic situation and to 
anticipate potential conflicts. Accordingly, the main goal of any traffic awareness 
functionality in the cockpit is to provide the crew with adequate, sufficient and un-
ambiguous information on operationally relevant surrounding traffic in an intuitive 
way. This is intended to supplement and simplify the generation of the crew’s mental 
picture of the surrounding traffic, particularly for traffic which is beyond the effec-
tive or convenient line of sight, thus fulfilling the traffic information part of High-
Level Requirement II. Besides, a traffic presentation might also enable a verification 
of ATC instructions, thus addressing High-Level Requirement IV.  
 
As discussed in Section 4.3, the only viable basis for an aerodrome traffic presenta-
tion is an airport moving map, because this provides the unique opportunity to dis-
play traffic both in relation to ownship and the aerodrome. Consequently, existing 
guidance material requires an airport moving map in conjunction with a surface traf-
fic CDTI, cf. [RTC02]. 
 
5.2.1 Concept & Research Issues 
The need of having a single consistent traffic surveillance picture in the cockpit, as 
discussed in Section 5.1.1.2, is one of the main reasons for using an EFIS-integrated 
airport moving map as basis for SMAAS. While this is certainly the most prominent 
repercussion of the traffic presentation on airport moving map design, it also signifi-
cantly constrains the design choices to be made for the Cockpit Display of Traffic In-
formation (CDTI). At the same time, EFIS integration ensures that basic CDTI re-
quirements set forth in RTCA DO-243 [RTC98], such as the capability of presenting 
the position of traffic relative to own aircraft within a range of at least 10 NM or an 
indication of range via range rings, are automatically fulfilled.  
 
Nevertheless, from a flight deck integration perspective, the key challenge associated 
with achieving a single traffic surveillance picture in the cockpit is how the enhanced 
traffic information provided by ADS-B and TIS-B can be utilised while maintaining 
consistency with existing ACAS installations. The envisaged usage of a CDTI based 
on an airport moving map for traffic surveillance during take-off and landing also 
raises the issue of transitioning from the small display ranges typically used for the 
airport moving map to the larger ranges of the ‘airborne’ ND modes remains an is-
sue. Apparently, this has not been studied systematically so far, and demonstrates 
that the need for consistency also encompasses the visualisation of airborne and 
ground traffic, irrespective of available sources of traffic data. 
 
There are two further key research issues concerning the display of traffic informa-
tion on the airport moving map. First of all, this functionality is dependent on the 
availability, accuracy and integrity of the corresponding traffic data. However, since 
a survey of potential traffic data sources has already been conducted within the 
scope of Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, the discussion below focuses on considerations on 
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the operational aspects of traffic data availability. In this context, the main aspect to 
be investigated is the influence of an incomplete traffic surveillance picture resulting 
from less than 100% equipage on the usability of a CDTI. Research on this matter, 
which should be largely independent of a particular CDTI design, was conducted 
during on-airport trials with TUD’s Navigation Test Vehicle at Frankfurt and Prague 
using ADS-B live traffic, see Chapter 7. 
In view of the large number of aircraft and vehicles simultaneously operating in high 
density traffic environments such as large hub airports, the second key issue is de-
termining what constitutes operationally relevant surrounding traffic, since a down-
selection might become necessary to limit display clutter. 
 
In conclusion, the common core of both issues concerns the impact that the scope of 
traffic visualisation has on the operational usability of a CDTI. A largely theoretical 
analysis on this aspect is presented below. 
 
5.2.1.1 Operational concept and procedures 
During surface operations, a crew-selectable CDTI traffic representation is envisaged 
to aid flight crews in maintaining appropriate awareness of the surrounding traffic 
irrespective of pertinent meteorological or geometrical visibility restrictions. It is 
therefore expected that pilots will routinely use the airport moving map with the 
display of traffic activated while taxiing. Outside the runways, however, the surface 
navigation task should drive airport moving map configuration in terms of range 
and modes used. 
 
By contrast, when approaching active runways for crossing or line-up, the airport 
moving map is expected to be configured for surveillance of potentially conflicting 
runway traffic, in support of the current visual check that the approach ends of the 
runway are clear. Likewise, during the take-off roll, the focus of AMM/CDTI usage 
is monitoring the display for potential Runway Incursions. In line with pilot roles 
proposed in Section 5.1.1.1, it is expected that airlines will mainly allocate this task to 
the Pilot Not Flying (PNF), whose role is currently focussed on monitoring engine 
parameters and speeds during take-off. 
 
Consequently, in order not to extend his or her scanning pattern, it could become 
necessary to duplicate critical engine parameters on the airport moving map75. Thus, 
the PNF could monitor both take-off performance and traffic situation at one glance; 
besides, additional performance cues could be added to the airport moving map it-
self76. In the first design iteration in the frame of this thesis, however, these take-off 
performance monitoring aspects were not addressed. 
                                                 
75  As an example, on an A380, the N1 indications of could be duplicated in the rectangular area below the AMM 
during take-off, cf. Figure 14. 
76  The take-off speeds v1 and vR correspond to a certain geometric location from the runway threshold or the 
intersection chosen for take-off. For a very basic form of take-off performance monitoring, the tolerance bands 
corresponding to v1 and vR with nominal engine performance could be added to the runway representation on 
the airport moving map. If the actual engine performance falls significantly short of the expectations, the crew 
could determine this when the aircraft crosses v1 (or vR) band with the indicated speed is still significantly 
lower. 
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5.2.1.2 Scope of traffic visualisation 
Especially at large airports with high traffic density, a general indiscriminate display 
of all traffic in the aerodrome environment will most likely result in tremendous dis-
play clutter. Since the resulting information overflow will probably increase crew 
workload and might subsequently decrease CDTI usability, it is feared that this 
could jeopardise the intended function. Even in present-day airborne traffic surveil-
lance, the display of ACAS intruders is therefore limited to the most threatening 
eight [Air05]. Consequently, control and minimization of display clutter is an impor-
tant CDTI design goal in DO-243. Traffic information is required to be partially or 
completely crew-selectable, and reducible to a minimum set of information by a sim-
ple crew action, such as pressing a de-clutter button [RTC98]. Additionally, reducing 
range is mentioned as valid method of limiting display clutter, specifically for surface 
traffic [RTC00a]. All of these references illustrate the necessity to limit the presenta-
tion of traffic in the airport environment to operationally relevant targets. 
 
5.2.1.2.1 Considerations on operationally relevant traffic 
Information needs regarding the surrounding traffic during the different phases of 
surface operations may vary. As an example, a presentation of airborne traffic ap-
proaching or departing the runways is operationally most likely irrelevant while 
taxiing on the apron, but will become more important on the manoeuvring area in 
the vicinity of runways, and is essential within the runway protection zone, e.g. dur-
ing runway crossing or when lined up for take-off. Likewise, with ownship in the 
runway environment, aircraft waiting for line-up on a different runway only a few 
hundred metres away or local traffic on parallel taxiways are most likely fairly ir-
relevant from an operational and safety perspective, whereas aircraft on final ap-
proach to the runway at a distance of several km may potentially cause conflicts. 
When lined up for take-off, all traffic on final approach, on the runway surface and 
immediately adjacent taxiways, including vehicle roads intersecting the runway, is 
relevant due to the potential Runway Incursion hazards.  
 
These examples illustrate that using distance as a simple metrics for the identification 
of relevant traffic is not possible due to the large bandwidth of traffic speeds in-
volved. The same applies to closure rates, since traffic stopped at a runway holding 
position and then erroneously starting to cross it might initially have a very low clo-
sure rate. However, a classification according to type of movement by assigning all 
aircraft and vehicles operating in the airport environment to one of the following ma-
jor categories might prove helpful in the identification of relevant traffic: 
 
 Aircraft operating under their own power. This category encompasses all air-
borne aircraft, aircraft taking off or landing, and aircraft taxiing with running en-
gines. 
 Aircraft under tow or during pushback. Aircraft can also be moved by tugs, with 
engines off or being started. The main distinction to be made between towing and 
pushback is that aircraft being towed to/from maintenance, or aircraft being relo-
cated between remote parking positions and gates by tugs are often moved with 
the majority of the electrical system off. 
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 Vehicles with special functions operating on the manoeuvring area. Some air-
port vehicles perform functions that routinely require them to use the manoeu-
vring area, such as tugs, marshaller or airport authority cars, snow clearing 
equipment, runway service cars and emergency response vehicles, such as fire 
fighting units. 
 General service vehicles. This group encompasses all vehicles that do not have 
functions performed on the manoeuvring area. Typically, this includes all vehi-
cles required to service aircraft, to handle cargo and to transport passengers to 
parking positions outside the terminals, such as refuelling trucks, passenger bus-
ses, transporters for the cleaning personnel and baggage cart tractors. 
 
Since airport vehicles account for a significant share of airport surface traffic, cf. Fig-
ure 28, the display policy for vehicles appears to be a key element of controlling dis-
play clutter. 
 
5.2.1.2.2 Principles for the visualisation of other aircraft 
All other aircraft operating under their own engine power, might constitute relevant 
traffic, since they can potentially cause conflicts on the runways or the movement 
area. Additionally, aircraft under tow or being pushed back may be relevant, espe-
cially in view of a serious incident at Schiphol, where a B767 had to abort a take-off 
when a Boeing 747 was towed across the runway by accident, cf. Appendix I-14.3. Of 
special concern from a human factors point of view is whether parked aircraft should 
be displayed, since they might be relevant as obstacles if adjacent taxiways do not 
provide sufficient clearance for all aircraft types to pass by. Therefore, information on 
aircraft parked on or immediately adjacent to taxiways has to be made available via 
the AIS per ICAO recommendation already today [ICA04]. From an operational, but 
not from a safety perspective, a visualisation of parked aircraft might, after landing, 
support flight crews in verifying whether the assigned parking position or gate is 
already available. 
 
5.2.1.2.3 Display policy for vehicles 
Vehicles operating on the manoeuvring area have been involved in Runway Incur-
sions, and although this has not resulted in fatalities aboard aircraft so far, it never-
theless constitutes a high threat to flight safety. Consequently, all vehicles with spe-
cial functions operating on the manoeuvring area must be incorporated in the on-
board traffic visualisation and alerting concept. 
By contrast, as discussed in Chapter 4, mobiles do not pose any threat while driving 
on dedicated vehicle roads, and the hazards associated with aircraft-vehicle collisions 
on the apron, during pushback or at the intersection of vehicle roads and taxiways 
are low, at least for persons aboard the aircraft. Since vehicles have to give way to 
aircraft on the airport surface at all times, according to current rules laid down in 
ICAO Annex 14 [ICA04b], the main responsibility for collision avoidance and the 
installation of appropriate traffic awareness functions, such as the ETNA system 
[Kra04], resides with airport authorities and vehicle operators, at least for service ve-
hicles. 
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Consequently, a representation of general service vehicles, which would cause sig-
nificant display clutter especially for large AMM range settings, is most likely not 
adding any safety benefits for aircraft operations and therefore probably not required 
for the default airport traffic awareness display. This exclusion might help to avoid 
cluttering the display with operationally insignificant vehicle traffic. However, this 
does not preclude that the display of service vehicles may be activated on explicit 
crew selection, e.g. in the vicinity of parking positions and gates, when the lowest 
available airport moving map ranges are envisaged to be used. Likewise, any vehicle 
traffic identified as conflicting by the alerting part of SMAAS should be displayed 
irrespective of its type, provided that accuracy and integrity issues as well as the 
concerns for the pushback phase (see below) are addressed appropriately. 
  
The main underlying reason, as discussed in Section 4.6.2, is the absence of a useful 
operational concept for a function providing awareness of general service vehicles. 
Even if the enhanced awareness of service vehicles on the apron might enable pilots 
to detect potential traffic conflicts during parking and pushback intuitively, the flight 
crew’s possibilities to react are limited, particularly during pushback, when they are 
not in control of the aircraft. Alerting the ramp agent via voice communication when 
perceiving a potential conflict on the traffic display is the only possibility, which, 
given typical reaction times, might be inefficient. Other pilot reactions, such as brak-
ing, could even be detrimental in this situation, since damage to the tug, pushbar or 
the nosewheel might result. In a worst case scenario, the aircraft may end up resting 
on its tail, which constitutes a higher hazard to the safety of passengers and crew 
than the actual collision with a service vehicle. 
 
5.2.1.3 Considerations on automatic display and de-cluttering of traffic 
In line with present ACAS implementations (cf. Section 3.2.1) and the CDTI design 
criteria discussed above, the display of traffic has to be crew-selectable, to allow pi-
lots to de-clutter the display manually in case they feel the need to do so. However, 
with the traffic presentation switched off, the flight crew might eventually miss 
safety-critical traffic alerts, and could be confused or react with delay if there is a 
mere aural alert (e.g. callout) without a corresponding indication on the display. 
Therefore, in case of a conflict, i.e. in the presence of traffic-related SMAAS alerts, 
conflicting traffic is displayed automatically, irrespective of display settings, consis-
tent with current ACAS implementation. 
 
Beyond the straightforward de-cluttering options, such as reducing display range or 
changing the mode, three different approaches of limiting the number of targets to be 
displayed can be envisaged: 
 
 Configurable traffic awareness display: The flight crew is provided with addi-
tional controls to configure the traffic awareness display, e.g. controls to select or 
de-select the display of airport vehicles. The drawback of this solution is that the 
responsibility (and thus the workload) for configuring the display to show only 
the traffic relevant for a given situation remains with the flight crew, who might 
potentially miss relevant traffic in case of display misconfiguration. 
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 Static de-cluttering: The traffic awareness display could be limited to certain air-
port areas, or traffic within a certain boundary around ownship, both with a po-
tential dependency on flight phase. 
 Situation-based automatic ‘intelligent’ de-cluttering: The visualisation of the 
surrounding traffic adapts dynamically and automatically to the operational con-
text. As an example, while on the manoeuvring area, the traffic display function 
may filter any traffic not located on own, parallel, neighbouring, adjacent or inter-
secting taxiways in order to reduce clutter. 
 
Each of the options above, which can be combined in principle, has its disadvantages 
when applied individually. While display configuration options are generally desir-
able, they should not impose additional workload on the crew. For an interactive 
CDS, a much wider range of additional features for configuring the traffic display 
and information shown for individual traffic can be implemented, but any additional 
functionality should be strictly driven by operational needs. 
 
However, both static de-cluttering and any crew-configurable solution will only par-
tially succeed in achieving a limitation of the traffic displayed. Situation-based auto-
matic de-cluttering, in turn, might require expensive additional onboard processing 
capacity, apart from the fact that it might be very difficult to find a suitable algorithm 
that can be validated for the myriads of different airport traffic constellations. Fur-
thermore, special care is required with respect to traffic de-cluttering for the run-
ways, because all potentially conflicting traffic within the runway protection zone(s) 
must always be visualised, irrespective of its type or nature, applicable filter rules 
and traffic display settings. 
 
Nevertheless, intelligent de-cluttering algorithms linked to AMDB topology are re-
quired to fully implement ‘single-button’ automatic de-cluttering put forward by 
DO-243. However, since the Institute lacked a powerful traffic simulation capable of 
creating realistic hub airport traffic densities, the development of these algorithms 
was postponed beyond the scope of this thesis, since there would have been no way 
of validating the results. 
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5.2.2 Traffic Symbology 
5.2.2.1 Design considerations on basic traffic symbology 
For reasons of HMI consistency, the envisaged EFIS integration of SMAAS constrains 
the design choices on traffic symbology, as outlined above. Besides, the traffic pa-
rameters listed as mandatory for a CDTI by DO-243 are essentially the same as for 
ACAS77 [RTC98]. Consequently, to be compatible with current ACAS implementa-
tions (cf. Section 3.2.1.2) and to ensure display consistency over both airport moving 
map and airborne ND ranges, the following requirements apply: 
 
 Traffic symbols must be presented in either white or blue, provided that no alert 
or additional information applies. 
 Traffic symbology used for the representation of aircraft on the ground and in the 
airport environment must be identical, or at least visually and functionally simi-
lar, to the symbology used for airborne CDTI applications. 
 To achieve a harmonized and consistent air/ground traffic presentation, filled 
traffic symbols must be used, since relevant airport traffic is typically within a 
horizontal range of 6 NM and a vertical range of +/– 1200 ft, thus fulfilling the 
criteria for so-called ACAS ‘proximate traffic’, cf. Section 3.2.1  
 
In contrast to ACAS, both ADS-B and TIS-B traffic data typically contain head-
ing/track information. However, supplementing conventional ACAS symbols with 
additional heading or track vectors has previously been identified as not desirable, 
because this leads to complex symbols and display clutter. One of the main reasons 
given was that ACAS traffic symbols are supplemented by altitude data and, if ap-
plicable, an arrow for climb and sink rates in excess of 500 ft/min [RM01]. By con-
trast, a chevron-like traffic symbol with unambiguous directionality, which intui-
tively reflects heading/track, received very positive flight crew ratings in extensive 
flight trials in the United States [BAO00], and can therefore be regarded as the most 
mature CDTI symbology available at present. 
Consequently, it was adopted for this thesis with 
very minor modifications necessary to ensure com-
patibility with ACAS traffic symbols. Figure 38 de-
tails the original construction idea behind this di-
rectional traffic symbol and its size interrelation 
with the conventional ACAS diamond. When not 
within the ‘proximate traffic’ range, it is shown as 
an unfilled outline, e.g. to visualise airborne ADS-B 
traffic. This symbol contains two natural position 
anchors, the centre of gravity, marked by a black 
cross, and the tip of the symbol, indicated by a red 
‘x’. This second anchor was initially considered due an issue resulting from the fixed 
traffic symbol size: when an aircraft is stopped well in front of a runway holding po-
sition, the tip of the symbol might protrude across the holding position for larger 
AMM range settings although the aircraft has not crossed it in reality. However, this 
                                                 
77 As an example, explicit reference to TCAS altitude data tags (cf. Section 3.2.1.2 and Figure 20) is made. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 38: Traffic symbol with 
integrated heading/track and 
directionality indication 
x 
x 
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solution was eventually considered as counter-intuitive during prototyping sessions 
and abandoned. Consequently, the aircraft CG, which is usually used and transmit-
ted as position reference, serves as the symbol reference and rotation axis. As an ad-
ditional benefit, the directional traffic symbol in Figure 38 is clearly distinguishable 
from the standard ownship symbol in terms of shape, which is believed to avoid po-
tential confusion, especially in difficult lighting conditions, when the display is 
viewed from an unusual perspective or when the pilot scan is perturbed. 
 
A prerequisite for using this directional 
symbol, however, is the availability of 
heading/track data from the traffic 
source data, because directional sym-
bols with a default heading have been 
proven to be misleading, irritating and 
thus unacceptable for pilots during the 
evaluation with the Navigation Test 
Vehicle in Frankfurt and Prague (see 
Chapter 7). Consequently, in case traffic 
data do not contain valid heading or 
track information, there is a reversion to 
the omni-directional standard ACAS 
symbology78. 
Figure 39 shows this solution based on 
real ADS-B traffic data recorded during 
an evaluation session at Frankfurt Air-
port (EDDF). The screenshot features 
both types of traffic symbols, which are accompanied by a very simple label, consist-
ing by default only of the callsign of the corresponding traffic, if available, or the air-
craft registration. Otherwise, there will be no label (see next section). Unless the op-
erational context requires highlighting in advisory or alerting colours, traffic is dis-
played in white. All aircraft supplying valid track or heading information are dis-
played using the chevron-shaped directional symbol introduced in Figure 38, such as 
the TAP Air Portugal flight TAP573. For all other traffic, the omni-directional stan-
dard ACAS proximate traffic symbol is used, in line with the considerations above. 
Both symbols have a fixed size throughout all ranges in which they are used, i.e. they 
are not re-scaled with range, identical to current ACAS implementations. The figure 
also clearly demonstrates that both types of traffic symbol have distinctly different 
shapes from the yellow standard Airbus ownship symbol. 
 
As for the ownship symbol, the issue of a symbolic versus a 2D scale representation 
(cf. Section 5.1.2.5) also exists for traffic symbols. At first glance, it appears that a traf-
fic representation to scale might be helpful in establishing the precise location of 
other aircraft in relation to a holding position, and allow a more intuitive traffic con-
flict avoidance while taxiing or queuing for line-up. 
                                                 
78  The directional symbol is only presented if the heading/track information supplied via ADS-B or TIS-B is 
consistent with the direction of motion calculated from the last two reported positions. If heading/track infor-
mation is lost while traffic is stopped, the last known value is retained for display until it starts moving again. 
 
Figure 39: Airport moving map display with 
display of ADS-B ground traffic (detail) 
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A closer look, however, reveals that this issue is significantly more complex than for 
the ownship symbol. First of all, since ADS-B transmits only the wake vortex cate-
gory of aircraft and dimensions [RTC00], data on aircraft type - essential for a repre-
sentation to scale – are not directly accessible. However, this information can in prin-
ciple be retrieved based on the unique ICAO 24-bit Mode S transponder address of 
each aircraft (e.g. 383E7A for the first A380, F-WWOW), provided that additional 
onboard aircraft registry database containing data on the precise aircraft type for 
each Mode S address is created to enable this correlation79. 
Nevertheless, a 2D scale representation of the surrounding aircraft is operationally 
meaningful only if accuracy and integrity of traffic data are sufficient, and addition-
ally requires valid heading/track data to be supplied. Otherwise, there is a high risk 
that a scale representation leads to false cues and misleading information. Further 
complexity originates from the fact that these criteria would have to be fulfilled by all 
traffic within the selected display range and mode, unless it can be proven that a mix 
of scale and abstract symbols might be acceptable to pilots. Last but not least, care 
must be exerted when defining the changeover between symbolic and scale represen-
tation due to the variations in aircraft sizes. In view of the multitude of unsolved is-
sues and the substantial effort required for their systematic study, it was eventually 
hypothesized that a symbolic representation of the surrounding traffic is sufficient 
for the purposes of Runway Incursion avoidance. 
 
5.2.2.2 Distinction between airborne and ground traffic 
For consistency reasons, airborne traffic 
has to be represented like conventional 
ACAS traffic, irrespective of whether 
the directional or the standard ACAS 
symbology is used. As shown in Figure 
40, the only significant difference to 
ACAS is that the airborne flight 
DLH406 is represented by the direc-
tional symbol and features a label con-
sisting of the flight plan call-sign. Rela-
tive altitude is indicated numerically 
above or below the traffic symbol. In the 
example in Figure 40, DLH406 is on 
short final to RWY 08R and approxi-
mately 300 ft above ownship, which is 
why the numerical value is displayed 
above the symbol. In good approxima-
tion, this is also the altitude above the 
runway threshold. Likewise, climb or sink rates in excess of 500 ft/min are visualised 
by an arrow pointing upward or downward next to the traffic symbol, cf. Section 
3.2.1.2. 
                                                 
79  There is no need to sacrifice valuable airborne data link bandwidth for these data, which essentially remain the 
same as long as an aircraft is not re-registered. This traffic registry database could be updated along with FMS 
and aerodrome mapping databases within the AIRAC cycle. 
 
Figure 40: Visualisation of airborne traffic on 
Airport moving map (detail) 
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Nonetheless, an intuitive distinction between airborne and ground traffic seems ap-
propriate, and has already been identified as desirable in previous research [BAO00], 
whereas the particular design chosen by this reference, the use of symbol colour to 
distinguish airborne and ground traffic, was criticised by participants. Besides, a cor-
responding solution is incompatible with the symbol colour change in case of TCAS 
alerts. Likewise, the introduction of dedicated symbology for traffic on the ground 
does not seem favourable, because it increases the complexity of the HMI. 
Therefore, in view of the need to limit HMI complexity and information density, a 
different approach consisting of the reduction of information compared to airborne 
traffic was taken. To limit display clutter, it seems imperative to suppress the opera-
tionally irrelevant altitude indication for ground traffic, such as UAL403 in Figure 40. 
To ensure that this suppression does not erroneously filter airborne traffic flying at 
the same altitude, the altitude indication is only removed when at least one of the 
following conditions is satisfied80: 
 
 The relative difference between ownship and traffic altitude is less than 100 ft, 
traffic is moving at a speed of less than 100 kts, and the weight-on-wheels switch 
or other means determine that ownship is on ground; 
 ADS-B/TIS-B surface type messages are received from traffic; 
 ADS-B/TIS-B messages indicate that traffic is a vehicle. 
 
By default, while ownship is airborne, the display of ground traffic is activated at 
and below 1,000 ft Radio Altitude (RA) in descent. To avoid flickering due to the ter-
rain profile and resulting oscillations of RA, there is a hysteresis: ground traffic is 
only removed when climbing through 1,500 ft RA again. After take-off, this ensures 
that ground traffic is removed at 1,500 ft RA and only brought back when descend-
ing through 1,000 ft RA. While ownship is on ground, the visualisation of ground 
traffic also encompasses aircraft on final approach. All airborne aircraft up to 1,000 ft 
above the runway threshold or Aerodrome Reference Point (ARP) are displayed81. 
 
5.2.2.3 Symbology for vehicles and aircraft/vehicle combinations 
Figure 39 implicitly illustrates a further issue that needs to be addressed. The traffic 
on taxiway November (‘N’) labelled ‘KFZ030’ is actually an aircraft tug. This raises 
the issue of whether a dedicated symbol for vehicles is necessary. Accordingly, dur-
ing the evaluation with the Navigation Test Vehicle in Frankfurt and Prague, several 
pilots expressed the desire to be able to distinguish aircraft and vehicles in the traffic 
presentation, cf. Chapter 7. In fact, information on the nature of traffic might be help-
ful or even essential for establishing a visual correspondence or predicting its future 
behaviour. Likewise, for the same reasons, it seems that aircraft moving under their 
own power and aircraft being towed or pushed should be discernible. Consequently, 
a dedicated symbology for vehicles was developed. 
                                                 
80  This combination of conditions takes into account that airports are not fully planar and also filters erroneous 
altimeter settings/readings for ground traffic. 
81  Neither ACAS nor ADS-B data contain radio altitude, but the altitude above the airport can be determined 
using barometric altitude (from ACAS or ADS-B traffic data) and the runway threshold or Aerodrome Refer-
ence Point (ARP) elevation stored in the AMDB. Since there is no logic to determine whether aircraft are land-
ing or taking off, all airborne traffic up to 1,000 ft above the airport is always shown by default. 
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Figure 41: Symbol alternatives to present vehicles and aircraft during pushback/tow 
 
Since circle and square are already in use for ACAS alerts, the number of geometric 
primitives left to choose from is very limited. To represent vehicles, it was therefore 
conceived to use either a hexagonal or triangular omni-directional symbol, fitting 
inside the default ACAS symbol (see Figure 41 a and b). To limit complexity, it was 
decided not to use a directional symbol for an implicit presentation of heading or 
track, because this would have an additional second vehicle symbol for traffic with-
out valid heading/track, as for the aircraft case. 
The main issue in this context, however, is the representation of aircraft-vehicle com-
binations that occur during pushback or while aircraft are under tow. The trivial so-
lution, shown in Figure 41 c & d, consists of presenting both aircraft and vehicle 
symbols, with drawing priority assigned to aircraft. When both tug and aircraft are 
ADS-B equipped, this is the ‘natural’ picture resulting during pushback or tow, with 
relative position and overlap between symbols determined largely by the positional 
accuracy of the navigation solution used. In the worst case, the vehicle might either 
be fully covered by the aircraft symbol, or displayed separately next to the aircraft. 
For aircraft being towed, the main issue is an appropriate procedure to ensure that 
ADS-B out is activated during tow; otherwise, only the vehicle symbol would be 
shown. 
 
There are two issues with the symbol combination shown in Figure 41 c & d. First of 
all, the overlapping symbols might be perceived as clutter. Secondly, the combina-
tion of two omni-directional symbols as shown in Figure 41 d may provide false di-
rectional cues. In view of these issues, it is worthwhile to consider a more abstract 
representation of aircraft being pushed back or under tow. In Figure 41 e/f, the stan-
dard aircraft symbols are supplemented by a simple black dot centred around the 
position reference of the symbol to indicate that they are being moved by a tug. 
 
Technically, this latter solution would necessitate an extension of the current ADS-B 
surface position message by a status flag indicating that an aircraft is being pushed 
back or towed. Apart from a means of activating this flag aboard the aircraft, this 
approach would also require that the ADS-B out transmission of the tug is inhibited 
in parallel. Consider the following scenario for illustration: As soon as an aircraft tug 
is connected to an aircraft by the push bar, the tug’s own ADS-B transmission will be 
inhibited. At the same time, the status flag in the ADS-B transmission of the aircraft 
would change to ‘pushback’, causing its symbol to change to the representation 
shown in Figure 41 e/f on the CDTIs of other aircraft, whereas the tug symbol would 
vanish. For aircraft under tow, the same solution can be realised. However, this 
might result in the potential inconvenience that the callsign of the tow combination 
would have to be entered into the aircraft’s FMS, and the aircraft would have to be 
towed with ADS-B out activated.  
a b c d e f 
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Nevertheless, the precise technical realisation of this ADS-B out inhibition and status 
change mentioned above is clearly beyond the scope of this work. In the simplest 
case, it could be achieved by procedurally operated manual switches82, but a more 
automated solution can be envisaged as well. As an example, the suppression of ve-
hicle ADS-B signals and the status change of the message aboard the aircraft might 
be mechanised by sensors in the landing gear of the aircraft and the tow bar connec-
tor of the tug. 
 
Since neither the traffic surveillance equipment used in the Prague trials nor the traf-
fic simulation used in the simulator provided a possibility to distinguish or include, 
respectively, vehicle traffic, the dedicated vehicle symbol could not prototyped or 
assessed. However, this section has identified some of the key issues that need to be 
taken into account for a further investigation of this matter. 
 
5.2.3 Traffic Identification & Labelling 
ADS-B and TIS-B messages contain additional traffic parameters beyond those re-
quired for a mere visualisation, such as traffic identification, cf. Section 3.2.2. Since 
availability of data is decidedly not a criterion for its visualisation, this section is 
dedicated to an analysis of the operational requirements regarding traffic identifica-
tion and required additional information. 
 
According to DO-243, further desirable features in addition to the mandatory ele-
ments of the traffic symbol include 
 
 an alpha-numerical indication of the callsign (up to 7 characters), 
 an alpha-numerical (up to 3 digits) or graphical depiction of ground speed, 
 a graphical visualisation of the predicted ground track, 
 an alpha-numerical presentation of the closure rate (up to 4 characters), 
 an indication of a vertical rate exceeding a certain pre-defined threshold, and 
 the visualisation of pertinent traffic alerts. 
 
Additionally, the flight crew should be able to select aircraft targets on the CDTI in 
an intuitive fashion; selected targets should then be highlighted, e.g. by boxing or 
circling the corresponding symbol [RTC98]. 
 
As traffic identification information beyond the ICAO 24-bit Mode S address, ADS-B 
and TIS-B messages contain the flight plan callsign, where available. In view of the 
guidance material above, it seems at first glance appropriate to display this callsign 
in conjunction with the traffic symbol. However, in contrast to controllers, pilots are 
currently not formally trained to interpret the three-letter airline codes used in this 
callsign, which may be different from the radio callsign used in R/T transmissions. 
As an example, British Airways Flight 123 will appear on controller screens and in 
ADS-B/TIS-B messages as “BAW123”, but be addressed as “Speedbird 123” by air 
traffic control. Furthermore, if other aircrews use either of these callsigns in R/T 
                                                 
82  Since the nosewheel steering is typically de-selected prior to pushback, the position of the switch might be a 
candidate to trigger the transmission of ‘pushback’ status aboard the aircraft. 
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transmissions, this might create confusion with current procedures. Last but not 
least, this introduction of ATM information on the flight deck could even provide an 
undesirable distraction, particularly if pilots attempt to look up exotic three-letter-
codes or inquire with ATC. 
In many cases, though, the correlation between the flight plan callsign and the radio 
callsign is either straightforward, common knowledge or at least easily deducible. In 
principle, it is therefore considered useful to have provisions to display the flight 
plan call sign as label for traffic identification, because it might provide pilots with 
additional cues to establish a correspondence between traffic shown on the display 
and traffic acquired visually, which may add to the awareness on the intent of other 
aircraft gained from the so-called ‘party line effect’ in a radiotelephony environment. 
 
Nonetheless, particularly at the hub airports of certain airlines, where many flights 
consequently have flight plan callsigns with the same airline prefix, other informa-
tion may additionally be required to achieve this correlation between display and 
outside world. Labels could be supplemented by information that can be confirmed 
visually, i.e. the aircraft type – which can usually be deduced from the silhouettes 
even at large distance – and aircraft registration, which is visually accessible at least 
over short distances. 
 
However, in view of the multitude of additional information already presented adja-
cent to the symbol of DHL406 in Figure 40, it becomes evident that, contrary to the 
recommendations of DO-243 [RTC98], it is most likely not desirable to add alpha-
numerical closure rate, ground speed, ground track or aircraft type information by 
default. Rather, if the flight crew can select individual traffic targets on the display, 
using e.g. a Cursor Control Device (CCD), this additional information on other traffic 
could be displayed on explicit pilot request. Unfortunately, the CDTI implementation 
used for this thesis lacked such interactivity. After prototyping, it was therefore de-
cided to limit the default traffic label to the callsign, because the basic question re-
lated to traffic labelling was more the general necessity than the precise content. 
 
5.2.4 Control of Displayed Traffic 
As outlined in Section 5.2.1.3, the flight crew must at minimum be provided with 
controls to select and de-select the presentation of traffic on the airport moving map. 
For the experiments concerning the CDTI, the Institute’s flight simulator was there-
fore fitted with buttons on the overhead touchscreen that allowed a separate activa-
tion of the traffic display on the NDs of captain and first officer. Additionally, there 
was a second button for each crew member to select and de-select the display of traf-
fic labels. Irrespective of these settings, however, conflicting traffic causing a Level 1 
alert or higher was always displayed. 
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5.3 Operational Awareness Function (OAF) 
 
Awareness of the operational status and configuration of an airport and its installa-
tions is crucial for safe and efficient surface movement operations, as identified by 
High-Level Requirement III. In particular, it is essential that the crew is aware of the 
runways in use and potential runway closures or restrictions; this information must 
be brought to the attention of flight crews in a suitable form. 
 
Consequently, the goal of the Operational Awareness Function (OAF) is to aid the 
flight crew in creating an adequate mental picture of the airport including all short-
term changes and other operationally relevant information. With just textual infor-
mation available in sources such NOTAM and D-ATIS, the crew has to merge this 
information with their mental picture of the airport. Based on the considerations in 
Section 4.3.3, it is presumed that pilots can be greatly aided in this process by a corre-
sponding representation on the flight deck, which is achieved by pre-processing and 
combining this information with the airport moving map, thus answering to High-
Level Requirement III. Due to the lack of existing research and guidance material in 
this field, the entire functionality has to be studied from scratch. 
 
The OAF is therefore expected to re-
duce the risk of error and confusion as 
well as pilot workload, because the 
crew does not have to look for infor-
mation in various places to build a 
mental model of the situation any 
more. In terms of flight safety, this 
particularly addresses take-off and 
landing operations on closed or oth-
erwise unsuitable runways. 
 
Since attentional resources are limited, 
this is believed to be particularly im-
portant for airports that the crew is not 
very familiar with, i.e. airports they 
visit only once every few months83, 
where they have to devote a larger 
share of their attention to orientation 
and navigation. Significant benefits are also expected if the crew has to deviate to one 
of the alternate airports, for which they have most likely not memorized NOTAM 
information for the reasons above. While there will be usually some time left to ac-
cess and review the relevant material for an en-route or destination alternate, de-
pending on the nature of the events triggering the deviation, this will hardly be the 
case for a take-off alternate. 
                                                 
83 Crews usually operate less than 50% of the time at their home base. Depending on the type of operation and 
the particular scheduling policies of airlines, this might drop to values as low as 10%. Besides, even pilots’ 
home bases are subject to change, mainly due to construction work for airport extensions, maintenance or im-
provement. 
 
Figure 42: Airport moving map with represen-
tation of closed runway 
5.3   OPERATIONAL AWARENESS FUNCTION (OAF) 
  165 
5.3.1 Concept & Research Issues 
From the analysis of incidents and accidents in Section 2.2, it is evident that runway 
closures and restrictions are the most significant short-term and temporary changes 
from a safety perspective. Consequently, in line with High-Level Requirement III, it 
is essential that the crew is aware of these. In other words, a visualisation of runway 
closures and restrictions on the airport moving map provides information on the 
runways not to be used and limitations to be taken into account.  
However, from a Runway Incursion prevention perspective, this raises the question 
whether it might not be equally important to supply the flight crew with positive 
confirmation of the runways available or assigned for take-off and landing. As e.g. 
the Taipei Singapore Airlines SQ006 (see Appendix I-6) and Lexington Comair (see 
Appendix I-12) accidents show, there is a non-negligible risk of confusing runways. 
It must therefore be studied whether presenting information on active runways and a 
reminder of the runway envisaged for ownship use can provide additional support 
in preventing disorientation or erroneous runway choices. Consequently, to address 
the above issues, the visualisation of the following additional information on the air-
port moving map was therefore analysed, conceived and evaluated by this thesis: 
 
 Indication of the take-off or landing runway selected in the FMS (Section 5.3.2) 
 Presentation of active runway information (Section 5.3.3) 
 Display of short-term and temporary changes, NOTAM (Section 5.3.4) 
 
Regarding the visualisation of short-term and temporary changes on an AMM, a 
limitation to runway-related NOTAMs may seem a good starting point, but in view 
of the discussion in Section 4.3.3, it is clearly not desirable to retain paper-based NO-
TAMs for the remainder of the airport in the long run. As a result, the prerequisites 
for an onboard visualisation of short-term or temporary information must be studied 
from a broader perspective to enable a holistic overall concept for a simultaneous 
representation of NOTAM and aerodrome mapping information. This is one of the 
key research issues, and addressed in Section 5.3.4. Another fundamental aspect is 
how a sufficiently modular data handling and operational concept enabling both 
NOTAM upload on the ground (as part of routine flight preparation) and in-flight 
updates can be realised, see Section 5.3.5. 
Eventually, the prototypic OAF encompassed provisions to supply the flight crew 
with information on the FMS-selected runway, the runways in use, closed runways, 
closed taxiways, and restrictions of either runways or taxiways in an integrated fash-
ion. While there is more information on the operational environment that might be 
relevant for presentation on the flight deck, the limitation of the initial OAF imple-
mentation to the items above was deemed sufficient for assessing the concept. 
Additionally, however, displaying information of meteorological nature, such as 
RVR or runway braking action, and derived information on whether LVP are in use, 
could be envisaged. Concerning the RVR, which may be different for individual 
runway segments, one of the main challenges is how the corresponding values can 
be linked intuitively to the runway segments they relate to. Likewise, for the braking 
action, there is a similar issue, and it should be analysed whether the corresponding 
ECAM (or EICAS) pages of the braking system are potentially a more appropriate 
location to display this information than the airport moving map. 
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5.3.2 FMS-selected Runway Representation 
5.3.2.1 Operational background & relevance 
In current generation Flight Management Systems (FMS), flight crews define take-off 
and landing runways as part of the FMS flight plan, and may then select Standard 
Instrument Departures (SID) or Standard Arrival Routes (STAR) for the respective 
runways. All take-off performance calculations,  including configuration used, en-
gine ratings applied, the speeds V1, VR, V2, initial departure speed, are also made for 
the specific runway chosen. 
 
The FMS-selected runways are, in virtually all cases, the runways actually used for 
take-off and landing. If runway changes occur prior to take-off, it is mandatory to 
update take-off performance calculations for the new runway, and therefore aircraft 
should never take off from a runway other than the one selected in the FMS. Like-
wise, the departure procedure should also be adapted to prevent unexpected autopi-
lot commands after take-off, when the FMS tries to align the aircraft with the origi-
nally planned departure route. For the landing runway, the situation is completely 
different. Sometimes, there are last minute runway changes during approach on such 
short notice that changing the FMS data is not possible or procedurally allowed any 
more. Another example is the so-called sidestep manoeuvre, in which the pilot uses 
the Navaids of the FMS-selected runway (e.g. an ILS) for the initial approach before 
side-stepping, after transition to the visual segment, to land on a parallel runway, e.g. 
if ATC assigns the other runway for operational reasons (traffic still on the runway, 
Navaids unserviceable, …), or in case the parallel runway is a non-precision runway. 
On Airbus aircraft, an oriented white runway outline is presented on the ND in con-
junction with the FMS flight plan as the sole airport element, provided that a runway 
has been specified in the flight plan. If the selected range is 10, 20 or 40 NM, the FMS-
selected runway is drawn to scale in terms of paved length84 [Air05]. 
 
5.3.2.2 Rationale 
Since an EFIS-integrated airport moving map should not provide less information 
than a conventional ND, a representation of the FMS-selected runway on the airport 
moving map could solely be motivated from an ND integration and consistency per-
spective. 
Nevertheless, a visualisation of this information as the basic stand-alone element of 
the OAF was chosen for an entirely different reason. Particularly when taxiing out 
for take-off, this feature is intended to provide the crew with an intuitive, positive 
confirmation of the runway to be used for take-off. This is envisaged to prevent in-
advertent runway entries or transgressions beyond basic disorientation, which 
should already be addressed by the AMM. In short, this feature is presumed to pro-
vide protection against erroneous runway operations, including also line-up, take-off 
and landing, whenever the reasons for runway confusion are more subtle. 
                                                 
84 Generally, the runway representation is supplemented with the airport’s ICAO identifier and the runway 
name, also in white. If no runway is selected, the airport is represented by a white star, and only the ICAO 
identifier is displayed. If the ARPT pushbutton is pressed on the EFIS control panel, all airports in the database 
that are not part of the flight plan are displayed as magenta stars along with their ICAO identifiers [Air05]. 
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Besides, displaying the FMS-selected runway is expected to enable improved situ-
ational awareness especially in the absence of a simultaneous taxi route presentation 
on the airport moving map. In this situation, it should help the flight crew to detect 
inconsistencies between FMS settings and actual operation; this also applies to final 
approach and landing. 
 
At Taipei Chiang Kai-Shek International Airport in October 2000, with Runway 05L 
correctly set in the FMS and displayed on an airport moving map, the crew of SQ006 
might potentially have noticed an inconsistency when entering Runway 05R, which 
could then have led them to re-confirm the situation with ATC. Likewise, the Comair 
Flight 5191 crew at Lexington might also have had a chance to notice that they were 
at the threshold of RWY 26 instead of RWY 22. Consequently, the perhaps most im-
portant justification for the presentation of the FMS-selected runway is that it might 
enable pro-active error detection by the flight crew. It seems that the only other pos-
sibility of preventing take-off or landing on a wrong and potentially unsuitable run-
way consists of alerts if the flight crew commences take-off from or approaches a 
runway not selected in the FMS (see Section 5.5). 
 
5.3.2.3 Prototypic realisation 
5.3.2.3.1 Symbology 
For reasons of consistency, the highlighted runway outline as indication of the FMS-
selected runway on the airport moving map was adapted from the standard ND. As 
additional benefit, this solution does not interfere with the displayed runway mark-
ings or any other airport moving map elements, i.e. it does not cover them or reduce 
their conspicuousness. It is also compatible with using a change of the runway sur-
face colour for runway-related alerts (see Section 5.5). With this choice of symbology 
made, the main remaining issue is colour. 
 
5.3.2.3.2 Initial colour concept 
Due to its brightness, white is generally a good choice to highlight information on 
electronic displays. However, since the colour white is already widely used on the 
industrial airport moving map prototype shown in Figure 43, the initial hypothesis 
was that retaining a white outline for the FMS-selected runway by might not be con-
spicuous enough. 
Furthermore, on Airbus aircraft, magenta is the colour typically associated with dis-
playing values calculated by or stored in the FMS. All navigation data, such as air-
ports, waypoints and navigational aids are consequently displayed in magenta on 
the ND. Therefore, the FMS-selected runway was visualized by adding a magenta 
outline to the corresponding basic runway representation in the first implementation 
of the feature. Only for ranges larger than 1 NM, the entire runway was coloured in 
magenta, because it was initially anticipated that solely presenting the outline would 
not be conspicuous enough. However, since this does not (yet) specify a unique run-
way, the threshold label indicating the magnetic runway heading (QFU) as runway 
identifier was coloured in magenta as well. 
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Figure 43: Initial FMS-selected runway representation evaluated in the EMMA project 
 
Figure 43 shows this initial solution, which was also implemented in a prototypic 
Airbus airport moving map display, called ‘Taxi Driver System’ (TDS), in the frame-
work of the European research project EMMA. This HMI was used during the field 
trials with the Navigation Test Vehicle at Frankfurt and Prague airport described in 
Chapter 7. On the left side, the solution for ranges of 1 NM and larger with the whole 
runway surface coloured in magenta is shown. For ranges of 0.5 NM and less (right 
side), the FMS-selected runway is indicated by a magenta outline. The runway iden-
tifier, visible only in the left screenshot, is generally displayed at all ranges, but may 
be cropped due to the particular range and mode settings made by the flight crew. 
 
With a magenta instead of a white runway outline, there is a minor consistency issue 
concerning the transition from the display ranges typically used for the airport mov-
ing map to the ranges associated with the ‘airborne’ modes of the ND, i.e. 10 NM and 
larger. The colour of the FMS-selected runway would have to be changed to magenta 
in these ranges as well to avoid a sudden unmotivated colour change. Besides, to 
maintain the distinction between airports which are part of the FMS flight plan and 
other airports, the white ICAO identifier for airports in the FMS flight plan would 
have to be retained, resulting in a magenta runway with a white label. 
 
5.3.2.3.3 Revised colour concept 
The initial evaluation of the FMS-selected runway presentation described in Chapter 
7 revealed that although magenta was found to be compatible with the overall cock-
pit colour philosophy (cf. Figure 121), several of the participants recommended to 
study an alternative colour coding. Furthermore, in the subsequent preparation for 
the second evaluation campaign (see Chapter 8), several of the pilots involved in 
HMI design reviews and prototyping sessions voiced concerns about magenta, be-
cause they feared it could be confused with red too easily. Additionally, there are a 
number of special cases that need to be taken into account where a single colour, and 
particularly magenta, fails. 
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Figure 44: Comparison of magenta (left) and white (right) FMS-selected runway outline for 
LAHSO operations 
 
The first special case to be considered are LAHSO operations, cf. Section 2.1.2. When 
LAHSO operations are in force, landing aircraft have only a reduced landing dis-
tance from the corresponding threshold to a pre-defined LAHSO location available, 
which is typically located in front of an intersecting runway. LAHSO locations, 
which are established permanently, are contained in the AMDB [RTC01, RTC05]. The 
fact that LAHSO operations are in force is typically conveyed together with active 
runway information. In certain countries, airlines and flight crews must be specially 
certified to perform LAHSO operations. Thus, runway length limitations imposed by 
LAHSO operations must be considered individual rather than general limitations. 
 
In case of LAHSO operations, highlighting the complete runway outline might give 
the crews misleading visual cues about the available runway length, since the 
LAHSO location and thus the intersecting runway must not be crossed in this situa-
tion. Furthermore, with the full outline, there might be insufficient emphasis on the 
hold-short location. Consequently, if LAHSO operations are effective, the FMS-
selected runway presentation on the airport moving map should be limited to the 
part from the runway threshold to the LAHSO location. Since the LAHSO location 
itself represents a clearance limit rather than a physical restriction, it is visualized as 
a red line across the runway to emphasize the clearance limit, in accordance with the 
principles derived in Section 5.4. 
 
A comparison of the two options presented in Figure 44 immediately explains why 
magenta is not a suitable colour choice for the runway outline in this case: the red 
LAHSO location and the magenta outline are virtually indiscriminable. By contrast, a 
white outline provides sufficient contrast. Consequently, in the LAHSO case, the 
FMS-selected runway is probably best represented by three white lines and one red 
line (the LAHSO location). The second special case rendering white the better choice 
of colour concerns the physical runway length restrictions addressed in Section 
5.3.4.3 on ‘Symbology for runway status, closures and restrictions’ below. 
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If the available runway length is 
reduced compared to the original 
value stored in the FMS or AMDB 
database or otherwise restricted, 
the FMS-selected runway is dis-
played by a yellow outline to at-
tract the crews attention to the 
limitation. The change from white 
to yellow is consistent with com-
mon flight deck colour usage, 
whereas a suitable change from 
magenta still remains to be found. 
In conclusion, therefore, the colour 
of the FMS-selected runway was 
changed to white for the second 
evaluation campaign on the Re-
search Flight Simulator described 
in Chapter 8. As the airport mov-
ing map of Cleveland-Hopkins 
International Airport (KLCE) in 
Figure 45 shows, the FMS-selected runway is also automatically displayed as active 
runway by dimming the runway label of the threshold not in use; a detailed descrip-
tion of this feature is provided in Section 5.3.3. 
 
5.3.2.4 Safety considerations 
This section discusses the impact of erroneous runway selections in the FMS on the 
FMS-selected runway visualisation and potentially associated safety issues. First of 
all, it should be noted that erroneously entering a wrong departure or landing run-
way in the FMS is a risk that already exists today. Secondly, the proposed visualisa-
tion of the FMS-selected runway on the airport moving map merely represents a 
crew selection and does not, neither explicitly or implicitly, endorse operations on 
the corresponding runway in any way. Consequently, as a mere reminder of crew 
settings, the FMS-selected runway information displayed can never become invalid. 
As a result, the additional visualisation does not worsen the situation in case of an 
erroneous selection. On the contrary, an explicit representation of the FMS-selected 
runway on the airport moving map display might actually help the crew to notice the 
inevitable inconsistencies with ATC instructions when an incorrect runway has been 
entered in the FMS, even in the absence of a simultaneous visualisation of the up-
linked taxi route. With a conventional ND, noting these inconsistencies requires far 
more subtle observation. At a system level, SMAAS can only detect inconsistencies or 
crew errors in setting runways in the FMS if there are other independent sources 
such as clearances via data link, D-ATIS or NOTAM information available for cross-
check. As an example, if active runway information is available via D-ATIS, potential 
inconsistencies between the active runway and the crew selection in the FMS can be 
addressed by a warning message on the ECAM and/or the MCDU (see Section 5.5). 
 
Figure 45: Symbology for FMS-selected runway 
visualisation as evaluated on the flight simulator 
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5.3.3 Runways in Use (Active Runways) 
5.3.3.1 Operational background & relevance 
Most runways feature two opposite thresholds85, of which only one may become 
runway-in-use at a time, depending on the prevailing conditions, cf. Section 2.1.1. 
Moreover, not all runways may be simultaneously in use, particularly for aerodrome 
configurations with intersecting runways. 
 
Active runway information is included in ATIS broadcasts (voice or digital), because 
it is essential from an operational perspective that flight crews are aware of the run-
ways-in-use. For decision-making and preparations, such as the take-off or approach 
briefing, pilots need to know the take-off or landing procedures to be expected, in-
cluding specific operational procedures such as LAHSO. A visualisation of active 
runways is also important to understand the prevailing traffic patterns, and enables 
the fine-grain distinction between runways not actively used for take-off/landing 
and temporarily closed runways (see Section 5.3.4). 
 
Last but not least, especially in the United States, it is essential to know the active 
runways to interpret taxi clearances correctly: in contrast to active runways, all run-
ways that are presently not used for take-off or landing may still be crossed without 
explicit ATC approval (cf. 14 CFR §91.129) [FAR07], although the NTSB has recently 
recommended a change to this procedure as a result of the Comair accident [NTS07]. 
 
5.3.3.2 Rationale 
A visualisation of the runways in use, or active runways, in conjunction with the air-
port moving map has already been proposed as an exemplary application of AMDBs 
by ED-99 [RTC01]. Furthermore, the necessity of displaying active runways in this 
manner has been acknowledged by previous research projects, cf. [RM01, Ver05]. 
Presenting active runways is envisaged to increase flight crew situational awareness 
with respect to the current aerodrome operational configuration in an intuitive man-
ner. A potential benefit expected is a reduced likelihood of misreading D-ATIS text 
or misunderstanding the recorded ATIS issued via radio. Besides, since the 
download of D-ATIS information could be performed automatically at certain inter-
vals without crew interaction, this might ensure that the crew always has access to 
the most recent ATIS data, and can additionally be notified of significant operational 
changes immediately. This is also believed to prevent erroneous crossing of active 
runways and take-off or landing attempts in the wrong direction – a risk considered 
non-negligible, especially in case the operating direction is changed on short notice. 
 
5.3.3.3 Prototypic realisation 
The previous research projects mentioned above have also conceived proposals for a 
human-machine interface, which are briefly surveyed and analysed below. 
                                                 
85 RWY 18 at Frankfurt Airport (EDDF) is a famous counter-example of a runway with only one threshold. 
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5.3.3.3.1 Survey of previous active runway visualisations 
  
Figure 46: Active runway representation in 
ISAWARE [RM01] 
Figure 47: Taxi route & active runway visu-
alisation in VICTORIA/ISAWARE II [Ver05] 
 
Figure 46 shows the active runway representation chosen for the European research 
project ISAWARE. On the display, the runway centreline marking is replaced by 
equidistant yellow arrows, and the runway outline is highlighted in yellow as well 
[RM01]. However, an issue with this representation is that this type of marking has, 
according to ICAO Annex 14, already an entirely different and contrary meaning: 
white arrows instead of the normal centreline markings are used to indicate a dis-
placed runway threshold [ICA04b]. Despite the fact that the ISAWARE symbology 
uses yellow instead of white, it might give pilots the hazardously misleading impres-
sion that the threshold is displaced and still ahead of them. This risk is particularly 
high if the symbology is applied without any other runway markings, as shown in 
the figure, or when only part of the runway is visible on the airport moving map dur-
ing landing. Apart from this, when superposed over the normal runway markings, 
the ISAWARE symbology will most likely lead to display clutter. Last but not least, 
the exclusive use of yellow, a colour associated with taxiway markings, has to be 
criticised. 
The European research projects VICTORIA and ISAWARE II used an alternate active 
runway representation with the arrows reduced to chevrons, cf. [Ver05]. Depending 
on the clearance, these chevrons would be either displayed in amber (no take-off 
clearance yet) or green (clearance available). Again, the problem is that chevrons al-
ready have a different meaning when employed as runway markings. According to 
ICAO Annex 14, any paved surface before a runway threshold longer than 60 m and 
not suitable for normal use by aircraft should be marked with chevrons of a con-
spicuous colour, preferably in yellow [ICA04b]. In view of this international standard 
and the fact that the colours amber and yellow are easily confused, particularly in 
difficult lighting conditions, cf. [SAE88], the VICTORIA/ISAWARE II solution has to 
be rejected as well. Of course, the way these chevrons are applied also raises the 
same issues regarding misleading information, compatibility with existing markings 
and display clutter as the ISAWARE solution (see Figure 47). 
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5.3.3.3.2 Development of active runway symbology 
Developing an appropriate active runway symbology for this thesis proved to be dif-
ficult for two reasons. First of all, both arrows and chevrons along the runway centre-
line are already used as airport markings with entirely different meanings, as dis-
cussed in the previous subsection. Secondly, adding arrows as additional elements in 
any other fashion is prone to cause display clutter, and can also be ruled out as ap-
propriate symbology. This causes the dilemma of having to indicate a direction 
without the universal symbol of directionality, the arrow. 
 
 
Figure 48: Schematic standard runway representation with indication of active runway 
In a first approach, the chevron solution was revisited and adapted. It was assumed 
that the problem of symbol misinterpretation discussed above is limited to situations 
where the chevrons are the only runway markings displayed. Consequently, it was 
expected that using equidistant chevrons as additional layer below all other runway 
markings, i.e. with less priority, would eliminate the risk of confusion with unusable 
runway areas. Furthermore, to reduce the visual dominance of the chevrons com-
pared to the VICTORIA/ISAWARE II solution, i.e. to make them less intrusive, they 
were drawn in a shade of grey slightly lighter, but nonetheless close to that of the 
runway surface. Figure 48 as schematically illustrates this approach. In all ranges 
below 5 NM, chevrons were displayed in a fashion such that the on-screen distance 
appeared equal in all ranges. With increasing display range, the distance between 
chevrons became larger, i.e. there seemed to be fewer chevrons at larger ranges. For 5 
NM and beyond, nothing was displayed for reasons of display clutter. To visually 
reinforce this chevron-based active runway indication, the labels of the thresholds 
not active were dimmed by representing them in grey instead of black and white. 
 
A clear benefit of this modified chevron solution is that it is visible when only part of 
the runway is in view. Additionally, both colour and priority of the chevrons can be 
changed, e.g. to inform the crew that they are approaching the runway opposite to 
the active direction, either on ground or in the air, or that a take-off clearance has 
been given. In a design reviews and prototyping with pilots, however, this HMI pro-
posal was nonetheless rejected for potential confusion with unusable pavement (see 
above) and a tendency to clutter the display. Thus, both the ISAWARE, the 
VICTORIA/ISAWARE II solution and the dimmed chevron approach had to be 
abandoned for a lack of compatibility with existing runway markings, aggravated by 
display clutter concerns. 
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Symbol Directionality De-Clutter Compatibility Conspicuousness Conclusion 
Arrow + - – + reject 
Chevron + - – + reject 
Dimmed Chevron + o - + reject 
Runway Label o + + o assess 
Table 7: Comparative rating of symbology alternatives for active runway representation 
Advantages and disadvantages of the different symbology variants are summarized 
in Table 7. Although it is only of average conspicuousness and not very strong in in-
dicating directionality, only the dimmed runway label concept remains, because all 
other variants do not comply with the essential compatibility criterion. 
 
Eventually, therefore, a design exclusively based on the dimmed label, which is used 
in all ranges and modes, was down-selected for simulator evaluation, as illustrated 
by Figure 49. Whenever information on 
active runways is available, the label of 
any non-active QFU is dimmed. In the 
exemplary AMM screenshot of Newark 
Liberty International Airport (KEWR) 
in the USA shown in the figure, RWY 
11 and RWY 04L are active. 
Figure 49 also anticipates the use of the 
dimmed label concept in the visualisa-
tion of closed runways discussed in the 
following section. If a runway is closed, 
it can obviously not be active, and thus 
both runway labels are presented in a 
dimmed state to reinforce the presenta-
tion of the closed runway. 
An expected major advantage of this 
representation compared to solutions 
requiring additional symbology is that 
it intrinsically indicates the availability of information, instead of potentially creating 
confusion in those cases where the display of this information fails, e.g. because the 
underlying information is not available. 
If no active runway information is available, both QFU labels will retain their normal 
representation, and the flight crew can, at least in principle, determine that informa-
tion is unavailable. By contrast, if additional symbology is employed as with the re-
jected alternatives, it may not immediately obvious to the pilots whether information 
is missing or whether a runway is actually not active, which will consequently neces-
sitates an additional indication of information status elsewhere on the flight deck. 
The only apparent drawback of using the runway labels for an indication of active 
runways is that the label is not visible in all range/mode combinations. Nevertheless, 
the crew is always free to choose an appropriate range or mode to access this infor-
mation when needed. Furthermore, for the FMS-selected runway, which always in-
dicates the QFU chosen in the same fashion, a consistency check with active runway 
data, where available, could ensure that the runway chosen is in fact active. This is 
realised in the frame of Surface Movement Alerting (see Section 5.5). 
 
Figure 49: Active runway representation via 
dimmed runway labels 
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5.3.4 Representation of Short-term and Temporary Changes 
5.3.4.1 Prerequisites for an integral NOTAM visualisation 
5.3.4.1.1 Availability of machine-readable NOTAM data 
To enable an integral visualisation of NOTAM and other relevant temporary data on 
an airport moving map, the corresponding data must be provided to the aircraft sys-
tems. However, making the manual entry of this data a routine crew task would con-
stitute an additional step in flight preparation, and thus most probably raise work-
load in a phase already crammed with activity. Since a shift of the dispatcher role to 
the flight deck is neither intended nor desirable, any manual NOTAM entry would 
start from a conventional PIB, resulting in a highly mechanized task under time pres-
sure86, which must therefore also be regarded as a potential source of error. Further-
more, making manual entries during flight preparation is likely to have an adverse 
impact on turnaround times, since it requires the aircraft to be at the gate or parking 
position. Consequently, it is essential that NOTAM data are made available onboard 
in a machine-readable format via data loading or data link, thus enabling the auto-
matic display of this information without routine crew interaction. 
An integrated NOTAM presentation on a flight guidance display, however, has a 
totally different quality than a paper printout, even if it originates from an aircraft 
system (such as METAR or D-ATIS printouts) with significant impact on the data 
quality and integrity requirements. As discussed in Section 4.3.3, this insight leads to 
the conclusion that the crucial step towards a combined representation of airport 
moving map and NOTAM, including other relevant short-term or temporary infor-
mation, is the integration of the underlying data through an adequate handling and 
operational concept. Today, airlines as the end-users are ultimately responsible for 
ensuring that the databases carried aboard their aircraft meet the quality require-
ments of the intended applications. In most cases, airlines meet this responsibility by 
obtaining databases from an accredited supplier. Consequently, the key issue associ-
ated with displaying airport-related NOTAM data integrated with the airport mov-
ing map is the availability of the required data in a machine-readable format with 
sufficient integrity. Since the data do not only serve as a basis for a display of infor-
mation on flight deck displays, but also as input for an alerting system, any errone-
ous information might have severe consequences. Therefore, the accuracy, integrity 
and traceability of these data must be ensured at all times. In particular, this means 
that the corresponding data will have to fulfil at least the basic criteria for aeronauti-
cal data processing and quality management set forth in DO-200A. 
 
In line with the considerations in Section 4.3.3, the initial focus is clearly on dispatch-
ing aircraft with all NOTAM contained in the conventional PIB also available to the 
avionics. Subsequently, the necessity of periodic or event-driven in-flight updates 
has to be evaluated. Consequently, the data handling and operational concept has to 
be scalable and extensible, from supporting initial, basic implementations at individ-
                                                 
86  One could argue that, in principle, a manual entry of NOTAM data through an adequate interface would force 
the crew to a detailed review PIB information and might thus have a positive impact on situational awareness 
and the accuracy of their mental model of the airport. However, the time pressure/mechanization issue may 
potentially annihilate this effect. Besides, a well-designed airport briefing procedure can achieve the same. 
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ual airlines or their sub-fleets to a future Aeronautical Information Services (AIS) en-
vironment supporting real-time in-flight updates via avionics data link. In this con-
text, the variety in the time horizon of the required data due to their short-term and 
temporary character constitutes a major challenge. 
 
5.3.4.1.2 Possibility of crew interaction with NOTAM data 
Even in case the NOTAM data is provided via data link and updated during the 
flight when required, weather, incidents/accidents or other operational demands 
might necessitate short-term changes at a tactical level, thus eluding coverage by 
NOTAM or related means. Consequently, the short-term and temporary character of 
NOTAM data will most probably require a possibility to review, enter or amend the 
corresponding information on the flight deck – where necessary – as a back-up. 
As an example, a runway closed for maintenance work might be temporarily re-
opened for take-off or landing of a large widebody aircraft, provided that the main-
tenance work can easily be discontinued (e.g. if only light bulbs of the lighting sys-
tem are changed). Likewise, a runway that is, according to a NOTAM, closed daily 
from 11:30 p.m. to 6:30 a.m. over a certain period, might become available again at 
5:50 a.m. on one particular day, and ATC could ask a crew to use it. The correspond-
ing NOTAM would obviously not be impacted in their overall validity by these indi-
vidual exceptions. 
Due to the compelling nature of the airport moving map display, however, particu-
larly the display of incorrect runway closure or restriction information is believed to 
be unacceptable from a human factors perspective, because it is likely to confuse the 
flight crew. This becomes an even more important concern if machine-readable 
NOTAM data is simultaneously used to generate safety-net type alerts, e.g. if the 
flight crew attempts to take off from a runway closed for take-off and landing, as in 
the frame of Surface Movement Alerting (see Section 5.5), because both missed and 
false alerts constitute a certification issue. 
Consequently, the necessity of providing flight crews with a possibility to interact 
with NOTAM information must be evaluated. This includes means of cancelling in-
dividual NOTAM and entering new or updated information, especially on runway 
status. Since the instances where such manual crew entries would be required are 
isolated events rather than routine, the previously stated concerns (workload, possi-
bility of error) might be addressed at a similar level as e.g. the entry of additional 
waypoints into the Flight Management System (FMS) due to a flight plan change. 
 
5.3.4.1.3 Adequate, intuitive symbology and presentation concept 
An integral representation of NOTAM and other operationally relevant short-term or 
temporary information on an airport moving map depends on an adequate, intuitive 
symbology set and presentation concept. The number of distinct new symbols for 
NOTAM visualisation should be kept at an absolute minimum, because a symbology 
set with the extent of a hieroglyphic alphabet does not appear to be desirable for us-
ability, crew training and proficiency reasons. Additionally, the content of some 
NOTAM information might even completely elude an intuitive graphic representa-
tion. Consequently, the cases where a graphical representation is useful must be 
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identified, because plain text can be superior to symbology once a certain degree of 
complexity has been reached. To limit the complexity of the symbology employed, 
therefore, a suitable transition from a graphic to a textual or hybrid representation 
must be defined. In combination with a generic attention-getting symbol, context-
specific textual information might still have significant advantages over the conven-
tional PIB/NOTAM system. Clearly, therefore, machine-readable NOTAMs must 
retain the currently used descriptive textual information87. 
To illustrate the symbology issue discussed above, a real-life example seems appro-
priate. At Toulouse Airport (LFBO), the use of the runway adjacent to the main Air-
bus facilities is sometimes restricted to flights carried out by the aircraft manufac-
turer, as is evident from Figure 50. 
Representing the limited portion 
of the runway as closed to all 
other aircraft does not seem ap-
propriate, because pilots might 
then be confused to see traffic 
taking off or landing on a run-
way marked as closed. In this 
case, a hybrid solution could 
consist of a generic ‘runway re-
stricted’ symbol for any situation 
where the runway is neither 
closed nor restricted in length, 
along with the descriptive NOTAM text detailing the restriction. As another exam-
ple, pilots could be required to obtain permission prior to using a particular runway. 
 
5.3.4.1.4 Temporal constraint visualisation and notification concept 
In many cases, relevant NOTAM are effective for the entire duration of the planned 
flight. However, if short-term or temporary changes become effective or expire dur-
ing the flight, there are several issues that need to be addressed. 
First of all, it must be ensured that only current and valid information is presented, 
and that important changes requiring immediate crew awareness are properly identi-
fied and brought to the attention of the pilots using an adequate notification concept. 
At or in the vicinity of an airport, runway status changes are potential candidates for 
such an advisory. Conversely, while airborne, a limitation to relevant landing run-
ways at the destination or alternate airports seems reasonable, since changes at other 
airports are hardly relevant unless a diversion is considered. 
Irrespective of whether a dedicated notification is deemed necessary or not, an indi-
cation of imminent or recent changes of operational relevance changes is probably 
required, since a sudden, unannounced change of the information displayed is prone 
to oversight or creating confusion. Further complexity is added by the fact that NO-
TAMs often use estimates for the time of expiry. At least in this case, an advisory to 
the crew to validate information with other sources such as ATIS or ATC is required. 
                                                 
87  Other reasons for this requirement are that the conventional PIB shall be in plain language [ICA04], and that a 
possibility of reviewing the original PIB/NOTAM information might be required depending on the interaction 
concept chosen, and to address contingency (e.g. in case of display failure) or retrofit. 
A2674/06 NOTAMR A2564/06 
Q) LFBB/QMRLT/IV/NBO/A 
A) LFBO B) 0607201330 C) 0607291700 
E) RWY 14R/32L : LENGTH LIMITED, EXCEPT FOR 
   ACFT BUILDER : 
   - QFU 32L, TAKING-OFF ON 2700M FROM TWY   
     M4 (POSSIBLE TAKE-OFF ON 3500M O/R AT   
     START-UP) 
   - QFU 14R : WHEN LANDING, RWY MUST BE    
     CLEARED VIA TWY M4 
   - WHEN LANDING AT QFU 32L, RWY MUST BE    
     CLEARED VIA TWY M10 EXCEPT ACFT 
     BUILDER 
Figure 50: Toulouse NOTAM example 
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Last but not least, in view of emerging ultra long-haul flight services with durations 
of 16 hours and more, the time reference to be used for the presentation of NOTAM 
information and the triggering of notifications deserves special attention.  
If ownship is in the vicinity or within the area of interest, such as an airport, using 
current time as reference emerges as the only possibility. However, this is non-trivial 
for areas several flight hours ahead: When considering destination or alternate air-
ports, information on e.g. runway closures and other pertinent restrictions is essen-
tial for decision making, such as the decision to divert and a suitable choice of an al-
ternate airport. Nevertheless, only the conditions at the time of arrival are critical, 
whereas the situation at the time of departure or in cruise flight is most likely irrele-
vant. Consequently, a predictive component might be required, and the Estimated 
Time of Arrival (ETA), which is calculated by the FMS, could be used as time refer-
ence for visualizing the situation at any destination or alternate airport. When the 
aircraft approaches the destination or alternate airport, however, a transition back to 
current time will have to take place at some stage, because otherwise inconsistencies 
with simultaneously displayed real-time data, such as traffic, might result. 
 
5.3.4.2 Closure and restriction cases to be covered 
Runway closures and other applicable runway or airport restrictions are used as an 
example to demonstrate the principles of integral NOTAM representation on an air-
port moving map in this thesis; taxiway closures are addressed as a by-product. 
Before defining the corresponding human-machine interface, a thorough survey of 
the different cases to be covered and the challenges associated with these must be 
performed. Generally, an important distinction to be made is whether closures or 
limitations apply to all aircraft operating at an airport, or whether they result from 
type-specific characteristics such as wingspan or mass. 
 
It quickly emerges that a binary distinction between ‘open’ and ‘closed’ runways is 
not sufficient to address all operationally relevant situations, since different levels of 
runway closure must be taken into account. As an example, a runway could be 
closed for the desired type of operation (e.g. landing) but still be in use for another 
(e.g. take-off), and this must be clearly distinguished from a situation where no air-
craft may use the runway for take-off and landing, or enter the runway. 
To achieve this, the concept of runway status, which allows reflecting various opera-
tional conditions from complete closure of the whole runway to availability for all 
operations, is introduced. In contrast to ATC instructions, runway status information 
is applicable to all aircraft operating at or in the vicinity of an airport. The following 
high-level cases can be identified: 
 
1. The runway is completely closed. Due to ongoing construction work etc., the 
runway cannot be used for any type of operation and may not be entered by 
any aircraft. 
2. The runway is closed for take-off and landing, but open for taxi operations.  
3. The runway is open for landing only. 
4. The runway is open for take-off only. 
5. The runway is open for take-off and landing. 
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Runway status thus covers the type of permissible operation, which commonly has 
to be provided per threshold, as discussed in Section 5.3.3. Closures form an excep-
tion. In this context, the fine-grain distinction between non-active runways and tem-
porarily closed runways is generally as follows: in case the runway is officially 
closed, take-off and landing operations are forbidden, whereas a non-active runway 
may become active any time, depending on the wind direction, or on explicit crew 
request [ICA01a]. Obviously, runway status and active runway are not fully inde-
pendent, since a closed runway cannot be active, and vice versa. 
 
It is important to note that the above status concept does not allow any distinction of 
temporary and permanent closure88. However, from an operational point of view, 
this is of secondary importance: a permanently closed runway such as RWY 04/22 at 
Prague Airport (LKPR) – currently used to park aircraft – might create an equally 
serious hazard in case of an erroneous take-off or landing attempt as a runway that is 
closed temporarily due to construction work with heavy machinery. 
 
5.3.4.2.1 Partial closure and length restrictions 
Runway status and active runway information as defined above always refer to the 
complete runway surface. This has the advantage of consistency with the current 
DO-272A/ED-99A implementation of runways, which allows segmentation only for 
the case of intersecting runways [RTC05]. As a result, status and active runway could 
be handled very easily as additional ‘pseudo-attributes’ of the runway as stored in 
the AMDB. Although adequate to address many situations, this is still not sufficient 
to characterize the operational status of a runway exhaustively; reality is somewhat 
more complex. The main issue is segmentation: in many cases, only a certain segment 
of a runway, e.g. between certain taxiways or high-speed exits, is completely closed. 
 
Consequently, completely closed parts and sections that may still be used for taxiing 
might coexist on a single runway, and not necessarily be separated by an intersecting 
runway. As an example, it could still be permissible to cross a completely closed 
runway via certain taxiway intersections. This principal discernibility of complete 
runway closure and closure still permitting taxi operations can be important when 
flight crews need to decide whether to accept a certain taxi route or not, and to un-
derstand the traffic patterns observed89. 
 
Depending on the location of a closed segment, the remainder of the runway can 
sometimes still be used for take off and/or landing, provided that sufficient runway 
length and obstacle clearance remain, although only one of the thresholds might re-
main usable if runway length is thus restricted. In conclusion, if a certain status does 
not apply to the whole runway, the crucial issue is an identification of runway seg-
                                                 
88  Technically, however, a distinction of permanently and temporarily closed runways is no problem, because a 
permanent closure would be included in the AMDB by setting the ‘status’ flag of the corresponding runway 
threshold to ‘closed’ [RTC01, RTC05]. 
89  It is irrelevant in this context whether traffic is presented on the airport moving map or just acquired visually – 
observing aircraft taxiing on runways displayed as closed is prone to create confusion, if no distinction of clo-
sure cases is provided. 
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ments with differing status and their impact on the usability of the overall runway90. 
Consequently, runway status information must be provided per segment in these 
cases, which raises the question of how segmentation information should be coded 
and transmitted. In current NOTAM, the identification of the runway segments con-
cerned is usually accomplished by specifying the identifiers of the intersecting taxi-
ways, or, if the runway remains usable, the reduced available accelerate-stop dis-
tance. Indeed, since the runway geometry is already available in the AMDB, all seg-
ments can be unambiguously identified by specifying two distance values from a 
given threshold. Compared to the transmission of the complete segment geometry as 
proposed e.g. by [TUD06], this has several advantages:  
 
 adverse effects of differing accuracies in the geodetic survey of the runway stored 
in the AMDB and the data in the NOTAM are minimized. A potentially irritating 
shift between runway segment data and the original runway representation 
based on the AMDB can be excluded; 
 the volume of data to be transmitted is significantly lower; and 
 a manual entry of segmented runway closure/restriction data is more convenient 
via distances 
 information is also usable in case an AMDB is not available for a given (alternate) 
airport, and can also be applied by legacy systems relying solely on ARINC 424 
for runway data, cf. [ARI02]. 
 
5.3.4.2.2 Further types of restrictions 
Runway or taxiway restrictions other than closures or length restrictions (runways 
only) can be divided into two general categories. The first comprises restrictions that 
can be parameterized, such as aircraft type, wingspan or mass restrictions. Con-
versely, the second category consists of restrictions that cannot be evaluated by the 
system due to a lack of parameters. 
 
Closures and restrictions of taxiways are less safety-critical, and the same applies to 
apron areas and parking positions. For taxiways and the movement area outside the 
runways, a fine-grain distinction of closure states is not necessary, since an adminis-
trative closure is either effective or not. With respect to taxiway restrictions, the only 
relevant differentiation is whether they apply to all traffic or only to aircraft with 
specific characteristics. Displaying taxiways that cannot be used by ownship due to a 
type-specific restriction as closed might be confusing, because the crew will then 
probably not expect other traffic on these taxiways. Usage limitations originating 
from airplane characteristics have to be indicated by other means. 
 
                                                 
90  If the effect of completely closing a segment in the centre of the runway is that the whole runway becomes 
unusable for take-off and landing, this could still be reasonably well be modelled by setting the status of the 
whole runway to ‘open for taxi’ – the crew would then just not know where exactly the completely closed part 
is. With speed in the range typically used for taxiing, this information can be obtained visually (barricades and 
markings). But this approach fails if the runway remains usable for take-off and landing. 
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5.3.4.3 Symbology for runway status, closures and restrictions 
This section addresses the human factors issues that need to be taken into account 
when designing symbology for a representation of runway status, closures and re-
strictions. In addition, the symbology eventually used during the evaluation cam-
paigns is described. 
 
5.3.4.3.1 Considerations on symbology for closed runways 
In virtually all implementations, the airport moving map resembles the real airport in 
terms of the elements displayed and, to a certain extent, the colours used, cf. Sections 
3.1 and 5.1. Therefore, the ICAO and FAA standards for marking closed runways 
described in Appendix II-2.1 should also serve as a guideline for visualizing closed 
runways and taxiways on an airport moving map. From a Synthetic Vision perspec-
tive, the main objective is to achieve sufficient resemblance for an intuitive percep-
tion of information, cf. [Ver05]. Consequently, while the corresponding symbology 
should be similar to the real markings, it is neither required nor intended to mimic 
these exactly. Additionally, due to the slight differences in colour concepts and mark-
ing philosophies employed in the USA and elsewhere, the presentation of closed 
runways on the airport moving map might intrinsically require some abstraction. 
 
In this context, the consistency of closure markings physically applied on the runway 
surface and those displayed in the cockpit is one of the key issues, since the physical 
closure markings might not be according to standards, obscured or entirely missing. 
In fact, due to operational constraints, the application of real markings is deliberately 
kept minimalist and – in accordance with ICAO recommendations – even facultative 
for temporary runway closures. Therefore, a one-to-one correspondence of physically 
applied and electronically displayed closure markings would not fulfil the basic re-
quirement of safeguarding the crew against inadvertent oversight of runway clo-
sures, and thus leave another advantage of Synthetic Vision unused: the possibility 
to augment the synthetic view by artificial cues conveying information relevant for 
the crew task, but not present in reality. In conclusion, the cockpit display must pro-
vide an indication of the closure status to the crew irrespective of whether and how 
runway closure markings are physically applied. 
 
Likewise, since isolated crosses on runway thresholds or taxiway entrances – as en-
visaged by ICAO and FAA standards for airport markings – might not be visible in 
all possible AMM range and mode combinations, the corresponding symbology on 
an airport moving map should always cover the whole length of the runway or taxi-
way concerned. Furthermore, if a closed segment renders the entire runway unus-
able for take-off and landing, it is consequently probably not sufficient to display 
merely the corresponding part of the runway as closed, either. Rather, the whole 
runway surface will have to be marked, with the remainder presented as closed, but 
still usable for taxi operations. 
Otherwise, the closure might be hidden from the crew: In analogy to the Taipei acci-
dent scenario, with a closed runway segment further down the runway not in view 
on the display, leaving runway parts that can still be used for taxiing without dedi-
cated marking could tempt flight crews into believing that the runway can still be 
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used for take-off or landing. Although alerts when attempting take-off or landing on 
a closed runway might still prevent an accident in this case (see Section 5.5 for de-
tails), presenting potentially misleading information is clearly not desirable and 
might thus be considered a certification issue. 
By contrast, if the runway remains usable in spite of closed segments, displaying the 
closed sections only, irrespective of their character, seems to be sufficient. Unless the 
flight crew intends to use this particular runway, there does not appear to be a need 
for a specific representation of the resulting length restriction, either. 
 
Figure 51 gives a schematic summary of the HMI design for the representation of 
closed runways eventually down-selected for this thesis. In view of the considera-
tions above, there appears to be no need to apply the closure crosses defined by 
ICAO using shape, dimensions and location to scale. Consequently, only one type of 
cross resembling more the ICAO taxiway closure cross is used to designate closed 
runways and taxiways. Likewise, the distinct cross shapes for runway and taxiway 
closures, respectively, do not have to be modelled exactly, because the difference in 
the shape of the crosses may be difficult to perceive at large range settings. Rather, to 
ensure visibility in larger display ranges, it was therefore chosen that closure crosses 
should extend virtually over the whole width of the runway or taxiway on the air-
port moving map. Colour and size of the crosses, however, are different for runways 
and taxiways (see below). 
 
 
Figure 51: Schematic HMI definition for the display of closed runways 
 
A closed runway or runway section is marked with equidistant crosses on the run-
way surface, covering all other runway elements or markings where displayed, with 
the exception of the runway label identifying the threshold. At larger range settings, 
there are fewer crosses, but – in analogy to the ICAO mandate – they are never sepa-
rated by more than the equivalent of 300 m in the respective scale (i.e. range setting). 
26 08
 
Markings: White ⇒ Grey 
RWY Closure Crosses: 
Red: completely closed 
White: closed, taxiing OK 
Runway outline: 
Removal of outline emphasizes: Not 
usable! 
26 08
 
Runway label: dimmed 
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For the smaller ranges, there are more crosses to ensure that even runway segments 
that are only partially visible due to range or mode settings can be clearly identified 
as closed by the crew. With respect to intersecting runways, if only one of them is 
closed, the open runway is displayed normally, and closure markings are only 
placed on the segments of the closed runway on both sides of the open runway91. 
 
Closed taxiways or taxiway segments are also represented by equidistant crosses on 
the taxiway surface, and for the distance of the crosses and the intersection with open 
taxiways, the same criteria as for the runway are applied accordingly. The same ap-
plies to other airport areas closed for traffic. Clearly, the flight crew should also be 
able to distinguish closed runways (irrespective of closure level) and closed taxiways 
at a glance. The reason for this is not only different criticality for flight safety, but 
also the human factors consideration that it is essential to main sufficient contrast 
between the visualisation of runways and taxiways, whatever their state. 
 
5.3.4.3.2 Colour concept 
Due to these constraints and the need for differentiation, any solution with a unique 
closure symbol as shown in Figure 53 can only employ colour coding to distinguish 
the different cases of runway closure on one side and closed taxiways on the other 
side. As a result, different symbol colours must be used to discern closed taxiways 
from closed runways (or segments thereof) that may still be used for taxiing. 
 
Using the same colour for closed taxiways and runway parts that are still available 
for taxiing might be prone to create confusion, because pilots would then be able en-
ter one aerodrome area with a closure marking in a given colour, but not the other. 
Consequently, the colour of the crosses used to indicate closed taxiways should be 
different from the two cases of runway closure. Conversely, employing the colour for 
complete runway closure for closed taxiways as well would help to prevent these 
inconsistencies, but might not reflect the different criticalities appropriately and 
could make closed runways and taxiways look too similar. 
 
In conclusion, therefore, a partially redundant coding is used, with the essential in-
formation that a runway, taxiway or corresponding segment is closed coded by the 
cross symbol, and the precise nature and criticality of the closure represented by the 
colour of the symbol92. The number of distinct closure categories is sufficiently small 
for colour coding to be applicable, cf. [SAE88]. 
                                                 
91  ICAO Annex 14 does not explicitly treat this case; the solution proposed here is, however, in line with FAA 
recommendations in [FAA05a]. 
92  Redundant coding ensures the accurate transmission of information in high ambient lighting conditions or 
other situations where colours alone may be difficult to distinguish for persons with normal colour vision. Fur-
thermore, although vision requirements on flight crews are strict, there is still some variation in colour vision 
performance even for pilots classified as having normal colour vision. In December 1998, there were approxi-
mately 2300 flight crew members in the USA with deficient colour vision who nonetheless held first class 
medicals. Therefore, redundant coding is also important for pilots with (albeit minimal) colour vision deficien-
cies. Furthermore, the ability to discern colours deteriorates with age. For these reasons, several of the newer 
FAA TSOs require a minimum of two coding techniques, which may include colour, shape, and location. In 
addition, this redundancy minimizes the effect of hardware failures resulting in a loss of colour [SAE88, 
FAA02b]. 
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In accordance with common practice, the choice of symbol colour for a completely 
closed runway or runway segment is, in view of the criticality, consequently between 
amber and red as the two “traditional warning and cautionary colors” [SAE88]. An issue 
in this context is that the use of the colour red on the flight deck is usually reserved 
for emergency situations that require immediate flight crew action, since any inap-
propriate use may desensitize pilots and thus reduce the effectiveness of flight deck 
alerts [SAE88a, FAA02b]. According to DO-257A, however, the guidance in §25.1322 
concerning amber and red should be understood to preclude only the excessive use 
of these colours on an airport moving map; thus amber and red still remain permis-
sible for coding surface signs, lights and markings [RTC03a]. However, since this 
would justify the use of red for a nominal indication on a display93, DO-257A is 
probably not specific enough in this matter. 
 
The visualisation of closed runways with coloured crosses could potentially be rein-
forced by additional colour changes to the other runway elements displayed. For a 
runway closed for take-off and landing, therefore, both threshold labels are dimmed 
from the usual white-on-black representation to grey (as for the inactive QFU), since 
obviously neither threshold can be active. 
Given the ICAO recommendation to obliterate the markings of permanently closed 
runways (as outlined in Appendix II-2.1), it was also considered to further emphasize 
the presentation of a closed runway by changing all standard runway markings from 
white to grey, as shown in Figure 51. This feature was, however, eventually not re-
tained for assessment, because both airport moving map display prototypes used in 
the two evaluation campaigns feature light grey runway surfaces, and prototyping 
sessions revealed that any grey tones between white and the runway surface tone 
either obscured the markings entirely or did not prove sufficiently conspicuous in 
comparison with white markings. Nevertheless, it can be expected that the obliter-
ated markings of permanently closed runways will eventually be removed from the 
corresponding AMDB in subsequent revisions. Intrinsically, therefore, there will be 
no runway markings for a permanently closed runway in this case. 
 
In the frame of this thesis, two different colour concepts consistent with the SAE rec-
ommendations were devised and eventually assessed during the two evaluation 
campaigns. Both concepts use white crosses for runways or runway segments closed 
for take-off and landing only, but still usable for taxiing or crossing, because this col-
our seemed the least alerting and intrusive. Since flight crews will routinely perceive 
the ownship symbol on top of these closure crosses, it seemed important not to create 
the impression that there is an abnormal situation. Additionally, white is the pre-
dominant colour of runway markings. 
 
The initial colour concept consisted of amber crosses for completely closed runways 
or runway segments (to avoid using red), and yellow crosses for closed taxiways (as 
the dominant colour of taxiway markings). To reinforce the representation of runway 
and taxiway closure, the corresponding surfaces were darkened. The associated im-
plementation, which corresponds to a subset of the concept above, is shown in Figure 
                                                 
93  In line with DO-257 guidance, the runway holding positions (stop bars) are displayed as red lines on some 
airport moving map implementations (see Section 3.1.1). 
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43. It was evaluated in the frame of the EMMA project; the results are described in 
Chapter 7. For technical reasons, the dimming of the runway surface was realised by 
an overlay, resulting in a complete removal of all runway markings. Due to the lim-
ited choice of colours, closed runways had the same colour as aprons. This concept 
was eventually revised for the second evaluation campaign due to the following rea-
sons: 
 
 Pilots participating in the first evaluation campaign found amber not strong 
enough (cf. Chapter 7), especially since the similar colour yellow is ubiquitous on 
the display due to a naturalistic representation of taxiway guidance lines. 
 The simultaneous use of amber and yellow should be limited, since they may be 
difficult to distinguish due to their similar appearance on electronic displays, par-
ticularly under conditions of high ambient light [SAE88]94. 
 Regardless of closure state, it was eventually considered more important to retain 
a consistent colour coding for the different airport surfaces, alongside the princi-
ple that a closed runway is still a runway and must be recognisable as such. 
 
Consequently, an alternative set of colours was implemented for the simulator 
evaluation campaign described in Chapter 8, which comprised red for complete clo-
sure and amber for closed taxiways (see Figure 52). In spite of the SAE recommenda-
tions quoted above, amber crosses on top of yellow taxiway markings were eventu-
ally presumed provide a better contrast than yellow crosses on yellow markings. 
 
Likewise, red is believed to provide a stronger distinction of completely closed run-
ways, as requested by pilots. The use of red seems justified in this case, because it is 
used only for completely closed runways or runway segments, which definitely con-
stitute a non-nominal condition and significant operational limitation. 
Therefore, this second approach is even more restrictive than DO-257 and consistent 
with a certified solution on the Primary Flight Display (PFD) of Airbus A320 family 
aircraft, where the ground reference is indicated by a red tape [Air05]. In this case, 
red is also used to indicate a hard operational limit, rather than the necessity of im-
mediate corrective action, since the tape may be in view while the altitude is still per-
fectly normal95. Therefore, with the argument of a hard operational constraint, red 
crosses for completely closed runways seem to be justifiable, all the more since pilots 
will probably not see this every day, thus lowering the risk that pilots will get com-
fortable and complacent with red indications on their display. 
 
Figure 52 and Figure 53 illustrate the revised solution implemented on the basis of 
the Institute’s airport moving map software. The figures also show a segment-wise 
distinction of the closure level; RWY 25R is completely closed between taxiways F 
and G, but the remainder of the runway may still be used for taxi operations. For 
completeness, Figure 52 also demonstrates the implementation of displaying closed 
taxiways. 
                                                 
94  In fact, according to [SAE88b], amber and yellow are to be used interchangeably for cautions and abnormal 
sources. 
95  In addition, the overspeed domain – which by comparison with the ground reference constitutes only a “soft” 
operational limit – is also indicated by a dashed red line on an Airbus family PFD [Air05]. 
5   EXPERIMENTAL SURFACE MOVEMENT AWARENESS AND ALERTING SYSTEM 
 186
  
Figure 52: Display of closed runways and 
taxiways on the airport moving map 
Figure 53: Runway closure symbology (low 
range) 
 
5.3.4.3.3 Visualisation of runway restrictions 
Restrictions to the runway length available for take-off or landing are quite common, 
and often the result of a partial closure at one runway end. A distinct representation 
of this situation is believed to be required only if the flight crew intends to use the 
runway in question for take-off or landing. Otherwise, displaying only closed run-
way segments – if applicable – appears sufficient. Consequently, the representation 
of length restrictions should be coupled to the display of the FMS-selected runway; 
see Section 5.3.2 for details. 
 
In case there is a temporary length restriction of the FMS-selected runway, e.g. due to 
a partial closure as shown in Figure 54, this approach results in the definition of a 
new temporary runway, which by definition always accurately models the interde-
pendency of closed segments and the remaining runway. Accordingly, the outline of 
the FMS-selected runway consequently only encompasses the temporary runway 
created by the restriction. 
The fact that the runway is restricted in length is further emphasized by displaying 
the corresponding temporary runway outline – excluding the closed or unusable 
part – in yellow instead of the usual white to indicate the non-standard situation. 
Likewise, the active threshold is indicated by a yellow (instead of a white) runway 
threshold label. 
 
For this design approach, the absence of a threshold label within the temporary out-
line signifies that the corresponding runway threshold is not available. In the exam-
ple shown in Figure 54, only RWY 25R is available, though restricted in length, 
whereas the RWY 07L direction would be unavailable. 
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Since it may be difficult to estimate the 
length of the remaining runway just 
from the outline displayed on the air-
port moving map, this information 
should be visualised at a prominent lo-
cation on the display. Provided that suf-
ficient display space is available, the text 
of the NOTAM detailing the runway 
restriction (or a brief summary thereof) 
could be displayed automatically (see 
Figure 54) as soon as the flight crew en-
ters a restricted runway that has been 
selected for take-off, or arms the ap-
proach mode for this runway, respec-
tively. In addition, this is intended to 
reinforce the visualisation of the runway 
restriction; text and frame colour corre-
spond to the runway status. 
 
Depending on the level of integration with the aircraft’s Electronic Centralized Air-
craft Monitoring (ECAM) or similar systems, NOTAM messages requiring crew noti-
fication could additionally be forwarded to the Engine/Warning display, which al-
ready features a list of operational constraints resulting from system failures. Conse-
quently, the ECAM could ensure that the crew is notified of emerging runway clo-
sures or restrictions at the destination in an appropriate fashion when in cruise flight. 
 
Not all of the runway restrictions conveyed by NOTAM are related to runway 
length. Restrictions may apply to ownship due to certain aircraft characteristics, such 
as wingspan or weight; sometimes certain aircraft types are specified as well. If re-
strictions contained in NOTAM are relevant for ownship, the corresponding runway 
or runway section could be marked with a series of ‘R’ in lieu of the closure crosses, 
with the colour concept accordingly; restriction information not applicable is not 
shown. This could ensure that flight crews can differentiate closure, which is appli-
cable to all traffic, from restriction, which may only concern certain aircraft. 
 
However, runway-related NOTAM do not necessarily fall into either the length or 
usage restriction category, and it might not always be possible for the system to 
process restriction information, e.g. due to a lack of parameters, if it consists of text 
only or is very complex, such as in the Toulouse example (cf. Figure 50). In these 
cases, if restrictions cannot be translated directly into marking a certain runway as 
unusable for ownship or depicting the constraints in a direct way, a generic atten-
tion-getting symbol, supplemented by the identifier of the corresponding NOTAM, is 
envisaged. It could always be placed in the centre of the visible part of the runway 
concerned. As for length restrictions, the corresponding NOTAM text might be visu-
alized automatically as detailed above if the runway is to be used for take-off or land-
ing. 
 
Figure 54: Runway length restriction due to 
partial closure 
RWY 25R: LENGTH REDUCED TO 3250M 
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Closure crosses, the restriction symbol and the attention-getting symbol notifying the 
crew of the existence of a NOTAM are the only additional symbols used by the OAF. 
Operational conditions that are neither closure nor restriction are thus mainly cov-
ered by text, rather than by a complex symbol set, to limit the complexity of symbol-
ogy. After all, this is the main reason why most early iconic alphabets were eventu-
ally superseded by the alphabets we know today. 
 
The principles for visualizing restrictions and the presence of NOTAM information 
that cannot be decoded into a restriction could be applied to taxiways and other air-
port areas as well. Taxiways that are not usable by ownship due to restrictions are 
marked by amber ‘R’ instead of crosses. Wherever possible, NOTAM should be proc-
essed using relevant ownship data and then be presented as usability criteria for the 
airport element that the restrictions refer to. If this cannot be achieved, the attention-
getting symbol can be applied accordingly, see Figure 55. To prevent display clutter, 
the attention-getting symbol could be coupled to the presentation of labels for the 
respective airport areas. For smaller taxiways and parking positions, the symbol 
would consequently only be shown in ranges where labels for these airport features 
are shown. Additionally, on an interactive ND, if the crew selects the attention-
getting symbol (irrespective of whether it pertains to a runway or other airport area), 
the textual NOTAM information is directly displayed in an overlay window. 
 
As for runway restrictions, NOTAM information is shown only if it is applicable to 
ownship. For example, if a taxiway is temporarily restricted for A380-size aircraft, 
but there are no limitations for A320 family aircraft, the A380 crew would see the 
taxiway marked as unusable – optionally with a reference to the corresponding 
NOTAM if they request additional information on the element – while the A320 crew 
would not be bothered with information not relevant for them; nothing would be 
displayed. 
 
The human-machine interface discussed in this section applies to closures, restric-
tions and limitations resulting from short-term and temporary changes. The symbol-
ogy developed is consequently intended for isolated, attention-getting application to 
highlight non-standard situations. However, there might also be permanent and 
more fundamental type-specific restrictions at airports, particularly for large aircraft 
such as the A340-600 or the A380, originating from basic airport characteristics. In 
principle, the symbology developed in this section could be applied as well, but this 
is an issue that should be addressed by future research. 
 
Likewise, length restrictions imposed by LAHSO are handled differently, as shown 
in Figure 44, because they are established permanently and constitute a clearance 
limit rather than a physical limit. 
 
Due to time constraints, the human-machine interface derived in this section could 
neither be prototyped nor formally be evaluated during the flight simulator cam-
paign, but was briefly reviewed in a post-hoc meeting with one of the flight test pi-
lots from the prototyping team. 
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5.3.4.4 Notification and indication of operational changes during flight 
The human factors requirements with respect to the indication of imminent changes 
on the airport moving map are still subject to further research, and they were not ad-
dressed by this thesis beyond the level of some basic analytical considerations. 
Consider the case that a runway clo-
sure, according to NOTAM informa-
tion, ends at 22:00. It seems straight-
forward that, at 21:59, the runway 
should still be displayed as closed. 
Likewise, more than 12 hours later, it 
could be presented as open again 
based on the assumption that a new or 
changed NOTAM will have been is-
sued by then if the closure persists. The 
critical time period encompasses the 
minutes and hours immediately fol-
lowing the scheduled end of the clo-
sure. 
A way of avoiding this problem would 
be an automatic data consolidation, 
e.g. with D-ATIS or ATC, to verify that 
the runway status has indeed changed 
as planned. But if such consolidation cannot be achieved due to failure or unavail-
ability, the two essential indications from a human factors perspective seem to be 
that 
 
a) a closure/restriction existed for a given runway until recently, and  
b) the flight crew should be advised to initiate suitable measures to check the 
current runway status. 
 
This is particularly important in case the end dates specified in a NOTAM are given 
as estimates only, and once more illustrates the necessity that the crew should have 
the ability to modify any operational awareness information manually. 
To visualize expired closures and restrictions, the method of choice appears to be 
obliterating the corresponding markings themselves, e.g. by reducing them to an out-
line, making them transparent, dithered, darkened or dashed from e.g. one minute 
after the specified end of the closure until the end of the transition period. Reducing 
closure and restriction symbology to a dashed outline retaining the initial colour 
seems favourable, because it would allow to preserve information on the nature of 
the closure on the display. Unless contrary D-ATIS or NOTAM information is re-
ceived, an initial guess is that for runways, this transition period should last until 30 
minutes to 2 hours for a fixed and 2 to 6 hours for an estimated end time. For all 
other airport areas, it is most likely sufficient to remove the corresponding informa-
tion much earlier, e.g. after 1 or 2 hours, respectively, due to the lower criticality.  
Upon perceiving the expired closure symbol, flight crews would then procedurally 
be instructed to clarify the status of the runway or taxiway with ATC; the necessity of 
a brief advisory or reminder to initiate such clarification remains to be established. 
 
Figure 55: Active and expired attention-
getting symbol for non-decodable NOTAM 
RWY 27L TO BE CLOSED IN 12 MIN 
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For short-term and temporary restrictions conveyed via the generic attention-getting 
symbol, the proposed symbol accompanied by the NOTAM number could be 
changed from a yellow-coloured active representation to a grey expired representa-
tion, as shown in Figure 55. 
 
To give pilots a better indication that a change is imminent, the active attention-
getting symbol could additionally be added, potentially flashing or blinking, to the 
normal closure or restriction symbology a couple of minutes before expiration, and 
might remain as inactive attention-getting symbol afterwards, because the change of 
symbology to the ‘expired’ state itself (as described above) does not contain any in-
formation on whether the expiration time was an estimate or potential other details. 
Consequently, the symbol and the NOTAM identifier might help flight crews to re-
trieve the corresponding NOTAM more easily, particularly on an interactive CDS, 
where the NOTAM text could be invoked by applying the cursor to the attention-
getting symbol. 
Conversely, an indication that closures or restrictions are imminent appears to be 
required as well, and future runway taxiway closures could be indicated by applying 
blinking crosses to the corresponding taxiway with a lead time of e.g. two minutes. 
For runways, the same concept can be applied accordingly, with the difference that 
the general lead time would be increased, e.g. to five minutes, and that an additional 
text message, for example “RWY 18 TO BE CLOSED IN 7 MIN”, could be displayed 
with ten or fifteen minutes lead time for FMS-selected runways, and, depending on 
the level of integration with the airframe, on the ECAM as well for any runway se-
lected as part of the FMS flight plan96. For all other short-term and temporary 
changes visualised through an attention-getting symbol only, it is most likely suffi-
cient to flash the symbol a couple of times when it is added to the display. 
 
5.3.4.5 Safety considerations 
A risk associated with manual modification of runway closure data is that the crew 
enters incorrect information. In contrast to the FMS-selected runway, which merely 
reflects a crew selection, this would lead to a display of misleading safety-critical op-
erational information, because at least one potentially usable runway will be dis-
played as closed, while a closed runway will be marked as usable in the worst case. 
However, in combination with the FMS-selected runway, there are intrinsic safe-
guards, for example when the FMS-selected runway is also marked as closed, a situa-
tion that is additionally covered by an alert (see Section 5.5). 
The combined risk of entering both an incorrect runway in the FMS and wrong run-
way closure data, however, can be regarded as low. Nonetheless, if the crew system-
atically confuses ‘R’ and ‘L’ for a given set of parallel runways, if one runway is the 
FMS-selected runway and the other one is closed, there might be an unsafe situation 
potentially resulting in a certification issue. Due to the compelling nature of the dis-
plays, certification authorities are likely to rate a wrong runway closure displayed on 
the airport moving map display as a more significant safety risk than an incorrect 
runway closure marking scribbled on a conventional paper chart. 
                                                 
96  Since the landing runway at the destination airport is initially often left undefined in the FMS flight plan and 
specified later, the precise notification logic will require detailed analysis and evaluation. 
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5.3.5 Data Handling and Operational Concept 
Since the envisaged Operational Awareness Function (OAF) is entirely data-driven, 
the availability of a data handling and operational concept making the required in-
formation accessible to aircraft systems is a crucial prerequisite for a sufficiently up-
to-date flight-deck based visualisation of aerodrome operational status and configu-
ration (cf. High-Level Requirement III), as discussed in Section 4.3.3. At minimum, it 
must therefore be ensured (as part of routine flight preparation) that aircraft are al-
ways dispatched and operated with data consistent with the conventional PIB, since 
this is essential for safe and efficient operations. Nevertheless, the handling of poten-
tial updates or additions of NOTAM while the aircraft is in flight, which will most 
likely be transmitted via AOC due to regulatory constraints (cf. Section 4.3.3), has to 
be considered as well. Consequently, the data handling and operational concept 
must be sufficiently scalable and extensible to cover in-flight NOTAM updates. 
 
Processes for the integration and transfer of the necessary data to the aircraft are, in 
turn, dependent on machine-readable formats for NOTAM, D-ATIS and other rele-
vant sources of short-term or temporary information (cf. Section 5.3.4.1). In an in-
creasingly data driven environment, with many airlines gradually transitioning from 
paper charts to Electronic Flight Bag applications, the role of future machine-
readable NOTAM formats in these processes is therefore a key issue. 
 
Furthermore, since the PIB encompasses all phases of flight, the limitations of the 
current NOTAM system identified in Section 2.3 are applicable beyond the domain 
of airport surface operations. This has two implications. First of all, it appears that 
storage and handling of digital PIB data aboard the aircraft should be centralised to 
prevent that each future onboard system making use of electronic NOTAM data of-
fers a custom-tailored, isolated solution, because this is inefficient and prone to yield 
inconsistencies. At the same time, the data handling and operational concept must be 
sufficiently generic to ensure that the needs of onboard systems other than SMAAS 
can be taken into account. Nevertheless, this section focuses on issues endemic to 
NOTAM concerning airport surface operations, such as modifications to airport ge-
ometry. 
 
5.3.5.1 Modified geometries: overlay vs. integral representation 
From a Runway Incursion pre-
vention perspective, the NOTAM 
information of predominant in-
terest concerns runway status, 
mainly in terms of closures and 
restrictions. Indeed, an unparal-
leled strength of NOTAM is their 
capability to convey information 
on the operational status of air 
traffic system installations, irrespective of whether they are runways or navigation 
aids. Nevertheless, relevant short-term and temporary changes in the aerodrome en-
vironment may also encompass modifications to the airport layout. 
A0443/08 NOTAMN 
Q)EDGG/QMPCS/IV/BO/A/000/999/5002N00834E005 
A) EDDF B) 0802181457 C) PERM  
E) NEW PARKING PSN LOCATED AT TERMINAL 1 
NORTH OF TWY E. 
C13 PSN 5003N 00834.8E 
C14 PSN 5003N 00834.8E 
C15 PSN 5003N 00834.9E. 
CREATED: 18 Feb 2008 14:59:00  
Figure 56: Sample NOTAM announcing new parking 
positions 
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While simple additional non-AMDB geometries, e.g. point-like structures such as 
obstacles or navigation facilities, can easily be transmitted via machine-readable 
NOTAM, there are significant issues when changes to complex airport geometries 
such as taxiways are concerned, i.e. if the topology of an airport is modified. Even 
when disregarding potential certification issues for the moment, NOTAM containing 
geometrical changes may be hard to merge with existing AMDB information from a 
technical perspective. 
 
To illustrate these issues, consider the – at first glance simple – case that permanent 
new parking positions at Frankfurt Airport (EDDF) are announced by NOTAM, as in 
the real-life example shown in Figure 56. Apparently, labels to identify these new 
parking positions can easily be placed on the airport moving map, using the coordi-
nates supplied via NOTAM. The fact that positions C13 and C14 apparently coincide 
is of minor importance, since it is essentially a matter of accuracy and can be resolved 
with relative ease, unless both positions overlap and their use is mutually exclusive. 
 
There are, however, two key issues. First, the content of the above NOTAM is not 
sufficient to create an airport moving map representation of the new parking posi-
tions, because it does not contain any information on the geometries defining these, 
such as the extent of the pavements hosting the parking position or the associated 
markings, such as parking stand guidance lines. Consequently, for a full representa-
tion of this change on an airport moving map, considerably more information of 
geometrical nature, would have to be transmitted. Technically, the definition of a 
machine-readable NOTAM format capable of conveying geometry information is not 
an issue – an initial xNOTAM format based on the Aeronautical Information Ex-
change Model (AIXM) for NOTAM relating to airports has been demonstrated to 
show-case the extended possibilities of AIXM 5.0 [TUD06]. 
However, the second and more important issue is that the exemplary NOTAM in 
Figure 56 does not contain any information about the interrelation of the new park-
ing positions with the existing airport facilities or with each other (e.g. mutually ex-
clusive use, see above). It does not give any indication concerning the fate of airport 
infrastructure that might previously have existed at these locations. Consequently, it 
remains unclear whether it has been removed (e.g. in case of buildings) or whether it 
is just re-used and re-designated (e.g. in case there were already parking positions). 
Likewise, information on the state of completion is missing. Flight crews have no 
way of inferring whether these new positions are already fully marked and equipped 
with the appropriate signage. 
 
These two issues have significant implications regarding the onboard handling and 
utilization of NOTAM data involving changes to airport geometry. Evidently, it must 
be ensured that the new information matches existing information in terms of con-
tent, accuracy and integrity. Furthermore, just displaying changed geometries as an 
overlay to the original AMDB might eventually lead to a cluttered or even illegible 
display in the areas concerned. Additionally, onboard applications other than the 
airport moving map, e.g. a function displaying an assigned taxi route on the basis of 
data stored in the AMDB, might rely on connectivity and would thus require merg-
ing of the original AMDB data with the NOTAM information. 
5.3   OPERATIONAL AWARENESS FUNCTION (OAF) 
  193 
Consequently, for an operationally meaningful integration of the new information 
with AMDB data already available aboard the aircraft, the NOTAM would also have 
to contain instructions on which part of the existing data to remove. In an operational 
context where airlines may choose between AMDBs from several suppliers, however, 
this is non-trivial, since the originator of the NOTAM does not necessarily have ac-
cess to all commercially available AMDBs for a given airport. Furthermore, since the 
validity dates of NOTAM are apparently not synchronised with the dates of the 
AIRAC cycle, the onboard system would also have to perform a check whether a 
change is already included in the AMDB currently available aboard or not. 
 
In conclusion, pursuing the approach of merging temporary or permanent geometry 
changes and existing AMDB information onboard the aircraft seems somewhat unre-
alistic in view of the tremendous development effort required to realise a certifiable 
onboard application capable of the required processing. Apart from this, a corre-
sponding solution is inefficient in view of the fact that the associated merging and 
validation processes would have to be performed individually aboard each aircraft. 
Besides, one may righteously ask whether there might not be a more adequate solu-
tion from an operations point of view, because the introduction of new parking posi-
tions, taxiways or even buildings and runways is hardly ever a spontaneous over-
night activity by the airport authorities, but rather planned carefully several weeks, 
months or longer in advance. Thus, construction plans detailing the future geometry 
(including markings) are in principle available with sufficient lead time to permit 
sharing them with database vendors and airlines well in advance, using e.g. AIP 
Supplements in AIXM or equivalent other digital formats. 
 
Therefore, rather than submitting geometrical information via machine-readable, 
digital NOTAM and trying to develop a certifiable onboard processing application 
capable of merging these changes with existing AMDB information, planned 
amendments to the airport geometry should better be released sufficiently early to 
enable AMDB suppliers to provide an updated database to users. This could be 
achieved e.g. by regulations requiring that changes affecting the airport infrastruc-
ture or layout should be announced 72 h in advance and must be notified no later 
than 36 h before they become effective97. These time values are initial estimates 
which assume that efficient and partially automated update processes at database 
providers ensure, together with 24/7 operations, that an updated AMDB can be 
made available within 12 h of change notification, such that airlines would routinely 
have sufficient time to deploy aircraft even on ultra-long-haul flights with AMDBs 
containing up-to-date airport geometries. 
Generally, these changes could then be automatically activated at the effective dates 
or, where necessary, by trigger-type digital NOTAM. A potential method of activa-
tion might e.g. be an AMDB database swap (as currently implemented for the FMS 
navigation database)98. It must only be ensured that any airport structures pre-
defined as obsolete once the changes become effective are suitably invalidated. 
                                                 
97  These comparatively short periods have been chosen to have a chance take into account temporary geometry 
changes as well, e.g. a provisional taxiway if a major taxiway is closed for reconstruction on short notice. 
98  Alternatively, in case of an airport expansion, the corresponding new airport elements could represented as 
closed prior to activation, i.e. while they are still under construction. 
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In case no updated AMDB versions containing NOTAM-ed geometry changes are 
available for some reason, or if the activation process fails, NOTAM with geometrical 
content not yet integrated in the AMDB could, as a back-up, still be handled as any 
other non-decodable NOTAM and visualised via the attention-getting symbol99, as 
described in Section 5.3.4.3.3.  
 
In conclusion, a conceptual separation of NOTAM and other relevant short-term in-
formation into status and geometry changes seems reasonable: a status change re-
flects the operational condition of an airport element, e.g. whether a runway is open, 
restricted or closed, whereas a geometry change consists of modifications to existing 
airport geometries, e.g. a broadened taxiway, or altogether new airport elements 
such as new runways, taxiways or buildings. Consequently, the machine-readable 
NOTAM information to be processed directly by the onboard system would rou-
tinely be limited to status information. From a human factors perspective, this ap-
proach has the additional advantage that it could significantly reduce the number of 
NOTAM to be considered for inclusion in the briefing material (PIB), since it would 
eliminate the need to include NOTAM related to geometry changes already effective 
and included in the AMDB when the flight commences. 
 
5.3.5.2 Concept for an electronic PIB (ePIB) 
The data handling and operational concept proposed by this thesis was conceived as 
an electronic, machine-readable extension of the conventional Pre-Flight Information 
Bulletin, taking into account the following fundamental considerations and basic re-
quirements: 
 
 The availability of onboard means of visualising short-term and temporary 
changes does not eliminate the necessity of making this information available 
to the crew as part of their briefing, as required by ICAO Annex 15 [ICA04]. 
 There is a clear need for consistency between the PIB and the NOTAM in-
formation uploaded to the aircraft’s avionics (see above). 
 Flight crews should be able to interact with NOTAM and other short-term or 
temporary information uploaded to the aircraft’s avionics to address last-
minute changes and exceptions, cf. Section 5.3.4.1. 
 The availability of electronic, machine-readable NOTAM information should 
not depend on a large-scale introduction of the corresponding AIS aeronauti-
cal data link services, but be capable of using them. Conversely, any reliance 
on an airborne data link to obtain basic NOTAM information would require 
appropriate safe-guarding against data link failure or unavailability. 
 There should not be a need to retransmit the complete NOTAM package fol-
lowing modifications or changes to take into account limited data link or 
data loader bandwidth during in-flight or on-ground updates. 
                                                 
99  As for any other NOTAM not presentable in an intuitive form, the key issue is the positioning of the attention-
getting symbol. By default, the position anchor from the NOTAM Q-line could be used. The accuracy require-
ments for this position reference would have to be increased to prevent a ‘stacking’ of attention-getting sym-
bols on the ARP – initially, the augmentation of accuracy could be performed by AOC. 
5.3   OPERATIONAL AWARENESS FUNCTION (OAF) 
  195 
Therefore, from an operational perspective, a transition from the conventional plain-
language PIB to a digital, machine-readable electronic PIB (ePIB) is a logic and 
straightforward step. As detailed in the previous section, onboard handling and 
processing of ePIB/NOTAM data will leave the original AMDB or any other onboard 
database untouched by limitation to status and simple geometry information. Conse-
quently, AMDB and NOTAM information will be stored separately and can be com-
bined at application level, which enables different handling policies depending on 
individual certification and data integrity requirements. As a basic example, if pilots 
question the integrity or validity of NOTAM data, they can simply switch them off100. 
 
The main advantage expected of an ePIB solution is that it can be aligned with the 
existing airline workflow, since the computer tools dispatchers currently use to com-
pile conventional PIBs could be upgraded to produce an ePIB instead, which would 
then be supplied both to the crew for briefing – in the most simple scenario as a 
plain-text compilation virtually indiscernible from today’s PIB101 – and simultane-
ously uploaded to the aircraft avionics prior to flight. This intrinsically ensures con-
sistency between the briefing material and the flight deck displays. Furthermore, the 
crew must be able to review all NOTAM contained in the electronic PIB in plain text, 
as this is an ICAO requirement on the PIB in general [ICA04].  
 
Like the conventional PIB, the envisaged ePIB is made up of individual NOTAM 
messages. Since ICAO Annex 15 requires that each NOTAM shall be transmitted as a 
single telecommunication message [ICA04], this was translated into a policy that 
there should be a single, dedicated file for each digital NOTAM, with the file name 
containing the serial number of the corresponding NOTAM, preceded by the identi-
fier of the originator for unambiguous identification (cf. Figure 57). This is necessary 
because NOTAM serial numbers are not unique. Rather, each AIS provider starts a 
new count every January 1st [ICA04]. The use of separate files has the advantage that 
NOTAM files already available on an aircraft could in principle be re-used for other 
future flights from the same airport, provided they are still valid and relevant, thus 
minimizing the volume of the data to be up-linked before each flight. Moreover, it 
facilitates the removal of outdated NOTAM from both ground and airborne systems, 
and provides dispatchers with an easy way of excluding irrelevant NOTAM when 
composing the ePIB, such as NOTAM relating to changes already contained in the 
most recent AMDB version. Most importantly, however, it allows a separation of the 
ePIB itself from the individual NOTAM data, in the same way the FMS flight plan is 
separate from the underlying navigation database – a change does not affect the 
waypoint data stored in the ARINC 424 database (cf. [ARI02]), either. 
While the precise exchange format for NOTAM files remains to be chosen, binary 
XML seems a likely candidate, because this format is already used for AMDBs en-
coded in the ARINC 816 standard [ARI06]. In analogy to the Airport Database con-
figuration file in ARINC 816, which lists the individual airport databases available, 
the ePIB can therefore be envisaged as an index referencing individual NOTAM files. 
                                                 
100  By contrast, a solution processing complex AMDB geometry data aboard the aircraft would most likely have to 
drive applications from the merged ‘working copy’, necessitating a re-load of the original AMDB if the crew 
opts to discontinue NOTAM use. 
101  This does not preclude the generation of advanced graphical representations on any EFB-type or other elec-
tronic charting devices the crew might use during the briefing, but this is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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The proposed ePIB directory and file structure 
is illustrated in Figure 57, which uses an adap-
tation of the conventional PIB presented in Fig-
ure 11 as example. Individual NOTAM files are 
placed in folders with the ICAO identifier of 
respective airport or Flight Information Region 
(FIR) as name, while the ePIB index file (cf. 
Figure 58) resides in the main directory. 
 
To ensure that the ePIB index file is only usable 
for the intended flight on a given day, an index 
file naming convention containing the flight 
identification, date and creation time could be 
applied, e.g. LH8385_20060809_1930.PIB 
for Lufthansa flight LH 8385 on August 9, 2006, 
with the PIB created at 19:30 UTC. This way, 
the onboard systems can double-check whether 
the received ePIB file is valid for the current 
flight or not. For additional safeguarding, it is 
envisaged that this information is duplicated 
inside the ePIB index file, see Figure 58. 
 
The separation of ePIB index and individual 
NOTAM files allows incremental changes and 
updates of the ePIB with minimal risk of cor-
rupting the data already available on board. In 
particular, the cancellation of individual 
NOTAM can be realised in a fully reversible 
fashion by removing the associated NOTAM file references from the ePIB index only, 
while leaving the NOTAM file itself in storage. In addition, the need for file deletion 
operations, which could in the worst case result in file system corruption, e.g. if a bus 
failure occurs during the process, is eliminated. 
Likewise, this approach also ensures the reversibility of any subsequent updates: the 
required additional or replacement NOTAM files are uploaded to the aircraft, ac-
companied by an updated ePIB index file substituting the current one. In case obvi-
ously corrupted or erroneous new NOTAM or ePIB index files are received, the flight 
crew may switch back to a previous version of the ePIB at any time. 
In conclusion, any changes to the ePIB will also result in a new index file with a dif-
ferent time stamp in both file body and file name. This ensures that only NOTAM 
and potential AIP supplements contained in the currently applicable ePIB index file 
are eventually processed by the Operational Awareness Function (OAF) and dis-
played on the airport moving map. Furthermore, in case slow data links or data 
loaders are used for uploading and the ePIB upload time thus becomes a factor for 
turnaround time, aircraft could be supplied with preliminary ePIB indices and all 
referenced NOTAM files for the scheduled aircraft rotation during routine daily 
maintenance activities, since the file naming convention outlined above permits the 
coexistence of ePIB index files for several flights. 
 
Figure 57: Sample ePIB onboard di-
rectory structure 
ePIB 
LH8385_20060809 
_1930.PIB  
… 
EDDF 
EDFH 
UACC 
… 
EDFF_A1970-06.bml 
EDFF_A1977-06.bml 
… 
UACC_K0399-06.bml 
UACC_K0402-06.bml 
EDFF_C0967-06.bml 
EDFF_C1375-06.bml 
… 
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From a systems perspective, the 
ePIB processing system aboard 
the aircraft should be closely 
linked to the FMS and the ECAM 
as the central mission manage-
ment systems aboard civil aircraft. 
This would also satisfy the aspect 
of centralised NOTAM data han-
dling. Furthermore, the FMS pro-
vides the time predictions re-
quired for the notification service 
and presentation of NOTAM in-
formation not valid for the whole 
duration of the flight. Besides, the 
mentioned data link to AOC for 
the flight plan upload might be 
extended to handle the ePIB up-
load as well. 
 
5.3.5.3 Core operational concept 
As mentioned above, the baseline 
operational concept encompasses 
that the ePIB is created at AOC by 
the responsible dispatcher and 
subsequently transmitted to the 
aircraft prior to flight, using either 
the available data loaders, or data 
links such as Gate Link/WLAN, 
ACARS. Alternatively, a suitable 
interface with EFB or crew laptops 
could be employed. 
This approach has the huge ad-
vantage that it is completely em-
bedded in the airline workflow, 
independent of any advanced AIS 
functions or formats. In this sense, 
it can be regarded as an autonomous onboard function, since it could in principle be 
realised and introduced by an individual manufacturer or airline for a particular sub-
fleet, provided that NOTAM can be made available in (or converted into) a machine-
readable format. While it is apparently preferable that the AIS-C already provides 
NOTAM in machine-readable format, this conversion could also be performed by the 
airline itself, or the provider of the AMDBs in the beginning. Likewise, such conver-
sion might initially be limited to status changes (i.e. closures, restrictions or renam-
ing) relating to runways. Successively, an extension to taxiways and further AMDB 
elements could be introduced. Intrinsically, therefore, the ePIB is a perfectly scalable 
and extensible solution. 
<?xml version="1.0" standalone="yes" ?> 
<!-- XSD,XMI References here... --> 
 
<ePIB> 
<FlightNumber>LH3220</FlightNumber> 
<CallSign>DLH47Y</CallSign> 
<FlightDate>2006-08-09</FlightDate> 
<CreationDate>2006-08-09</CreationDate> 
<CreationTime>14:30:00Z</CreationTime> 
 
<Origin> 
   <ICAO>EDDF</ICAO> 
   <Runway> 
 <NOTAM bmlfile="EDFF_A1747-06.bml">A1747/06</NOTAM> 
 <NOTAM bmlfile="EDFF_A1767-06.bml">A1767/06</NOTAM> 
 <!-- ... --> 
   </Runway> 
   <MovementArea> 
 <NOTAM bmlfile="EDFF_A1769-06.bml">A1769/06</NOTAM> 
 <!-- ... --> 
   </MovementArea> 
</Origin> 
 
<Destination> 
   <ICAO>ULLI</ICAO> 
   <Runway> 
 <NOTAM bmlfile="ULLL_A3828-06.bml">A3828/06</NOTAM> 
 <NOTAM bmlfile="ULLL_A3836-06.bml">A3836/06</NOTAM> 
 <!-- ... --> 
   </Runway> 
   <ApproachProcedure> 
   </ApproachProcedure> 
   <MovementArea> 
 <NOTAM bmlfile="ULLL_A3826-06.bml">A3826/06</NOTAM> 
 <!-- ... --> 
   </MovementArea> 
</Destination> 
 
<AlternateAirports> 
   <Airport icao="LKPR"> 
   <Runway> 
   </Runway> 
   <ApproachProcedure> 
   </ApproachProcedure> 
   <MovementArea> 
 <NOTAM bmlfile="LKAA_A0848-06.bml">A0848/06</NOTAM> 
 <NOTAM bmlfile="LKAA_A0855-06.bml">A0855/06</NOTAM> 
 <!-- ... --> 
   </MovementArea> 
   </Airport> 
 
   <Airport icao="EDDT"> 
   <!-- ... --> 
   </Airport> 
 
<!-- ... --> 
 
 
</AlternateAirports> 
 
<Enroute> 
<!-- ... --> 
</Enroute> 
 
</ePIB> 
Figure 58: Sample ePIB index file 
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A further example of scalability is the correlation of NOTAM containing changes to 
the airport geometry and available AMDB revisions proposed in Section 5.3.5.1. As a 
first enhancement of the basic ePIB process, the dispatcher could identify, most likely 
aided by software tools, NOTAM containing modifications of airport geometry while 
compiling the electronic PIB. Subsequently, if the currently used AMDB does not yet 
incorporate these changes, a check on the availability of further AMDB revisions 
with the corresponding database provider would follow. Alternatively, database 
providers might submit changed AMDBs to subscribing aircraft operators as soon as 
they become available. If applicable, the corresponding updated AMDB would be 
acquired and uploaded to the aircraft as an off-cycle update together with the elec-
tronic PIB. 
 
In terms of extensibility, the application of the ePIB concept is by no means limited to 
the immediate aerodrome environment and the airport moving map. It is sufficiently 
generic to support e.g. NOTAM on navigational facilities as well. As an example, for 
an ILS that is not working or in maintenance mode, machine-readable NOTAM 
could be used by the FMS e.g. to block the entry/tuning of that particular Navaid 
and related procedures in the aircraft’s FMS or any other part of the autoflight sys-
tem, provided that the flight crew is kept in the loop. 
 
5.3.5.4 In-flight NOTAM updates 
At least for domestic or continental flights of short duration (typically less than 2-3 
hours), the majority of applicable NOTAM is already available prior to the flight, 
which, given the typical lead times for the release of a NOTAM following significant 
short-term changes, virtually eliminates the need for in-flight updates102. 
 
For initial ePIB implementations, the flight crew would be advised in a conventional 
fashion (i.e. via R/T or ACARS text messages) in case important NOTAM are 
amended or cancelled while the aircraft is airborne. To prevent that aircraft systems 
continue to use this then outdated information, pilots must consequently have a pos-
sibility to review and amend the respective data, cf. Section 5.3.4.1. Considerations 
on a corresponding human-machine interface for flight crew interaction with short-
term and temporary information can be found in Section 5.3.6. 
 
However, in line with the considerations in Sections 4.3.3 and 5.3.4.1, the data han-
dling and operational concept must be capable of supporting the transmission of ad-
ditional or updated machine-readable NOTAM information while in flight, at least as 
an option. Nevertheless, there are several open research issues concerning in-flight 
NOTAM updates which need to be addressed, and the number of feasible scenarios 
is considerably limited by the shared responsibility of dispatchers and flight crews in 
some countries, which necessitates that all in-flight NOTAM updates are handled via 
AOC or at least with AOC in the loop in this case, as discussed in Section 4.3.3. 
                                                 
102  Following a runway excursion of a Continental Airlines Boeing B-737 at Denver International Airport on De-
cember 20, 2008 (local date), NOTAM announcing the closure of the affected runway RWY 16R/34L 
(A6517/08) and RWY 16L/34R (A6518/08) were released at 2:20 and 2:23 UTC on Dec. 21st, 2008, i.e. approxi-
mately one hour after the accident. Further NOTAM detailing taxiway closures and restrictions in the vicinity 
of these runways and the accident site were created four hours later. 
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One of the central issues is how the completeness, consistency and integrity of in-
flight NOTAM updates can be guaranteed without shifting tasks from the dispatcher 
to the flight crew, which must be avoided at all cost in order not to increase pilot 
workload. In a scenario where AOC with the dispatcher as single point of contact 
prepares all in-flight NOTAM updates, a copy of the initial ePIB index file created for 
the briefing is always available and can simultaneously serve as an inventory of 
NOTAM already available on board. This facilitates the preparation of subsequent 
updates, because the latest available ePIB index file can be used to determine which 
additional NOTAM have to be transferred to the aircraft or whether any NOTAM 
cancellations are necessary. This helps to ensure that all relevant information is up-
loaded during an update103, whereas e.g. the time filtering window concept proposed 
by the CASCADE OSED [BT05] cannot fulfil this requirement with certainty. 
For scenarios where NOTAM updates can be received directly from the ANSP/AIS 
providers in addition, therefore, the NOTAM configuration of an aircraft must be 
shared with these prior to any in-flight update. However, it remains to be studied 
whether the corresponding data should be transmitted directly via the aircraft, e.g. 
by down-linking the ePIB index file to the corresponding provider, or whether the 
NOTAM configuration could be distributed prior to flight in the same fashion flight 
plan data are exchanged to save airborne data link bandwidth104. At any rate, for any 
in-flight NOTAM update, a direct, simultaneous transmission of relevant NOTAM 
files and an updated ePIB index directly from the ANSP/AIS provider to both air-
craft and AOC will be required to ensure that the dispatcher remains in the loop 
where required, and that the latest NOTAM configuration is always used as baseline 
for subsequent updates. Nevertheless, inconsistencies between AOC and aircraft, 
which might result if information is correctly transmitted from the ANSP/AIS pro-
vider to the aircraft, but not the dispatcher (or vice versa) are a concern. Conse-
quently, in this update scenario, neither the dispatcher nor the flight crew might 
eventually be aware that the other missed information, which could result in confu-
sion if dispatcher and flight crew subsequently discuss an operational situation and 
try to conclude on the decisions to be made based on dissimilar information. By con-
trast, such transmission failures are more likely to be detected if all updates are han-
dled exclusively via AOC, because the dispatcher is then aware that updated infor-
mation has been supplied, and can double-check whether it was correctly received 
by the crew in subsequent communications. 
 
The second significant problem domain encompasses the required flight crew inter-
action during the in-flight NOTAM update process and the associated workload. At 
first glance, this does not seem to be an issue at all, since fully automatic updates in 
the background could ensure that the latest NOTAM information is always available 
for the flight crew to review. However, a closer look reveals that this might not be 
appropriate, since flight crews would then be totally unaware of changes compared 
to the original briefing material and might be confused at first confrontation with 
updated, modified information, or miss relevant changes altogether. 
                                                 
103  Even if in-flight updates are not possible or unavailable, the use of the ePIB copy at AOC ensures that only 
relevant additional or cancellation information is communicated to the flight crew in another way (e.g. R/T). 
104 In this case, however, modifications to the NOTAM configuration would have to be transmitted whenever 
AOC or the AIS/ANSP of another FIR have completed an in-flight NOTAM update. 
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Likewise, it is highly undesirable that pilots are required to collect updated short-
term and temporary information from various ANSP/AIS provider sources, particu-
larly since such updates would most likely occur while ownship is spatially close to 
the respective FIR. Conversely, if NOTAM updates are initiated by the ANSP/AIS 
providers, information would have to be sent every time the aircraft enters the re-
spective domain, without warranty that this would remain the only update while in 
the service area of that particular ANSP/AIS provider. 
Since not all of the updates received in either scenario might be operationally rele-
vant for the immediate flight task at hand, the associated risk is that pilots are dis-
tracted by handling minor and potentially irrelevant updates, with probably detri-
mental impact on workload. Besides, it is unlikely that pilots can keep track of all 
updates received during the flight. Consequently, to ensure that neither critical in-
formation is missed nor workload increases, any updates initiated by an ANSP/AIS 
provider would require a very sophisticated flight crew notification concept, as an 
extension of the functionality discussed in Section 5.3.4.1. The same applies to occur-
ring automatically in the background. 
 
By contrast, if NOTAM updates are handled exclusively via AOC, the dispatcher 
could collect new, amended and cancelled NOTAM and send a consolidated update 
package whenever deemed appropriate or if significant changes occur. Additionally, 
the flight crew might request NOTAM updates at their discretion, either for the com-
plete route, or for specific areas of interest, such as the destination airport or destina-
tion alternates. This might enable them to access relevant information when actually 
needed, without the constraint of having to be in the vicinity of the respective area of 
interest. Furthermore, routing NOTAM updates via AOC has the additional advan-
tage that potential bandwidth limitations of typical airborne data links could be cir-
cumnavigated by using broadband onboard Internet connections where available. In 
this case, a fraction of the bandwidth of Internet services for passengers might be re-
served for the transfer of operational information via an encrypted connection. 
In conclusion, therefore, a centralised handling of in-flight NOTAM updates via 
AOC appears to be preferable, since the complexity of update scenarios and failure 
modes is much lower than for scenarios involving ANSP or AIS providers. Of course, 
this should not preclude the direct, immediate exchange of critical information be-
tween aircraft and ANSP or AIS providers when abnormal situations require this. 
 
In principle, the availability of broadband data link connections aboard aircraft could 
also be used to upload entire AMDBs to aircraft. This seems appropriate for easier 
maintenance or faster flight preparation. However, in view of the considerations in 
Section 5.3.5.1, there is no credible operational concept for a corresponding in-flight 
functionality: neither airports nor airline route networks are spontaneously modified 
from one day to another without prior notification. Since it is assumed that aircraft 
will be deployed with AMDBs for the envisaged route network and the most likely 
alternate airports, the only valid use case for uploading a complete AMDB would be 
a diversion to an airport previously not considered as alternate airport and therefore 
not available onboard the aircraft. However, particularly in case of emergencies, the 
flight crew should not be distracted from the primary tasks in such abnormal opera-
tions by requesting AMDB downloads. 
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5.3.6 Crew Interaction with Short-term and Temporary Information 
Even the short-term and temporary information on the aerodrome environment con-
tained in NOTAM or conveyed via ATIS broadcasts may be subject to change or can-
cellation. Since this can occur on such short notice that a timely update of the respec-
tive information via these sources might be precluded due to the lead times typically 
required (cf. Footnote 102 on p. 198 and Section 3.4.2), it is assumed that flight crews 
need a means of interacting with NOTAM and other short-term or temporary infor-
mation, as outlined in Section 5.3.4.1. In particular, the display of incorrect runway 
closure or restriction information seems unacceptable from a human factors and cer-
tification perspective. Therefore, provisions for cancelling individual NOTAM as 
well as possibilities to review, amend or enter new and updated information, espe-
cially concerning runway status, must be evaluated. 
On most current-generation transport 
category aircraft, the Multipurpose Con-
trol Display Unit (MCDU, Figure 59), 
which is chiefly used to operate the Flight 
Management System (FMS)105, still consti-
tutes the only cockpit interface enabling 
complex interaction processes and alpha-
numeric data entry. It consequently also 
serves as interface to various other air-
craft systems, such as Airline Operations 
Control (AOC) and ATC communication 
functions via the Air Traffic Services Unit 
(ATSU). On the ground, it is additionally 
used by maintenance personnel to access 
the aircraft’s Central Maintenance System 
(CMS)106 [Air05]. 
Nevertheless, with its text-based menu 
structure, the MCDU is quite far from a 
modern, human-centred ergonomic de-
sign, but rather reflects the technical pos-
sibilities at the beginning of the 1980s. It 
has consequently been replaced by a cur-
sor- and keyboard-operated graphical 
user interface using a standard size cock-
pit display on the latest Airbus and Boe-
ing aircraft developments. 
In spite of this, the MCDU remains a likely candidate for flight crew interaction with 
short-term and temporary information, since the prime research focus in this context 
is not on the optimisation of the interface between flight crew and aircraft systems, 
but rather on validating the need for pilot interaction with NOTAM information in a 
representative environment. Besides, providing pilots with a way of interaction they 
                                                 
105  This includes flight plan entry and modifications as well as the handling of aircraft performance data and the 
underlying ARINC 424 navigation databases. 
106  For simplicity, this section uses the Airbus names of the respective systems, some of which may be customer 
options not available on each airframe. Other aircraft manufacturers may use a slightly different terminology. 
 
Figure 59: Multipurpose Control Display 
Unit (MCDU) currently used on Airbus 
A330/A340 [Tha05] 
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are familiar with will help to eliminate potential confounders resulting from an en-
tirely new flight crew interface, which might unintentionally shift the focus of feed-
back towards the interaction concept. Therefore, a conventional MCDU-based inter-
action was selected for this thesis, which also addresses the flight deck integration 
aspects outlined in Section 4.6.1 appropriately, because the still MCDU-equipped 
A320 and A330/A340 aircraft families were chosen as reference aircraft. 
 
On these aircraft, the MCDUs for the two flight crew member are located slightly 
forward and sideways of the thrust levers on the centre pedestal, as shown in Figure 
24 on p. 82. A typical MCDU display screen contains 14 lines; the last is referred to as 
‘scratchpad’ and used either to insert and modify data, or to display FMS messages, 
such as ‘A/C POSITION INVALID’ in Figure 59. Six Line Select Keys (LSK) each on 
the right and left side of the display screen, identified as 1L through 6L and 1R to 6R, 
respectively, can be used to transfer data typed in the scratchpad to data fields adja-
cent to the LSKs, to access sub-menus indicated by the symbols < and >, or to acti-
vate a specific function identified by the prompts *, ← and → [Tha05]. An example of 
MCDU data entry is given in Appendix III. 
 
Based on the concept for an electronic PIB outlined in the previous section, an ‘ePIB 
Main’ menu page accessible from the MCDU root menu was created as central flight 
crew means of reviewing the ePIB and interacting with its content. To ensure consis-
tency with current applications, all the MCDU page designs presented below were 
drafted taking into account the guidelines laid down in ref. [Tha05]. 
The proposed ePIB Main 
menu (see Figure 60) con-
tains fundamental PIB 
information, such as ap-
plicable flight number, 
creation date and -time. 
Below, a typical MCDU 
menu enables a struc-
tured review of ePIB in-
formation based on the 
grouping of NOTAM 
information in a conven-
tional PIB [DLH06a]. It is 
envisaged that flight 
crews can use this menu 
structure to obtain an 
overview of the NOTAM 
available for origin and 
departure airport, en-route segments or alternate airports and eventually access in-
dividual NOTAM, as shown in Figure 61. This would also give pilots the possibility 
to manually de-activate NOTAM that have been cancelled or to highlight the aero-
drome elements concerned by a certain NOTAM on the airport moving map. A more 
detailed description of the ePIB MCDU pages and the underlying design considera-
tions can be found in Appendix III-1. 
 
Figure 60: ePIB Main Page displayed on the MCDU in the TUD 
simulator cockpit 
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   A1865/07    
    FRANKFURT MAIN EDDF    
 –  VALID: 23-JUL 20:00 – 28-JUL 04:00  –  
   DAILY: 20:00 - 04:00    
 –  RWY 07R/25L CLOSED.  –  
      
 –   –  
      
 –   –  
      
 –   HIGHLIGHT *  –  
       
 –  < RETURN DE-ACTIVATE *  –  
   ↑↓    
       
Figure 61: ePIB NOTAM review page with highlight & de-activation function  
 
However, it became quickly apparent during design reviews with pilots that it might 
be too cumbersome and slow to access specific runway-related NOTAM through this 
ePIB MCDU page structure in case of last-minute changes, because several interac-
tion steps will typically be required. Furthermore, by definition, the ePIB MCDU 
page concept only allows the de-activation of existing NOTAM, but not the entry of 
new or additional information on runway status, and does not take into account D-
ATIS information, e.g. on active runways, at all. 
To address these shortcomings, and to ensure that any runway status update made 
available on very short notice by means other than data link (e.g. via R/T) can be en-
tered conveniently, the idea of a synoptic Airport Menu presenting a combined 
NOTAM and ATIS status for all runways available at a specific aerodrome was born. 
 
       
   AIRPORT MENU    
    ATIS J 14:30     
 –  FRANKFURT MAIN EDDF  –  
   RUNWAY ACTIVE/STATUS    
 –  07L/25R 25R/ALL OPS  –  
       
 –  07R/25L 25L/LANDING  –  
       
 –  18 /--- 18 /TAKEOFF  –  
       
 –    –  
       
 –  < RETURN EPIB-NOTAM >  –  
       
       
Figure 62: SMAAS Main Page (MCDU) 
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Figure 62 illustrates the solution evaluated in the frame of this thesis. The Airport 
Menu presents both official name and ICAO identifier of the currently selected air-
port. Besides, an ATIS code letter and the associated release time are indicated to 
emphasise on which ATIS transmission the information presented is based. In con-
tract mode, the system would automatically receive the latest D-ATIS information on 
the runways in use and closed runways, if applicable. 
 
By default, the Airport Menu will show data for the origin airport specified in the 
FMS whenever the aircraft is at the origin airport. Once the aircraft has taken off, the 
data for the FMS destination airport will be displayed. Using LSK 1R, however, the 
crew can alter the airport for which data should be displayed by typing in the ICAO 
identifier, e.g. if they want to review, enter or amend information for an alternate or 
the destination airport at any time during the flight. 
The main feature of the MCDU Airport Menu is a list of the runways available at the 
currently selected airport. For each runway, information on the applicable active 
runway and general runway status is given. Titles and menu items are presented in 
white, and fixed data is visualised in green font, while information that may be al-
tered by the pilots and functions that may be activated are displayed in blue. The 
only exception from this rule is the runway selected in the FMS flight plan (if appli-
cable), which is shown in white, in line with colour coding used on the airport mov-
ing map (cf. Section 5.3.2). 
Flight crews may change active runway and status information by typing the desired 
modification in the scratchpad and subsequently inserting it in the corresponding 
runway field with the appropriate LSK on the right. It is intentional that the altera-
tion of data requires explicit typing and inserting, because this safeguards the system 
against inadvertent modifications, compared to a solution where flight crews can 
simply toggle active runway and status information with the LSKs. An issue that re-
mains, of course, is the entry of erroneous information. Nevertheless, this is essen-
tially applicable to all MCDU inputs by the crew. Generally, however, flight crews 
have adapted to using the MCDU and been able to partially compensate its ergo-
nomic deficiencies, such as the alphabetically ordered keyboard. 
Since the MCDU Airport Menu is limited to reviewing and editing runway-related 
short-term and temporary information, the use of ePIB MCDU pages presented 
above is envisaged for interaction with NOTAM concerning the remainder of the 
aerodrome. Whether this is appropriate remains to be evaluated. Likewise, the ePIB 
MCDU pages, which are essentially a by-product of the ePIB, may have an added 
value for reviewing or recalling NOTAM in flight, which also needs to be established 
by future studies. Last but not least, for aircraft with a fully interactive Cockpit Dis-
play System (CDS), a modification of runway or taxiway status using direct pilot in-
teraction with the corresponding airport moving map elements will have to be as-
sessed. 
 
For the simulator evaluation campaign described in Chapter 8, some of the proposed 
MCDU ePIB pages and the Airport Menu were integrated in the NLR Research Flight 
Management System (RFMS), as described in Section 8.3.2. In fact, Figure 60 shows 
this NLR realisation. More detailed design considerations and the handling of special 
cases are described in Appendix III-2. 
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5.4 Clearance Awareness Function (CAF) 
 
The Clearance Awareness Function (CAF) enables a visualisation of airport-related 
ATC instructions and clearances, such as the assigned taxi route or take-off and land-
ing clearances, on the flight deck. This is aimed at improving both safety and effi-
ciency of aerodrome operations. As discussed in Section 4.3.4, an onboard solution 
emerges as the most promising approach to address the corresponding High-Level 
Requirement IV. 
A continuously accessible representa-
tion of taxi instructions on the airport 
moving map, as shown in Figure 63, is 
intended to enable the flight crew to 
review an assigned taxi route, to moni-
tor taxi progress and to detect potential 
deviations intuitively. Presumably, this 
will also contribute to resolving poten-
tial ambiguities and uncertainties result-
ing from phraseology or language profi-
ciency issues, and might thus help pilots 
to dispel any doubts about controller 
intentions. 
Consequently, a visualisation of the taxi 
route is expected to reduce the number 
of inadvertent deviations from ATC in-
structions, which may ultimately lead to 
Runway Incursions. This is believed to 
reduce the risk of Runway Incursions significantly, because it seems hardly possible 
to take a completely wrong taxiway or to confuse runways without noticing the in-
evitable discrepancies with the presented taxi route, which can therefore also be re-
garded as an additional layer of protection against disorientation. Furthermore, since 
ATC is obliged to provide conflict-free routing to aircraft [ICA01a], a stricter adher-
ence to the assigned taxi route could also lower the risk of collisions with other traffic 
on the manoeuvring area outside the runways. 
 
Apart from the expected increase in safety, there might be efficiency benefits as well. 
Particularly on complex airfields and if the crew is not too familiar with the airport 
environment, missing a turn or taking a wrong taxiway is hardly a rare exception, 
since there are presumably several occurrences around the world every day. In good 
visibility, chances are high that such navigation errors are detected, and see-and-
avoid procedures can be employed to minimize the risk of colliding with other traf-
fic. Nonetheless, such deviations nearly always lead to re-routing, increased taxi 
times and subsequently higher fuel burn. The inconveniences and delays that are 
likely to result in this situation may not be limited to the deviating aircraft itself, and 
thus cause an obvious reduction of efficiency. It is therefore believed that displaying 
the taxi route on the airport moving map is crucial for improving and maintaining 
safety and efficiency of ground operations. 
 
Figure 63: Airport moving map with repre-
sentation of assigned taxi route 
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However, Runway Incursions do not always result from a loss of position awareness 
on the aerodrome or a deviation from an assigned taxi route, but rather from a misin-
terpretation of an instruction to hold short of a runway, irrespective of whether this 
results from phraseology problems, call-sign confusion or a wrong mindset. Like-
wise, having the wrong impression of being cleared for take-off (or landing), or be-
lieving to have approval to cross a runway, to backtrack or to line up is hardly a 
problem of position awareness. 
From a safety point of view, it is consequently essential that not only the taxi route, 
but also ATC instructions and clearances relating to the runway are brought to the 
attention of the crew in a suitable form, cf. Section 4.3.4. Therefore, displaying these 
on the airport moving map is believed to be crucial to avoid erroneous runway us-
age. Moreover, there is always a risk that a crew that has been instructed to line up 
on a runway gets the false impression that a take-off clearance has been issued as 
well, and takes off without clearance, as in the Tenerife disaster (cf. Appendix I-1). 
 
5.4.1 Concept & Research Issues 
It is assumed for the purposes for this thesis that interaction with ATC instructions 
and clearances in the aerodrome environment takes place via the existing optional 
FANS DCDU equipment, as discussed in Section 4.3.4. This has the important impli-
cation that the visualisation on the airport moving map will always be accompanied 
by a textual presentation, which is entirely equivalent to the phraseology presently 
used in conventional R/T communication, cf. [ICA01a, ICA01d, ICA06], in line with 
virtually all currently implemented FANS clearances [FAN06]. Figure 64 illustrates 
this concept for a standard taxi instruction. The fields containing variables (runway 
and route) are shown in cyan, since the flight crew has not yet acknowledged (cf. Sec-
tion 3.4). The taxi route instructed in this example corresponds to the route presented 
in Figure 63. 
Furthermore, it is presumed that having the DCDU installed at a prominent location 
in the cockpit will ensure that the pilots are always able to discern a CPDLC and a 
non-CPDLC environment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 64: Airbus A320/A330 family DCDU with CPDLC taxi clearance 
0723Z FROM EDDF GND 
TAXI TO HP RWY 07L 
VIA   M  A  L 
OPEN 
*UNABLE 
<OTHER 
STBY* 
WILCO* 
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5.4.1.1 Taxi route and related instructions 
There are several technical and conceptual issues regarding the encoding, transmis-
sion, processing and visualisation of taxi instructions that have to be assessed care-
fully. As discussed in Section 4.3.4, one of the key technical issues is how to obtain 
the taxi route in a suitable machine-readable format for display and, subsequently, 
the alerting part of the SMAAS. Receiving taxi instructions via CPDLC is apparently 
preferable, but requires that a corresponding CPDLC service supporting machine-
readable taxi instructions is available. Therefore, an associated issue is whether it 
might be desirable (or required) to have provisions for manual entry as a back-up.  
 
5.4.1.1.1 Manual entry of taxi instructions 
There are no fundamental technical hurdles precluding the computation of a taxi 
route based on a manually entered series of taxiway identifiers and the geometrical 
information in an AMDB. Besides, many crews already use the scratchpad of the 
MCDU107 to write down taxi instructions, which are typically issued as a sequence of 
taxiway identifiers by the controller. Consequently, a solution using a dedicated 
MCDU page to enable the flight crew to generate a taxi route for display in this fash-
ion could be envisaged and would probably not create significant additional work-
load. As a further or alternative option, if standard taxi routes are used at an airport, 
pilots could retrieve a stored pre-processed standard taxi route in the same fashion 
SIDs and STARs are currently inserted in the FMS flight plan. 
Nonetheless, workload aspects and the risk that the crew enters possibly incorrect 
data have to be considered versus the expected benefits. The variant of displaying 
pre-processed standard taxi routes appears to be a viable option for airports not 
equipped with CPDLC or as back-up in case of CPDLC failure, since the stored data 
can be validated beforehand by comparison to the published route, and will thus ac-
curately reflect the controller’s intention. An apparent drawback of this approach, 
however, is its inflexibility: as soon as the dynamics of the situation necessitates a 
diversion from the standard taxi route, it would either have to be removed from the 
display to prevent showing potentially misleading information, or adapted manu-
ally. Nevertheless, the main risk associated with computing or adapting a route 
based on manually entered taxiway identifiers is that the resulting route might not 
exactly correspond to the controller’s intention for some reason, even if the crew en-
ters everything correctly. As an example, verbal taxi instructions are sometimes sim-
plified and may omit the identifiers of minor taxiways along the route, which might 
nonetheless be important for the system to obtain an unambiguous route. The situa-
tion can be complicated further by local rules, such as the usage of taxiway M for 
widebody aircraft and M1 for single aisle aircraft at Frankfurt Airport (EDDF), which 
would have to be captured sufficiently in the system. 
In conclusion, due to the potentially compelling nature of displaying an assigned taxi 
route, the risk of potential ambiguities resulting in misleading information was con-
sidered unacceptable by the pilots during prototyping, and the approach of manual 
taxi route entry as a backup was therefore not pursued any further. 
                                                 
107  All alphanumerical entries made on the MCDU keyboard are initially transferred to the bottom line of the 
MCDU, the so-called scratchpad. If the flight crew are satisfied with their entry, they can commit it into one of 
the data fields available on the current MCDU page by pressing the adjacent MFK. 
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5.4.1.1.2 Taxi route assignments 
When flight crews receive taxi instructions in the current R/T environment, they can 
either acknowledge by reading back the route assignment, or declare themselves un-
able to comply, cf. Section 2.1.2. As discussed in Sections 3.4 and 4.3.4, this acknowl-
edgment process is also retained in a CPDLC environment.  
 
The main challenge associated with transitioning to CPDLC taxi instructions is accu-
rately capturing the multitude of different route assignment scenarios that exist to-
day. Typically, controllers will clear a flight up to a certain runway holding position 
or stop bar, either of the take-off runway or any other runway to be crossed on the 
way to the departure runway. Sometimes, however, additional intermediate holds 
may be required at taxiway intersections due to other traffic. Consequently, ATC 
usually does not assign the entire planned taxi route from the gate to the assigned 
runway (or vice versa) en block in a single step. Rather, most of the larger airports 
use progressive taxi instructions as described above, because this gives controllers 
more flexibility to react to changing situations. In fact, amendments to the instructed 
and acknowledged taxi route can occur any time. 
During taxi operations, the aircraft will also frequently have to cross active runways, 
and occasionally use part of the runway itself to taxi or, less frequently, backtrack. 
Last but not least, the special case of conditional clearances needs to be addressed. 
ATC may instruct flight crews to follow a certain taxi route after another aircraft has 
passed, e.g. “Give way to company A320, then taxi…”. Since the visualisation of 
conditional clearances involving other traffic might be dependent on the availability 
of traffic data for this particular aircraft (or vehicle), one of the main challenges is an 
adequate error handling in case this condition is not fulfilled. 
 
It is evident from the above considerations that these different assignment stages and 
scenarios have to be accurately reflected when visualising taxi instructions. Clearly, 
displaying taxi instructions only after flight crew acknowledgment does not seem to 
be a desirable option, since this would deprive pilots of the possibility to review the 
route assignment in graphical format before acknowledging or rejecting. 
 
First and foremost, therefore, pilots must be able to distinguish whether they have 
already acknowledged a taxi route presented on the airport moving map or not, also 
because a visualisation of read-back status is required for reasons of consistency with 
existing CPDLC implementations, cf. Section 4.3.4.  
Besides, whenever an existing taxi route is amended or extended, a removal of the 
already acknowledged taxi route and a limitation of the display to the modified ATC 
route proposal does not seem to be appropriate, because a comparison of current and 
new or updated assignment might be relevant for an intuitive comprehension of 
changes and decision making. This scenario is illustrated in Figure 65, which makes 
exemplary use of different colours to allow a distinction of the currently assigned 
taxi route (green) and the changes and extensions proposed by ATC (cyan). It is im-
mediately evident from the figure that an indiscriminate representation of taxi in-
structions irrespective of read-back status will almost inevitably create confusion, 
because the flight crew would have to refer to the textual instruction on the DCDU to 
distinguish the routes.  
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When progressive taxi instructions are used, the intermediate holding position speci-
fied does not necessarily coincide with the end of the assigned taxi route segment, 
because the controller might sometimes want to provide the flight crew with an 
overall picture of ATC intentions for better planning. Consequently, to reflect this, 
there might be a need for different representations to distinguish the part of the route 
up to the intermediate hold, which is approved for immediate execution, and an as-
signed segment beyond subject to further ATC instructions or approval, as in Figure 
66. However, particularly in complex traffic scenarios, there is an inherent risk that 
especially those parts of the taxi route that are given ‘for information only’ in this 
manner may subsequently change. Therefore, the added value of displaying this part 
of the route has to be assessed carefully. Likewise, it must be established whether 
flight crews always correctly understand what their acknowledgement relates to. 
 
Additionally, another distinct representation might be required for conditional clear-
ances as long as the specified condition is not fulfilled yet. For both conditional clear-
ances and parts of the taxi route that are subject to further ATC approval, the under-
lying assumption is that the representation will change to the default as-
signed/acknowledged state as described above once the conditions are fulfilled or 
further approval has been obtained. 
Last but not least, it must be studied how the taxiway intersection markings, taxiway 
holding positions or stop bars acting as clearance limits should be represented in all 
of the above cases to be sufficiently conspicuous to the flight crew. 
 
5.4.1.1.3 Taxi route encoding 
The main technical and conceptual issue related to the machine-readable encoding 
and transmission of taxi routes is whether the corresponding data should be trans-
mitted as meta information in the form of taxiway identifiers, as a series of points, or 
  
Figure 65: Simultaneous visualisation of cur-
rent taxi route (green) and assigned, but not 
yet acknowledged amendment (cyan) 
Figure 66: Taxi route with additional inter-
mediate hold at a taxiway intersection, and 
full route (dashed line) given for information 
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whether a combination of both approaches might be necessary. In either case, route 
information would have to be supplemented by a clearance limit (i.e. the applicable 
holding position) and data on conditional clearances, if applicable, which might con-
tain the callsign of other traffic and a type code for the condition. 
The obvious disadvantage of a purely geometric solution is that it is highly depend-
ent on the aerodrome database used by ATC in generating the route. Imprecision of 
either the onboard or the ATC database might therefore lead to a taxi route that may 
routinely be slightly shifted from the taxiway centreline, and, in a worst case sce-
nario, completely off the taxiway or extend beyond an intended holding position or 
stop bar. While the first case has merely human factors implications, the latter may 
eventually lead to the display of wrong or misleading information, with potential 
implications from a certification point of view. 
Another issue concerns the bandwidth of the airborne data link envisaged for 
CPDLC. Especially for curves, several points or additional geometry information 
might be required for a sufficiently smooth and precise representation, and thus eas-
ily require the transmission of an array containing 20+ latitude and longitude values 
with high precision, which would potentially have to supplemented by geometry 
type codes (e.g. line, curve, spline, …). 
 
In contrast to this, meta information for a taxi route will hardly exceed a series of 10 
to 15 taxiway identifiers. Furthermore, a corresponding solution could potentially be 
realised on a smaller timescale, because it features better compatibility with the exist-
ing FANS CPDLC technology down-selected for this thesis, which will require taxi-
way identifiers at any rate to display the textual part of the clearance on the 
DCDU108. Subsequently, meta information would be used for onboard processing of 
the taxi route to be displayed on the AMM based on the taxiway guidance lines and 
other relevant features contained in the AMDB. An apparent advantage of this ap-
proach - apart from presumably lower data link load - is that the route thus calcu-
lated is intrinsically always perfectly aligned with the airport moving map. Never-
theless, this solution might require extensive onboard processing 
Clearly, the meta information approach has the larger growth potential, because it 
enables direct cross-checking of the proposed route for potentially applicable taxi-
way closures and restrictions that are either directly stored in the AMDB (such as 
mass or wingspan limitations) or accessible via NOTAM (e.g. closures), and thus a 
detection of ATC errors. By contrast, with a purely geometric solution, an identifica-
tion of the corresponding taxiways or taxiway segments will most likely necessitate 
extensive computations. Besides, this solution is not in accordance with the AMDB 
design philosophy of combining functional attributes and geometric data. 
 
On the other hand, the risk associated with the meta solution is that ambiguities 
might occur if several possible routes can be constructed from a sequence of taxiway 
identifiers. Likewise, the connectivity of taxiway guidance lines in the AMDB is 
clearly an issue complicating the processing of a taxi route from meta information. A 
further problem is that the current AMDB standard DO-272A/ED-99A does pres-
ently not contain provisions for an unambiguous ‘natural’ identification of taxiway 
                                                 
108  From a purely technical perspective, the changes required to the existing ATC controller working position 
FANS interface are less complex for this approach as well. 
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holding positions, cf. [RTC05], once a certain degree of complexity has been reached. 
For illustration, consider the example of the holding positions on taxiway K7 at the 
intersection with RWY 09R/27L at Paris Charles-de-Gaulle Airport (LFPG). In an 
AMDB, holding positions are primarily identified by the object identifier ‘idlin’, 
which always references the name of the taxiway segment the holding position is 
located on. For the LFPG example, this will result in four taxiway holding positions 
with ‘idlin’ set to K7. Since this is apparently not sufficient for characterisation, the 
two further attributes associated with the taxiway holding position feature in 
DO-272A/ED-99A are: 
 
 idp (≡ idrwy) the runway the stop bar refers to 
 catstop  low visibility category for which the stop bar is applicable 
 
Nevertheless, this still does not permit to fully eliminate the ambiguity, because there 
is a holding position corresponding to ‘idlin.idp.catstop’ on each side of the runway. 
Therefore, an extension of ED-99A might be envisaged to create a unique identifier 
for each holding position, which could consist of an additional attribute containing 
its relative location in relation to the runway, and would then indicate by a single 
character whether the holding position in question is rather north (N), south (S), east 
(E) or west (W) relative to the runway it refers to. Display and user applications 
could then access stop bars individually without comparison to geometrical reference 
positions. 
 
In conclusion, neither approach currently fully satisfies all potential certification or 
human factors aspects. As a preliminary conclusion, a combination of both ap-
proaches, i.e. meta information supplemented by certain check point coordinates 
(e.g. one per taxiway), could integrate the advantages of both solutions while avoid-
ing the potential pitfalls of each individual one. A more detailed discussion on this 
matter is beyond the scope of this thesis. In the long run, however, a meta solution 
seems preferable. 
 
5.4.1.2 Runway-related clearances 
While a taxi route ending at a runway holding position or stop bar might be suitable 
to emphasize a ‘hold short of’-instruction and thus contribute to Runway Incursion 
prevention, the subsequent runway-related ATC instructions and clearances are even 
more essential from a runway safety point of view. As discussed in Section 4.3.4, they 
will therefore be addressed by a dedicated CPDLC clearance/approval and ac-
knowledgement process and not be implicitly contained in the assigned CPDLC taxi 
route, which also reflects the organisation of ATC at airports. Only crossing or back-
tracking closed runways (where possible) and operation on non-active runways (in a 
U.S. operational environment only) may be handled as part of a taxi route assign-
ment. 
 
It should be noted, though, that this concerns CPDLC data handling and interaction 
only, and is completely independent of how these instructions and clearances are 
eventually presented on the airport moving map. 
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The following cases have to be covered: 
 
• approval to cross a runway 
• approval to taxi or back-track on a runway 
• approval to line up and wait on a runway 
• clearance to take off from a runway 
• clearance to land on a runway 
 
For all of the above CPDLC instructions and clearances, there is an additional condi-
tional variant, for example “After landing KLM Fokker 100…” or “You are No. 2 af-
ter Lufthansa Airbus…” The availability of traffic and aerodrome mapping data on 
the display also provides fully new opportunities to visualize these conditional clear-
ances involving other aircraft, which are particularly sensitive to misunderstanding, 
as the accident in Paris in 2000 (see Appendix I-8) and the Munich incident in 2004 
(Appendix I-16) show. In contrast to taxi routes, neither assignment scenarios nor 
machine-readable encoding constitute any difficulty, and the considerations on read-
back status and the availability of traffic data when conditional clearances are used 
apply accordingly. The key research issue is therefore an appropriate visualisation of 
these CPDLC instructions and clearances. 
For an approval to cross or to back-track a runway, including using part of the run-
way for taxiing, one of the main decisions to be made is whether to represent these 
instructions implicitly in the fashion of a taxi route, or whether a dedicated, poten-
tially entirely different explicit visualisation is necessary in this case. The same con-
siderations apply to an approval to line up and wait on a runway as well. Here, the 
main concern with an implicit representation is that the difference between a situa-
tion where the aircraft has to hold short of a runway and a scenario where line-up is 
approved may not be as evident as desired particularly in the larger airport moving 
map ranges envisaged to be used for runway traffic surveillance.  
Another aspect that needs to be studied is the timing of runway-related ATC instruc-
tions and clearances. This involves timeliness and time criticality as well as situations 
such as being lined up and waiting on a runway for an extended period of time 
without receiving a take-off clearance. In this situation, an advisory or alert of some 
kind might be required. 
 
5.4.1.3 CPDLC implementation stages and scenarios 
Since the transition scenario from the current R/T to CPDLC in the runway envi-
ronment remains to be established, cf. Section 4.3.4, it is likely that CPDLC clearances 
in the airport environment will be introduced in two stages, beginning with CPDLC 
taxi route service. Therefore, two different scenarios have to be covered: 
 
a) Taxi instructions are provided via CPDLC, but all runway-related clearances 
are still only transmitted via standard R/T. 
b) All clearances are provided using CPDLC. 
 
It is evident that the flight crew needs provisions to distinguish these two scenarios 
at a glance, because the transition may occur gradually on an airport-by-airport basis. 
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5.4.1.4 Compensation for the ‘party line effect’ in a CPDLC environment 
One of the unresolved issues with a CPDLC environment is that the crew loses 
awareness of the ATC instructions and clearances issued to other traffic, which is 
obtained through the so-called ‘party line effect’ in a conventional R/T environment. 
While a detailed study of this aspect is beyond the scope of this thesis, a few general 
considerations are presented below. 
 
In order to address the problem of the missing party line effect, broadcasting CPDLC 
clearances to all parties involved could be envisaged. The resulting CPDLC-B service 
might enable the visualisation of clearances assigned to other traffic, either on pilot 
request or in case of potentially conflicting clearances. Likewise, information of gen-
eral interest to all parties, such as the take-off sequence for a given runway, could be 
shared in this fashion. 
CPDLC-B information on what other traffic has been instructed to do might even 
improve the flight crew’s situational awareness compared to the present situation 
and aid pilots in anticipating potential conflicts, because instructions or clearances to 
other traffic would be continuously available and accessible in graphical and textual 
form109. On the radio, if the flight crew misses part of the ATC communication with 
other traffic for some reason, the information is lost. On the system side, access to 
instructions issued to other traffic via CPDLC-B could help to make traffic alerting 
more specific and decrease the number of nuisance alerts. 
Nevertheless, whether this is suitable to compensate for the party line effect remains 
to be studied. A possible drawback of the CPDLC-B approach apart from data link 
bandwidth is that it shifts the perception of further information from the audio chan-
nel to the visual channel. While the problem of frequency congestion, particularly at 
hub airports, should not be underestimated, the potential impact of concentrating 
information on the visual channel must not be neglected. 
 
Another option could be the parallel use of CPDLC and voice communication for 
runway-related ATC instructions and clearances. However, this violates the recom-
mendations of ICAO Doc. 4444, according to which either CPDLC or voice commu-
nication shall be used, except in case of emergency [ICA01a]. 
Nonetheless, the use of two different media to convey a runway-related clearance is 
already reality at many airports today. At airports equipped with stop bars, most 
airlines and several airports/ATM providers instruct pilots not to proceed across a lit 
stop bar even if line-up or crossing has been approved via R/T. In that sense, addi-
tional CPDLC clearances might add a third ‘line of defence’ to the runway for the 
case of entry on the ground and a second for take-off and landing, provided that the 
technology chosen to implement CPDLC can guarantee immediate delivery of these 
messages. Moreover, to avoid inconsistencies, the stop bar lighting could be coupled 
to the CPDLC process within the ground system. 
At any rate, the concept of dual CPDLC/voice clearances for the runway environ-
ment needs further studies at conceptual level and extensive validation. Initial steps 
in this direction were conducted in the frame of the simulator experiment described 
in Chapter 8. 
                                                 
109  This could help to reduce problems due to language proficiency, as the crew could choose their preferred 
ICAO or even local language to display clearances. 
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5.4.2 Visualisation of Taxi Route Assignments 
The most common solution to represent a route is a continuous line in a conspicuous 
colour. This applies to the FMS flight plan as well as to domains outside aviation, 
such as automotive navigation systems. While earlier studies experimented with a 
follow-me car like alternating pattern of black and yellow segments [Kub99], there is 
little dispute that a taxi route that has been assigned by ATC and acknowledged by 
the crew should be represented by a continuous green line, in analogy to FANS col-
our coding and the ‘follow the greens’ logic employed at some A-SMGCS equipped 
airfields. Another analogy is the representation of the active FMS flight plan also in 
green on Airbus aircraft. 
 
As discussed in the previous section, 
however, the read-back status of the 
instruction needs to be reflected as well 
in a CPDLC environment. If ATC as-
signs a new taxi route, the first step 
consists of displaying the taxi instruc-
tions on the Datalink Control and Dis-
play Unit (DCDU) or any other interface 
used for CPDLC in textual form, as for 
any other CPDLC clearance. Simultane-
ously or immediately afterwards, the 
proposed taxi route is also displayed on 
the airport moving map. In order not to 
confuse the crew by presenting an as-
signed route without the associated 
read-back or confirmation dialogue, it 
seems to be important to achieve either 
a simultaneous presentation of route 
and textual clearance, or to maintain the sequence above. The route assigned by ATC 
is presented in cyan, which is in line with the current use of this colour for ATC as-
signments on the DCDU. When the crew acknowledges the route using the DCDU, 
the representation is changed to green. To emphasize the representation of the taxi 
route, the text of taxiway labels along the taxi route could also be changed from the 
default yellow to cyan or green, respectively, as shown in Figure 67. Due to time con-
straints, however, the label highlight function was eventually not implemented for 
simulator evaluation. 
 
Those parts of a taxi route beyond an intermediate hold subject to further ATC ap-
proval are always presented as a dashed cyan line. Only the part up to the up to the 
specified holding position or other applicable limit changes to solid green, based on 
the consideration that the flight crew’s acknowledgement can only refer to the part of 
the taxi route assigned for immediate execution. Besides, from a human factors per-
spective, the acknowledgment process is more consistent if the dashed cyan route 
changes to solid cyan when ATC subsequently assigns the next part of the route for 
acknowledgment when the aircraft approaches (or is at) the intermediate holding 
position, compared to a solution where a dashed green route reverts to solid cyan. 
 
Figure 67: Display of the taxi route with 
highlighted taxiway labels 
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For planning purposes, flight crews may also desire to have information on the taxi 
route to be expected while still at the gate. In line with the discussion above, an ex-
pected taxi route could therefore also be visualized by a dashed cyan line. 
Route modifications and extensions are handled as follows: When ATC sends a route 
extension or amendment for acknowledgement, it is always drawn in addition to and 
on to of the already acknowledged (part of the) taxi route. If the change impacts the 
part of the route prior to the current clearance limit, the whole route assignment from 
ownship to the new holding position is drawn in cyan, as illustrated by Figure 65. 
Otherwise, only the part beyond the current clearance limit is presented in cyan. In 
either case, any ‘for information only’ part of the route is replaced if applicable, in an 
attempt to limit complexity. 
An explicit result of the prototyping sessions was that those parts of the assigned taxi 
route that the aircraft has already traversed should be removed from the airport 
moving map, since they provide no added value. 
 
5.4.2.1 Visualisation of clearance limits 
From the considerations in the previous section, it is evident that the currently appli-
cable holding position or other clearance limit needs to be visualised in conjunction 
with the taxi route. This is confirmed by design reviews and prototyping sessions 
with pilots, which revealed that an explicit visualisation of the clearance limit is de-
sired that needs to be more conspicuous than merely an ending route. 
Consequently, intermediate holding positions on a taxiway are always represented 
by highlighting the corresponding taxiway intersection marking in the colour of the 
route, or an equivalent line perpendicular to the end of the taxi route, cf. Figure 65. 
Likewise, if a taxi route contains a runway holding position, this holding position is 
displayed in red to emphasize the hold-short-of instruction (see Figure 68). Appar-
ently, this is only useful in a scenario where at least CPDLC line-up clearances are 
employed. 
  
Figure 68: Taxi route with clearance limit 
(runway holding position) 
Figure 69: Taxi route with additional ap-
proval to line up and wait on RWY 26L 
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Otherwise, it seems virtually impossible to determine a useful triggering event for 
the ‘extinction’ of the red stop bar. As an example, switching the red stop bar back to 
normal a couple of seconds after the aircraft has come to a stop near the holding posi-
tion might easily give the flight crew the misleading impression that line-up has been 
approved. Therefore, to emphasize the route-only CPDLC scenario to pilots, the 
clearance limit is indicated by a filled green circle, positioned slightly in front of the 
corresponding holding position, in this scenario, which ensures that the flight crew 
will not have to cross a ‘virtual red stop bar’ on the airport moving map. 
 
5.4.2.2 Conditional clearances 
 
When a conditional taxi instruction involving other traffic is assigned, the part which 
is still subject to the constraint that the crew gives way to the other aircraft is repre-
sented as a dashed cyan line. Likewise, the aircraft or vehicle constituting the con-
straint, including its label, is displayed in cyan. When the crew acknowledges the 
clearance, the colour of both the traffic symbol and the dashed taxi route changes to 
green, in analogy to the non-active flight plan (see Section 5.4.3.4 below). This situa-
tion is illustrated by Figure 70: the flight crew will have to give way to flight DLH 
416, which is the second to pass its present position. It is believed that highlighting 
the constraining aircraft in this fashion will help to prevent confusion as to which 
traffic the controller is referring to. Once the other aircraft has joined the taxi route 
(and achieved a certain safety distance from ownship), the taxi route representation 
changes to solid green, and the symbol of the aircraft ownship had to give way to 
changes back to the normal white representation, as shown in Figure 71 – once the 
condition of the route assignment has been fulfilled, there does not seem to be any 
need to deviate from the standard taxi route representation 
 
Table 8 gives a concluding overview of the different taxi route representations con-
ceived to reflect the various cases for the assigned and the acknowledged stage. 
  
Figure 70: Acknowledged conditional taxi 
route assignment before condition fulfilment 
Figure 71: Conditional taxi route assignment 
after condition has been fulfilled 
DLH416 
DLH7YW 
DLH7YW 
AFL106 
AFL106 
DLH416 
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Taxi Route Representations assigned acknowledged Remark 
Default taxi route or route segment 
for immediate execution cyan green 
FANS standard 
colour coding 
Route segment beyond clearance limit 
subject to further progressive clearance dashed cyan dashed cyan  
Route segment subject to conditional 
clearance 
condition not fulfilled 
dashed cyan dashed green 
Reverts to solid 
green as soon 
as condition is 
fulfilled 
Table 8: Summary of different taxi route representations 
 
5.4.2.3 Taxi instructions to other traffic 
In connection with the loss of the party line effect in a CPDLC environment, a com-
pensatory broadcast of taxi instructions to all parties concerned has been proposed 
(see Section 5.4.1.4). However, it is evident that an indiscriminate visualisation of all 
taxi instructions issued to the surrounding traffic will result in tremendous display 
clutter. Consequently, the amount of information to be displayed will have to be re-
stricted to arrive at an operationally meaningful presentation. This section contains 
some initial considerations as a suggested starting point for further research on this 
matter. The central idea is that the taxi routes assigned to other aircraft should gener-
ally be displayed only on explicit pilot request or in case of conflicts:  
 
• A taxi route assigned to another aircraft should only be displayed if the other 
crew has acknowledged. 
• The crew may only select the representation of the taxi route for one other air-
craft at a time. 
• An automatic display of taxi instructions to other aircraft may only take place 
in case a conflicting route has been issued to the other aircraft, or if ownship 
violates the right of way of another aircraft. 
• The routes issued to other aircraft could be represented in the same colour as 
the other traffic, which will typically be white. Only if the colour of the other 
aircraft, due to conditional clearances, is cyan or green, its associated clear-
ances should still be displayed in white. 
 
These principles are intended to ensure that the risk of confusing taxi instructions 
assigned to ownship and to other traffic is minimized, and that the taxi routes for 
other traffic do not clutter the display. 
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5.4.3 Design for Runway-related ATC Instructions & Clearances 
Irrespective of the conceptual issues and technical challenges with runway-related 
CPDLC instructions and clearances previously discussed, this thesis conceived an 
option for their presentation on the airport moving map to assess the associated op-
erational and human factors issues. As for taxi instructions, the visualisation on the 
airport moving map display is, as for taxi instructions, always accompanied by a cor-
responding textual message on the DCDU. 
 
5.4.3.1 Take-off and landing clearances 
In line with the dark and silent cockpit philosophy [Bil96]110, the fact that there is no 
take-off or landing clearance presumably does not need to be shown explicitly, be-
cause this is apparently the default pertaining to all runways111. Consequently, the 
concept proposed is that only ‘positive’ clearances should be displayed. 
As outlined in Section 5.3.3, the runway outline is already used to reflect the FMS-
selected take-off or landing runway. Conceptually, the runway outline is thus al-
ready used to emphasize that a runway has been selected for take-off or landing. It is 
therefore obvious to use the runway outline to reflect the clearance status as well. 
Consequently, the same colour concept 
as for the taxi route is applied. In case a 
take-off or landing clearance has been 
issued by ATC, the outline of the FMS-
selected runway changes from white to 
cyan, and then to green when confirmed 
by the crew. The display of the take-off 
or landing clearance thus supersedes 
the FMS-selected runway representa-
tion. The rationale for this choice is 
quite simple. First of all, the clearance 
information has higher priority, because 
it authorises runway usage, while the 
FMS-selected runway just represents a 
crew selection. Secondly, the change of 
the FMS-selected runway outline to 
green is envisaged to give a visual con-
firmation to the crew that this is indeed 
the runway used for take-off or landing operations. Along with the runway outline, 
the threshold label (QFU) of the corresponding runway also turns from white (via 
cyan) to green, as shown in Figure 72. 
Of course, take-off and landing clearances are displayed via cyan/green runway out-
line and threshold labels irrespective of whether the corresponding runway has been 
selected in the FMS or not. Therefore, this representation is also envisaged to empha-
size the special situation if a runway other than the FMS-selected is used for landing 
(e.g. in case of a sidestep manoeuvre or circling procedure). 
                                                 
110  Information is only displayed if relevant for the current crew task, no information means everything is normal. 
111  As an example, using red outlines for all runways of an airfield that the flight crew is not cleared to take off or 
land on might only represent a distraction and not provide added operational value. 
 
Figure 72: Visualisation of take-off/landing 
clearance on airport moving map 
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Whenever this is not intentional, i.e. for all take-off scenarios and other landing sce-
narios, the presence of a FMS-selected RWY outline on one runway and a clearance 
outline on a different runway is therefore intended to advise pilots of potential flight 
crew or ATC errors. 
 
Two special cases deserve to be mentioned, although they are fairly straightforward. 
First of all, a LAHSO location as shown in Figure 44 will trivially remain red also in 
case a landing clearance is assigned. Accordingly, only the part used for the FMS-
selected runway outline is changed to cyan or green, respectively. Likewise, the yel-
low temporary FMS-selected runway outline visualised in case of runway length re-
strictions (cf. Figure 54) will also change as specified above in case of a take-off or 
landing clearance. 
For conditional clearances, the same HMI design principles as for taxi instructions 
are employed. The other traffic constituting the constraint is highlighted as described 
in Section 5.4.2.2. Since the difference between a dashed and a solid runway outline 
might not be sufficiently conspicuous, however, the cyan or green runway outline is 
only shown once the condition has been fulfilled. 
 
In the initial implementation of this concept for the field trials with the Institute’s 
Navigation Test Vehicle, there would be a switchover from the runway outline to the 
full runway area at ranges of 2 NM and beyond, since it was felt that a mere outline 
would not be sufficiently conspicuous and, consequently, efficient in these ranges. 
Since pilots had no difficulties with the mere outline even at slightly larger ranges 
during subsequent prototyping sessions in preparation of the simulator trials, the use 
of a modified runway surface colour was subsequently restricted exclusively to advi-
sories and alerts, cf. Section 5.5.3 below. 
 
5.4.3.2 Approval for other runway operations (line-up, crossing, backtracking) 
The principle of displaying positive in-
formation only is also applied to ATC 
instructions for other runway-related 
operations. Therefore, in case of CPDLC 
availability, the absence of information 
means that approval for runway opera-
tions still has to be obtained. 
For the case of crossing a runway or 
backtracking, an implicit representation 
of the corresponding approval via the 
taxi route was chosen, as shown in Fig-
ure 73, irrespective of the underlying 
technical implementation. A green taxi 
route segment extending across a run-
way therefore signifies approval to cross 
a runway in a presumably intuitive 
fashion; there are no other ‘natural’ 
transversal runway elements that could 
 
Figure 73: Visualisation of approval to cross 
a runway on the airport moving map 
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be employed. Since crossing runways is typically part of taxi operations, this consis-
tency with the taxi route seems to be desirable. The same applies to backtracking or 
using a runway as taxiway, where approval is also is reflected by displaying corre-
sponding taxi route segments on the runway. Additional symbology was deliber-
ately avoided, because it is believed that this would only make the interpretation of 
the displayed ATC instructions more complicated. 
The only exception from the above rule to display only positive information concerns 
the presentation of taxi route segments extending across or along a runway in case 
CPDLC services for runway-related ATC instructions and clearances are not avail-
able. In this scenario, the part of the taxi route across the runway between the appli-
cable holding positions is always shown as a dashed amber line in order to remind 
the flight crew that this part is excluded from the taxi instruction and that approval 
to cross the runway has to be obtained via R/T. 
 
For the visualisation of a line-up approval, several potential alternatives were con-
sidered. Initially, when the use of the chevron concept for an indication of active 
runway was still considered a viable alternative (cf. Section 5.3.3), using a 
cyan/green runway outline to represent an approval to line up and wait on a run-
way was envisaged. Take-off and landing clearance would then have been presented 
by highlighting the active runway chevrons in cyan/green. However, this solution 
had to be abandoned, since chevrons were rejected for a representation of the run-
way-in-use for the reasons given in Section 5.3.3. This eventually led to the solution 
for take-off and landing clearances described above. 
Since a line-up approval may precede the take-off clearance, using a dashed, differ-
ently coloured or flashing runway outline was subsequently envisaged, thus repre-
senting the line-up approval as a precursor of the take-off clearance. Dashed or flash-
ing outlines were not pursued further to avoid potential confusion with the visualisa-
tion of take-off clearances. Likewise, using a yellow runway outline was dropped, 
because this colour is already employed for runway restrictions associated with the 
FMS-selected runway, as described in Section 5.3.4. 
Apart from defining additional symbology, the only remaining options are a visuali-
sation of the line-up approval by a taxi route extending onto the runway surface, or 
via the colour of the associated taxiway holding positions/stop bars. Both options 
can obviously be combined, and this is the solution chosen for this thesis, as shown 
in Figure 69. A line leading towards the runway centreline is displayed as part of the 
taxi route, using the existing extension of taxiway centrelines onto the runway as re-
quired per ICAO Annex 14 [ICA04b]. Additionally, once an approval to line up on a 
runway has been acknowledged by the crew via CPDLC, the colour of the taxiway 
holding position changes from red back to the default representation. Simultane-
ously, the lead-on route changes from cyan to green. Conditional line-up approvals 
are visualised in exactly the same fashion as taxi instructions, with the addition that 
the colour of the holding position only changes when the condition has been fulfilled. 
All of these solutions for visualizing approval to cross, backtrack or line up on a 
runway are deliberately very different from the representation of the take-off clear-
ance, which is intended to ensure that there is no confusion. After all, in RT phrase-
ology, the word ‘clearance’ is intentionally avoided for all cases except take-off and 
landing for the very same reasons. 
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5.4.3.3 Automatic revocation of runway-related CPDLC messages 
If the aircraft has to cross the landing runway again while taxiing to the terminal, or 
if the runway is vacated after a rejected take-off, the flight crew will definitely need a 
new permission before re-entering the runway for crossing or another take-off at-
tempt, respectively, because the authorisation for using the runway obvisously 
ceases upon leaving the runway. Consequently, all runway-related ATC instructions 
and clearances are revoked automatically by SMAAS and no longer visualised if the 
aircraft vacates the runway. After take-off, the automatic revocation takes place 
when crossing 400 ft radio altitude during climb. After landing or crossing, this oc-
curs while physically leaving the runway surface on the ground. 
Furthermore, this ensures that the runway will be treated like any other runway in 
the frame of Surface Movement Alerting once the aircraft has vacated it, which en-
sures that the appropriate alerts are not erroneously suppressed and can be triggered 
if required. 
 
5.4.3.4 Transition to airborne ND modes and ranges 
On the Navigation Display (ND), the FMS flight plan extends from the FMS-selected 
runway representation or airport symbol to the selected waypoints, or vice versa. 
Depending on MCDU selections and flight plan status, the various flight plans that 
can be displayed on the ND are as follows [Air05]: 
 
• active flight plan, followed by the aircraft (green) 
• primary flight plan, not active   (dashed green) 
• missed approach procedure   (blue) 
• alternate flight plan    (dashed blue) 
• temporary flight plan    (dashed yellow) 
• secondary flight plan    (dimmed white) 
 
As a consequence, if the FMS flight plan were to be shown in all available ND ranges 
and modes, including those introduced for the airport moving map, there might be a 
risk that the representation of the active, primary or alternate flight plan intersects or 
otherwise visually interferes with the simultaneously presented taxi route, which is 
also presented in cyan or green. In the worst case, the crew could confuse flight plan 
and taxi route, and thus get the false impression of being approved, via the taxi 
route, to proceed up to the runway threshold.  
 
The only viable solution to avoid these issues appears to be displaying, depending on 
range, either the assigned taxi route or the various FMS flight plans. As it is the low-
est range currently used for the ND, 10 NM, seems a suitable point for the switch-
over. By contrast, the cyan/green outline for a runway for which a take-off or land-
ing clearance has been assigned can be retained for all ND ranges and replace the 
standard white outline, because it does not lead to any inconsistencies on the display. 
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5.5 Surface Movement Alerting (SMA) 
 
Since attentional resources are limited, and monitoring the airport moving map dis-
play is not the only pilot task during taxi, take-off and landing operations, the 
SMAAS situational awareness functions intended to aid flight crews in building a 
more accurate mental model of their environment may easily become inefficient in 
preventing hazardous situations when the flight crew’s cognitive resources are ex-
pended on a different task. As an example, weather along the departure route might 
be of concern to pilots, thus necessitating the use of the weather radar and associated 
ranges on the ND during taxi out. The same applies in case a recapitulation of the 
Standard Instrument Departure (SID) or a review of significant terrain features is 
needed. Besides, mistakes by other traffic in the aerodrome environment or errone-
ous ATC instructions may rapidly evolve into a hazardous situation that might be 
difficult to perceive due to its inherent dynamics. Therefore, as outlined in Section 
4.4.1, alerting is considered necessary as last resort safety net function. 
 
5.5.1 Concept & Research Issues 
The preventive part of Surface Movement Alerting is, as discussed in Section 4.4.2, 
primarily intended to prevent ownship Runway Incursions by providing alerts to the 
flight crew whenever they are at risk of causing a Runway Incursion, both on ground 
or while airborne. Preventive alerts are solely based on ownship position, airport to-
pology information from the AMDB, and the same machine-readable data on the 
aerodrome operational environment or CPDLC ATC instructions and clearances as 
used by the OAF and the CAF. By contrast, reactive Surface Movement Alerting util-
izes surveillance data of the surrounding traffic and mainly aims at alerting pilots of 
any pertinent conflicting runway traffic. This will typically encompass Runway In-
cursions caused by other flight crews, vehicle drivers or air traffic controllers. 
 
Surface Movement Alerting creates a new domain of alerts in the cockpit. Generally, 
the unambiguous characterisation of situations necessitating an alert and the iden-
tification of suitable metrics to detect these are among the greatest challenges in de-
signing flight deck alerts. The aspect of detectability is intimately interwoven with 
the definition of suitable trigger conditions, which have to ensure that alerts occur in 
a timely, sufficiently specific and reliable fashion. 
Flight deck alerts must be triggered with sufficient margin for the flight crew to take 
remedial action, assuming an immediate pilot response after a nominal reaction time. 
Conversely, if alerts are too unspecific or triggered prematurely, there is a high risk 
that they will be perceived as mere nuisance alerts by the flight crew, who might 
subsequently lose trust in the system. Indeed, it is a well-established fact in cognitive 
psychology that a loss of trust in an alerting system is accompanied by a reduction of 
responsiveness and increased reaction times. Conversely, highly reliable alerting sys-
tems induce a faster operator response [BB04]. Beyond the mere performance level, a 
loss of trust may have further and potentially far more severe consequences. Pilots 
might eventually entirely ignore a system prone to unspecific or nuisance alerts, with 
the result that its alerts in situations of actual danger are either missed or a priori 
treated as nuisance/false alerts by the flight crew, cf. [Bil96, HSL02]. 
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Accordingly, the key research issues concerning Surface Movement Alerting are an 
analysis of situations requiring an alert, see Section 5.5.3, as well as the subsequent 
functional definition of preventive Surface Movement Alerting (Section 5.5.5) and its 
reactive counterpart (Section 5.5.6), including the identification of suitable trigger 
conditions, which may be common to both, as outlined in Section 5.5.4. However, in 
accomplishing this, further challenges resulting from the boundary conditions and 
constraints imposed by airworthiness requirements, commonly accepted industry 
standards or the integration in an existing cockpit environment, as detailed in Section 
5.5.2, need to be addressed. 
With respect to airworthiness, there is – apart from the directly applicable regula-
tions – a substantial indirect impact originating from alerting systems that are cur-
rently mandatory for transport category aircraft, such as the Airborne Collision 
Avoidance System (ACAS, cf. Section 3.2.1), the Terrain Awareness and Warning 
System (TAWS, §121.354), the Windshear (§121.358) or the Take-off Configuration 
(§25.703) Warning System [EAS06, FAA87, FAA93a, FAA01a, FAR07]. Their presence 
will necessitate special emphasis on the prioritisation and general interrelation, e.g. 
in terms of the human-machine interface, of Surface Movement Alerting and the 
alerts generated by these mandatory systems. Last but not least, all of these aspects 
have to be taken into account in the design of a suitable human-machine interface for 
Surface Movement Alerting, which encompasses the visualisation of alerts and the 
associated callouts (Section 5.5.7). 
 
5.5.2 Flight Deck Alerting System Philosophy & Design 
The integration of Surface Movement Alerting in the cockpit has to be in line with the 
commonly accepted recommendations for flight deck alerting systems [SAE88a]. Ac-
cordingly, Surface Movement Alerting will make use of the alert levels defined by 
the SAE industry standard, as indicated by Table 5 in Section 4.4.1. In particular, this 
means that an appropriate criticality has to be assigned to all advisories and alerts, 
and that at least a distinction of caution (Level 2) and warning (Level 3) alerts must 
be provided. Besides, consistency with the cockpit design and alerting philosophy 
chosen for the particular aircraft type in question is required, cf. [SAE88]. 
 
On current and next generation transport category aircraft, the so-called ‘Dark and 
Silent Cockpit’ philosophy is applied for all information and alerts. Information is 
only displayed if relevant for the current task of the crew, and the absence of infor-
mation or alerts essentially means that the situation is normal [Bil96]. Moreover, in 
order to avoid distraction of the crew in critical flight phases like take-off and land-
ing, many alerts are inhibited during these phases, cf. [SAE88a]. The alerting phi-
losophy applied to nearly all types of alerts is ‘Alert, Localize, Explain’ [Air05]. A 
major goal is to keep the overall number of alerts, especially the number of aural 
alerts, as low as possible [SAE88a]. For aural alerts, there is an inherent danger of 
interference with voice communication with ATC or procedural communication in-
side the cockpit. Consequently, the use of voice callouts is limited to Level 2 and 
Level 3 alerts. Last but not least, in line with the considerations in the previous sec-
tion, eliminating the risk of nuisance alerts is a further important design goal for 
flight deck alerting systems, cf. [SAE88a]. 
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Generally, flight deck alerts can be sub-divided in two major categories: alerts ad-
dressing the internal (system) state of the aircraft, and alerts linked to the external 
environment. Examples of alerts concerned with aircraft systems are e.g. the Take-off 
Configuration Warning, engine fire or brake overheating alerts, which convey infor-
mation on abnormal or critical system states to the flight crew. So-called onboard 
surveillance systems such as the Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS) and 
the Terrain Awareness and Warning System (TAWS) provide, in addition to basic 
situational awareness functions, alerts on external threats like traffic and terrain. 
 
By nature, SMAAS is an onboard surveillance system like ACAS or TAWS, and 
should therefore strive for maximum consistency with these alerting systems in 
terms of behaviour and cockpit integration. Since Surface Movement Alerting ad-
dresses an everyday task, taxiing, alerts have to be designed with exceptional care in 
order to minimize any undesirable interference. This necessitates to limit the overall 
number of additional cockpit alerts for Surface Movement Alerting to the required 
minimum, in line with the previous considerations that the main purpose of an on-
board system for Runway Incursion avoidance is enhanced situational awareness, 
and not the creation of additional alerts. Besides, limiting the number of distinct 
alerts minimizes the training effort, and allows for a more intuitive response to alerts 
by flight crews [Bil96]. Nevertheless, alerts must be sufficiently specific and tailored 
to the actual situation to avoid pilot confusion; finding an appropriate balance be-
tween these potentially conflicting requirements may prove to be a formidable chal-
lenge. In line with the ‘Dark and Silent Cockpit’ philosophy, there is clearly no need 
to indicate that a runway is used by other traffic, or that the flight crew is not author-
ized to enter, since both reflects the nominal condition. 
 
In this context, the importance of providing the flight crew with unambiguous, con-
sistent and sufficiently reliable alerts and an appropriate human-machine interface 
specifically indicating the cause of the alert condition cannot be overemphasized, 
particularly in view of the Helios Airways Boeing 737 (5B-DBY) accident near Athens 
in 2005 [AAI06]. Irrespective of the failure of the flight crew to detect the non-
standard configuration of the pressurization system during the cockpit preparation 
and various checklists112, their misinterpretation of the Cabin Altitude Warning horn 
as spurious Take-off Configuration Warning (which uses exactly the same 
horn/sound on the Boeing 737, albeit continuously) deprived them of taking reme-
dial action113. During the accident investigation process, it turned out that a confu-
sion of the Take-off Configuration Warning and the Cabin Altitude Warning on the 
Boeing 737 was by no means endemic to the Helios Airways accident114 [AIU03, 
                                                 
112  After unscheduled maintenance following pressurization problems during the previous flight, ground person-
nel had left the outflow valves in an open position [AAI06]. 
113  The FDR record, in fact, revealed that the crew’s initial reaction on the intermittent sounding of the warning 
horn was to disconnect the autopilot and to retard and subsequently advance the throttle, which suggests that 
they confused the alert with a Take-off Configuration Warning [AAI06]. 
114  In 2003, a Ryanair Boeing 737 (EI-CJE) had performed a climb to FL250 with incorrect pressurisation configura-
tion, but the crew, initially also mistaking the alert for a Take-off Configuration Warning, quickly found the 
true reason during a thorough scan of the overhead panel and solved the problem [AIU03]. Two years earlier, 
the crew of a Norwegian Boeing 737-700 (LN-TUD) had made the same mistake and silenced the Cabin Alti-
tude Warning horn with the circuit breaker, realising the true nature of the situation only when the passenger 
oxygen masks were automatically deployed [HSL02]. 
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HSL02]. Therefore, the official accident investigation report concluded, among oth-
ers, that the use of the same aural warning for two completely different alert situa-
tions (Take-off Configuration and Cabin Altitude Warning) was “not consistent with 
good Human Factors principles” [AAI06]. Besides, the fact that a Norwegian flight crew 
used a circuit breaker to silence the Cabin Altitude Warning in a very similar inci-
dent – which can be regarded as strong evidence that they also mistook the alert for a 
false or spurious Take-off Configuration Warning, cf. [HSL02] – clearly demonstrates 
the attitude flight crews will develop towards systems they perceive as generating 
nuisance alerts. 
 
Consequently, the philosophy pursued by this thesis is that Surface Movement Alert-
ing, and particularly Runway Incursion avoidance alerts, have to be accompanied by 
an appropriate visualisation and dedicated voice callouts (where justified by the alert 
level) to avoid such ambiguity and potential flight crew confusion. Preferably, the 
alert visualisation should employ modifications of or additions to the airport moving 
map, supplemented by textual information where necessary. A key design goal in 
this context is to achieve commonality, consistency and recognition between the dif-
ferent alerts. Likewise, while chimes, bells and other unspecific aural alerts clearly 
have attention-getting capabilities, they eventually make the cockpit noisier without 
relating any specific information on the situation to the crew [SAE88a]. Therefore, 
Surface Movement Alerting is envisaged to use exclusively dedicated voice callouts 
to get pilots’ attention and to present unambiguous information on the nature of the 
alert. 
 
Since particularly Runway Incursion avoidance alerts are highly safety-critical and 
will have to be relied upon by pilots, a key requirement is that no alert situation must 
remain undetected, since this may have catastrophic consequences. A further design 
goal is to limit the number of nuisance and false positive alerts, in accordance with 
[SAE88a], although this may not always be strictly possible due to a trade-off be-
tween not missing an alert situation and limiting the amount of spurious alerts. 
Nonetheless, in the high-energy regime of take-off it is mandatory that no nuisance 
alerts occur, based on the considerations in Section 4.2.3. Consequently, the design 
goal is that no alert situation corresponding to a Level 2 alert or higher remains un-
detected, and no nuisance Level 2 or higher alerts occur beyond 80 kts, cf. [FAA93]. 
 
Last but not least, the new alerts defined for Surface Movement Alerting need to be 
properly prioritized in relation to existing cockpit alerts, cf. [SAE88a], which requires 
that the avionics hosting the Surface Movement Alerting function is either directly 
connected to the aircraft’s flight warning system, or that Surface Movement Alerting 
functionality is part of an onboard Integrated Surveillance System (ISS), cf. [ARI05]. 
A suggested prioritisation of the alerts generated by Surface Movement Alerting and 
currently mandatory alerting systems will be presented in Section 5.5.9. 
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5.5.3 Analysis of Situations Requiring an Alert 
This section is dedicated to a precise characterisation of situations with existing, im-
pending or emerging surface movement hazards, mainly Runway Incursions, which 
will subsequently serve as basis for the definition of specific alerts. An approach fre-
quently taken in determining the conditions requiring a Runway Incursion alert 
strives to define a set of conflict scenarios that need to be covered. Corresponding 
‘shopping lists’ can be found e.g. in the ICAO Manual on A-SMGS, as discussed in 
Section 3.5.3. Nevertheless, the inherent danger associated with such a method based 
on use cases is that it is not exhaustive, as even those employing it have to admit, cf. 
[ICA04a]. In the worst case, potentially critical situations may thus accidentally be 
missed. 
 
Consequently, this thesis attempts to pursue a more generic and comprehensive ap-
proach towards situations necessitating an alert, based on the extended definition of 
a Runway Incursion as an “incorrect presence or manoeuvre of an aircraft, vehicle or per-
son on the protected area of a surface designated for the landing and take off of aircraft” (cf. 
Section 1.2). Evidently, any incorrect presence or manoeuvre within the runway pro-
tection zone, irrespective of whether it is caused by ownship or other traffic, corre-
sponds to a violation of the procedural safeguards associated with runway opera-
tions. 
This leads to the fundamental insight that the procedures associated with runway 
operations, as discussed in Section 2.1.2, must be translated into a set of basic rules 
and conditions unambiguously characterising hazardous constellations, which en-
ables a rule-based analysis of situations requiring an alert instead of a scenario-based 
approach. Due to the myriads of local variations in the way operations are handled, 
which may result in differences even between two airports in the same country, this 
constitutes a formidable task. However, a common framework is laid down in ICAO 
Annex 11 [ICA01], the PANS-ATM [ICA01a] and various other ICAO documents, cf. 
Section 2.1.2, which is taken as a baseline. 
 
The corresponding analysis eventually yields that an incorrect presence or manoeu-
vre on a runway, and thus a Runway Incursion, can only occur as the result of run-
way operations 
 
 without proper authorisation by ATC (Section 5.5.3.1); 
 on a closed or otherwise unsuitable runway (Section 5.5.3.2); or 
 in the presence of conflicting traffic (Section 5.5.3.3). 
 
In this context, the term ‘runway operations’ encompasses take-off and landing as 
well as entering, crossing, back-tracking, lining up or holding on a runway. Addi-
tionally, the specific incident and accidents analysed in Section 2.2.2 and the subse-
quently derived High-Level Requirements (Section 2.3.8) suggest that any actual or 
attempted take-off and landing operations on a taxiway or other paved surface out-
side the runways have to be addressed by an alert as well (Section 5.5.3.4). Besides, 
an advisory when deviating from the assigned taxi route seems appropriate to attract 
pilots’ attention (Section 5.5.3.5). A detailed discussion is provided in the following 
sections. 
5.5   SURFACE MOVEMENT ALERTING (SMA) 
  227 
5.5.3.1 Runway operations without proper authorisation by ATC 
Runway operations without proper authorisation can either be the result of disorien-
tation, as evidenced e.g. by the 1983 Madrid, the 1990 Detroit or the 2006 Lexington 
accidents (see Section 2.3.1 for details), or a lack of situational awareness with respect 
to ATC instructions and clearances. The latter encompasses e.g. an erroneous inter-
pretation or oblivion concerning an instruction to hold short of a runway, or misun-
derstanding regarding a take-off clearance, cf. Section 2.3.4, with the 1977 Tenerife 
disaster as most prominent example. Irrespective of the cause, two generic cases have 
to be distinguished: 
 
 Infringement of the runway protection zone during surface movement: Alerts 
have to be provided whenever pilots are at risk of violating or actually crossing 
the currently applicable taxiway holding position or stop bar in the absence of  
a) ATC approval to cross, line up on or back-track the corresponding runway; 
b) a clearance to take off on that particular runway. 
For airports with non-parallel runways, infringement of the runway protection 
zone from an intersecting runway (including a violation of a LAHSO location if 
applicable) has to be covered by an alert as well. 
 
 Take-off or landing without clearance: An alert is required whenever a flight 
crew initiates take-off on a runway without a corresponding clearance. The same 
applies if pilots attempt to land on a runway without being cleared to. An issue 
that has to be addressed in the light of potential nuisance alerts in the latter case, 
however, is the potential late arrival of a landing clearance, which may frequently 
be the case during final approach at hub airports with high traffic density. 
 
To address the highly dynamic situation in the runway environment, any CPDLC 
assignment relating to runway operations not yet acknowledged by the flight crew, 
cf. Section 3.4.1, has to be considered as sufficient authorisation for the purposes of 
alerting. On the ground, this is intended to avoid spurious alerts if the flight crew 
member at the controls of the aircraft commences executing the instructed manoeu-
vre while the other is simultaneously sending the acknowledgement. Likewise, dur-
ing final approach, this can be used as a measure to ensure that the late arrival of a 
landing clearance does not result in an unnecessary alert. Furthermore, to address 
situations in which a flight is already cleared for take-off while still outside the re-
spective runway, cf. Section 2.1.2, a corresponding CPDLC clearance – which implies 
exclusive runway usage – must be considered as implicitly including approval to line 
up, since a dedicated CPDLC message to that extent might be omitted in this case. 
 
Apparently, the above alerts can only be generated if runway-related ATC instruc-
tions and clearances are provided in a machine-readable format by a corresponding 
CPDLC service, since the possibility of having pilots enter the required information 
has been excluded due to the risks associated with potential errors, as discussed in 
Section 4.3.4. If CPDLC services are unavailable, fail or merely support the provision 
of taxi instructions via data link, it is consequently impossible to infer whether the 
flight crew is authorised to use a runway or not. 
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At first glance, this appears to preclude the generation of specific, operationally 
meaningful alerts in this situation. As an example, a general caution alert upon enter-
ing the runway protection zone is highly undesirable, since it would routinely be 
triggered even in perfectly normal conditions when appropriate authorisation to op-
erate on the runway has been obtained via R/T. This would constitute a violation of 
the ‘dark and silent’ cockpit philosophy and is prone to induce flight crew compla-
cency towards the alert, as discussed in Section 5.5.2. 
 
Nevertheless, it will be shown in the following sections how information on the op-
erational environment, the selections made in the Flight Management System and 
traffic surveillance data can be utilized to detect potentially hazardous procedural 
inconsistencies irrespective of the availability of CPDLC. 
 
5.5.3.2 Runway operations on a closed or otherwise unsuitable runway 
Based on the assumption that it should not be possible to obtain ATC authorisation 
for operations on a closed or otherwise unsuitable runway in the first place, one 
might argue that this case does not need to be treated separately. Nevertheless, rely-
ing exclusively on ATC instructions and clearances to address this situation would 
necessitate that controllers always work flawlessly. However, there is a wealth of 
evidence that this is not the case, see Section 2.3.5. In particular, the Denver incident 
in 2001 (cf. Appendix I-10) demonstrates that ATC may even erroneously clear an 
aircraft for take-off on a closed runway. 
 
In view of these facts and given that CPDLC services encompassing runway-related 
clearances might not be available at all or fail, protection against Runway Incursions 
must not depend solely on ATC instructions. Instead, taking into account the 2000 
Taipei accident and the 2001 Denver incident, cf. Section 2.3.3, runway closure and 
restriction information, as discussed in Section 5.3.4, has to be used as basis for alert-
ing in the following situations: 
 
 Infringement of a completely closed runway or runway segment: An alert is 
necessary whenever the flight crew is at risk of entering or actually intruding into 
a completely closed runway or corresponding runway segment, irrespective of 
whether the aircraft is approaching from the taxiway system or another runway 
segment. By contrast, there is no need for an alert when ownship is taxing on a 
closed runway or a part of the runway that is still usable as taxiway. 
 
 Attempted take-off or landing on a closed runway: Pilots have to be alerted if 
they attempt to take off or land on a runway that is closed, irrespective of 
whether the runway in question may partially still be used for taxiing or not. 
 
Particularly in view of the 2006 Lexington accident, it is unquestionable that alerts 
are also required when pilots attempt to use an unsuitable runway for take-off and 
landing, irrespective of whether short-term and temporary changes, such as length 
restrictions, render the runway in question unusable for ownship, or whether an a 
priori inappropriate runway has erroneously been chosen. 
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The key issue in this context is how the operational suitability of a runway can be 
determined. It quickly emerges that inconsistencies between the runway chosen by 
the flight crew and active runway information available via D-ATIS, as described in 
Section 5.3.3, do no justify an alert, because they neither yield any clues concerning 
runway suitability, nor do they conclusively hint at a procedural error, because the 
flight crew may always request (and be granted) using a different runway, as dis-
cussed in Section 2.1.1. Consequently, pilots can have a perfectly valid operational 
reason for using a runway not listed as active or as available for the desired opera-
tion (departure/arrival) in the current D-ATIS broadcast. 
Therefore, especially when D-ATIS information is updated automatically as envis-
aged, this would only lead to nuisance alerts when a change of active runway is al-
ready announced via ATIS while ownship is, with ATC approval, still on final ap-
proach to the previous active runway. Besides, for the approach and landing case, the 
possibility that an aircraft is accidentally routed to the ‘wrong’ runway threshold or 
entirely unsuitable runway seems very remote due to the use of STARs. 
 
In the absence of closed runway segments, the crucial criterion determining the suit-
ability of runway for an intended take-off operation is the available accelerate-stop-
distance, although requirements concerning width, pavement strength and runway 
lighting should not be neglected. At any rate, all of these aspects are taken into ac-
count when choosing a take-off runway during flight preparation, which eventually 
culminates in the entry of the selected runway and the take-off speeds resulting from 
performance calculations in the FMS. Assuming that unsuitable runways are thus 
already identified and excluded at this preparatory stage leads to the insight that the 
best and most simple available protection against take-off from an unsuitable run-
way might be alerting pilots whenever take-off is commenced on any runway other 
than the one selected as departure RWY in the FMS. As discussed in Section 5.3.2, 
this evidently constitutes a substantial violation of standard operating procedures, 
because it implies at the very least taking off with invalid take-off performance data, 
e.g. if the flight crew forgets to update data in an otherwise correctly executed last-
minute runway change. In all other cases, this additionally means that take-off is ini-
tiated on the wrong and thus potentially unsuitable runway. Simultaneously, there is 
a significant probability that take-off is therefore not authorised by ATC, either, as 
the accidents involving runway confusion at Taipei and Lexington clearly show. 
Conversely, for all landing scenarios, unsuitable runways cannot be identified as un-
ambiguously based on FMS selections. Valid operational scenarios involving landing 
on a different runway – and thus situations in which an alert is undesirable – are last-
minute runway changes precluding an entry of updated data in the FMS due to time 
or procedural constraints, or a sidestep manoeuvre, in which the pilot uses the 
Navaids of the FMS-selected runway for the initial approach before side-stepping to 
a parallel landing runway. Unless a revised FMS interface permits flight crews to 
specify that they intend to perform a sidestep, positively identifying this manoeuvre 
or a last minute runway change is therefore only possible in a CPDLC environment, 
in which this constellation would be characterised by a landing clearance for a run-
way other than the FMS-selected arrival runway. Consequently, a warning is only 
justified if the aircraft is neither approaching the FMS-selected runway nor cleared to 
land on this particular runway, which indicates something may be wrong. 
5   EXPERIMENTAL SURFACE MOVEMENT AWARENESS AND ALERTING SYSTEM 
 230
5.5.3.3 Runway operations in the presence of conflicting traffic 
The need to alert pilots whenever there is conflicting traffic in the runway environ-
ment to avert imminent collision hazards has already been established, cf. High-
Level Requirement II. In line with the considerations in Sections 4.2.2 and 4.4.2, this is 
mainly required to provide protection against Runway Incursions caused by other 
traffic and controller errors (High-Level Requirement V), both of which may manifest 
themselves in the form of traffic conflicts. Consequently, reactive Surface Movement 
Alerting must be completely independent of the availability of CPDLC. 
The particular challenge concerning reactive Runway Incursion alerting is that all 
potentially hazardous traffic constellations must be covered adequately while simul-
taneously minimizing the risk of nuisance alerts, particularly in high density opera-
tions. Besides, if potential traffic conflicts are not detected sufficiently early, espe-
cially during take-off, it may not be possible to avoid an accident any more, as dis-
cussed in Section 4.2.3. 
 
To identify situations involving conflicting runway traffic, the novel approach pur-
sued by this thesis is to characterise the anomalies in the traffic pattern in the vicinity 
of the runway which unambiguously indicate a violation of the procedural safe-
guards associated with runway operations. A corresponding analysis of the 
‘Procedures for Aerodrome Control Service’ as discussed in Section 2.1.2 yields that 
this characterisation can be achieved by a classification of runway-related manoeu-
vres according to whether they require exclusive runway usage or not, because the 
corresponding ATC instructions and clearances are assigned based on the compati-
bility of the intended runway manoeuvres. 
 
The procedural safeguards for runway operations can therefore be translated into 
rules for exclusive and non-exclusive runway usage. This permits using traffic sur-
veillance data to draw conclusions on whether it is safe for ownship to perform the 
currently intended runway manoeuvre or not. An identification of manoeuvres in-
compatible with the one ownship intends to perform can thus be used to directly 
identify situations necessitating an alert. Table 9 summarizes this approach. 
 
Ownship … Crossing RWY Lining Up Taking Off Approach Landing 
Runway Usage non-exclusive non-exclusive exclusive non-exclusive exclusive 
Other Traffic … 
 may cross 
as well 
 may line up 
 
 may back-
track or 
stop 
 
 must not 
take off or 
land 
 may still 
cross 
 may line up 
 
 should not 
backtrack 
or stop on 
the runway 
 must not 
take off or 
land 
 must not 
cross 
 must not 
line up 
 must not 
backtrack 
or stop on 
the runway 
must not 
take off or 
land 
 may still 
cross 
 should not 
line up 
 
 should not 
backtrack 
or stop on 
the runway 
 should not 
take off or 
land 
 must not 
cross 
 must not 
line up 
 must not 
back-
track or 
stop on 
the run-
way 
must not 
take off 
or land 
Table 9: Classification of ownship runway manoeuvres according to exclusive/non-
exclusive runway usage 
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As an example, if the flight crew is instructed to hold short of a runway, this implies 
that this particular runway is required for exclusive usage by (an)other aircraft. 
Likewise, a take-off clearance issued to ownship means that all other aircraft must be 
instructed to hold short of that particular runway, or remain behind the aircraft lined 
up for departure. Conversely, if ownship is lining up or crossing a runway, this does 
not require exclusive runway usage. In this case, ATC may still allow other aircraft to 
cross the runway simultaneously. In all of these cases, the surrounding traffic has to 
be surveyed for potential manoeuvres by other traffic incompatible with non-
exclusive runway usage. An alert is therefore only required if another aircraft is tak-
ing off, on final approach below a certain altitude threshold or landing.  
 
Evidently, exclusive runway usage in Table 9 always relates to the part of the run-
way ahead of the corresponding aircraft. In this way, only manoeuvres that can at 
least in principle result in an intersection of trajectories are considered. This ensures 
that there will be no nuisance alerts if another aircraft crosses the runway or com-
mences line-up behind ownship during a manoeuvre requiring exclusive runway 
usage. In fact, at airports with high traffic density, aircraft sometimes line up simul-
taneously from adjacent taxiways to expedite traffic flow. 
For configurations with intersecting runways, these principles can be generalised; 
with ownship taking off or landing, corresponding operations on intersecting run-
ways are not permissible. For LAHSO operations, the respective limit is considered 
like a normal holding position; an impending or actual infringement is the criterion 
for an alert if traffic is taking off or landing on the intersecting runway. 
 
Generally, when approaching the runway protection zone, an alert is necessary once 
an aircraft taking off or landing on the runway is detected, provided that the closure 
rate is positive. These reactive alerts therefore safeguard the flight crew against er-
rors by other pilots or the controller, since they provide, based on traffic surveillance 
data, an indication when it is not safe to enter the runway, irrespective of whether 
clearance data are available. This ensures that runway safety is maintained even if no 
runway-related ATC instructions and clearances are available. Nevertheless, run-
way-related CPDLC services may help to make alerting more specific if available. 
 
5.5.3.4 Take-off or landing on a taxiway or other surface outside the runways 
In the past, there have been numerous attempts where aircraft attempted to take off 
from a taxiway. Fortunately, this was either realised early enough or accomplished 
successfully, as in the case of the China Airlines aircraft taking off from TWY K in 
Anchorage (cf. Section 2.2.2 and Appendix I-13). However, one should not be de-
ceived by the lucky outcome of these incidents – this scenario is rather an accident 
waiting to happen. The same applies to the cases where aircraft erroneously but suc-
cessfully landed on a taxiway. 
 
Although the probability and frequency of occurrence are, based on Section 2.2.2, 
much lower than for a Runway Incursion, taking off from or landing on a taxiway 
has a much higher potential for fatalities, since the aircraft attempting to take off or 
land might – in the worst case – collide with multiple other aircraft, which is ex-
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tremely improbable for a runway scenario. Consider, for example, long straight 
taxiways, like A and N at Frankfurt Airport (EDDF), on which aircraft are frequently 
queuing for line-up. A large widebody aircraft unsuccessfully attempting to take off 
or land on a corresponding taxiway and hitting such a queue with speeds in excess of 
100 kts might easily destroy several other aircraft, with catastrophic consequences.  
 
In conclusion, to mitigate this hazard, any attempt to take off or land outside a run-
way necessitates the immediate awareness and remedial action of the flight crew. 
Therefore, an alert is required as soon as the intention of the crew to commence take-
off or to land outside the confines of the runway(s) available at a certain airport be 
detected unambiguously. 
 
By contrast, a simple ‘overspeed’ warning is neither desirable nor suitable to detect 
an attempted take-off from a taxiway. First of all, there is no general speed limit for 
taxiways, although an ‘unwritten law’ and common sense usually mandate not to 
exceed a speed of 30 kts on taxiways. Nevertheless, as discussions with Airbus flight 
test pilots yielded, taxiing at as much as 40 kts does not significantly endanger air-
craft, passengers and crew on a long, straight taxiway in dry and good visibility con-
ditions. By contrast, even 10 kts may be extremely critical when turning on an icy 
taxiway with a very small radius. Consequently, the real challenge in taxiing is to 
adapt the speed to the surface state (dry/wet/icy) and the curvature of the taxiway. 
 
5.5.3.5 Deviation from the assigned taxi route 
Outside and in safe distance from the applicable runway protection zone, a deviation 
from the assigned taxi route is not immediately safety-critical. Nevertheless, such 
surface navigation errors may indicate pilot distraction, inattention or disorientation. 
If the flight crew deviates substantially from the assigned taxi route, this might sub-
sequently lead to hazardous situations, such as the infringement of a runway protec-
tion zone, or a collision with other traffic. Although these situations will eventually 
be covered by the other alert conditions outlined in the previous subsections, it 
seems highly desirable to trap potential errors in surface movement as early as possi-
ble. It is therefore deemed necessary direct the flight crew’s attention to the fact that 
there is a deviation from the assigned taxi route. A low-level alert (advisory) should 
be sufficient in this case. 
At any rate, the situation becomes critical only in case the crew attempts to take off 
from a runway that they are only approved to use for taxi operations. This condition 
requires a safety-net type of alert, because there might be other traffic crossing or lin-
ing up on the runway. However, this scenario is already implicitly addressed by the 
alerts for take-off without authorisation and departure from the wrong runway, 
which once more demonstrates the benefits of the rule-based approach. 
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5.5.4 Common Functions and Alert Trigger Conditions 
The analysis of situations necessitating an alert in the previous section reveals that 
two key criteria, an infringement of the runway protection zone and the (erroneous) 
initiation of take-off, repeatedly appear in the characterisation of hazardous surface 
movement constellations. Accordingly, Surface Movement Alerting must be capable 
of determining probable or actual intrusions into the runway protection zone, irre-
spective of whether they occur via the airport surface or from the air. Furthermore, 
the intention of flight crews to take off needs to be established unambiguously. Not 
surprisingly, these criteria correspond to the identification of an “incorrect presence” 
or an “incorrect manoeuvre”, thus reflecting the definition of a Runway Incursion. Evi-
dently, they have to be applied to ownship as well as to the surrounding traffic. Al-
though the precise methods of detecting these situations may differ for ownship and 
traffic, two common core functions can be defined employing this abstraction: 
 
 Runway Infringement Detection (Section 5.5.4.1) 
 Take-Off Intent Detection (Section 5.5.4.2) 
 
These functions yield global trigger conditions for several alerts, consequently form-
ing the functional basis of both preventive and reactive Surface Movement Alerting. 
  
5.5.4.1 Runway Infringement Detection 
The detection of actual or impending ownship runway infringements is based on a 
continuous comparison of the aircraft state vector (and its extrapolation) to the air-
port topology stored in an ED-99/ED-99A compliant AMDB. Likewise, potentially 
conflicting traffic is also identified based on its position in relation to the runway 
protection zone thus extracted from the AMDB. As fallback solution in case of AMDB 
failure or unavailability, e.g. for a diversion airport, runway information can be re-
trieved from either the Navigation System (ARINC 424) or TAWS database instead. 
 
5.5.4.1.1 Landside infringement of the runway protection zone 
The applicable runway protection zone is dependent on the type of runway and the 
type of operation. For a meaningful assessment of the Runway Incursion risk, there-
fore, the system has to be capable of determining whether Low Visibility Procedures 
(LVP), cf. Section 2.1.2, are in force, because infringing the ILS critical area poses a 
hazard to approaching aircraft when automatic landings are performed. It is as-
sumed for the purposes of this thesis that the applicability of LVP can automatically 
be inferred based on the RVR contained in D-ATIS transmissions115, but that the re-
sult may subsequently be overruled by manual LVP mode (de-)selection116. In the 
absence of RVR information, the non-LVP scenario is used as default. 
In principle, standardized rectangular runway protection zones according to the 
definitions in ICAO Annex 14 [ICA04b], as detailed in Appendix II-2, could be used. 
                                                 
115 Since there is no LVP operations flag in D-ATIS, the LVP mode will be activated by default whenever the re-
ported RVR for the FMS-selected departure runway, or else the lowest reported RVR, is below 550 m. 
116  This could be achieved as part of a SMAAS MCDU/MFD menu, or a pushbutton on a potential SMAAS hard-
ware control panel. 
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Figure 74: AMDB with highlighted runway protection zones for LVP (amber + red) and non-
LVP operations (red) for RWY 08L/26R and RWY 08R/26L at Paris Charles-de-Gaulle airport 
 
However, this bears the risk of perceivable inconsistencies in alerting whenever the 
actual holding positions or stop bars are not according to this standard, which gives 
minimum values only and specifies various corrective factors, e.g. for airfield eleva-
tion or altitude differences between holding position and runway threshold. Further 
discrepancies may result from the need to take into account curved taxiway geome-
tries. Alerts might then be perceived as occurring either too early or too late, depend-
ing on whether the painted holding position is closer or farther away from the run-
way centreline. 
Consequently, for the purpose of Surface Movement Alerting, the runway protection 
zone consists of the runway surface and any taxiway part beyond the currently ap-
plicable runway holding position (see Figure 74). Accordingly, crossing the currently 
applicable holding positions or stop bars is used to determine whether ownship or 
traffic has infringed the runway protection zone. In doing so, the direction in which 
the crossing occurs must be taken into account, i.e. the corresponding algorithm has 
to determine whether the runway to which the holding position/stop bar being 
crossed refers to is ahead of or behind an aircraft. For contingency, though, whenever 
SMAAS cannot determine the applicable holding position from the AMDB, the sys-
tem uses a reduced core runway protection zone extending 55 m from the centreline, 
which corresponds to ~75% of the nominal distance for a CAT holding position, cf. 
Appendix II-2. This ensures proper infringement detection even in case a relevant 
taxiway/holding position is missing in an AMDB, or if the protection zone is ap-
proached from an intersecting runway. Likewise, the core protection zone is used in 
fallback mode (see above) when only runway data are available. 
 
ILS critical areas on perimeter taxiways constitute a special case requiring particular 
attention. Figure 75 shows an excerpt from an AMDB of Frankfurt Airport (EDDF). 
While the blue arrows each mark a set of holding positions defining the ILS critical 
areas on taxiways Bravo and Bravo East pertinent to RWY 07L/25R, the green arrows 
delineate the corresponding area for RWY 07R/25L. Crossing the corresponding 
holding positions does not constitute a Runway Incursion hazard in the classical 
sense, since there is no risk of a physical runway surface infringement. 
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Nevertheless, entering the ILS criti-
cal area will jeopardise the integrity 
of the ILS signal. Besides, depend-
ing on the distance of the perimeter 
taxiway from the runway thresh-
old, there might be insufficient ver-
tical margin for aircraft to cross 
while take-off and landing opera-
tions are being conducted. Except 
for a closed runway, which may 
safely be circumnavigated on any 
perimeter taxiway, alerts are con-
sequently required when entering 
the ILS critical on a perimeter taxi-
way. 
 
Technically, the runway protection 
zone is infringed whenever an air-
craft’s nose protrudes across the applicable holding position. However, for large air-
craft like the Airbus A340-600 or the A380, the nose is some 30…40 m ahead of the 
aircraft’s navigation reference point, which typically coincides with either centre of 
gravity and/or the location of the yaw axis [Air09, Air10]. Consequently, to ensure 
that crossing the holding position is detected in a timely fashion, the aircraft nose 
position, which can be calculated based on the known aircraft geometry, has to be 
used instead to determine whether ownship has entered the runway protection zone. 
Nevertheless, the risk of nuisance alerts due to positional inaccuracies in the order of 
a few metres is comparatively low. Assuming that flight crews usually stop their air-
craft with the corresponding holding position marking still in view, and given the 
visibility restrictions from the cockpit due to a typical cut-off angle of ~20° (see Fig-
ure 27), there will commonly be a margin of approximately 10…20 m117. 
 
By contrast, reliably detecting an intrusion of other traffic into the runway protection 
zone is more difficult. Obviously, the positions broadcast via ADS-B refer to the 
navigation reference point, and ADS-B data do not contain aircraft or vehicle type 
information, but only generic dimension information, cf. [RTC00]. The same applies 
to TIS-B traffic data. While aircraft type could in principle be retrieved based on each 
aircraft’s unique ICAO 24-bit Mode S transponder address as discussed in Section 
5.2.2, a corresponding registry database remains to be created. For the initial imple-
mentation, therefore, an extrapolation of received ADS-B or TIS-B aircraft positions 
to the respective aircraft nose or nose wheel positions could not be achieved, which 
means that an entry into the runway protection zone is detected comparatively late, 
approximately when the first half of the aircraft has already crossed the applicable 
holding position. Conversely, combined with potential latency effects, this virtually 
eliminates the risk of premature nuisance alerts, because only substantial infringe-
ments of the runway protection zone are considered. 
                                                 
117 Typical values for the distance ahead of the aircraft’s nose thus invisible from the cockpit are 12.5 m (Airbus 
A320 family), 13.75 m (A310), 14.00 m (A340-600) and 20.28 m (A380) [Air10]. 
 
Figure 75: Excerpt from Frankfurt Airport AMDB 
with ILS critical areas on perimeter taxiways 
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To establish the risk of ownship entering or infringing the runway protection zone, it 
is apparently required to predict its trajectory for a certain period of time, to assess 
whether there is an intersection with one of the currently applicable holding posi-
tions or the core protection zone, and to determine – in analogy to TCAS – the time τ 
until a potential intersection occurs, which can subsequently be compared to pre-
defined alert thresholds that will be discussed in Section 5.5.5 and 5.5.6. In view of 
the comparatively low speeds during taxi operations, predicting ownship trajectory 
for the next 15 s appears to be sufficient: even when taxiing relatively fast at a ground 
speed of 20 kts, this corresponds to a distance of only slightly over 150 m. 
 
Virtually all airports feature a system of taxiways parallel to the main runways, and 
frequently, particularly the corresponding CAT II/III holding positions are compara-
tively close to the edges of these taxiways, as illustrated by Figure 74 and Figure 75. 
In the frequently occurring constellation schematically presented in Figure 76, there 
is consequently a high probability of a spurious infringement risk detection, because 
it cannot be established at this stage whether ownship intends to turn right or plans 
to continue straight ahead, especially when the size of the aircraft or the narrowness 
of the turn, respectively, additionally require oversteering. 
This clearly demonstrates the challenges associated with trajectory prediction and the 
subsequent need for sophistication. To eliminate premature infringement risk detec-
tions, it is therefore necessary to ascertain that ownship is indeed heading directly 
towards the runway and not intending to turn. Consequently, as a first measure for 
disambiguation, the algorithm devised for this thesis always follows the taxiway 
guidance line segments ahead of ownship for a fixed distance of 150 m to determine 
whether there is an intersection with either a runway or a corresponding holding 
position. In the latter case, the sweep distance is doubled to establish whether the 
holding position in question protects the runway itself or an ILS critical area. Simul-
 
 
Figure 76: Determination of taxiway guid-
ance line branching points ahead of ownship 
Figure 77: Calculation of time τ CAT II/III until 
intersection with CAT II/III holding position 
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taneously, the number of intersecting taxiway guidance lines ahead of the aircraft is 
calculated. In case at least one of the taxiway guidance lines emerging from these 
nodes does not yield an intersection with a runway protection zone, the calculation 
of τ is suppressed. This is illustrated by Figure 76, where a single node with diverg-
ing taxiway guidance lines, of which only one leads towards a runway, has been de-
tected. The second measure to make predictions more precise consists of taking into 
account all available linear and angular velocities as well as accelerations in deter-
mining the future ownship trajectory. 
Accordingly, when the aircraft advances further straight ahead, as shown in Figure 
77, there are no remaining nodes, because the perpendicular taxiway guidance line 
directly in front of the aircraft is not considered as relevant, as turns with more than 
80° are excluded. Since the predicted trajectory simultaneously intersects the CAT 
II/III holding position currently applicable in this example, it is now increasingly 
likely that ownship is indeed heading towards the runway protection zone, and the 
time τ CAT II/III is calculated and evaluated against the alert thresholds. 
Due to the missing accelerations and turn rates in the currently available traffic data, 
a sophisticated prediction of the infringement risk is not feasible for the surrounding 
traffic, and a simple linear extrapolation of traffic position with respect to the appli-
cable holding position seems prone to create nuisance alerts. However, given the fact 
that the distance between the boundary of a 60 m wide runway and the CAT I hold-
ing position may be as low as 45 m, and thus approximately equal to the distance 
covered by traffic moving at a speed of 10 kts in less than 10 seconds, it appears to be 
necessary to increase the margin for the detection of hazardous situations. Conse-
quently, the time τ RWY until the runway surface is physically violated is used as addi-
tional criterion. Accordingly, the surrounding traffic is considered as infringing the 
protection zone whenever it is either determined to be located inside or predicted to 
physically infringe the runway surface within 10 s. 
 
5.5.4.1.2 Airside infringement of the runway protection zone 
Figure 78: Determination of runway currently being approached 
 
In order to establish whether there is an airside infringement of the runway protec-
tion zone, it is essential first to determine the runway currently being approached. 
Clearly, the intersection of the aircraft’s projected lateral flight path with the runway 
surface is not a suitable criterion, because the aircraft is obviously not intending to 
land when flying perpendicular to the runway. At the same time, even when per-
fectly aligned with the runway centreline at 5 NM from the runway threshold, the 
projected flight path will miss a runway 60 m wide if an angular deviation from 
runway heading of more than 0.18° in either direction occurs. 
Runway Centreline Extension 
Offset Bar 
Aircraft Symbol 
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 Runway 
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Consequently, a different approach is necessary. As illustrated by Figure 78, the 
runway centreline is extended by 20 km from the runway threshold. Furthermore, a 
so-called Offset Bar perpendicular to the aircraft’s longitudinal axis through the cen-
tre of gravity is introduced. Below 5000 ft above field elevation, whenever this 150 m 
wide118 Offset Bar intersects with the Runway Centreline Extension and aircraft track 
does not differ by more than 10° from runway orientation, the aircraft is considered 
aligned with and approaching the runway. This ensures that the runway intended 
for landing is continuously and consistently detected even if the flight path predictor 
misses the runway surface, as shown in Figure 78 (blue aircraft). Conversely, if the 
Offset Bar is disconnected from the Runway Centreline extension, the aircraft is not 
considered to be approaching the runway in question even if the flight path inter-
sects the runway surface (red aircraft). This method, which is deliberately not cou-
pled to any particular landing system technology, works for all types of straight-in 
approaches, but the principle could be extended to curved approaches as well. 
Moreover, the relatively small width of the Offset Bar, which corresponds to the 
typical extent of the runway protection zone for non-precision operations, ensures 
that erroneous approaches to taxiways parallel to the actually intended landing run-
way can be detected as well, the characteristic criterion being that the aircraft is not 
aligned with any runway below a certain altitude threshold. 
 
Due to the need for sufficient vertical margin to initiate a go-around, e.g. in case of 
conflicting traffic, an airside infringement of the runway protection zone during ap-
proach already occurs when an aircraft descends below a certain altitude threshold. 
In consequence, the determination of suitable altitude thresholds for caution and 
warning alerts deserves particular attention. Surface Movement Alerting is intended 
to cover every type of approach operation, irrespective of whether it is precision or 
non-precision, in all visibility conditions. Therefore, a coupling of the trigger condi-
tions to the decision height (DH) or decision altitude (DA) does not make sense for 
several reasons. First of all, certain operations are based on RVR only and do not 
specify a DH/DA at all. Besides, decision heights and altitudes exhibit a high vari-
ability, from several hundred feet for non-precision approaches down to 50 ft/0 ft for 
CAT III approaches. Consequently, pilots could perceive an incoherent behaviour of 
alerts when these are always triggered at different altitudes. More importantly, 
though, an alert at the DH might not be sufficient to prevent unsafe conditions in 
CAT II/III operations when taking into account the vertical dimensions of current 
long-range aircraft and typical reaction times. After all, the tail fin of the largest 
commercially used aircraft, the Airbus A380, towers approximately 80 ft (24.4 m) 
above the airport surface, cf. [Air09]. 
However, standardized glide slopes and defined type-specific approach speed 
ranges allow for a consistent behaviour of the infringement detection when coupling 
alerts directly to fixed radio altitude thresholds irrespective to the type of approach. 
During final approach, airliners lose approximately 500-800 ft per minute on a typical 
3° ILS glide slope. In case a protection zone infringement necessitates an alert, it 
seems reasonable to provide an initial alert slightly less than half a minute before 
touchdown. Accordingly, a caution (Level 2) alert is triggered at 450 ft; this altitude 
was chosen to avoid interference with the automatic radio altitude callout at 500 ft 
                                                 
118 This applies for zero crosswind only; obviously width has to be compensated for any side wind component. 
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installed on many aircraft. If the aircraft descends further, a warning (Level 3) is trig-
gered at 250 ft, which should provide ample vertical margin to initiate a go-around 
even with an A380 size aircraft lined up or crossing at the runway threshold. 
Furthermore, if there is no alignment with any landing runway at low altitude, 
which would be the case when attempting to land on a taxiway, the same altitude 
thresholds as for a runway protection zone infringement can be used to alert the 
flight crew. At the same time, these trigger conditions do not interfere with a poten-
tially intended sidestep manoeuvre, because alignment with the landing runway 
should have been achieved at 450 ft. In conclusion, therefore, the 450 ft/ 250 ft RA 
criterion is applied for all ownship landing scenarios. To prevent spurious alert re-
moval and re-triggering due to terrain undulations in the approach zone, there is a 
hysteresis allowing alert removal only if the radio altitude increases by more that 100 
ft above the respective threshold. When using the pressure altitude above the airfield 
instead of radio altitude, the criteria for runway protection zone infringement de-
rived in this section can also be applied to the surrounding traffic. 
 
5.5.4.2 Take-off Intent Detection 
Several of the hazardous situations identified as necessitating an alert in Section 5.5.3 
may be detected when it can be established that the flight crew is attempting to take 
off. In this context, it should be noted that virtually all aircraft types currently em-
ployed in commercial air transport already feature a certified logic capable of detect-
ing that take-off is intended or has commenced (cf. Section 4.4.3), because Take-off 
Configuration Warning Systems are mandatory for transport category aircraft ac-
cording to §25.703 [FAR07]. On an Airbus A320 family aircraft, for example, the 
warning that the aircraft is not in take-off configuration119 is triggered when the 
thrust levers are advanced to the FLEX/TOGA detent [Air05], i.e. if the crew com-
mands take-off thrust. In this case, the Master Warning button illuminates, and a 
continuous repetitive chime is sounded. 
Evidently, therefore, the interrelation of Surface Movement Alerting and the Take-off 
Configuration Warning deserves special attention, both in terms of consistent system 
design and alert prioritisation, as already mentioned in Section 5.5.1. In order to 
achieve a consistent behaviour of alerts, the trigger conditions of the Take-off Intent 
Detection employed by SMAAS have to be identical or at least very similar to those 
used for the Take-off Configuration Warning on a particular aircraft type, depending 
on the specific implementation used by the manufacturer. Nevertheless, in view of 
the issues identified in connection with the Helios airways accident [AAI06], cf. Sec-
tion 5.5.2, dedicated aural alerts for SMAAS are required at any rate to allow for an 
unambiguous identification of the source of the alert. Therefore, while the trigger 
conditions may be the same as for the Take-Off Configuration Warning, a simultane-
ous re-use of the aural alert for the purposes of SMAAS would result in similar unde-
sirable ambiguities as those discussed Section 5.5.2. 
It quickly emerges that thrust lever position and thus commanded thrust constitutes 
a better trigger criterion than EPR or %N1, because there is clearly no need to let the 
                                                 
119  An Airbus A320 family aircraft is considered not to be in take-off configuration whenever its flaps/slats are 
not set appropriately, if the speed brakes are not retracted, or when pitch and rudder trim are not within the 
range permissible for take-off [Air05]. 
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engines run up before triggering the alert, since the procedure in case of a Take-Off 
Configuration Warning is to cancel take-off, and the corresponding SMAAS alerts are 
intended to induce the same reaction. Besides, the goal is to detect a potential alert 
condition as early as possible. Consequently, for the purposes of SMAAS, the flight 
crew’s intention to take off is therefore also deduced from the fact that thrust levers 
are symmetrically advanced to the FLEX/TOGA position120, with the additional con-
straint that the engines must be running. Requiring symmetric thrust lever position-
ing for all engines is intended to avoid nuisance alerts in case of engine test runs. 
A potential alternative for Take-off Intent Detection considered by this thesis makes 
use of the aircraft’s internal flight phase logic. For Airbus A320 family aircraft, the 
flight phase changes from PREFLIGHT to TAKEOFF whenever the so-called Speed 
Reference System (SRS) mode is activated and N1 is simultaneously 85% or more. 
Alternatively, the transition occurs whenever the speed exceeds 90 kts or EPR ≥ 1.25. 
The SRS mode itself is also activated121 when the thrust levers are moved to the 
FLEX/TOGA detent [Air05], but additionally requires Auto-Thrust and Flight Direc-
tor (FD) to be armed or active. Besides, SRS is only available with a valid V2 value 
entered. In view of these preconditions, which might not always be fulfilled, and the 
need to run up the engines to 85% N1, the changeover to TAKEOFF flight phase does 
not seem to be a favourable primary criterion to establish the intent to take off, at 
least on Airbus aircraft, but could constitute a viable back-up option. Nevertheless, 
since both the logic for flight phase changeover and Take-off Configuration Warning 
may be implemented differently by other manufacturers, the precise choice whether 
the SMAAS Take-off Intent Detection should be based on the Take-off Configuration 
Warning or a flight phase change has to be made individually for each aircraft type. 
Irrespective of aircraft type and the precise implementation, however, there is the 
issue of prioritisation, i.e. whether the Take-Off Configuration Warning or the 
SMAAS alerts based on take-off intent should take precedence. In principle, the crew 
should never take off in the presence of either the Take-off Configuration Warning or 
the corresponding SMAAS alerts, i.e. the intended pilot reaction is identical for both.  
 
Consequently, the sequence in which the underlying problems are addressed by the 
flight crew is irrelevant. Since the aircraft may not be flyable at all if configured in-
appropriately for take-off, the Take-Off Configuration Warning should take priority. 
Besides, the checks to resolve preventive SMAAS alerts could be somewhat more 
complex, because the crew might e.g. need to double-check for themselves and with 
ATC whether they actually ended up on the wrong runway or whether the alert is 
due to incorrect or outdated data in the system. 
                                                 
120  As a side note, the ECAM control panel on Airbus aircraft features a button permitting the flight crew to emu-
late the conditions that would trigger the take-off configuration warning. The crew can employ this button to 
check whether the aircraft is configured correctly for take-off [Air05]. With SMAAS simultaneously present, 
this raises the question if and how those alerts using the same trigger conditions should be integrated in this 
concept. Evidently, the envisaged SMAAS alerts when attempting to take off outside the runways must be in-
hibited when this T.O. button is pressed. Otherwise, the corresponding alert would be triggered as a nuisance 
each and every time the flight crew attempts to check the take-off configuration. On the intended take-of run-
way, however, triggering the corresponding runway-related SMAAS alerts as well might prove to be benefi-
cial, since it allows the flight crew to perform an extended system configuration check. 
121  The SRS mode is a managed vertical speed mode used to maintain SRS speed (V2, V2 + 10, VAPP) at take-off and 
during a go-around. SRS is a control law which provides a pitch that allows maintaining at least V2 +10 kts 
with the selected thrust. 
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5.5.5 Preventive Surface Movement Alerting 
To ensure specific alerting tailored to the actual situation, detailed information on the 
operational environment and clearances is required. Consequently, the scope of the 
preventive Surface Movement Alerting functionality that can be provided to flight 
crews is strongly dependent on the availability of ATC instructions and clearances in 
machine-readable form via a corresponding CPDLC service. Essentially, three differ-
ent scenarios have to be distinguished. The first scenario is characterised by either 
unavailability or complete failure of CPDLC. In the second scenario, taxi routing is 
available via CPLDC, while runway-related ATC instructions and clearances are still 
solely communicated via conventional R/T. For both of these scenarios, the preven-
tive part of SMAAS can only generate specific alerts in case runways or taxiways are 
used in an inappropriate fashion, based on operational context information concern-
ing closures or restrictions, thus addressing High-Level Requirement III, and the 
take-off runway selected in the FMS. This leads to the important insight that alerting 
solely based on such operational environment data is not sufficient to prevent pilots 
from causing a Runway Incursion on the runway that has been assigned to them for 
take-off or landing. Even in the presence of a taxi route, a failure to hold short of a 
runway or taking off without clearance on the ‘correct’ runway cannot be addressed 
in this routine scenario.  
This only changes fundamentally in the third scenario, which provides the complete 
spectrum of CPDLC services, and thus the complete range of alerts. Only if runway-
related ATC instructions and clearances are available in machine-readable format, 
the system can detect if pilots fail to hold short of an active runway or take off with-
out clearance, and generate a corresponding alert. 
 
For the design of preventive Surface Movement Alerting, this means that flight crews 
must be able to discern the currently applicable scenario in an unambiguous fashion. 
A further prerequisite is that Surface Movement Alerting has to be capable of coping 
with all three scenarios in a way that is consistent and logical for the pilots, i.e. the 
absence of a CPDLC service should not result in an entirely different behaviour. Be-
sides, for the system to work correctly, therefore, the currently available CPDLC en-
vironment must be accessible in a simple fashion, e.g. via a service level flag associ-
ated with each ATC data authority. 
 
In other words, preventive Surface Movement Alerting can alert pilots whenever in-
consistencies between the operational configuration of the aerodrome and the flight 
crew’s actions arise, irrespective of whether the corresponding mismatch is due to a 
pilot error, controller error or any other reason. Consequently, in a full CPDLC envi-
ronment, it provides protection against disorientation, as demanded by High-Level 
Requirement I, and immediately alert pilots in case of non-adherence to ATC instruc-
tions or clearances, which addresses High-Level Requirement IV. 
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5.5.5.1 General cross-functional consistency checks 
The preventive Surface Movement Alerting functions conceived by this thesis pro-
vide several layers of protection. The first consists of continuously monitoring the 
airports and associated departure/landing runways selected as part of the FMS flight 
plan against potential inconsistencies with the available closure or restriction infor-
mation and – where available – CPDLC messages related to runway operations. 
Depending on the result of these consistency checks, which will typically permit the 
detection of potential procedural errors well before the conditions for a high-level 
alert are fulfilled, the following text messages may be displayed, accompanied by a 
single attention-getting sound, the so-called ATTENSON (cf. [SAE88a]), if applicable:  
 
  CHECK FMS RWY  is presented as text message on the ECAM in amber, accompa-
nied by an ATTENSON, in case a line-up instruction or take-off clearance is re-
ceived for a runway not selected as departure runway in the FMS. For a landing 
clearance, the same message is shown as mere reminder in white and without 
ATTENSON, because a potential last minute runway change or an intentional 
sidestep manoeuvre may be a valid reason for this discrepancy. 
  RWY CLOSED  appears in the scratchpad of the MCDU in amber as error message 
whenever a closed runway is selected for departure or landing. Usage of the cor-
responding runway for departure is blocked in the FMS; but it may be used for 
landing due to a potentially intended sidestep manoeuvre122. 
  RWY 27L TO BE CLOSED IN 18’25’’  will be visualised as a text countdown on the 
ND if the FMS-selected take-off runway (RWY 27L in this example) is, based on 
NOTAM information, expected to be closed within 30 min. As shown in Figure 
55, the font colour changes from white to amber if time remaining before closure 
decreases below 15 min. For a landing runway, the ETA at the airport must be 
within 45 min for this message to be displayed, which ensures that runway clo-
sures beginning during the flight, but ending well before the aircraft’s arrival are 
filtered and do not distract the flight crew. 
  CHECK RWY STATUS  will be presented on the ECAM and in the MCDU scratch-
pad in amber, accompanied by an ATTENSON, if the FMS-selected runway 
 is within 15 min of closure or has already been closed;  
 has been re-opened within the last 10 min (defined end time of closure); 
 has re-opened within the last hour (estimated end time of closure); or 
 will be subject to a restriction that will be effective within less than 15 min; 
with ownship at the airport or arriving within 45 min. 
  AIRPORT CLOSED  will be shown as error message in the scratchpad of the 
MCDU upon blocking the flight crew’s attempt to enter the identifier of an airport 
which is closed by NOTAM or has no remaining open runways at ETA ± 60 min.  
  CHECK AIRPORT STATUS  is presented as amber text message on the ECAM to 
advise pilots of an impending, effective or recently expired airport closure, with 
conditions completely analogous to the “CHECK RWY STATUS” message. 
  CHECK ALTERNATE STATUS  will appear on the ECAM in white font whenever 
one of the alternate airports currently specified in the FMS flight plan is closed 
and must be expected to remain closed beyond the ETA. 
                                                 
122  Nevertheless, when using the Navaids of a closed runway, particular attention has to given to their operational 
status. If these are unserviceable, the selection of the corresponding approaches needs to be blocked. 
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5.5.5.2 Advisories and alerts in case of inadvertent runway infringement 
The alerting envisaged in case of an inadvertent violation of the runway protection 
zone forms the core of the preventive Runway Incursion alerting functionality within 
the SMAAS; its purpose is the avoidance of Runway Incursions by preventing the 
aircraft from entering or crossing runways it is not authorised to operate on. 
 
5.5.5.2.1 Runway Proximity Information 
In a conventional R/T environment or with only taxi routes available via CPDLC, 
there is no possibility to detect deviations from an ATC instruction to hold short of a 
runway, and consequently no specific alert offering protection against inadvertent 
runway entry. Nevertheless, to provide at least a basic level of safeguarding against 
erroneous runway infringement even in the absence of CPDLC, a general reminder 
in the form of an unspecific advisory is generated to draw the flight crew’s attention 
to that fact that they are about to enter a runway. Furthermore, a corresponding ad-
visory is also envisaged as part of the OANS on the Airbus A380, cf. Section 3.1.1.  
 
Therefore, a so-called Runway Proximity Information (RPI) is triggered systemati-
cally when the aircraft is approaching any runway during surface operations. Ac-
cordingly, the advisory, which mainly consists of highlighting the runway on the 
airport moving map (see Section 5.5.7 for details), is presented totally irrespective of 
whether there is, in a CPDLC environment, already approval to proceed further onto 
the runway or not. 
Likewise, since the RPI serves as a general reminder and not as an alert, it is conse-
quently not coupled to the time τ remaining until the runway protection zone will be 
entered, but always triggered at a fixed distance from the runway. In normal opera-
tions, the RPI is presented when the CAT II/III holding position or stop bar is 
crossed. In LVP, an additional margin of 50 m is added. This is intended to ensure 
that this advisory is always and consistently triggered before any other potentially 
applicable other Runway Incursion alerts, which always take priority over the RPI. 
 
While on the ground, runways or runway sections which are completely closed form 
the only exception. The RPI advisory is suppressed in this case, because the closed 
runway alerting as described below takes priority. Besides, the advisory is also sup-
pressed during final approach and landing, because there is obviously no need to 
inform pilots that they are about to land on a certain runway. 
 
In conclusion, irrespective of the available CPDLC environment, the RPI will be the 
only functionality of Surface Movement Alerting which will always visible to pilots 
during each and every flight, and is thus a core means of ensuring a consistent per-
ception of SMAAS by flight crews. In perfectly routine operations, it will simultane-
ously remain the only SMAAS advisory or alert encountered by pilots. At the same 
time, it can also be used as an intrinsic fidelity check for Surface Movement Alerting 
– if the RPI does not behave as expected, this points at system degradation. 
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5.5.5.2.2 Principles for the distinction of caution and warning alerts 
The common functions for Runway Infringement and Take-off Intent Detection dis-
cussed in Section 5.5.4 form the basis for a consistent behaviour of Surface Movement 
Alerting across the full spectrum of alerts. However, to ensure that there is perceived 
consistency in alerting, common criteria for assigning the applicable alert levels are 
required in addition. 
Evidently, any actual Runway Incursion due to erroneous runway entry justifies a 
warning (Level 3) alert. Nevertheless, in line with the considerations in Section 5.5.3, 
alerting the flight crew only when the runway protection zone has already been 
physically infringed does not seem desirable, particularly with respect to potential 
ILS disturbances. Consequently, all warnings concerning erroneous ownship runway 
entry always have to be preceded by a caution (Level 2) alert. Accordingly, the prin-
ciple governing the distinction between caution and warning chosen for this thesis is 
that a risk of infringement will generally result in a caution, while the actual entry 
into the applicable protection zone will yield a warning. To minimize the actual in-
fringement, an additional warning threshold was introduced for an infringement risk 
as supplementary trigger condition for a warning in some cases. 
The underlying rationale behind this staged alerting is that the caution creates im-
mediate awareness of the problem, which is expected to be sufficient in most cases to 
trigger remedial pilot action. Therefore, the warning mainly serves as contingency 
measure and indicator to the crew that their initial response to the alert may not have 
been sufficient. 
Once the aircraft has physically entered the runway, all alerts concerning erroneous 
runway entry, irrespective of whether the underlying reason is a lack of authorisa-
tion or a closure, will persist only until the aircraft leaves the runway surface, be-
cause maintaining a warning while the aircraft is within the applicable protection 
zone appears to be exaggerated, since the problem is already being resolved. 
 
5.5.5.2.3 Unauthorised runway entry & operations 
In an environment where ATC instructions and clearances related to runway opera-
tions are available via CPDLC – and only in this case – Surface Movement Alerting 
is able to provide alerts protecting the flight crew against inadvertent infringement 
into the protection zone of a runway they are not authorised to enter, cross, or oth-
erwise operate on. Consequently, unless there is CPDLC authorisation to proceed 
beyond the applicable holding position, a “RUNWAY AHEAD” caution alert is trig-
gered whenever ownship is at risk of infringing the runway protection zone. Evi-
dently, the main challenge consists of defining suitable τ values, because there is a 
clear need to minimize nuisance alerts while ownship, in expectance of a line-up 
clearance, slowly taxies towards the holding position of the departure runway. Ac-
cordingly, in normal operations, the caution alert is not issued until τ ≤ 5 s, which e.g. 
permits the aircraft to proceed within ~15 m of the holding position at a constant taxi 
speed of 6 kts without alert. This appears to be a reasonable value in view of the dis-
tance ahead of the aircraft typically obscured due to the cockpit cut-off angle, and 
fact that aircraft are typically taxiing slowly and decelerating when approaching a 
holding position. 
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Since it is, for obvious reasons, furthermore desirable to minimize the distance actu-
ally travelled beyond the holding position until the aircraft can be stopped, it seems 
appropriate to trigger the warning alert slightly before actually infringing the protec-
tion zone. Consequently, the “RUNWAY INCURSION” warning is activated either 
for τ ≤ 2 s (equivalent to ~5 m at 5 kts) or if the holding position is crossed. 
By contrast, in Low Visibility Operations, there is no immediate collision hazard 
when entering the ILS critical area, and the corresponding holding positions are 
commonly very close to the edges of taxiways frequently used, which increases the 
risk of spurious alerts, as discussed in Section 5.5.4. Therefore, and in view of the fact 
that aircraft taxi very slowly when LVP are in effect, the margin for the “RUNWAY 
AHEAD” caution alert is reduced to τ ≤ 3 s, which corresponds to ~9 m at 6 kts, and 
the warning is only triggered when the aircraft actually infringes the holding posi-
tion. Entering the ILS critical area on a perimeter taxiway without authorisation will 
by default be treated like any other protection zone infringement, based on the as-
sumption that approval to cross on the protection zone via the perimeter taxiway is 
also given by the aerodrome controller due to the potentially hazardous interference 
with runway operations. 
 
5.5.5.2.4 Infringement of closed runways 
For alerts pertaining to the risk of erroneously entering closed runways, a distinction 
of normal operations and Low Visibility Procedures is not necessary, because the 
navigational facilities of a closed runway, such as the ILS, will only be used for side-
step manoeuvres (if at all), which are exclusively conducted in conditions permitting 
a visual transition to the parallel runway. Consequently, there is no extended ILS 
critical area to protect in case LVP are in force. Likewise, if runways are only partially 
closed and may still be used for taxi operations, there is no need to alert the flight 
crew upon runway entry, either. Only if pilots attempt to take off, a warning is re-
quired, as detailed in the next section. 
 
In analogy to the alerts for unauthorised runway entry, a “CLOSED RUNWAY” cau-
tion alert will therefore only be presented in case the aircraft is approaching the hold-
ing position of a completely closed runway or runway segment and at risk of infring-
ing it. If the flight crew continues in spite of this alert, it will be raised to warning 
level as soon as the time τ decreases below the warning threshold or whenever the 
holding position is actually crossed. Evidently, the alert will persist if the aircraft en-
ters the runway surface or attempts to take off.  
However, in view of the dead-end character of any taxiway leading up to a com-
pletely closed runway or respective segment, there is no need to permit pilots to ad-
vance almost up to the holding position before providing an alert. Besides, there is a 
wide variation in the placing of the physical barriers indicating closure, if available, 
between different airports. Consequently, to address this aspect, the applicable alert 
threshold τ is doubled to 10 s for a caution and 5 s for a warning alert in this case. 
With ownship already on a closed runway still available for taxiing, the same alert-
ing criteria are used when approaching the boundary of a completely closed runway 
segment. Likewise, a cautionary “TAXIWAY CLOSED” will be triggered if ownship 
is within 5 s of infringing a closed taxiway segment. 
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5.5.5.3 Protection against erroneous Take-off operations 
In accordance with the analysis of situations necessitating an alert in Section 5.5.3 
and the trigger criteria derived in Section 5.5.4, the following warnings are provided 
in case the flight crew erroneously initiates take-off by forwarding the thrust levers 
symmetrically to the FLEX/TOGA detent, if N1 exceeds 85% or if the TAKEOFF 
flight phase is entered123 while ownship is within the confines of the respective run-
way surface: 
 
 A “WRONG RUNWAY124” warning is activated if take-off is performed on 
any runway other than the FMS-selected one. It is triggered irrespective of and 
with priority over any potentially available CPDLC take-off clearance. 
 A “CLOSED RUNWAY” warning will be issued if the flight crew attempts to 
take off from a runway which is either completely closed, available for taxiing 
only or rendered unusable for take-off and landing by completely closed run-
way segments. This alert has a higher priority than both the alert for taking off 
from a non-FMS runway and the CPDLC-based alert. 
 A “RUNWAY INCURSION” warning is triggered immediately when the 
crew commences take-off without a corresponding clearance for the current 
runway, but only in case a CPDLC service capable of providing runway-
related ATC instructions and clearances is available. 
 
Outside the runway surface, but in otherwise identical conditions, the so-called 
Taxiway Take-off Prevention is triggered. A “NOT ON RUNWAY” warning is pre-
sented as soon as the intention of the flight crew to take off on a taxiway has been 
detected. This alert is not limited to the taxiway system, but generally triggered if the 
flight crew attempts to take off outside the known runway surfaces at an airport; it is 
consequently also available on aprons, at parking positions or de-icing areas. 
 
Initially, a distinction of caution and warning level similar to the alerts in case of in-
advertent runway infringement was also envisaged for the SMAAS alerts related to 
take-off operations. Once the flight crew’s intention to commence take-off in an un-
safe condition had been established by SMAAS as described above, a caution alert 
was triggered, which would subsequently be raised to a warning as soon as a speed 
threshold of 40 kts was exceeded in addition. However, in a first design review with 
Airbus test pilots, this two-stage concept was rejected, based on the argument that 
there is no need to let the aircraft accelerate to 40 kts before warning the flight crew 
that they are involved in an unsafe take-off operation. 
Moreover, from an analytical perspective, there is no incremental safety margin for 
the take-off manoeuvre, since it is either safe to take off in a given situation or not. 
Consequently, there are no intermediate stages that would justify additional alert 
levels. This is particularly evident for the case of taking off from a taxiway, which is 
obviously never safe in routine operations125. Besides, the conventional Take-Off 
                                                 
123  The primary trigger condition is the thrust lever advancement to FLEX/TOGA; the other two conditions 
merely serve as a back up and will result in a delayed activation of the alert. 
124 For better distinction from the remainder of the text, all callouts are given in “CAPITAL LETTERS”. 
125 The use of a taxiway as temporary runway that sometimes occurs at airfields with just one runway forms the 
only exception, but requires dedicated authorisation, such as a NOTAM defining a temporary runway. 
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Configuration Warning exclusively uses Level 3, presumably for the same reason. 
In conclusion, therefore, a warning is immediately triggered without intermediate 
caution whenever SMAAS has detected that the pilots intend to take off in a situation 
necessitating an alert. 
From a conceptual and operational perspective, this functionality can be seen as an 
extension of the existing Take-off Configuration Warning systems, which alert for an 
unsafe condition of the aircraft configuration, whereas the SMAAS alerts described 
above warn pilots if the external conditions are not safe due to the status and con-
figuration of the aerodrome environment. 
 
During the take-off roll, all preventive SMAAS alerts are suppressed as soon as the 
aircraft enters the high-speed regime at 100 kts. The visualisation of the alerts that 
have already been triggered is retained as long as the alert condition persists, but 
callouts will cease, and the Master Caution/Master Warning lights extinguish. The 
underlying rationale is that a flight crew, having been confronted with the preventive 
alert from the setting of take-off power, will have had ample opportunity to react to 
the alert by then. Additionally, in contrast to reactive surface movement alerting, no 
hazardous new situations can emerge between 100 kts and V1. Even in the only re-
motely probable case that a runway closure becomes effective during the take-off 
run, a rejected take-off in the high-speed regime induced by this situation is not de-
sirable. Therefore, any runway status changes and associated alerts are inhibited 10 s 
after take-off has commenced. Likewise, a potential cancellation of the take-off clear-
ance in case of emergency is expected by voice via conventional R/T, in accordance 
with ICAO recommendations [ICA01a]. Conversely, the suppression beyond 100 kts 
trivially ensures that there will not be any nuisance or false positive alerts in the 
high-speed regime. In particular, a sudden failure or degradation of the navigation 
system, which might potentially resulting in a position shift, will not lead to the trig-
gering of e.g. the Taxiway Take-off Prevention or a preventive Runway Incursion 
alert for a parallel runway. 
 
5.5.5.4 Advisories and alerts during approach and landing 
As outlined in Section 5.5.3, hazardous approach and landing scenarios are compara-
tively difficult to detect if there are no runway closures or restrictions, because land-
ing on a runway other than the FMS-selected one is, in contrast to the take-off case, 
not necessarily associated with procedural error. Due to the fact that a last-minute 
runway change could have been advised by ATC on too short notice for the crew to 
enter the required changes into the FMS, or since a sidestep manoeuvre might be in-
tended, there may be an operationally valid reason for doing so. Consequently, there 
will be no advisory or alert if the flight is approaching or landing on a runway not 
selected in the FMS in the absence of CPDLC landing clearances. 
 
If landing clearances are available in machine-readable format via CPDLC, alerts can 
in principle be provided if the crew attempts to land on a runway without clearance. 
However, particularly at airports with high density operations, landing clearances 
are often issued very late during final approach for legal reasons even in a conven-
tional R/T environment, although a landing clearance still missing below 250 ft is 
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rather exceptional. Nevertheless, in view of the fact the expected procedural flight 
crew reaction in case of a SMAAS warning during approach is the initiation of a go-
around, issuing a Level 3 alert in case of a missing CPDLC landing clearance can be 
precluded. Otherwise, especially in view of potential data link latency effects, a late 
arrival of landing clearances might result in unnecessary go-arounds, which has to be 
avoided. Consequently, only a “CLEARANCE MISSING” caution alert is triggered 
when, during approach to the FMS-selected runway, there is still no landing clear-
ance at or below 250 ft radio altitude (RA). Depending on the precise circumstances, 
the flight crew may then decide to continue the approach or to go around. 
Conversely, if the aircraft is approaching a different runway than the one selected in 
the FMS and there is no landing clearance, either, there will be a “WRONG 
RUNWAY” caution at 450 ft RA, followed by the corresponding warning at 250 ft 
RA, see Table 10. Likewise, to prevent landing attempts on a taxiway or elsewhere 
outside the runways, these two alerts are also triggered if the system is unable to es-
tablish the runway intended for landing when crossing 450 ft or 250 ft RA, respec-
tively, irrespective of whether CPDLC landing clearances are available or not. 
 
For the reasons detailed in Section 5.5.3, the advisories and alerts provided in case 
ownship erroneously attempts to land on a closed or otherwise unsuitable runway 
are completely independent of the CPDLC environment and have priority over any 
alerts triggered based on CPDLC clearances. The general consistency checks de-
scribed in Section 5.5.5.1 are believed to provide pilots with an opportunity to detect 
potentially hazardous situations with respect to current or emerging runway closures 
proactively. Nevertheless, the “CHECK RWY STATUS” Level 1 alert is additionally 
triggered whenever pilots arm the autoflight system with an approach to a closed 
runway. Apparently, a higher level alert is not desirable in this case, because there 
should be sufficient margin to resolve the situation. Besides, the approach mode 
might have been routinely selected as part of a sidestep manoeuvre or circling pro-
cedure to another runway. Safety-net type alerts are only required if the aircraft con-
tinues the approach126. Accordingly, on final approach to a runway that is either 
completely closed or may only be used for taxi operations, a “CLOSED RUNWAY” 
caution alert is presented whenever the aircraft descends through 450 ft RA, which is 
raised to warning level in case the flight crew proceeds below 250 ft RA. 
 
For intersecting runways, SMAAS will always assume that ownship is always enti-
tled to use the full available runway length during roll-out, i.e. there will be no advi-
sories or alerts when approaching or crossing the intersecting runway. Only if ex-
plicit information that LAHSO operations are being conducted is received, e.g. as 
part of a CPDLC landing clearance, there will be a “RUNWAY AHEAD” caution 
alert if the predicted time τ until crossing the LAHSO location drops below 15 sec-
onds, and a “RUNWAY INCURSION” warning if this clearance limit is actually 
crossed. 
                                                 
126 When using the Navaids of a closed runway for a sidestep manoeuvre, particular attention has to be given to 
the operational status of the Navaid in question. 
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5.5.5.5 Surface Movement Alerting outside the runway environment 
5.5.5.5.1 Taxi Route Conformance Monitoring 
 
Figure 79: Illustration of Taxi Route Conformance checks 
 
Pilots’ adherence to the taxi instructions provided via CPDLC (if available) is also 
determined employing the so-called Offset Bar, which is already used in detecting 
the landing runway (cf. Section 5.5.4). Accordingly, on the movement area outside 
the runways, a deviation from the assigned route is considered as established when-
ever the offset bar, which is 20 m wide during surface movement, ceases to intersect 
the assigned taxi route. As can be seen from Figure 79, this approach is compara-
tively robust against the oversteering required when taxiing a large widebody air-
craft, and also requires a substantial cross-track error. 
 
In case a deviation from the assigned taxi route has thus been detected, the taxi route 
will start blinking to attract pilots’ attention. At the same time, a text message 
“CHECK TAXI ROUTE” is displayed in white in the area designated for messages 
on the Navigation Display (ND). To supplement these attention-getting features, an 
ATTENSON was envisaged, but not implemented in the scope of this thesis. At any 
rate, the criticality of the advisory clearly does not justify a dedicated callout, and 
this Level 0 advisory was therefore chosen for a route deviation on the taxiway sys-
tem. Initially, guidance cues back to the assigned route were also considered, but 
eventually dropped, since re-routing would be required for all non-straightforward 
cases, in which such guidance is superfluous anyhow, because current regulations 
allocate the task of assigning taxi routes to the controller [ICA01a]. 
 
A special case requiring careful consideration is a deviation from the assigned taxi 
route while crossing a runway or during a back-track manoeuvre. The resulting un-
expected increase in runway occupancy time, e.g. if the flight crew erroneously per-
forms a line-up manoeuvre on a runway when only approved to cross, may jeopard-
ise the controller’s planning and result in the need to instruct approaching aircraft to 
go around. Therefore, the alert is raised to Level 1 if the deviation occurs inside the 
runway protection zone. 
 
By contrast, overshooting the end of an assigned taxi route can only be detected if the 
corresponding clearance limit is the holding position of a runway and provided that 
the approval to line up or to cross the runway is available via CPDLC. However, the 
corresponding situations are handled by the alerts associated with inadvertent run-
way infringement, as discussed in Section 5.5.5.2. 
Taxi Route 
Offset Bar 
off Taxi Route 
off Taxi Route 
Aircraft Symbol 
! Not to Scale ! 
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Alert Type/Condition Alert Level Callout PFD Text Message 
Unauthorised RWY Operations♠ 
 Take-off clearance 
for non-FMS RWY♠ 
Advisory (Level 1) - CHECK FMS RWY† 
 Landing without 
clearance (FMS-
selected RWY)♠ 
Caution (Level 2) “CLEARANCE MISSING” CLEARANCE MISSING 
 Risk of unauthorised 
entry onto any RWY♠ 
Caution (Level 2) “RUNWAY AHEAD” RWY AHEAD 
 Unauthorised entry of 
any RWY♠ 
Warning (Level 3) 
“RUNWAY INCURSION” 
RWY INCURSION 
 Take-off without 
CPDLC clearance♠ 
Warning (Level 3) RWY INCURSION 
Non-FMS Runway Operations 
 Attempted Take-off Warning (Level 3) 
“WRONG RUNWAY” 
WRONG RWY 
 Attempted Landing, 
while simultaneously 
not cleared to land♠ 
Caution (Level 2) 
Warning (Level 3) 
WRONG RWY 
WRONG RWY 
Closure Alerting  
 Alternate airport 
closed Advisory (Level 0) 
N/A 
CHECK ALTERNATE 
STATUS† 
 FMS-selected RWY to 
be closed in ≤ 30 min Advisory (Level 0) 
RWY <ID> TO BE 
CLOSED IN <TIME>♣ 
 FMS-selected RWY to 
be closed in ≤ 30 min Advisory (Level 1) 
RWY <ID> TO BE 
CLOSED IN <TIME>♣ 
 FMS-selected RWY to 
be closed in ≤ 15 min Advisory (Level 1) 
RWY <ID> TO BE 
CLOSED IN <TIME>♣ 
 FMS-selected RWY 
closed/restricted Advisory (Level 1) CHECK RWY STATUS
† 
 Destination airport 
closed/to be closed Advisory (Level 1) 
CHECK AIRPORT 
STATUS† 
 Impending infringe-
ment of closed TWY Caution (Level 2) “TAXIWAY CLOSED” TWY CLOSED 
 RWY infringement risk 
(airside/landside) Caution (Level 2) 
“CLOSED RUNWAY” 
CLOSED RWY 
 Infringement during 
surface operations Warning (Level 3) CLOSED RWY 
 Attempted Take-off 
or Landing Warning (Level 3) CLOSED RWY 
Taxiway Take-off Prevention (TTOP) 
 Attempted Take-off 
on TWY/outside RWY Warning (Level 3) “NOT ON RUNWAY” NOT ON RWY 
Taxi Route Conformance Monitoring (TCONF)♠ 
 Taxi route deviation 
 … on RWY 
Advisory (Level 0) 
N/A 
CHECK TAXI ROUTE♣ 
Advisory (Level 1) CHECK TAXI ROUTE♣ 
♠
 CPDLC environment only  
♣ Text message on ND † Text message on ECAM 
 
Table 10: Callouts and textual messages for preventive Surface Movement Alerting 
 
As can be seen from Table 10, preventive Surface Movement Alerting only uses seven 
distinct callouts. Generally, cautionary callouts are issued once, whereas the voice 
callouts associated with warnings are continuously repeated until they are either si-
lenced upon pressing the Master Warning Button or the hazardous condition ceases 
to exist. Messages and callouts presented in italics in Table 10 were not implemented 
in the SMAAS prototype used during the evaluation campaigns. 
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5.5.6 Reactive Surface Movement Alerting 
Runway Incursions caused by ownship or other traffic, as well as those resulting 
from controller errors, may eventually manifest themselves in the form of traffic con-
flicts in the runway environment. Doubtlessly, these situations need to be addressed 
by alerts, as discussed in Sections 4.4.2. 
As sketched in Section 5.5.3, conflicting runway traffic can be identified based on the 
incompatibility of the manoeuvres currently performed by ownship and the sur-
rounding traffic. The classification of manoeuvres according to whether they require 
exclusive runway usage or not, as developed in Table 9, can subsequently be used to 
infer which combinations of manoeuvres require an alert, see Table 11. An asterisk in 
the table indicates that the compatibility depends on the actual constellation and the 
available margin. A detailed rationale for the choice of the alert level and the precise 
criteria for an alert are described in the following sections. 
 
Ownship … Crossing RWY Lining Up Taking Off Final Approach Landing 
Other Traffic …      
Crossing RWY compatible compatible WARNING CAUTION WARNING 
Lining Up compatible compatible compatible* CAUTION WARNING 
Taking Off WARNING compatible* WARNING CAUTION WARNING* 
Final Approach CAUTION CAUTION compatible* CAUTION compatible* 
Landing WARNING WARNING WARNING CAUTION WARNING* 
Table 11: Alert matrix for conflicting traffic in the runway environment 
5.5.6.1 Traffic alerting while entering or within the runway protection zone 
Evidently, it is not safe for ownship to enter the runway protection zone while other 
traffic is taking off, on short final or landing on the same runway, as already indi-
cated in Table 9. The same applies to crossing, back-tracking, lining up or holding on 
this runway127. However, approaching aircraft do not pose a hazard if they are still 
sufficiently high, and may be disregarded in this case. 
The fact that other aircraft are on final approach can be detected as described in Sec-
tion 5.5.4, but with the reported altitude above the corresponding threshold instead 
of radio altitude as criterion. Alerts for potentially hazardous traffic on final ap-
proach are therefore issued when other aircraft are less than 500 ft above the thresh-
old while ownship is simultaneously within the runway protection zone, or less than 
τ ≤ 2 s from crossing the applicable holding position, in which case a “TRAFFIC ON 
APPROACH” caution alert is issued in accordance with Table 11. Subsequently, a 
“RUNWAY INCURSION” warning is raised if conflicting traffic is detected less 
than 250 ft above the threshold. 
 
The intent of other aircraft to take off is more difficult to determine, since none of the 
parameters employed to establish the initiation of take-off for ownship is currently 
part of traffic surveillance data. Nonetheless, it seems reasonable to assume that 
runway traffic with a reported ground speed in excess of 20 kts may be in the initial 
stages of its take-off run, and to issue a “RUNWAY TRAFFIC” caution alert. Like-
                                                 
127  Simultaneously, this hazardous constellation may serve as an indication that ownship is either not authorised 
to operate within the confines of the runway, or that there must be some other procedural error. Reactive 
Runway Incursion alerting can thus be regarded as a back-up in case preventive alerting is not available due to 
the absence or failure of CPDLC. 
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wise, for traffic beyond 40 kts, a “RUNWAY INCURSION” warning appears to be 
justified. Apparently, these thresholds and alerts are also appropriate to address 
landing traffic in its roll-out. 
The trigger criteria outlined above ensure that there will be no alerts for traffic simul-
taneously crossing the runway at other intersections, traffic taxiing or backtracking 
on the runway, or lining up while ownship is within the runway protection zone. 
Likewise, to prevent nuisance alerts in case ownship crosses the runway behind de-
parting traffic or commences line-up while another aircraft in its landing rollout has 
already passed by, the above alerts are suppressed as soon as the distance between 
ownship and the respective traffic on the runway surface increases.  
 
5.5.6.2 Alerting for conflicting traffic during take-off 
Potential Runway Incursions due to existing or emerging traffic conflicts during 
ownship’s take-off roll have to be detected as early as possible in order to maximize 
the margin available for remedial action, as discussed in Section 5.5.3. Accordingly, 
once it is established that the flight crew has initiated take-off – based on the criteria 
derived in Sections 5.5.4 & 5.5.5.3 – a “RUNWAY INCURSION” warning will be 
issued whenever other traffic is detected on the runway surface ahead of ownship or 
within the applicable runway protection zone and at risk of physically infringing the 
runway within 10 seconds. 
In contrast to preventive Surface Movement Alerting, hazardous situations may 
emerge at any time during the entire take-off run. Therefore, to ensure that no run-
way traffic conflict is missed, this warning is triggered up to V1, and reduced to cau-
tion level beyond V1. Moreover, in order to minimize the risk of unnecessary RTOs in 
the high speed regime, the sensitivity of the alert will be reduced beyond 100 kts by 
only taking into account traffic directly on the runway surface. Irrespective of 
whether the conflict still persists, the alert is removed at 100 ft RA after lift-off. 
These trigger conditions ensure that, in accordance with Table 9, there are no alerts if 
other traffic is present on the runway as long as ownship is merely lining up and 
waiting for the take-off clearance. Only when initiating take-off, pilots will receive 
the warning described above for any other traffic in the runway protection zone 
ahead of ownship. Furthermore, in an environment supporting CPDLC clearances 
for runway manoeuvres, an additional “RUNWAY TRAFFIC” caution alert will be 
triggered if ownship has acknowledged a take-off clearance while other traffic is on 
the runway surface, irrespective of the thrust settings. Consequently, this permits the 
detection of Runway Incursions before the take-off roll has actually commenced. 
However, in current operations at hub airports, take-off clearances are sometimes 
given while a preceding aircraft taking off is barely rotating or while a previous land-
ing aircraft is just turning off the runway. To reduce the risk of potential nuisance 
alerts in routine operations, therefore, additional measures to increase the specificity 
of reactive alerts may be necessary, irrespective of the applicable CPDLC scenario. 
Future research will therefore have to address whether this could be achieved e.g. by 
excluding traffic moving away from ownship for the first seconds of the take-off roll. 
Besides, once take-off has been initiated, the alerts for traffic on final approach de-
scribed in the previous section will be suppressed for all aircraft approaching from 
behind, since a rejected take-off would definitely worsen the situation. 
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For airport configurations with intersecting runways, any take-off and landing op-
erations on these runways must be considered as potentially conflicting while own-
ship is taking off. In line with the criteria derived in the previous section, correspond-
ing aircraft are characterised by having an altitude of less than 250 ft above the run-
way threshold and a groundspeed in excess of 40 kts. If the intersecting runway sup-
ports LAHSO operations, only traffic on the runway surface will be considered to 
exclude aircraft on final approach, which will be assumed to hold short of the run-
way used by ownship. Besides, a distinction between accelerating and decelerating 
surface traffic must be made to ensure that aircraft taking off are still taken into ac-
count, and that only landing aircraft are filtered. 
 
Low-speed traffic rolling out, taxiing or back-tracking on intersecting runways that 
might be of risk of infringing ownship’s take-off runway will be treated like any 
other traffic infringing the runway protection zone from the taxiway system. Accord-
ingly, the “RUNWAY INCURSION” warning will be triggered when traffic on in-
tersecting runways either infringes the LAHSO location or, alternatively, the core 
protection zone (cf. Section 5.5.4) and is within 10 s from entering the surface of the 
runway used for take-off by ownship. 
Approximately halfway through the low speed regime, when ownship accelerates 
through 50 kts, there appears to be a need to limit the scope of traffic on intersecting 
runways taken into account for alerting to avoid spurious RTOs; thus warnings are 
limited to conflicting traffic that might enter the intersection in less than 15 s. 
Clearly, this rudimentary initial approach to detecting conflicting traffic on intersect-
ing runways calls for further sophistication, which may be a rewarding topic for fu-
ture work in the field. One approach might be to use type-specific approach and 
runway deceleration profiles for other aircraft on crossing runways to compensate 
for the lack of acceleration/deceleration in ADS-B and TIS-B traffic data.  
 
5.5.6.3 Conflicting traffic during final approach and landing 
During approach, when ownship descends below 1500 ft RA, the landing runway 
established by SMAAS is continuously monitored for potentially conflicting traffic. 
At 450 ft RA or less, if any other aircraft are detected on the runway or within the 
applicable protection zone, a “RUNWAY TRAFFIC” caution alert is triggered. At or 
below 250 ft RA, if traffic fails to vacate the runway or if the conflict persists other-
wise, the alert is raised to a “RUNWAY INCURSION” warning. Likewise, if conflict-
ing traffic emerges below this altitude, the warning is issued immediately without 
preceding caution. Aircraft which are already airborne, i.e. more than 50 ft above the 
runway surface, form the only exception. 
When this warning occurs during final approach, the flight crew is expected to initi-
ate a go-around unless they can visually establish that the alert is spurious. At any 
rate, while the aircraft is still airborne, the flight crew can initiate a go-around at any 
time without endangering the safety of flight128. Nevertheless, unnecessary go-
arounds due to nuisance or premature alerts must be avoided, since this might even-
                                                 
128  Initiating a go-around is safe provided that a sufficient amount of fuel is available and that there are no major 
technical problems, such as e.g. an engine fire. Besides, the corresponding Runway Incursion warning could be 
inhibited in case of an engine fire or insufficient fuel resources. 
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tually decrease the operational acceptability of the system, because frequent go-
arounds will jeopardize the airline’s efforts on fuel efficiency, punctuality or reduced 
maintenance costs, and thus cause economic disadvantage. 
Particularly for high-density operations, there might consequently be a necessity to 
fine-tune the trigger conditions while maintaining the general fundamental principle. 
As an example, other aircraft with a groundspeed beyond 80 kts in the second half of 
the landing runway could be regarded as having taken off by the time ownship 
lands, and thus not be classified as conflicting. A similar exception might be applied 
to landing aircraft during turn-off when it can be established that they will have va-
cated the runway surface within the next 15 s. 
 
Potentially conflicting traffic on intersecting runways is comparatively difficult to 
identify for the landing case, because the actual collision hazard depends on the pre-
cise geometry of the intersection, and on whether LAHSO operations are in use. If 
this is the case for ownship’s landing runway, it is generally assumed that the flight 
crew will manage to respect this constraint, and consequently, any traffic on runways 
crossing beyond the LAHSO location is completely ignored. Based on a similar ra-
tionale, all landing traffic on intersecting runways featuring LAHSO operations is 
therefore excluded from conflict alerting. To minimize the risk of spurious alerts as 
far as possible, traffic on runways intersecting the landing runway in the last third of 
its length is only taken into account after touchdown. 
For all other traffic on other runways moving towards the intersection and not sub-
ject to these constraints, fundamentally the same criteria as for conflicting traffic dur-
ing entry into the runway protection zone from the taxiway system are applied: 
  
 A “TRAFFIC ON APPROACH” caution alert will be issued for any traffic on fi-
nal approach to crossing runways, i.e. all aircraft below 250 ft above the threshold 
of the intersecting runway, while ownship is simultaneously less than 450 ft RA 
above its landing runway. 
 A “RUNWAY TRAFFIC” caution alert is triggered for any traffic on the intersec-
tion runway with ground speed beyond 40 kts; which is assumed to be either tak-
ing off or landing. 
 A “RUNWAY INCURSION” warning is issued when, in otherwise identical 
conditions as above, ownship is less than 250 ft RA above the threshold of its 
landing runway. 
 
It must be emphasised that these criteria are mainly safety-driven and intended for 
an initial evaluation of the principal functionality. In an operational context, particu-
larly at busy airports, the will consequently most likely be a need for further fine-
tuning to prevent nuisance alerts. As in the case of traffic turning off the runway in a 
single runway scenario (see above), these aspects will have to be addressed by future 
research. To make alerting more specific in the landing case, a coupling of SMAAS to 
a potentially available Brake-to-Vacate functionality, cf. [Vil09], should be envisaged. 
The selected runway exit and predicted landing distance from this system could be 
employed for a more specific identification of the part of the landing runway to be 
protected against intrusions by alerting. Again, these aspects have to be recom-
mended to detailed investigation by future research. 
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5.5.6.4 Traffic alerting outside the runways 
Outside the runways, and during low-speed operations in the runway environment, 
a TCAS-like CPA protection against conflicting traffic is used to minimize the risk of 
colliding with other traffic. Generally, any traffic in the immediate proximity within 
a radius of 50 m will be highlighted (Level 0) to attract the attention of the flight 
crew. Furthermore, if other traffic is predicted to infringe the type-specific protection 
zone around ownship within less than 10 seconds, a “TRAFFIC” callout as for ACAS 
will be raised. In this case, pilots should try to acquire the intruder visually as with 
current ACAS procedures, and to slow down or stop their aircraft in case of doubt, 
i.e. if external conditions do not permit to visually acquire the conflicting traffic. 
Since the hazards associated with a collision during low speed taxi operations are 
rather low in comparison to Runway Incursions, the use of warning level alerts by 
SMAAS is reserved to these immediately live-threatening situations. 
In order to prevent that aircraft queuing for take-off do not receive nuisance alerts, 
there may be the need to reduce the threshold for this alert when other traffic is mov-
ing nearly in the same direction as ownship. 
 
5.5.6.5 Constraints 
A prerequisite for reactive Surface Movement Alerting is that data covering all rele-
vant traffic on the manoeuvring area is available in sufficient quality, i.e. with the 
nominal update rate and minimum latency. Performance requirements are signifi-
cant, since traffic in the runway environment is highly dynamic. TIS-B data reflecting 
a traffic situation 5 or 10 seconds in the past is of very limited use for reactive Run-
way Incursion alerting, particularly when trying to establish whether other traffic is 
taking off or has entered the runway protection zone. 
Therefore, an issue with alerts based on traffic surveillance information is that there 
is no guarantee that information is complete, unless ADS-B out equipage is manda-
tory and potential equipment failures are addressed. Consequently, integrity, accu-
racy, update rate, latency and reliability of traffic data might limit the possibility to 
generate high-level traffic alerts. 
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Condition Alert Type Callout PFD Text Message 
 Taxiway/Apron Traf-
fic conflict 
 Traffic conflict on 
runway with both air-
craft/mobiles < L2 
speed limit 
Caution (Level 2) “TRAFFIC” TRAFFIC 
 Ownship approaching 
runway (landside) 
with traffic beyond 
L2/L3 speed limit 
present 
 Ownship approaching 
runway (airside) be-
low L2/L3 height limit 
with traffic present 
on runway 
 ownship taking off 
with traffic beyond 
L2/L3 speed limit to-
wards intersection on 
converging runway 
(non-LAHSO) 
Caution (Level 2) “RUNWAY TRAFFIC” RUNWAY TRAFFIC 
Warning (Level 3) “RUNWAY INCURSION” RUNWAY INCURSION 
 Ownship approaching 
runway (landside) 
with approaching 
traffic 500 ft above 
ownship altitude or 
less 
Caution (Level 2) “TRAFFIC ON APPROACH” TRAFFIC ON APPROACH 
 Ownship approaching 
runway (landside) 
with approaching 
traffic 250 ft above 
ownship altitude or 
less 
Warning (Level 3) “RUNWAY INCURSION” RUNWAY INCURSION 
Table 12: Summary of reactive SMAAS alerts 
 
Table 12 summarizes the callouts provided by the reactive part of SMAAS. Addition-
ally, whenever a runway traffic conflict requiring a warning alert has been resolved, 
an TCAS-style “CLEAR OF CONFLICT” is sounded. Consequently, there are, in ad-
dition to the seven callouts for preventive Surface Movement Alerting, only four ad-
ditional ones for the reactive functionality. Therefore, the introduction of SMAAS 
would result in the addition of only nine new callouts to the flight deck, because 
“TRAFFIC” and “CLEAR OF CONFLICT” are already known from TCAS and used 
in an identical fashion. Given the complexity of the Surface Movement Alerting func-
tionality, this appears to be a reasonable number. 
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5.5.7 Human-Machine Interface for Surface Movement Alerting 
The commonly accepted design principles for flight deck alerting systems [SAE88a] 
as well as the need for consistency and adequate prioritisation with mandatory other 
onboard alerting systems [SAE88] impose considerable constraints on the Human-
Machine Interface (HMI) design for Surface Movement Alerting, as discussed in Sec-
tion 5.5.2. The integration into an existing cockpit environment with its potentially 
unique design philosophy may, depending on the aircraft type, further limit the de-
sign choices available. Therefore, these boundary conditions resulting from airwor-
thiness and standardisation constitute the main challenge in defining a suitable HMI 
for Surface Movement Alerting.  
In line with the flight deck alerting philosophy derived in section 5.5.2, Surface 
Movement Alerting cautions and warnings are accompanied by voice callouts to 
alert the flight crew, whereas the localisation of the hazard causing the alert is con-
veyed by an accompanying visualisation on the airport moving map. Both the callout 
and the display simultaneously provide further explanation of the situation, and can 
be supplemented by additional explanatory textual information where necessary. 
This is intended to ensure commonality between the presentation of surface move-
ment and particularly Runway Incursions alerts. 
 
5.5.7.1 Visualisation and callouts for preventive Runway Incursion alerting 
The visualisation of Runway Incursion alerts is an example of how the need for con-
sistency with existing systems de facto dictates design choices. Upon alert, onboard 
surveillance systems such as TCAS or TAWS highlight the part of the external envi-
ronment to which the threat relates, not the ownship symbol, probably because a 
colour change of the ownship symbol to amber or red is not considered to be suffi-
ciently conspicuous. In analogy to this, therefore, the corresponding runway or run-
way elements will have to be highlighted in case of a Runway Incursion alert. 
Kubbat et al. were the first to suggest using a colour change of the runway surface to 
indicate a potentially hazardous condition or Runway Incursion [Kub99]. This choice 
seems reasonable for several reasons. First of all, in the typical airport moving map 
ranges, the representation of the runway surface usually covers a significant part of 
the display area, which is likely to make a colour change of that area an efficient vis-
ual cue or attention-getter to induce the immediate awareness or immediate reaction 
required in case of a caution or warning. Using the whole runway surface, as op-
posed to the part of immediate concern (such as a closed runway segment), addition-
ally minimizes the risk that the alert visualisation is hidden by particular combina-
tion of range or mode. By contrast, only an automatic range and/or mode adaptation 
in case of an alert, as discussed in Section 5.5.7.2, can fully eliminate this issue. 
Conversely, using merely the runway outline to convey an alert condition appears to 
be inappropriate. Due to the smaller resulting area that will eventually be high-
lighted in an alert colour, it is considered as a much less efficient visual cue, and 
therefore not deemed suitable to convey information that requires the crew’s imme-
diate awareness or reaction. Accordingly, the runway outline is used for different 
purposes within SMAAS, such as highlighting the FMS-selected runway and the 
presentation of take-off and landing clearances, see Sections 5.3.2 and 5.4.3, which do 
not necessitate immediate awareness. 
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Figure 80 and Figure 81 show the resulting visualisation of Runway Incursion cau-
tion (Level 2) and warning (Level 3) alerts, respectively, that was used for the simula-
tor evaluation campaign described in Chapter 8. The entire runway surface, includ-
ing the runway outline, is highlighted in the colour corresponding to the applicable 
alert level (cf. Table 13) as long as the alert condition persists. Simultaneously, any 
runway or other pertinent airport markings are removed in the ranges where they 
would normally be displayed. Furthermore, the runway labels also change font and 
outline colour according to the alert level, using the default black background. The 
design intention behind this is twofold: first, the label of the runway concerned by 
the alert is itself highlighted through the use of a signal colour like amber or red. 
Secondly, this helps to maintain a visually integral runway representation. Other-
wise, if the labels retained their default or even dimmed representation as described 
in Section 5.3.3 (see Figure 49), this would result in three seemingly fragmented run-
way sections in amber or red on the display, separated by the runway labels. 
 
The integration of the runway outline into the alert visualisation is based on the phi-
losophy that the caution or warning condition takes precedence over any other in-
formation normally conveyed via the runway outline, such as FMS-selected runway 
(or restrictions thereof), for the duration of the alert. The representation of take-off 
and landing clearances forms a slight exception, because any existing clearance in-
formation is permanently removed following a traffic-related Runway Incursion 
warning. The underlying rationale is that a Level 3 Runway Incursion alert, particu-
larly when resulting in a rejected take-off, will necessitate at least a new take-off 
clearance. Likewise, since the crew is expected to execute to a go-around manoeuvre 
during a Level 3 alert prior to landing, a new landing clearance will be required as 
well. Conversely, in case of a caution alert, which hints more to a developing situa-
tion than to an acute problem, the crew may still choose to proceed with the origi-
nally intended manoeuvre, and clearance information is returned once the alert has 
ceased. 
  
Figure 80: Common visualisation of all Run-
way Incursion caution (Level 2) alerts 
Figure 81: Runway Incursion warning alert 
(Level 3) visualisation 
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Other visual cues, such as the use and placement of textual messages or the behav-
iour of the Master Caution and Master Warning lights are highly airframe-specific. In 
the frame of SMAAS simulator evaluation campaign, textual messages briefly sum-
marizing the nature of the alert were presented on the PFD for Level 2 and Level 3 
alerts (see Table 10), in accordance with the Airbus cockpit philosophy as described 
in [Air05]. Additionally, the Master Caution/Master Warning lights, respectively, 
were lighted, and pressing them enabled flight crews to silence aural alerts. 
 
For the field trials with the Navigation Test Vehicle (cf. Chapter 7), the standalone 
airport moving map configuration featured a marginally different alerting HMI. In-
stead of a steady colour change, the runway surface would pulse in the colour asso-
ciated with the corresponding alert level, alternating with a framed message box in 
the display centre presenting the runway threshold names and in the same alert col-
our. For Level 0 alerts, however, the threshold name was displayed in magenta for 
the FMS-selected runway, superseded by a cyan/green representation whenever a 
line-up or take-off clearance was assigned/acknowledged for the respective runway. 
Furthermore, for Level 0 alerts, the colour of the runway surface was changed to yel-
low instead of white. Besides, text messages were presented in a status line below the 
airport moving map instead of the PFD. 
 
In accordance with the commonly accepted principles of Flight Deck Alerting, cf. 
[SAE88a], all Level 2 and Level 3 alerts are accompanied by a callout detailing the 
nature of the alert. Callouts also ensure that flight crews do not miss an alert even if 
the currently selected display configuration does not permit them to see the airport 
moving map in sufficient detail. 
Any deviations from this principle and the precise wording of the SMAAS aural 
alerts have already been detailed in the previous section describing the correspond-
ing alerts. Table 10 provides a summary of callouts and textual messages for preven-
tive Surface Movement Alerting. 
 
5.5.7.2 Visualisation and callouts for Reactive Runway Incursion Alerting 
Since all traffic alerting systems aboard an aircraft have to be consistent in the way 
alerts are presented to avoid confusion, the visualisation of conflicting traffic in the 
aerodrome environment must strive for maximum commonality with TCAS as man-
datory system, in line with the discussion in Sections 5.5.1 and 5.5.2. Consequently, 
the traffic alerts provided by SMAAS will also have to be visualised by changing col-
our and/or shape of the symbol associated with conflicting traffic. 
Apparently, if conflicting aircraft traffic is not supplying valid track or heading in-
formation, the same shape-modified traffic alert symbols as for TCAS (amber circle, 
red square, cf. Figure 20 in Section 3.2.1) can be used for Level 2 and Level 3 alerts, 
respectively. This seems necessary to avoid the discrepancies with TCAS that would 
inevitably result from presenting an amber or red diamond symbol. However, since 
it may be essential for pilots to perceive at a single glance whether conflicting traffic 
is entering or leaving the runway, directional information – where available – must 
be retained throughout an alert, which precludes a general use of the TCAS caution 
and warning symbols for Surface Movement Alerting. Nevertheless, since the aero-
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drome traffic symbology derived in Section 5.2 is already quite complex and uses 
symbol shape to code the type of traffic, an additional dedicated shape change for the 
different alert levels that preserves directionality does not seem appropriate. 
Consequently, aircraft or vehicle 
symbols are merely highlighted 
in the colour corresponding to 
the applicable alert level, see Ta-
ble 13, which summarizes sym-
bol and runway colours associ-
ated with the different alert lev-
els, for details. Accordingly, am-
ber and red symbols are used to indicate Level 2 (caution) or Level 3 (warning) alerts, 
respectively. The distinction between Level 1 and Level 2 alerts is made through the 
presence of a callout – every caution is accompanied by a callout, whereas there is no 
aural alert for Level 1. This approach is consistent with both TCAS implementations 
and the standards for flight deck alerting systems and colour coding [SAE88, 
SAE88a]. 
It is crucial that the flight crew does not miss an alert due to display configuration, 
and that an identification of the traffic in conflict occurs as soon as possible. There-
fore, irrespective of pilot settings with respect to the presentation of aerodrome traf-
fic, at least the conflicting aircraft or vehicles have to be displayed in case of a 
SMAAS traffic alert, again in analogy to TCAS, cf. [RTC97]. Nevertheless, an open 
issue in this context is whether merely the conflicting traffic or the complete traffic 
picture should be activated automatically upon alert. The latter would be intended to 
provide the crew with adequate situational awareness for conflict resolution, thus 
ensuring that any corrective action taken by the crew does not lead to a consecutive 
traffic conflict. However, an interview with two airline captains having an official 
function in the IFALPA aircraft design and operations committee during the design 
phase yielded that, in contrast to TCAS, only the conflicting traffic itself should be 
presented while on the ground, because both the options for conflict avoidance and 
the risk of consecutive alerts are much more limited on the ground. Furthermore, it 
should be considered that there is usually an operational reason for de-selecting the 
display of traffic. Therefore, it was decided to limit the automatic pop-up to conflict-
ing traffic only. 
 
While the behaviour of traffic symbology in case of alert is thus largely pre-
determined by standardisation, the presentation of the traffic labels offers a certain 
degree of freedom for HMI design. For improved conspicuity, displaying the traffic 
triggering the alert along with its associated label appears to be reasonable. There-
fore, for Level 1 alerts and higher, the traffic label is always displayed irrespective of 
potentially differing crew settings with respect to traffic labels. 
At the same time, the presentation of reactive, traffic-related alerts should also be 
consistent with the way preventive SMAAS alerts are visualized. In particular, it 
seems appropriate to present Runway Incursion alerts in a similar fashion irrespec-
tive of whether they are triggered due to traffic or other causal factors. In this con-
text, the concept for the visualisation of reactive Runway Incursion alerts should be 
regarded as an extension of the HMI for displaying preventive SMAAS alerts. 
Alert Level Traffic Symbol Runway 
No alert white default 
Level 0 yellow white 
Level 1 amber amber 
Level 2 amber amber 
Level 3 red red 
Table 13: Colour coding for different alert levels 
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In conclusion, reactive Runway Incursion alerts are therefore visualized by highlight-
ing both the runway surface (as described in Section 5.5.7) and the intruder causing 
the alert in the colour corresponding to the applicable alert level, cf. Figure 82. For 
intersecting runways, only the surface of the runway used by ownship is highlighted 
in addition to the conflicting traffic, unless an infringement of intersecting runway by 
ownship necessitates a simultaneous preventive alert. 
Since this design may evidently result in an intruder being displayed on a runway 
highlighted in exactly the same colour, intruder symbols are given a black halo to 
make them discriminable from the background in this case. Additionally, the in-
truder label is ‘inverted’ for all Runway Incursion alerts: black text is displayed on a 
label background coloured according to the applicable alert level. This is intended to 
serve as another measure to make the intruder more conspicuous in the runway en-
vironment. Conversely, for all traffic alerts not related to a Runway Incursion, only 
the colour of the label text is changed. Consequently, the style in which the traffic 
label is presented introduces some redundancy beyond colour.  
Figure 82 shows the HMI for a Runway Incursion warning that was evaluated in the 
simulator evaluation campaign described in Chapter 8. Since the conflicting traffic is 
directly on the runway surface, the traffic label simultaneously serves as an addi-
tional visual cue where to look for the intruder. Furthermore, this solution maintains 
the readability of the callsign even if the label of the conflicting traffic intersects with 
the runway surface. For traffic alerts not related to Runway Incursions, such precau-
tions are not necessary, as shown on the example of a traffic caution alert on the 
taxiway system in Figure 83, where just the colour of the label text is changed. 
 
Since pilots may choose range and mode for the display hosting the airport moving 
map at their discretion, there is a non-negligible risk that conflicting traffic might be 
out of range or otherwise outside the selected display field of view. However, to un-
derstand the precise nature and severity of the traffic conflict, and to react ade-
quately, the flight crew must be made aware of the precise location of the traffic trig-
  
Figure 82: Visualisation of reactive Runway 
Incursion warning (Level 3 alert) 
Figure 83: Reactive Surface Movement Alert 
(caution) not related to a Runway Incursion 
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gering the Runway Incursion alert. Besides, having the conflicting traffic in view on 
the display is also a well-established requirement for ACAS, cf. [RTC97]. 
Of course, one could procedurally prescribe or recommend that at least one pilot al-
ways uses the AMM in a range where the whole runway, including potentially inter-
secting runways, is visible during take-off. But even then, there is no guarantee that 
the crew adheres. When taking off into a difficult and rapidly changing weather 
situation, or with potentially conflicting traffic at a runway intersection close to the 
own aircraft, displaying the airport moving map may probably not be best suited to 
the task at hand, and there might be valid reasons to deviate from such a procedure. 
 
Consequently, this raises the question which measures should be taken in HMI de-
sign to address situations in which the display is not configured appropriately when 
a SMAAS alert occurs. From the considerations above, it is evident that pilots should 
nevertheless be provided with an appropriate visual alert indication in this situation. 
Therefore, to ensure that the crew is alerted efficiently, additional visual cues might 
be required for cases where the conflicting traffic is outside the current range set for 
the display in a given mode. 
 
In view of the situations in which a Runway Incursion alert for conflicting traffic is 
required, it is immediately evident that ownship will be either on the runway surface 
or approaching it when a corresponding SMAAS alert is triggered. Consequently, at 
least part of the runway should be visible on the display in most cases, irrespective of 
the precise display settings. Thus, highlighting the runway surface is believed to be 
an efficient visual alerting cue in virtually all cases where conflicting traffic is mo-
mentarily not in view. Apart from the consistency issues mentioned above, there are 
consequently further practical reasons to highlight not only the conflicting traffic, but 
also the runway surface in case of a Runway Incursion alert. 
However, this still does not provide pilots with cues concerning the location of the 
conflicting traffic. One potential approach, which is currently used on Airbus aircraft, 
consists of requesting the flight crew to change range and mode. If ranges beyond 40 
NM are selected and a TCAS Traffic Advisory (TA) or Resolution Advisory (RA) oc-
curs, a text message “TCAS: REDUCE RANGE” is displayed on the ND in amber or 
red, respectively. Likewise, if the ND is set to PLAN mode, a “TCAS: CHANGE 
MODE” text message will appear in exactly the same fashion [Air05]. 
 
Alert Level Condition ND Text Message 
coloured according to the associated alert level. 
Level 3 
Level 2 
Level 1 
PLAN-Mode selected [CALLOUT TEXT], CHANGE MODE 
ARC-Mode selected, conflicting traffic behind [CALLOUT TEXT], CHANGE MODE 
Range > 10 NM selected [CALLOUT TEXT], REDUCE RANGE 
Conflicting traffic out of range [CALLOUT TEXT], INCREASE RANGE 
Table 14: Proposal for ND text messages for off-scale reactive SMAAS alerts 
 
Table 14 summarizes an analogous Airbus-style solution for traffic-related SMAAS 
alerts, which seems favourable from a flight deck consistency perspective, given that 
the A320 aircraft family is used as reference for this thesis. Accordingly, for Level 1 
alerts and higher, the ND would show a text message equivalent to the callout asso-
ciated with the alert, followed by an instruction to change mode or range. 
5.5   SURFACE MOVEMENT ALERTING (SMA) 
  263 
Nevertheless, particularly in case of a safety-net alert, which requires immediate pilot 
reaction and may create an environment of very high workload, the flight crew’s re-
sources should not be spent on reconfiguring a display. Since pilots need to focus on 
addressing the alert, including potentially associated recovery procedures, a manual 
display reconfiguration is consequently sub-optimum in terms of priorities and thus 
appears questionable from a human factors perspective. 
To avoid this, and to relieve the flight crew of the 
task of finding an appropriate range/mode com-
bination for conflicting traffic, an automatic or 
semi-automatic display reconfiguration upon alert 
could be envisaged. Other aircraft manufacturers 
have followed this approach. On the McDonnell-
Douglas MD-11, for example, a dedicated TCAS 
mode can be selected on the ND via the EIS Con-
trol Panel (ECP), cf. Figure 84. When the corre-
sponding button is depressed, the ND changes to 
a 10 NM default range, and all other information, 
such as weather radar, bearing pointers, flight 
plan etc. is removed [McD90]. In case of a TCAS 
resolution advisory, this virtually guarantees that 
the conflicting traffic is in view, and that other information is de-cluttered. In fact, 
asking a flight crew to push a single button in an alert situation appears as a reason-
able compromise between fully automatic and completely manual display reconfigu-
ration, because it keeps the flight crew in the loop. 
The available range and mode controls are, however, the main factor determining the 
feasibility of an automatic or semi-automatic adaptation of range and mode to bring 
conflicting traffic into view. Since many EFIS control panels use knob shape, notches 
and legends or other hardware means to indicate pilot selections, a mismatch of 
hardware controls and actual display configuration is an almost inevitable conse-
quence of an automated range or mode adaptation. Evidently, though, this has to be 
avoided to prevent potential pilot confusion129. By contrast, there is no issue when 
the indication of EFIS configuration is decoupled from selector hardware. On the 
MD-11, for example, ND range is adjusted via an INCR or DECR pushbutton on the 
EIS Control Panel (ECP), while the selected range is only displayed on the display130, 
cf. Figure 84. Similarly, on the Airbus A380, the selector position is no longer only 
indicated by a hardware notch, but through the illumination of a green LED triangle 
corresponding to the current selection131. 
 
                                                 
129  Reverting the display to the originally selected range and mode once the alert condition is over might seem to 
be a potential solution to this issue at first glance, but misses a crucial point: If pilots want to override - with an 
alert still persisting - the automatically established setting, e.g. by choosing a range/mode combination provid-
ing more detail, they will have to start out from a hardware setting inconsistent with their display. This, in 
turn, might induce further workload and confusion in an already very demanding situation. 
130  While this solution facilitates the introduction of new display ranges through modified EFIS software, since no 
hardware modifications are required in this case, a potential disadvantage associated with indicating the range 
selection only on the ND itself is that the flight crew needs to go head down to confirm the range setting. 
131  Due to lack of publicly accessible information, however, it was not possible to infer whether the A380 FCU 
design was established in this way with an automatic range/mode adaptation in view or not. 
 
Figure 84: McDonnell-Douglas 
MD-11 EIS Control Panel (ECP) on 
Captain’s side with selector for 
dedicated TCAS mode 
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5.5.7.3 HMI Design for other Surface Movement Alerts 
Concerning the HMI design for the Taxiway Take-off Prevention, there is a signifi-
cant dilemma concerning the visualisation on the airport moving map. From a con-
ceptual and alerting philosophy perspective, cf. Section 5.5.2, this alert should be ac-
companied by dedicated visual cues on the display. The problem, however, is that a 
taxiway surface highlighted in amber or red was considered to be far too evocative of 
the Runway Incursion alerts, and was therefore a priori excluded to avoid potential 
confusion. After all, the purpose of the Taxiway Take-off Prevention is to alert the 
flight crew that they are not on a runway. Accordingly, it was decided that runway 
surfaces would remain the only airport areas to be highlighted in an alert colour. 
Several other modifications of the taxiway presentation were considered as well, 
among others pulsing taxiway labels and/or highlighting the taxiway centre lines in 
the colour corresponding to the alert level, but eventually discarded during the pro-
totyping sessions with test and technical pilots since neither guidance lines nor labels 
are displayed in all available airport moving map ranges. Eventually, a simple text 
message “TWY [TWY Name]” reminding the flight crew of the taxiway they are cur-
rently located on remained as sole visual cue on the display. The only other related 
indication that the crew received when exceeding 30/40 kts of ground speed was a 
change from a green to an amber numerical groundspeed indication. 
 
Likewise, finding an appropriate callout for this alert turned out to be difficult. A 
repetitive callout instructing the flight crew to abort take-off, such as “STOP”, seems 
a natural choice, because cancelling the erroneously initiated take-off is anyhow the 
only option in this case. Accordingly, the considerations in Section 4.4.4 on conflict 
resolution instructions apply to Runway Incursion alerting only. 
Nevertheless, potential ambiguities and failure modes have to be taken into account 
a priori. While a “STOP” callout may be perfectly appropriate on a taxiway, it might 
induce a potentially hazardous rejected take-off if aircraft positional accuracy or in-
tegrity degrades such that an apparent shift to a parallel taxiway occurs during the 
take-off roll. Therefore, after a “TAXIWAY TAKE-OFF” callout during the evaluation 
with the Navigation Test Vehicle had been criticised by most evaluation participants, 
cf. Section 7.7, a basic “NOT ON RUNWAY” callout was eventually chosen to alert 
the flight crew that they are trying to take off outside the runways. 
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5.5.8 Schematic SMAAS Logic 
 
 
 
Figure 85: Schematic overview of overall SMAAS logic (simplified) 
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5.5.9 Prioritisation with Other Cockpit Alerts 
The alerts generated by Surface Movement Alerting must be properly prioritised in 
relation to other flight deck alerts, particularly those generated by other onboard 
surveillance systems, cf. [SAE88a]. While a fixed or dynamic prioritization scheme 
helps to prevent conflicting alerts, this may not always be sufficient to address the 
issue of consecutive alerts, i.e. a subsequent alert triggered by a second surveillance 
system as a result of a recovery manoeuvre instructed (either procedurally or system-
wise) by a first surveillance system. This has led to the development of Integrated 
Surveillance Systems (ISS) in research, cf. [Ver05], and industry, resulting in the 
ARINC 768 standard [ARI05]. Although this document explicitly mentions “runway 
alerting” as future growth potential, it does not contain any considerations regarding 
the prioritisation of the corresponding alerts. 
For Surface Movement Alerting, the only major competitive alert on the ground is 
the take-off configuration warning, which should always have priority as already 
established in Section 5.5.4. Consequently, alert prioritisation is of particular concern 
only for the SMAAS alerts triggered during final approach and landing. ARINC 768 
contains the same static alert prioritisation table as the one required for TAWS ac-
cording to TSO-C151b [FAA02c], except for the spare V1 (Priority 5) and engine fail 
(Priority 6) callouts. Therefore, extending this table by the SMAAS alerts appears to 
be a good starting point, based on the principle that the alerts provided by the Wind-
shear Warning System and TAWS must have priority over SMAAS and TCAS, be-
cause windshear and terrain hazards will almost inevitably result in a crash if not 
mitigated. The necessary modifications are highlighted in Table 15; which is other-
wise identical to references [ARI05, FAA02c]. 
 
Priority Alert Type Level Comments 
1 Reactive Windshear Warning  WARNING  
2 Sink Rate Pull-Up Warning  WARNING continuous  
3 Excessive Closure Pull-Up Warning  WARNING continuous  
4 RTC Terrain Warning  WARNING  
5 FLTA Pull-Up warning  WARNING continuous  
6 PWS Warning  WARNING  
7 SMAAS Runway Incursion Warning WARNING  
8 TCAS Resolution Advisory WARNING  
9 RTC Terrain Caution  CAUTION continuous  
10 Minimums  Information  
11 FLTA Caution  CAUTION 7 s period  
12 Too Low Terrain  CAUTION  
13 PDA (“Too Low Terrain”) Caution  CAUTION  
14 Altitude Callouts  Information  
15 Too Low Gear  CAUTION  
16 Too Low Flaps  CAUTION  
17 Sink Rate  CAUTION  
18 Don't Sink  CAUTION  
19 Glideslope  CAUTION 3 s period  
20 Predictive Windshear Caution  CAUTION  
21 Approaching Minimums  Information  
22 Bank Angle  CAUTION  
23 Reactive Windshear Caution  CAUTION  
24 SMAAS Caution Advisories CAUTION  
25 TCAS TA ("Traffic, Traffic")  CAUTION Continuous  
Table 15: Integrated Surveillance System (ISS) alert prioritisation with SMAAS extension 
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5.6 Summary 
 
In this chapter, the different layers of protection against Runway Incursions offered 
by the envisaged Surface Movement Awareness and Alerting System (SMAAS), each 
of which addresses an individual deficiency of current flight decks with respect to 
either availability or accessibility of information required for safe operations in the 
aerodrome environment, as identified by the High-Level Requirements, have been 
discussed in detail. It could be shown that there are no fundamental technology hur-
dles precluding the realisation of such an onboard surveillance system, although 
there are clearly still substantial challenges in the domain of Controller-Pilot Data 
Link Communication (CPDLC). 
 
A basic, but essential level of protection against disorientation is provided by the 
presentation of the airport topology contained in the Aerodrome Mapping Databases 
(AMDB) in the form of an airport moving map (Section 5.1), which can easily be en-
hanced by a visualisation of the departure or landing runway planned in the FMS, 
and alerts in the style of an extended Take-off Configuration Warning whenever the 
flight crew attempts to take off outside this FMS-selected runway132. These features 
alone, which require only an AMDB and the availability of a Global Navigation Sat-
ellite System such as GPS to supplement current inertial navigation, would most 
probably have been sufficient to alter the sequence of events in the Runway Incur-
sion accidents involving disorientation at Madrid (1983), Anchorage (1983, Korean 
Airlines), Detroit (1990), Taipei (2000) and Lexington (2006), cf. Table 2 in Section 2.2. 
Additionally, a flight deck representation of the surrounding traffic (Section 5.2), 
based on e.g. ADS-B technology, might have reduced the collision hazard in those 
cases where visual acquisition of conflicting runway traffic was impossible due to 
visibility conditions or conspicuity issues, in particular the accidents at Tenerife 
(1977), Anchorage (1983, Japan Airlines), Sioux Falls (1983), Atlanta (1990), Los Ange-
les (1991), St. Louis (1994),  Paris Charles-de-Gaulle (2000) and Milano-Linate (2001).  
 
Essentially, it may therefore be concluded that an airport moving map with a presen-
tation of the surrounding traffic could already have contributed substantially to pre-
vent all of the accidents studied in this thesis. Furthermore, the additional visualisa-
tion of short-term or temporary changes and other details on the aerodrome’s opera-
tional status (Section 5.3) as well as displaying ATC instructions and clearances (Sec-
tion 5.4) would clearly have interrupted the chain of events at some stage for several 
accidents, as discussed previously. 
Nevertheless, it cannot be stated with certainty that the mere presentation of addi-
tional information for enhanced situational awareness would have been sufficient to 
prevent all of these accidents, although this appears plausible. Accordingly, an addi-
tional alerting functionality is clearly required. In this context, it has been shown Sec-
tion 5.5 that preventive Surface Movement Alerting can be a highly specific and thus 
very powerful means of detecting and avoiding ownship Runway Incursions, par-
ticularly when based on CPDLC data. 
                                                 
132 Nevertheless, the underlying FMS logic might have to be modified, since present systems sometimes use the 
initiation of take-off for a position update by setting the coordinates of the FMS-selected runway, whereas 
SMAAS requires that the GPS-based position is used to determine the runway the aircraft is located on. 
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Nonetheless, as already outlined in Section 4.2.2, an approach solely relying on pre-
ventive functions is vulnerable in at least three aspects. First of all, a hypothetical 
mandate for equipage with SMAAS would, as past experience with ACAS and 
TAWS suggests, require several years to become effective. Consequently, many air-
craft will not be equipped with a corresponding system any time in the near future, 
and therefore continue to cause Runway Incursions at a rate similar to today. Be-
sides, less than 100% equipage is not only a temporary issue for a transition period 
following a potential mandate, but may remain reality for vehicles or airfields with 
mixed commercial and general aviation operations. 
Secondly, in view of the incidents and accidents in which controllers erroneously 
assigned clearances resulting in Runway Incursions, there is sufficient evidence that 
ATC does not always work flawlessly, cf. Section 2.3.5. However, the correctness of 
controller instructions is at the heart of the assumption that preventive alerting alone 
will provide sufficient protection against Runway Incursions. 
Last but not least, as discussed in Section 5.4, there are still considerable unsolved 
issues concerning the availability and operational impact of runway-related CPDLC 
services, which would be required to achieve full preventive coverage. Even when 
assuming that these issues will eventually be resolved, the aspect of worldwide 
availability and contingency measures in case of CPDLC failure must additionally be 
taken into account. Consequently, this necessitates an approach to runway safety that 
does not exclusively depend on the availability of runway-related CPDLC clearances. 
 
Therefore, reactive Surface Movement Alerting is additionally required. Evidently, it 
is impossible for Surface Movement Alerting to infer whether ownship is authorised 
to operate within the confines of the runway protection zone, which includes take-off 
and landing, in the absence of the respective CPDLC information. However, as soon 
as traffic detected in the runway environment is performing a manoeuvre incom-
patible with the operation conducted by ownship, this evidently indicates that the 
procedural safeguards associated with runway operations are have been violated, 
and an alert to address the resulting Runway Incursion hazard is triggered before 
there is an actual collision hazard. Consequently, analysing the manoeuvres per-
formed by the surrounding traffic for potential incompatibilities permits indirect 
conclusions on authorisation to use the runway at least to the extent that, in the pres-
ence of conflicting traffic, either ownship or the other traffic will necessarily have 
been authorised either in error or not at all. 
In conclusion, the availability of data on the surrounding traffic can thus be regarded 
as a potential compensation and back-up for missing runway-related CPDLC ser-
vices, since this permits to detect obvious conflicts in the authorisation for runway 
operations. As an example, if ownship fails to hold short of a runway in a conven-
tional R/T environment while other traffic is taking off, an alert can be triggered 
solely based on the traffic information. Conversely, in a CPDLC environment, the 
preventive alert will be triggered irrespective of the presence of other traffic if own-
ship attempts to take off without clearance. Preventive and reactive Surface Move-
ment Alerting can therefore be regarded as supplementary in many situations. Gen-
erally, SMAAS offers several redundant layers of defence against Runway Incur-
sions, and therefore exhibits a certain degree of robustness against the unavailability 
or failure of a certain source of information. 
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6 Considerations on Verification and Validation 
 
 
Verification checks a system against the specification documents and determines to 
which extent the requirements set therein are met, thus establishing whether the re-
alisation coincides with the system conceived. In other words, verification is the 
process of answering the question whether a system was ‘built right’. 
By contrast, according to the CAATS glossary, validation is “the process by which the 
fitness-for-purpose of a new system or operational concept being developed is established” 
[Eur07]. Validation can thus be defined as the process of answering the question 
“Are we building the right system?” and usually involves prospective users of the 
system under evaluation, such as pilots or air traffic controllers. 
In the context of this thesis, the verification process was coupled to the integration of 
the SMAAS components on the selected evaluation platform and therefore generally 
completed before an assessment with pilots took place. All pilot-in-the-loop evalua-
tions conducted in the frame of this thesis are therefore considered as validation ac-
tivities. 
 
 
6.1 Validation Objectives 
 
The global validation objective concerning the Surface Movement Awareness and 
Alerting System (SMAAS) conceived in the previous chapter is to determine whether 
an onboard surveillance system is an appropriate means of addressing the problem 
of Runway Incursions. Accordingly, one approach to validation could consist of es-
tablishing the capability of SMAAS to prevent and mitigate hazardous situations in 
the airport environment, particularly Runway Incursions, and thus its potential con-
tribution to improve runway safety. An assessment of safety per se, however, is ex-
tremely difficult, because there is a profound lack of directly accessible objective met-
rics, which is often referred to as the ‘criterion problem’, cf. [Fit51]. Accordingly, any 
impact on runway safety can only be inferred indirectly, e.g. by studying the impact 
of SMAAS on the number of Runway Incursions. However, in spite of the increase in 
recent years, as discussed in Section 1.4, Runway Incursions are still comparatively 
rare events with typically less than 10 occurrences per one million operations. There-
fore, achieving a statistically sound proof in a realistic, representative simulator exer-
cise with a cumulative duration of less than 150 hours is simply impossible. Besides, 
previous experience from another flight simulator experiment assessing terrain-
related onboard surveillance systems has already shown the futility of an approach 
attempting to induce specific flight crew errors through scenario design, cf. [Ver05]. 
 
Consequently, a different approach to validation will have to be used. Essentially, the 
necessity of making certain information accessible to flight crews for the avoidance of 
Runway Incursions has already been established, albeit theoretically, as result of the 
analysis of selected incidents and accidents in Section 2.2, and expressed in the form 
of High-Level Requirements in Section 2.3. This reduces the validation task to estab-
lishing that SMAAS conveys the additional information necessary according to the 
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High-Level Requirements in a suitable and efficient form. Due to the modularity of 
SMAAS, this can be deduced from an assessment of its individual sub-functions. 
 
In assessing and understanding complex human-centred systems, the three interde-
pendent categories technical usability, domain suitability and user acceptability in-
troduced by Harwood have proven helpful [Har93]. Domain suitability refers to the 
appropriateness of information presented on the flight deck in supporting the cogni-
tive requirements of the task at hand, whereas user acceptability addresses usability 
and user satisfaction. With technical usability already covered by integration and 
verification activities, including shakedown sessions, the main objective of the 
SMAAS validation campaigns can therefore be restated as assessing the operational 
relevance (Harwood’s domain suitability) and the usability (Harwood’s user accept-
ability) of the additional information items and alerts provided by SMAAS. 
Since one of the central goals of SMAAS is to compensate deficiencies of current 
flight deck instrumentation by enhancing pilot situational awareness through a series 
of new display features, validation has an intrinsic focus on human-machine inter-
face aspects. Nevertheless, it must be stressed again that the main purpose is to vali-
date the underlying SMAAS concept itself. Therefore, the interest in validating the 
particular Human-Machine Interface (HMI) implementation chosen for this thesis is 
limited to demonstrating that a consistent, integrated solution based on an airport 
moving map is feasible. Consequently, special care was taken regarding the design of 
the prototypic HMI, because an immature or inappropriate HMI can and will nega-
tively influence conceptual evaluation results. In other words, a deficient realisation 
might lead to negative feedback on the underlying concept, since it is often very dif-
ficult for external evaluators to discriminate whether the perceived deficiencies are 
due to the realisation or the concept. Even when an inappropriate implementation is 
apparent, e.g. in case a colour concept violating commonly accepted design princi-
ples is used for a flight deck display, this is still likely to have a detrimental effect on 
the evaluation, because it diverts participants’ attention, resulting in a wealth of 
feedback on display colours, whereas the primary objective of the evaluation might 
have been entirely different. 
 
In evaluating the domain suitability and usability of SMAAS, human factors aspects 
will therefore play a central role. This encompasses establishing the impact of the 
new display features on pilot situational awareness as well as an assessment of work-
load, at the level of ensuring that the SMAAS does not cause excessive extra work-
load in routine operations. Additionally, for the alerts, the adequacy and appropri-
ateness in terms of timing, trigger conditions and reliability is of key interest. 
Furthermore, it is worthwhile to assess the potential impact of the novel system on 
operations, including ATC and other stakeholders. In this context, it might be 
worthwhile to analyse at least the perceived impact on safety. 
Last but not least, an assessment of the particular HMI design chosen must be con-
ducted to identify potentially critical design issues, including possible certification 
concerns, which may be applicable to the concept in general. Besides, evaluation re-
sults on the HMI itself can later be used as an indication as to whether validation re-
sults on the functionality per se might have been impacted by issues or dissatisfaction 
with the particular HMI implementation of SMAAS chosen for this thesis. 
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6.2 Validation Strategy 
6.2.1 Objective versus Subjective Techniques 
A fundamental decision to be made in determining the validation strategy for 
SMAAS concerns the use of objective assessment techniques, because this has a sub-
stantial impact on experimental design, particularly on the setup of evaluation sce-
narios. Besides, objective measurements require the recording of certain aircraft pa-
rameters for later analysis, which is usually no problem in a simulator or an instru-
mented Navigation Test Vehicle. Generally, though, objective and subjective tech-
niques can be applied in parallel. 
 
Objective validation exercises typically compare different systems on the basis of cer-
tain pre-defined performance indicators and metrics, such as flight technical error, 
reaction time or minimum terrain separation in an evasive manoeuvre. Less fre-
quently, binary criteria such as success in executing a certain manoeuvre or recogni-
tion of a conflict are employed. In most cases, an experimental system is assessed 
versus a baseline (see Section 6.4.1 for details) in order to determine to what extent 
the extended or modified features of the novel system constitute an improvement. 
Some authors, such as Newman and Greeley, regard objective measurements as the 
ultimate method of testing new aircraft systems [NG01]. However, a word of caution 
seems appropriate. The design of experiments measuring objective data requires ex-
ceptional care, particularly in human factors evaluations. 
The main problem is that finding suitable objective metrics having a proven and con-
textually valid interrelation with system performance aspects such as situational 
awareness, workload or usability constitutes a formidable challenge. A typical as-
sumption in this context is that improved situational awareness will lead to faster 
recognition of conflicts or quicker response to system failures, or alternatively a bet-
ter adherence to an intended manoeuvre or trajectory, cf. [NG01]. While this is not 
necessarily wrong, this approach is abundant with pitfalls. Measured recognition 
time may be confounded by individual reaction times or bias induced by the experi-
ment scenario (see below). Likewise, a low flight technical error does not necessarily 
correlate with high situational awareness concerning the flight path (or even the sur-
rounding terrain), but may simply result from perfect adherence to flight director 
commands on a PFD. In this case, measurements would be confounded by pilot skill. 
A further issue is the potential influence of scenario design on performance-based, 
objective measurements. As an example, for traffic conflict detection, experimenters 
may introduce bias by inadvertently designing scenarios in which conflicting traffic 
is always easier to detect with a CDTI, compared to visual acquisition. Such bias may 
be quite subtle and not immediately evident. 
Besides, an issue often overlooked is that the pilots participating in the evaluation 
have to constitute a representative sample of the prospective user group for objective 
data to be meaningful. Otherwise, e.g. if airline pilots are used to evaluate a system 
intended for General Aviation, the experience and flying skills of these professional 
pilots might mask the actual difference between the baseline and the advanced sys-
tem. In the other extreme case, their familiarity with complex avionics might help 
airline pilots to achieve objectively better performance with a system that is actually 
unusable for the average General Aviation pilot due to its complexity. 
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Last but not least, objective measurements result in far stricter requirements regard-
ing the stability of the overall evaluation setup. Initial software prototypes some-
times lack this stability, which is crucial, because any technical failures usually in-
validate all the objective data collected during a run, and due to potential training 
effects, it is often not possible to repeat a run. In this context, simulator fidelity is an 
aspect not to be neglected. Performance measurements on a certified flight simulator, 
on which pilots with the corresponding type rating can perform any procedure al-
most blind-folded, have a different level of validity than those in a generic research 
simulator, where both familiarity and fidelity aspects might act as confounders. 
 
A huge advantage of subjective validation techniques is that pilots’ expertise and 
experience concerning the operational environment can be harnessed to the fullest 
extent. Techniques for collecting subjective feedback encompass open loop com-
ments, structured interviews and standardized or custom questionnaires, which in 
either case frequently involve Likert-style rating scales to collect participants’ quanti-
tative level of agreement (or disagreement) with certain aspects of the system under 
evaluation or the overall scenario.  
Standardised questionnaires for assessing workload (e.g. NASA TLX) or situational 
awareness, such as SART (cf. Section 6.5.1), frequently transform feedback on indi-
vidual questions into a single performance index according to pre-defined rules, 
which may then be used in a quantitative comparison. At any rate, variance analysis 
methods can in principle be applied to any quantified subjective feedback, irrespec-
tive of whether the original ratings or a performance index is used. Nonetheless, such 
comparisons do not have the same statistical power as those based on objective data. 
 
Nevertheless, validation experiments without collecting subjective pilot feedback are 
virtually unthinkable, since early system prototypes such as the proposed SMAAS 
are hardly ever perfect and typically suffer from various smaller or larger deficien-
cies impairing operational usability. Since design processes are iterative, detailed 
subjective feedback is essential in determining which aspects of the system under 
study require improvement and why. Essentially, only open loop feedback, either 
during evaluation sessions or in a debriefing after the experiment can yield this in-
formation. Accordingly, the ultimate benefit of subjective techniques is that the feed-
back obtained can look beyond the limitations and constraints of the experimental 
setup, and may thus help in extending knowledge about further relevant operational 
or system design aspects. Additionally, pilot feedback thus obtained may contain 
hints at important operational aspects that are well-known to practitioners, but not 
immediately accessible or evident to the researcher based on the theoretical material 
available. By contrast, while objective measurements may result more precise results 
on a particular issue, is impossible to obtain such additional insight by using them. In 
this sense, objective techniques are self-contained. 
Evidently, while pilots do not deliberately decrease their performance or make mis-
takes to emulate an ‘average pilot’ in an experiment measuring performance, their 
subjective feedback may take into account, albeit from an individual perspective, the 
interests and concerns of the pilot community as a whole, particularly if they have a 
flight test, technical or certification background. 
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6.2.2 Validation of Caution and Warning Alerts 
As mentioned earlier in this section, Runway Incursions are still very rare events in 
relation to the vast number of flight operations. While this is reassuring for passen-
gers, it creates substantial problems for the design of scenarios suitable to validate 
the caution and warning alerts provided by SMAAS. 
Due to the high professionalism of flight crews, it is therefore questionable whether a 
validation approach waiting for participants to cause Runway Incursions during a 
simulator experiment will see any of the preventive Runway Incursion Alerting func-
tions triggered with a limited number of participants. This situation is aggravated 
further by the fact that briefing and training prior to the actual evaluation session 
will necessarily disclose the purpose of the experiment and thus pre-trigger pilots 
concerning Runway Incursion hazards. Consequently, they will possibly dedicate 
more attention to these aspects during the evaluation than in everyday routine flight 
operations. Apart from higher vigilance, there will also be certain expectations as to 
what might happen during the evaluation scenarios, which, in turn, gives pilots cues 
to anticipate dangerous situations construed to trigger an alert. 
In order to ameliorate these effects, creating high workload in scenarios to distract 
pilots might, on the one hand, increase the chances that there is a crew error leading 
to the triggering of an alert, but on the other hand, could generally distract the crew 
from the SMAAS, with the effect that its normal indications and advisories might not 
be noticed (and thus not evaluated) by participants. 
These problems are less pronounced for reactive Runway Incursion scenarios, be-
cause conflicting other traffic can be introduced at any time. Nevertheless, repeatedly 
occurring Runway Incursions – as required for a thorough assessment of the reactive 
alerts – decrease the operational realism of scenarios. In conclusion, any validation 
approach counting on the ‘natural’ occurrence of Runway Incursions is prone to fail. 
It was therefore decided to pursue an explorative approach with respect to the vali-
dation of the alerts, which consisted of employing demonstration scenarios explicitly 
and deliberately triggering the alerts and collecting exclusively subjective pilot feed-
back. 
 
6.2.3 Conclusion 
In view of the validation objectives for SMAAS, it is essential to capture pilots ex-
perience concerning the tasks associated with surface operations by letting them 
judge the operational relevance and support provided by SMAAS in a subjective 
fashion. Besides, the overall complexity of both SMAAS and surface operations sug-
gests using an explorative approach. 
Since participants of the evaluation with the Navigation Test Vehicle could not be in 
control of the vehicle, it was not possible to apply any objective measurements, be-
cause the limitations of the experiment forced pilots into a passive observer role. Be-
sides, the use of real-time traffic data prevented reproducible scenarios. 
Likewise, the simulator experiment was also limited to the use of subjective valida-
tion techniques, since the number of individual SMAAS functions to be assessed pre-
cluded both the inclusion of a baseline set-up as well as a strict separation of scenar-
ios  objectively establishing e.g. situational awareness and scenarios aimed at dem-
onstration the alerting functionality. 
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6.3 Considerations on Participants 
6.3.1 Participant Requirements 
SMAAS as the system under evaluation is based on current-generation glass cockpit 
technology and, in principle, applicable to all aircraft types from turboprops, busi-
ness and regional jets to large widebody passenger aircraft and freighters. Further-
more, the Institute’s Research Flight Simulator is sufficiently generic for type-specific 
training requirements not to be an issue. 
Consequently, there are no particular requirements regarding the aircraft type flown. 
Nevertheless, experience with an Electronic Flight Instrument System (EFIS) is man-
datory, because the training effort would be too high otherwise133. Prospective ex-
periment participants were therefore required to have a type rating for at least one 
aircraft type with a glass cockpit. Besides, while SMAAS can in principle be adapted 
to General Aviation aircraft, the focus of this thesis is on an air transport operational 
environment, and it was therefore decided that participants must have an Air Trans-
port Pilot Licence (ATPL) and at least 500 hours of relevant experience, preferably 
with an airline, although pilots from high-end business aviation were also welcome. 
There were no particular requirements regarding rank, age or gender, although an 
even distribution of Captains and First Officers and a wide range of ages was sought, 
provided that there was sufficient choice among prospective participants, to alleviate 
the risk of obtaining feedback only from a specific group of pilots. 
 
6.3.2 Participant Recruiting 
Apart from the formal requirements to be fulfilled, the way of recruiting pilots for 
the trials and the general conditions for participation deserve some attention. Trials 
were generally announced publicly through contacts to the German airline pilots’ 
association Vereinigung Cockpit (VC) and a German airline, who then employed in-
ternal mailing lists or bulletin systems to disseminate information about the planned 
trials. In parallel, participants of previous evaluation campaigns at either the Institute 
or the Nationaal Lucht- en Ruimtevaartlaboratorium (NLR) in Amsterdam were con-
tacted individually. Furthermore, when travelling by air, the author tried to contact 
the flight crew prior to or after the flight to motivate them to participate in the 
SMAAS evaluation campaign. Contacts obtained this way were also utilized in re-
cruiting participants, which adds a certain random component to participant selec-
tion. 
 
It is important to note, however, that the Institute is not able to pay pilots for partici-
pation in either simulator or field trials, and there is no financial compensation for 
any travel or accommodation expenses participants might have, either. Likewise, 
with very few exceptions, e.g. when pilots from one the Institute’s partners in the 
European research projects EMMA or FLYSAFE were sent to Darmstadt by their 
companies, the trials were not part of the normal crew scheduling or duty time. Most 
pilots therefore participated in the trials on a voluntary basis and in their spare time. 
                                                 
133 It is also assumed that the first-time exposure to glass cockpit technology constitutes a significant cultural 
shock for ‘old school’ pilots, and that therefore a significant part of their feedback and system-related questions 
will be on the glass cockpit itself, rather than on the SMAAS. 
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Of course, this has a significant effect on the sample of the airline pilot community 
obtained, because the sole remaining motivation for participation in the trials is of 
idealistic nature: a true interest in the subject and/or willingness to support aviation 
research. Consequently, only very motivated pilots will commonly volunteer to par-
ticipate under these circumstances. It is assumed that these pilots are generally also 
more open to new technologies. In fact, several of the pilots participating in the trials 
stated that they were always interested in new technical developments. 
 
From the considerations above, it can be concluded that the pilots volunteering for 
the evaluation will, almost irrespective of the actual number of participants, not form 
a representative sample of their profession. This must be kept in mind when analys-
ing the results. Besides, this an important aspect to be considered when choosing be-
tween objective and subjective evaluation methods, since a non-representative pilot 
sample diminishes the significance of objective measurements.  
 
 
6.4 Experimental Factors 
 
This section discusses the most important experimental factors that are of relevance 
for both the field trials with the Navigation Test Vehicle and the Institute’s Research 
Flight Simulator, and details how these factors were eventually controlled or ad-
dressed during evaluation. More details can be found in the respective chapters on 
the evaluation campaigns. 
 
6.4.1 Baseline versus Experimental System 
Comparing the system under evaluation with the current baseline (paper charts, 
classic ND, visual observation) results in a quantitative indication on how the new 
system performs in relation to the standard. This necessitates that the baseline used 
in the experiment is sufficiently representative of the ‘real’ baseline. However, both 
of the available evaluation platforms exhibited substantial discrepancies with respect 
to the current baseline for surface operations, see Sections 7.3.4 and 8.3.3 for details. 
Besides, a drawback of this comparative approach is that the time experiment par-
ticipants spend on the actual experimental system may be substantially reduced. 
Therefore, since the time available for each evaluation session was very limited dur-
ing both evaluation campaigns, given the complexity of the proposed new system, a 
comparison of SMAAS with the current baseline was not carried out. However, sev-
eral questions addressed the advantages or disadvantages of the AMM over current 
technology, which all pilots know by heart due to the nature of their job. This par-
tially compensated for the lack of a baseline setup. 
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6.4.2 Visibility Conditions 
Both the airport moving map and the other SMAAS functions aimed at increasing 
flight crew situational awareness are expected to achieve the greatest benefits in de-
graded or marginal visibility conditions, when visual observation as sole conven-
tional surveillance technique fails. Consequently, wherever the validation platform 
permits to control visibility conditions, this should be utilised to determine whether 
there is any interdependence between visibility and pilots’ feedback. 
 
6.4.3 Airport Complexity 
SMAAS is expected to achieve substantial benefits in terms of situational awareness 
mainly at large and complex airports. Nevertheless, there is also a need to improve 
safety and to avoid accidents like the Comair 5191 crash at smaller airfields. In prin-
ciple, several different airports with varying complexity (e.g. from medium to high) 
could be used to make airport complexity an experimental factor. Since the SMAAS 
prototype supports direct loading of ED-99 files, there are no immediate technical 
constraints that would prevent this approach. Nevertheless, the definition of truly 
comparable scenarios with respect to other factors, such as complexity of taxi routes, 
traffic patterns etc. at different airports is very difficult. 
 
6.4.4 Traffic Density 
Traffic density is expected to have a substantial impact on usability and design issue 
of the Cockpit Display of Traffic Information (CDTI), because a large number of sur-
rounding aircraft could eventually result in clutter when shown indiscriminately on 
the AMM. Conversely, in an environment with only a few other aircraft present, this 
might not be perceivable as an issue at all. In field trials, the actual traffic density is 
dependent on airport complexity and several other factors, e.g. the time of day. By 
contrast, traffic density may be controlled in the simulator, but if it does not match 
with airport complexity, this could impair the perceived realism of the scenario. 
 
6.4.5 Familiarity with Airport 
It is expected that the safety and efficiency benefits will be most notable at airports 
the crew is not very familiar with. However, with respect to experiment design and 
pilot invitations, it is almost impossible to control the participating pilots’ level of 
familiarity with a specific airport a priori, because participation to the trials is volun-
tary. Although participants were expected to be mainly recruited from the Frank-
furt/Main area and the local airlines, and may thus be expected to be very familiar 
with Frankfurt Airport (EDDF), the detailed level of familiarity with any other air-
port is an unknown variable prior to the experiment. 
After the evaluation, however, it might be possible to compare results for different 
levels of airport familiarity, because the Pilot Intake Questionnaire contains a self-
assessment with respect to airport familiarity. If a statistically sufficient sample is 
obtained, i.e. if it turns out after the experiment that sufficiently large groups of dif-
ferent familiarity levels have incidentally formed, a post-hoc analysis on the impact of 
airport familiarity can be made. 
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6.4.6 Pilot Background and Rank 
Like familiarity with a particular airport, this experimental factor is difficult to con-
trol if public announcements requesting participation in simulator experiments are 
made. However, a post-hoc grouping of pilots according to rank might shed some 
light on whether the typically younger first officers, having grown up with com-
puters and therefore often jocularly referred to as ‘Nintendo Kids’, assess the SMAAS 
significantly different than the ‘old school’ captains who started flying well before 
the introduction of both glass cockpits and personal computers. Depending on the 
actual distribution of pilots participating in the trials, the following possibilities for a 
post-hoc formation of sub-groups are: 
 
• By rank: There is a high interest to determine whether the early naturalisation 
with computers and electronic displays the generally younger first officers are 
likely to have had influences their acceptance of the proposed novel functions, 
which heavily rely on electronic displays. 
• By age: Participants can be allocated to a minimum of two groups, e.g. 20-40 
years and 41-60 years of age, with the same motivation as above. 
• By type of operation: Additional clues may be obtained from grouping par-
ticipants according to the type of operation, e.g. regional/short haul versus 
long range, or passenger versus freight. 
• By aircraft type/manufacturer flown: Although no significant differences are 
expected, it might be useful to validate this assumption based on the data col-
lected. 
• By airline: Verify whether association with a particular airline and thus the 
pertinent company philosophy and culture have an impact on the results. 
 
Depending on the actual number and sample of participants, further groupings 
might be envisaged; however, since pilots volunteered to participate in the trials, the 
factors above were difficult to influence a priori. 
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6.5 Methods and Metrics 
6.5.1 Methods and Techniques for Measuring Situational Awareness 
Since one of the main objectives of the SMAAS is to improve crew situational aware-
ness in different domains, it seems appropriate to review some of the techniques that 
can be used to measure situational awareness. 
 
In human factors literature, there are two major objective techniques to assess situ-
ational awareness, the Situation Awareness Global Assessment Technique (SAGAT) 
and the Situation Awareness Probe (SAP). SAGAT stops simulation at random inter-
vals and inquires the crew for an assessment of the current situation. As an example, 
pilots could be asked for bearing and distance to certain other traffic. Their answers 
can then be compared to the actual values and thus give an apparently objective as-
sessment of situational awareness. The fact that it delivers objective results is often 
quoted as a major advantage of SAGAT. It must be noted, however, that the objective 
data obtained from the crew are not as infallibly ‘hard’ objective as parameters re-
corded by the flight test instrumentation, but rather ‘soft’ objective134. At any rate, the 
main disadvantage of SAGAT is that it is very intrusive and decreases operational 
realism of a simulated scenario, and may thus divert evaluators’ attention. Often, it is 
not possible to continue the scenario after the interruption. For obvious reasons, 
SAGAT cannot be used in a flight test, either. SAP tries to avoid these disadvantages 
by asking pilots during simulation or flight [NG01]. The major drawback of both of 
these techniques, however, is that they require profound and a priori knowledge 
about the factors relevant for situational awareness in a certain situation, and con-
cerning a specific task. 
 
This can be avoided when using subjective measurements of situational awareness, 
which are usually based on questionnaires using a more or less intricate self-
assessment. The most commonly used tests are [NG01]: 
 
• China Lake Situation Awareness (CLSA) 
• Crew Situation Awareness (CSA) 
• Situation Awareness Rating Technique (SART) 
• Situation Awareness Subjective Workload Dominance (SA-SWORD) 
• Situation Awareness Supervisory Rating Form (SASRF) 
 
CLSA is a direct, subjective situational awareness rating scale originally developed 
for flight testing. The pilot directly rates situational awareness from 1 (Very Good) to 
5 (Very Poor). A variant of the CLSA is having pilots rate the improvement or dete-
rioration of situational awareness compared to a baseline system using a Likert scale. 
A disadvantage of CLSA and its variants is that factors influencing situational 
awareness cannot be characterised in detail. CSA is an exception in the above list, 
because it uses expert observers to rate pilots’ situational awareness. SART computes 
                                                 
134  Again, the experiment must be designed with care to minimize undesired effects. In the example above, the 
scenario must be designed in such a fashion that pilots can easily derive bearing and distance from the HMI. 
Otherwise, there is a risk that the results yield more information on pilots’ ability to estimate distance and 
bearing than on situational awareness. This potential pitfall is often not addressed, cf. [NG01]. 
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a value for situational awareness from the Likert-style ratings on a series of questions 
related to situational awareness. While SART is in principle rather complex and 
powerful, its main disadvantage is that it is hardly useful when pilots are not trained 
to use it, particularly if they are not English native speakers. 
 
Through their training, pilots are familiar with the concept of situational awareness, 
and consequently capable of a direct self-assessment. It was therefore decided to ad-
dress this aspect directly in the post-exercise questionnaires and in the debriefing by 
letting pilots rate the perceived impact of certain SMAAS features on situational 
awareness using a Likert-style rating scale. From a formal perspective, therefore, this 
approach is equivalent to CLSA. 
 
6.5.2 Considerations on Workload 
Whenever new functionality is added to the flight deck, this usually leads to addi-
tional crew tasks, unless existing systems or procedures are replaced. Therefore, it is 
important to capture the impact on workload that is associated with any additional 
system in the cockpit. For SMAAS, it is important to verify that the proposed func-
tions do not cause excessive workload, since this may be a source of errors. The fol-
lowing considerations apply: 
 
• Workload must be in line with the criticality of the situation. This means that it 
may be high in a critical situation, but there should not be any significant im-
pact on workload induced by SMAAS during routine operations. 
• Workload must be consistent with the relative frequency of the situation en-
countered. If an event or a situation is occurring frequently, the impact of in-
troducing SMAAS on workload should be low. 
 
In general, it is assumed that improved situational awareness will free attentional 
resources and consequently lead to lower levels of workload. 
Neither the validation campaign with the Navigation Test Vehicle nor the simulator 
experiment were considered suitable for applying standard workload tests, because 
pilots’ role was entirely passive in the field trials, and the workload in the simulation 
is not representative of an air transport environment, mainly due to the single pilot 
configuration eventually used. Besides, a fine-grain workload analysis did not ap-
pear to be appropriate in view of the overall maturity of the SMAAS functions as-
sessed. It was therefore deemed more appropriate to address workload aspects di-
rectly in questionnaires and de-briefing sessions. 
 
6   CONSIDERATIONS ON VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION 
 280
6.5.3 Human-Machine Interface, Operational Relevance and Usability Aspects 
Evaluation scenarios were developed based on the assumption that cockpit proce-
dures for using an airport moving map display and associated functions will give the 
role of monitoring the display to the pilot non-flying (PNF) to avoid that the aircraft 
is taxied head-down by the pilot flying (PF). 
Subjective pilot feedback (custom questionnaires, comments) and direct observation 
were used to validate the SMAAS functions, to identify potential additional opera-
tional needs and to detect potential HMI issues. Likewise, custom questionnaires 
were use to obtain initial reactions and estimates of pilots pertaining to the perceived 
level of safety when using the additional onboard functions. In this context, pilot 
comments on potential certification issues were regarded as an indication that the 
safety objectives may were not or only partially fulfilled. 
 
In the questionnaire, the statements to be rated by participants were deliberately 
worded in a strong and suggestive fashion to provoke and spawn discussion. As out-
lined previously, discussion and open loop comments are essential, because one of 
the main problems in exploring new flight deck functionality is that potential issues 
or essentially important aspects might not always be in the areas expected. Thus, po-
tentially critical design issues or even showstoppers might eventually not be covered 
by a questionnaire. 
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7 Field Trials with a Navigation Test Vehicle 
 
 
Between November 2005 and February 2006, an initial prototype of the Surface 
Movement Awareness and Alerting System (SMAAS) was evaluated in live trials at 
Frankfurt (EDDF) and Prague (LKPR) airport with a total of 15 airline pilots from 
five European airlines in the scope of the European Research Project EMMA. TUD’s 
Navigation Test Vehicle, a Volkswagen LT 28 van equipped with a Honeywell H764 
INS, various GPS receivers and a Filser RT60 ADS-B receiver (1090 ES), was used in 
this validation exercise to simulate an aircraft taxiing on an airport. The passenger 
seat was fitted with an LCD display and a basic Crew Control Device (CCD) and 
served as a very basic cockpit mock-up. This particular test bed was chosen because 
it enables low-cost live field tests of onboard functions in a real airport environment. 
Thus, it provides not only unparalleled realism that can hardly be achieved in simu-
lators, but also a possibility to assess the potential impact of environmental factors 
such as database and navigation accuracy (e.g. INS drift due to GPS outages) or the 
quality of ADS-B data. Nevertheless, the main purpose of the trials was a validation 
of the overall SMAAS concept, including a design validation of selected onboard 
functions. 
 
 
7.1 Evaluation Objectives 
 
The objective of the validation tests performed with TUD’s Navigation Test Vehicle 
was a first conceptual assessment of SMAAS integrated surveillance system ap-
proach with special emphasis on operational aspects, i.e. its relevance and adequacy 
to address Runway Incursion-related problems. 
 
 
Figure 86: Configuration of the SMAAS prototype employed in the field trials 
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Figure 86 illustrates the configuration of the initial SMAAS prototype used for the 
field trials with the Navigation Test Vehicle. One of the most notable discrepancies 
from the SMAAS architecture presented in Figure 29 on p. 137 is the absence of reac-
tive Surface Movement Alerting, i.e. the SMAAS prototype did not yet support traffic 
alerting. Likewise, the Operational and Clearance Awareness Functions did not yet 
feature their full scope. The functions assessed on the Navigation Test Vehicle and 
their respective discrepancies compared to the design described in Chapter 5 were: 
 
• Airport Moving Map (AMM): Instead of the AMM described in Section 5.1, 
the so-called Moving Map Standalone (MMS), a software prototype of the On-
board Airport Navigation System (OANS) used on the Airbus A380, cf. Sec-
tion 3.1.1, was used due to contractual aspects of the EMMA project. 
• Ground Traffic Display (CDTI): Traffic symbology, provided as an integral 
part of the Airbus MMS application, was limited to a copy of the ownship 
symbol in white, accompanied by a label consisting of the callsign. 
• Operational Awareness Function (OAF): The features available were a repre-
sentation of the FMS-selected RWY (in magenta) and a visualisation of com-
pletely closed RWYs (using amber crosses), as shown in Figure 43 on  p. 168. 
• Clearance Awareness Function (CAF): The functions supported were taxi 
route representation, line-up approval and take-off clearance. 
• Preventive Surface Movement Alerting (SMA) 
 
The fact that a different AMM and CDTI implementation can be accommodated due 
to the modularity of SMAAS may already serve as an indication for its independence 
of a particular HMI design for these functions. Accordingly, conceptual validation 
encompassed SMAAS as a whole, whereas design validation was limited to Opera-
tional Awareness, Clearance Awareness and Surface Movement Alerting to gain con-
fidence in the adequacy of the HMI solution proposed for these advanced features, as 
shown in Figure 86. The performance of the technologies required to support 
SMAAS, such as GPS, AMDB accuracy and integrity, traffic data link etc. (i.e. techni-
cal usability), were not themselves subject of the assessment, and it was generally 
tried to minimize their effect on validation results. However, in the case of the ADS-B 
traffic data link used in the trials, this proved to be impossible, which compulsorily 
led to evaluation feedback on both the HMI function (CDTI) and quality and reliabil-
ity of ADS-B data at the implementation level in late 2005/early 2006. 
 
Pilots would first be asked to evaluate the core element, an airport moving map dis-
play, supplemented by Operational Awareness (OAF) and Clearance Awareness 
Function (CAF) elements intended to increase situational awareness. In a second ses-
sion, the preventive Surface Movement Alerting concept was demonstrated to the 
maximum extent possible with respect to airport safety, i.e. up to advisory level in 
Frankfurt and up to warning level in Prague, where a runway permanently closed 
for take-offs and landings creates ideal prerequisites for the assessment of Runway 
Incursion alerting. Evaluation sessions concluded with a presentation of ADS-B 
ground traffic on the airport moving map display. Subjective feedback was collected 
using questionnaires filled by the pilots during and after the trials (both electroni-
cally and on paper) and open loop comments recorded during the sessions. 
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7.2 Experimental Design 
7.2.1 Experimental Factors 
7.2.1.1 Baseline system 
In line with the considerations in Section 6.4.1, no baseline system (conventional ND, 
paper charts) was used in the validation activities carried out on TUD’s Navigation 
Test Vehicle. Given the overall setup of the evaluation (see Section 7.3 for details), a 
baseline experiment would have consisted of driving pilots around the airport with 
paper charts as sole navigation reference. In view of the limited time available for 
evaluation, this was considered as not relevant. 
 
7.2.1.2 Experimental system 
A software prototype of the SMAAS as described in Chapter 5 was used, but with the 
discrepancies and limitations listed in Section 7.1. 
 
7.2.1.3 Visibility conditions 
All of the trials were carried out at daytime, with sessions starting either in the morn-
ing or in the early in the afternoon. Due to pilot scheduling constraints and the very 
nature of live trials, visibility conditions were not a factor that could be controlled in 
the evaluation exercise performed, e.g. by performing evaluation sessions only if 
visibility is greater than a certain pre-defined value. 
Incidentally, nevertheless, all trial sessions in Frankfurt and Prague were carried out 
in good visibility conditions, i.e. in Visibility Condition 1 or Visibility Condition 2 as 
defined by the ICAO European Manual on A-SMGCS, and more or less dry weather 
(only some light rain or drizzle), with mostly overcast skies. Only one session was 
carried out in light fog. The lowest visibility encountered during the Frankfurt trials 
was 1 mile during the test session with Pilot #6 on January 20th, 2006, deduced from 
METAR information recorded on an hourly basis. 
One of the Prague sessions was carried out during a period of heavy snowfall, but 
still in fair visibility, with taxiways and roads partially covered by snow and slush. 
Although visibility was periodically impaired by snowfall, it never dropped below 
Visibility Condition 2. For the other Prague sessions, the conditions were similar to 
the Frankfurt trials, with mostly calm and cold winter weather. 
 
7.2.1.4 Airport complexity 
To ensure that the results obtained do not contain potential artefacts resulting from 
features specific to just one airport, and to obtain more confidence in the general ap-
plicability of results, it was decided to use at least two airports.  
Therefore, the choice was made to include Frankfurt Airport (EDDF) as test site, to 
have a hub airport close to TUD’s facilities available for integration and testing. Pra-
gue airport (LKPR), as official EMMA test site, was chosen because it is the closest 
and most complex of the three EMMA airports.  
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At any rate, performing trials at airports with low complexity is not really useful, 
because the challenges the crew faces there are believed to be relatively minor. There-
fore, at any rate, airports with high complexity are expected to be the places where 
the benefits of the new onboard functions will become most apparent. Regarding the 
AMM functionality, several pilots eventually confirmed this by commenting that the 
application would be extremely helpful at congested hub airports like New York’s 
Kennedy Airport (KJFK).  
Taking into account the various factors determining airport complexity, it can be 
concluded that both Frankfurt (EDDF) and Prague (LKPR) airports fulfil several of 
the criteria each and can thus be regarded as complex airports, while Prague is cer-
tainly near the threshold from medium to high complexity. 
 
7.2.1.5 Traffic density 
In contrast to airport complexity, which can be selected by the simple choice of the 
test site, traffic density is not as easy to control in live trials. Of course, the desired 
average traffic density can be achieved by picking a certain airport, but actual traffic 
density varies with seasons, the time of day (hub peaks) and the weather. Thus, for 
an individual experiment session, the actual traffic density is hard to control. Even 
when scheduling all evaluation sessions exactly at the same time of day, there can be 
variations in traffic due to delays, which might even be independent of weather con-
ditions at the test airport. 
With respect to the test sites chosen, traffic density is nearly always heavy at Frank-
furt, as there are usually many more than 26 take-offs and landings per hour (the cri-
terion for heavy traffic density), although there are certain distinct hub peaks over 
the day with maximum traffic density. In comparison to Frankfurt, the density of 
traffic is significantly lower at Prague airport (LKPR), where it varies from medium 
to low, depending on the time of day and the area of the airport used. Near the 
closed RWY 04/22 and the South Apron, where a significant part of the evaluation 
was carried out, traffic density is comparatively low. 
 
7.2.2 Conduct of Experiment 
7.2.2.1 Assessment team 
The core assessment team for all the trials consisted of two TUD research scientists. 
One of them was a systems engineer responsible for the operation of the systems on 
the Navigation Test Vehicle, and – in the majority of evaluation sessions – for driving 
around the airport for all of the experiment sessions taking place at Frankfurt Airport 
(EDDF), since he was in possession of a special driver’s license for the airport. The 
other research scientist was the author of this thesis, acting as an experiment leader, 
conducting the briefing as well as the familiarisation, taking down pilots’ comments 
and assisting pilots in filling the questionnaires. 
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With three exceptions, all the Frankfurt sessions were carried out with only those 
two TUD research scientists and the experiment pilot present on the Navigation Test 
Vehicle. The first exception was a combined session for Pilot #7 and Pilot #8, who 
took turns in observing the AMM and additional functions from the passenger seat 
of the van. This experiment session and the subsequent session for Pilot #9 on the 
same day were also attended by an Airbus engineer as an observer. The third excep-
tion consisted on another combined session for Pilot #10 and Pilot #11, who are fa-
ther and son, and thus asked for an opportunity to participate together. 
In addition to the two TUD systems engineers and the experiment pilots, all of the 
four Prague experiment sessions were also attended by two officials from Prague 
airport authority, who took turns in driving the van. 
 
7.2.2.2 General Experiment Schedule (EDDF) 
Since nearly all of the pilots participating to the trials in Frankfurt were flying for an 
airline sustaining operations there, all evaluation sessions except one started at the 
airline’s base. Before going through the security checks, pilots were given a briefing 
of the AMM and a short period of time to familiarise with the application and its con-
trols. When entering the apron area after the security checks, the actual experiment 
would begin. 
First, the AMM only configuration was assessed, supplemented by OAF and CAF 
elements. At the end of this session, before completing the first set of questionnaires, 
a Level 0 alert for increased runway awareness was demonstrated to the crew. Sub-
sequently, the presentation of traffic on the AMM using ADS-B equipped traffic was 
assessed. 
 
7.2.2.3 General Experiment Schedule (LKPR) 
For the experiment in Prague, with access to the taxiway system and a closed run-
way, the experiment schedule compared to Frankfurt was slightly altered. After 
briefing and familiarisation, each trial session consisted of three parts: 
 
 Airport moving map assessment (ca. 20 min), afterwards questionnaires. The pre-
ventive alerting part of SMAAS was available, but would only trigger Level 0 ad-
visories in the scenarios presented. 
 
 Airport moving map, OAF/CAF functions and Preventive Surface Movement 
Alerting, afterwards questionnaires. 
 
 Airport moving map, OAF/CAF functions and traffic presentation, afterwards 
questionnaires. The preventive alerting part of SMAAS was available, but would 
only trigger Level 0 advisories in the scenarios presented. 
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7.2.3 Data Collection and Analysis 
7.2.3.1 Data collection 
Subjective pilot feedback was collected through questionnaires at the end of each 
evaluation run and comments taken down by the experiment leader during sessions.  
After the AMM evaluation scenarios, which will be described in detail in Section 7.4, 
had been carried out, pilots were requested to fill a digital AMM questionnaire on a 
laptop. This questionnaire is an extended variant of a questionnaire originally de-
signed by DLR for EMMA. Subsequently, the scenarios with activated traffic presen-
tation were conducted. To collect pilot feedback on the CDTI, a paper questionnaire 
with exclusively traffic-related questions devised by the author was used after the 
corresponding scenarios. 
After both the AMM and the traf-
fic session, pilots were addition-
ally asked to fill a slightly modi-
fied standard System Usability 
Scale (SUS). The modifications of 
the SUS consisted of shortening 
the questions to more precise 
statements and in a rewording of 
the question relating to ‘support 
of a technical person’, which is not 
applicable in an aircraft environ-
ment, see Figure 87 for details. 
 
7.2.3.2 Analysis methods 
The main analysis methods used were a direct analysis of the questionnaires and a 
correlation of the data with pilots’ comments during and after the test sessions, along 
with an analysis of the experiment leader’s observations of during the sessions. Fur-
thermore, consistency of pilots’ answers for similar and directly opposite questions 
was checked. Last but not least, a two-sided Kolmogorov-Smirnov test was per-
formed on the questionnaire results for each individual question to check whether 
there are potential deviations from a normal distribution. 
Unfortunately, only four pilots participated in the Prague experiment (compared to 
11 for Frankfurt), and thus a comparison of the results for statistically significant dif-
ferences between the two test sites is questionable in its validity. 
 
1. I would like to use this system frequently. 
2. The system is unnecessarily complex. 
3. The system is easy to use. 
4. I would need training to be able to use the system. 
5. The various functions in this system are well inte-
grated. 
6. There is too much inconsistency in this system. 
7. Most pilots will learn to use this system very quickly. 
8. The system is very cumbersome to use. 
9. I feel very confident using the system. 
10. I needed to learn a lot of things before I could get 
going with the system. 
Figure 87: Modified System Usability Scale (SUS) 
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7.3 Assessment Platform 
7.3.1 Overview 
 
Figure 88: Navigation Test Vehicle during tests on the closed RWY 04/22 at Prague airport 
(LKPR), February 6th, 2006 
 
TUD’s Navigation Test Vehicle, a Volkswagen LT 28 van shown in Figure 88, is op-
erated by the Institute of Flight Systems and Automatic Control and was originally 
conceived as a mobile test platform for the development and validation of navigation 
sensors and equipment. It features an array of sensors suited for precise navigation 
and a measurement data acquisition and logging system. A post-processing software 
allows to generate highly precise reference trajectories with a CEP95 of 0,44 m based 
on sensor logs [Sch04]. 
 
Furthermore, as a by-product, a high-precision online navigation solution also pro-
vides the prerequisites for the verification and validation of equipment used on air-
craft, particularly in the domain of flight guidance displays for surface movement, 
either in the form of software prototypes or real hardware. Consequently, the Navi-
gation Test Vehicle can be used to simulate a taxiing aircraft and enables low-cost 
live field tests of such onboard functions in a real airport environment. Thus, it al-
lows not only an evaluation of the novel onboard functions themselves, but also an 
assessment of the potential impact of factors such as database or navigation accuracy 
(e.g. IRS drift and GPS outages and/or multi-path effects), or the quality of the data 
obtained via data link, e.g. ADS-B traffic data, as well as the data link itself. 
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7.3.2 Navigation System 
A Honeywell H764 inertial reference system forms the core of the van’s precision 
navigation system, which is supplemented by an array of various GPS receivers 
ranging from off-the-shelf to high accuracy measurement models (cf. Figure 89). The 
sensor mounting positions were measured within centimetre accuracy to correct er-
rors caused by different sensor locations. An overview to the sensor equipment is 
given in Table 16. 
A Wiener filter is used 
for the implementation 
of an optimum sensor 
data fusion combining 
inputs from the H764 
and a Novatel RT20 GPS 
receiver with D-GPS ca-
pabilities. To provide 
differential correction 
data to the onboard re-
ceivers, a portable refer-
ence station can be in-
stalled at points of which 
the exact position is 
known. The range of the 
D-GPS broadcasts de-
pends on the surround-
ing environment and can vary between several dozens and some hundred meters, 
provided there is a free line of sight between rover- and reference station. As a 
backup, D-GPS can be obtained from the ALF service, which is available within 600 
km of Frankfurt/Main, Germany. For the EMMA trials, however, no D-GPS correc-
tion data were used, because the shakedown trials had shown that a sufficient real-
time navigation precision in the order of a few meters could be achieved with GPS 
only. 
 
7.3.3 Equipment 
In the back of TUD’s Navigation Test Vehicle, one row of seats has been removed to 
make room for two custom-built, interconnected racks that hold the hardware and 
computer equipment (Figure 90). Two inverters in the back are used to convert the 
12V DC supplied by the vehicle’s electric bus to 250V/50 Hz AC required to drive 
the PC equipment. 
In its standard configuration, the Navigation Test Vehicle is equipped with at least 
two PCs interconnected by Ethernet. The Navigation PC is responsible for collecting 
sensor data and the real-time calculation of the GPS/IRS sensor data fusion. It is 
equipped with both a MIL-1553 and an ARINC 429 card to interface with common 
aircraft avionics. The other PC is used for multiple purposes, such as data logging, 
acquiring traffic data and calculating a traffic data fusion or hosting software proto-
types of onboard functions such as an airport moving map. Space permitting, further 
PCs can be added and connected to the vehicle’s Ethernet network. 
 
Figure 89: Antenna mounting plate on the roof of the Naviga-
tion Test Vehicle 
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Figure 90: Hardware and computer racks in the back of the vehicle 
 
ADS-B live traffic can be received using a Filser RT60 ADS-B receiver (purchased via 
Eurotelematik) that sends out traffic data via Ethernet. Furthermore, the vehicle is 
equipped with Wireless LAN (WLAN), 
which can be used to access TIS-B traffic ac-
quired through Frankfurt airport’s Coopera-
tive Area Precision Tracking System 
(CAPTS), a Mode-S multilateration surveil-
lance system developed by Thales and Sen-
sis. The TIS-B over WLAN data link was de-
veloped for the ETNA project, where this 
feature was employed to bring traffic aware-
ness to airport vehicles, particularly the air-
port fire engines [Kra04]. 
 
The passenger seat served as a very simple 
cockpit mock-up for the pilot evaluations and 
was therefore fitted with a 15” off-the-shelf 
LCD display (see Figure 91) and a Logitech 
trackball as a basic Crew Control Device 
(CCD), both provisionally mounted by the 
help of Velcro® tape. 
Although the LCD used is far from the rug-
gedised, high-contrast AMLCD screens used 
in aircraft cockpits, the display readability 
was very good even in back light conditions. Another limitation of the screen used is 
that its diagonal is a factor of 1.5 larger than the 6” x 8” screens currently used in the 
Airbus A380. 
 
Figure 91: LCD screen installation in 
front of passenger seat 
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The test van has the permissions necessary to operate on the movement area of 
Frankfurt Airport (EDDF). For evaluations on the manoeuvring area, the van was 
equipped with a turning light, and licensed drivers with the required radio permis-
sions were kindly supplied by Frankfurt and Prague airport authorities. In Prague, 
additionally, an autonomous ADS-B transponder requiring only power supply was 
installed on the van’s roof. 
 
 
Sensor/ HW Manufacturer Technical Data Remarks 
H764 (INS) Honeywell Position  
<1.0 [nmi/hr] CEP 
velocity 
<1.0 [m/s] RMS 
Heading  
0.1 [deg] RMS 
Pitch, Roll 
0.05 [deg] RMS 
INS medium 
accuracy 
RT20 L1 (GPS) Novatel 12 channel L1 
20 cm CEP50 
 (RT2 DGPS) 
High accuracy 
RT2 L1/L2 (GPS) Novatel 12 CH L1/L2 
2 cm CEP50 
 (RT2 DGPS) 
High accuracy 
SK8 (GPS) Trimble 8 CH L1 
2 m CEP50  
(DGPS) 
Low cost receiver 
GPS 35 Garmin 12 CH L1 
5 m RMS 
(DGPS) 
Low cost receiver 
Ashtech G12 Thales 12 channel L1 
40cm CEP50 
(DGPS) 
GA certified 
reference station 
RT2, Hermes mo-
dem (DGPS, VHF 
link) 
Novatel, 
Phillips 
L1/L2  
RTCM Type 59N  
RTCA Type 7 
VHF Modem: 459,57Mhz  
reference point 
required. 
Odometer  Bosch 56 pulse/round ABS controller 
ALF receiver 
(DGPS ) 
DeTex RTCM-104 v2.0 
122,5 kHz 
Available within 600 
km radius of Frank-
furt 
MS5535 (Barome-
ter/ Thermometer) 
Intersema -40°C to +125°C 
1-12 bar 
Parport PC Inter-
face 
RT60 Filser 1090 Mhz, Enhanced 
Squitter 
ADS-B receiver 
Table 16: Sensor equipment of TUD’s Navigation Test Vehicle 
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7.3.4 Testbed Limitations 
7.3.4.1 Material constraints 
In the following, a list of the physical limitations of the set-up for the evaluation 
setup is given, which relate mainly to the test bed itself and associated constraints: 
 
 Very basic cockpit mock-up: The passenger seat of the Navigation Test Vehicle is 
obviously not at all representative of a real cockpit environment (cf. Figure 91); its 
use also enforces a single pilot configuration. Furthermore, a consumer COTS TFT 
monitor was used, but the lower contrast and brightness ratio was of no signifi-
cance for display readability due to the mostly overcast skies encountered during 
the trials. A constraint that might have had a small influence on results was the 
lower position of the seat above the airfield compared to real aircraft. 
 Experiment pilot physically not in control of vehicle: This is not relevant due to 
envisaged PNF role of the pilot monitoring the AMM and the several add-ons. 
 Availability and quality of ADS-B data: Not all of the aircraft encountered at 
Frankfurt and Prague airport were equipped with ADS-B, and the quality of the 
data provided by those equipped showed a substantial variance. As pilot com-
ments show, this clearly had an impact on evaluation results. 
 Absence of CPDLC and other data link services: Pre-stored ATC instructions 
and clearances were used, but this should not have any influence on results. 
 
7.3.4.2 Experimental conditions 
This section describes limitations related to experimental conditions, i.e. constraints 
in terms of operational realism, which partially result from physical constraints: 
 
 Passive observer role of experiment pilot: Due to the envisaged task-sharing for 
airport moving map use, which allocates the task of SMAAS monitoring to the pi-
lot non-flying (PNF) to avoid that the aircraft is taxied head-down by the pilot fly-
ing (PF), the passive, monitoring role that pilots assumed in the van trials is not 
crucial. Therefore, the impact on the results is believed to be very low. 
 Lower workload than in real life: Given the absence of an operational cockpit 
environment with responsibility for e.g. checklist reading and managing radio 
communications, the workload of a PNF will be higher in reality, compared to the 
assessment on the van. 
 Use of vehicle roads: Instead of driving on taxiways, TUD's Navigation Test Ve-
hicle used airport vehicle roads during the assessment of AMM and AMM with 
additional traffic presentation (CDTI) at both Frankfurt and Prague airport. The 
impact on evaluation results, however, is believed to be negligible, because the 
general principle of an electronic presentation of aerodrome mapping information 
is the same for taxiways and vehicle roads; the same applies to the CDTI. Besides, 
the vehicle roads used were mostly parallel to the taxiways. 
 Absence of interaction with CPDLC and other data links: There was no interac-
tion with ATC via CPDLC, which lowered workload and operational realism, but 
is believed to be of virtually no impact on results. 
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7.4 Evaluation Scenarios 
7.4.1 Scenarios for Frankfurt Airport (EDDF) 
7.4.1.1 AMM Scenarios 
Due to the high traffic density at Frankfurt airport, using the taxiway system during 
daytime was impossible. However, there are vehicle roads largely adjacent to the 
long major taxiways A, D and N that extend parallel to the main runways all along 
the northern part with the two terminals and the cargo apron, and these were used 
for the trials. Typically, a scenario for the moving map standalone assessment would 
consist of driving from Terminal 1C up taxiway N and N North up to taxiway Z, and 
then back on A and down to position V102 near the eastern end of Terminal 2. At the 
edge of this parking position, the Level 0 alert for approaching a holding position in 
LVP conditions could be demonstrated without actually entering the manoeuvring 
area. After this scenario, pilots were asked to fill a first set of questionnaires and a 
first System Usability Scale (SUS). 
 
7.4.1.2 AMM and Ground Traffic Scenarios 
Subsequently, for the traffic assessment scenarios, ADS-B equipped aircraft were 
chosen and, where possible, being followed, mostly along their taxi route to RWY18 
or while taxiing in, using largely the same vehicle roads as in the AMM only sub-
experiment. During debriefing, as second set of questionnaires including another 
SUS was filled. It was found that recently delivered Airbus A320 and A330/A340 
family aircraft were generally suitable targets, providing positional data with good 
accuracy, nominal update rate and also track data. Thus, the experiment leaders tried 
to spot and follow these aircraft, which was eased by the fact that they grew more 
and more familiar with the flight schedule at Frankfurt as the experiment progressed. 
Initially, it had been planned to use TIS-B data in the Frankfurt experiment as well. 
Unfortunately, however, due to technical problems on the server side, the experi-
mental TIS-B multilateration data broadcast via WLAN was only available during 
the integration and shakedown trials, but not during the experiment itself. 
 
7.4.1.3 Surface Movement Awareness and Alerting Scenarios 
For a presentation and assessment of the OAF functionality, Runway 25R was set as a 
fictitious FMS-selected runway, and Runway 25L was marked as closed. 
The CAF functionality was presented as well, using a pre-defined taxi route, but due 
to the limitation of the Navigation Test Vehicles movement to the apron and vehicle 
roads, the route was not being followed. 
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7.4.2 Scenarios for Prague Airport (LKPR) 
7.4.2.1 Airport Moving Map 
The briefing on the AMM included a first hint at the existence of additional Surface 
Movement Awareness and Alerting functions and a quick explanation of the Run-
way Proximity Information advisory (cf. Section 5.5.5). The AMM evaluation was 
carried out in a similar fashion as in Frankfurt. Starting out from the South Apron, 
the vehicle roads up to and around the passenger terminal (North Terminal) were 
used to evaluate the AMM only functionality. A typical scenario would use the vehi-
cle roads around the three distinct terminal fingers and then go to the Cargo Apron 
alongside taxiway Z. 
 
7.4.2.2 Additional Surface Movement Awareness and Alerting Functions 
Prague airport with its RWY 04/22 permanently closed for take-offs and landings 
provides an ideal location for live trials on Runway Incursion alerting. As opposed to 
a long straight taxiway, an actual – though closed – runway provides sufficient real-
ism in terms of layout, holding positions etc. Furthermore, a closed runway can be 
used without influencing or being influenced by scheduled flights landing and tak-
ing off. This is not only important from a runway safety point of view, but also from 
a scenario design perspective. As an example, for a future experiment, a dedicated 
ATC frequency could be set up for the closed runway, thus permitting the simulation 
of an active runway. Of course, coordination with regular ATC will be required for 
safety reasons. 
 
7.4.2.2.1 Runway Incursion Alerting for FMS-selected runway (missing clearance) 
In the briefing, pilots were told to imagine that Runway 04/22 was used as an active 
runway again. In the first scenario (see Figure 92), RWY 22 was assumed to be the 
runway assigned for take-off entered in the FMS. Starting out from the South Apron, 
the pilot would discover that the direct route to the runway via taxiway N was 
blocked by a fictitious aircraft that had blown a tyre. 
 
 
Figure 92: Runway Incursion alerting for FMS-selected runway scenario 
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Level 2/3 Alert 
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L 
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Thus, a detour via N – P – 04/22 – P – L – M – 22 had to be taken, which would re-
quire crossing the runway. The corresponding taxi route was not shown on the dis-
play in this scenario, because a segment-wise allocation of the taxi route up to a pre-
defined holding position, permitting to model the behaviour of the taxi route during 
runway crossing as described in Section 5.4.3, was not yet feasible with the SMAAS 
prototype. With RWY 22 set and clearly marked as the FMS-selected runway, the 
alerting concept (Level 2 and Level 3) for approaching and entering the FMS-selected 
runway without appropriate clearance was evaluated at the intersection of P with 
RWY04/22. Another aspect of the same alert was shown before receiving the line-up 
clearance on M. Last but not least, the normal behaviour of the function in the pres-
ence of appropriate clearances was shown during line-up on RWY 22. 
 
7.4.2.2.2 Runway Incursion Alerting for non-FMS-selected runway (“wrong” runway) 
This scenario was aimed at evaluating the alert presented to the crew if they inadver-
tently enter a ‘wrong’ runway, i.e. a runway that has neither been selected in the FMS 
nor approved for any operation on the runway surface (crossing, line-up etc). The 
experiment pilot was briefed to imagine a flight crew in a totally wrong mindset, 
missing a turn and then heading straight onto the runway that is neither in the FMS 
nor part of the assigned taxi route. 
 
For this scenario, RWY 31 was set and unambiguously marked as the FMS-selected 
runway. The assigned taxi route (as displayed in green in Figure 93) was displayed 
on the AMM, and the behaviour of the SMAAS when leaving the assigned route was 
demonstrated: at the intersection of R and RR, the actual path would diverge from 
the assigned route (red line). At the intersection with taxiway L, the error was not 
corrected, and the van would turn right instead of left (to the departure/FMS RWY 
31), causing an alert for unauthorised infringement of RWY 04/22. 
 
 
Figure 93: Runway Incursion alerting for FMS-selected runway scenario 
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7.4.2.2.3 Runway Incursion Alerting for completely closed runway 
The purpose of this scenario was to assess the behaviour of the SMAAS if the aircraft 
is inadvertently heading for a runway that is completely closed. For the briefing, pi-
lots were told to imagine that Runway 04/22 was planned to be re-opened as an ac-
tive runway again, and that for this reason, there was heavy construction work in 
progress. The starting point would be on taxiway L, with the aircraft scheduled for 
take-off on RWY 31. The controller would then make an error and not correctly ad-
vise the ‘detour’ via M as expected (green route in Figure 94), but give a route via L 
instead (red route). Assuming that the crew would be busy with some PAX problems 
(the purser is in the cockpit for some reason, e.g. not enough business meals), this 
controller error would go unnoticed, and the aircraft would go straight ahead on L 
and eventually come dangerously close to the runway under reconstruction. 
For this scenario, RWY 31 was set and displayed as the FMS-selected runway, and 
RWY 04/22 was set and displayed as closed. No taxi route was displayed for this 
scenario in order to emphasize the independence of the alerting for closed runways 
from the availability of a taxi route presentation to the participating pilots. 
 
 
Figure 94: Scenario for the assessment of Runway Incursion alerts for a closed runway 
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7.5 Experiment Participants 
7.5.1 Overview 
A total of 15 male airline pilots with an average age of 43.2 years (between 26 and 59 
years old), among them nine Captains (CPT), three Senior First Officers (SFO) and 
three First Officers (FO), from five European airlines participated in the field trials 
with the Institute’s Navigation Test Vehicle. 
During their entire career in commercial aviation, the participating pilots had logged 
between 1,500 and 20,000 hours (ø 9335 h). The distribution of aircraft types currently 
flown was as follows: 
 
 Airbus A320 family:    2 
 Airbus A330/A340 family:   4 
 Boeing B-737 Classic (B733, B735,…): 4 
 Boeing B-747-400:    2 
 Boeing B-777:     1 
 McDonnell-Douglas MD-11:   2  
 
Incidentally, there was thus an almost even distribution over Airbus and Boeing air-
craft types. Familiarity/type-specific experience with the current aircraft type ranged 
from 200 to 9,000 hrs (ø 3287 h). On average, pilots had spent 15.1 years with their 
current airline, with a minimum of two years and a maximum of 37 years. One pilot 
had a flight testing and certification background, and several others were technical 
pilots and/or instructors with their present airline. 
 
Num Background 
(Flight test, Airlines 
Training) 
Nationality Native 
Language 
Sex 
(F/M) 
Age Hierarchical 
(Captain/ [Senior] 
First Officer) 
Amount 
of flight 
hours 
Application 
knowledge 
1 Airline German German M N/A Senior First Officer 3500 AMM (other) 
2 Flight test, Airline, 
Certification Dutch Dutch M 59 Captain 11000 
AMM 
(other) 
3 Airline German German M 40 Captain 9000 - 
4 Airline German German M 39 Senior First Officer 7130 - 
5 Airline German German M 50 Captain 13000 - 
6 Airline, Training German German M 51 Captain 20000 - 
7 Airline German German M 29 First Officer 2400 MMS 
8 Airline, Tech. Pilot German German M 57 Captain 18000 -* 
9 Airline, Training, Tech. 
Pilot German German M 57 Captain 20000 -* 
10 Airline German German M 29 First Officer 2900 N/A 
11 Airline, Training German German M 55 Captain 18500 - 
12 Airline Czech Czech M 26 First Officer 1500 MMS 
13 Airline, Training, Flight 
test Czech Czech M 42 Captain 7000 MMS 
14 Airline Czech Czech M 31 Senior First Officer 1900 MMS 
15 Airline Czech Czech M 40 Captain 4200 MMS 
Table 17: Overview of the background of pilots participating in the trials 
 
With 11 pilots, the majority of sessions took place in Frankfurt. Unfortunately, due to 
scheduling constraints and the limited time available on site, eventually only four 
pilots participated in the Prague experiment. 
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7.5.2 Background in Traffic-related Systems 
In order to enable a better post-hoc classification and understanding of assessment 
results, pilots were asked for relevant experience in the domain of traffic-related sys-
tems such as TCAS (cf. Section 3.2.1) and ADS-B (Section 3.2.2). Regarding TCAS ex-
perience, seven of the pilots had experience in the old TCAS I, while 12 pilots stated 
they were familiar with TCAS II. Given their current aircraft types, all 15 participants 
can be expected to have TCAS II experience, but two pilots skipped the whole ques-
tion altogether, and a third one claimed ADS-B experience only. But given the air-
craft type he flies, he should be familiar with TCAS II, and thus it seems reasonable 
to assume that he accidentally forgot to check the TCAS II box on the questionnaire. 
 
A total of four pilots claimed familiarity with ADS-B, but none was actually using 
any applications based on ADS-B in daily operations. Experience was limited to re-
search and development. 
 
7.5.3 Experience in Runway Incursions and RAAS 
In view of the scope of the evaluation, pilots were asked whether they had ever ex-
perienced a Runway Incursion themselves. One pilot did not answer to this question; 
it could not be determined whether this was due to the sensitive nature of the ques-
tion, or simply by oversight. Of the remaining pilots, 10 (or 71.4%) had never person-
ally encountered a Runway Incursion. Four pilots (or 28.6%) stated that they had 
first-hand experience with Runway Incursions, although typically only once in their 
career. One Captain with 20,000 flight hours (Pilot #9) reported more than one en-
counter. Another pilot (Pilot #15) had merely experienced a Runway Incursion in a 
simulator scenario. 
 
Pilot #1 gave a more detailed description of his encounter and stated that Bangkok 
Don Mueang Airport (VTBD) was very dangerous with respect to Runway Incur-
sions at the time, because there was a large portion of taxiway parallel to the runway 
behind the holding position. He had experienced this once, when the crew over-
looked this in their Boeing 747-400 with three crew members in the cockpit (includ-
ing a check-pilot), and were taxiing across this holding position onto this TWY in 
parallel to the runway when another aircraft landed. The remaining wingtip separa-
tion was around 10 m. 
Another pilot (Pilot #5) also stated he had missed a holding position once, and added 
that there might probably several more that he had missed over the years, without 
even noticing. Pilot #9 reported encounters with other aircraft on the active runway, 
opposite taxiway traffic and others. 
 
Participants were also asked for relevant experience with Honeywell’s Runway 
Awareness and Alerting System (RAAS; see Section 3.3.1 for details), an add-on func-
tion to the TAWS that provides only aural alerts and advisories for various runway 
safety-related cases. 
Eight of the participating pilots, or 53.3%, had never heard of the RAAS before. Three 
pilots, or 20%, had heard or read of the RAAS, and another three had seen it in a 
simulator. One of the pilots had been involved in the testing of RAAS for his airline. 
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7.5.4 Background in Research Projects and Airport Moving Map 
Two thirds of the participants had previously participated in research projects 
and/or product development. The four Czech pilots had all participated in EMMA 
trials in Braunschweig, three of the German pilots had been involved in simulator 
trials for the European research project ISAWARE II, cf. [Ver05]. 
Roughly half of the participating pilots had already previous experience with airport 
moving map displays. Two further pilots, although they did not claim corresponding 
experience, had already been demonstrated the MMS during an earlier visit at Air-
bus facilities; these are marked with an asterisk in the table135. For all pilots, however, 
this experience was limited to research projects and simulator trials, none of the pi-
lots had actual operational experience with airport moving map displays. 
Three of the four participating Czech pilots had participated in a simulator evalua-
tion with exactly the same airport moving map display from earlier EMMA trials in 
DLR’s cockpit simulator, using Paris – Charles de Gaulle (LFPG) as scenario location. 
Two of the German pilots had also been given a demonstration of this display at Air-
bus facilities. Furthermore, another three pilots had participated in the ISAWARE II 
ND taxi display evaluation. One pilot did not answer this question. 
 
7.5.5 Familiarity with Test Airport 
Pilots were requested to rate their familiarity with the airport at which the tests took 
place on a six-step scale with text statements, ranging from “It is my first time here” 
to “I know the layout of this airport almost better than that of my flat”. The vast ma-
jority of pilots (80%) stated that they knew the airport in question very well. While it 
was the first-ever visit to the test airport for one pilot (6.67%), another one had been 
at the corresponding airport several times before, and one pilot claimed to know the 
airport better than the layout of his flat. 
 
 
 
                                                 
135 In retrospect, it seems that the corresponding question (see questionnaire in the appendix) was not precise 
enough, as it did not discriminate operational experience and experience with the technology in research pro-
jects. 
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7.6 Assessment Results 
7.6.1 Basic Airport Moving Map Display 
  
Figure 95: Perceived contribution to situ-
ational awareness 
Figure 96: Operational relevance of airport 
moving map 
 
Overall feedback and comments on the airport moving map were very positive. Ac-
cording to pilot’s perception, the AMM helps to increase their situational awareness, 
as shown in Figure 95. With 11 pilots, almost three quarters of the participants opted 
for the highest rating on a Likert-style scale from 1 (strong disagreement) to 10 
(strong agreement), resulting in an average rating of 9.53 and a significant deviation 
from normality (1% confidence level). Pilot #4 commented that while the AMM 
clearly increased situational awareness, he feared that it might also be a distraction. 
The questionnaire results displayed in Figure 96 clearly indicate that the AMM corre-
sponds to an operational need, since all 
participants agree that it gives them 
support they miss with current systems 
(Mean = 9.20, Standard Deviation = 0.94). 
 
Although the perceived level of safety 
when using the AMM was generally 
high according to the results presented 
in Figure 97 (M = 8.47, SD = 1.77), it is 
noteworthy that the mean rating is 
markedly lower than for situational 
awareness. The senior captain (Pilot #11) 
disagreeing on this was also somewhat 
reluctant with his confidence in the pres-
entation on the display (see Figure 104). 
Nevertheless, he acknowledged that the 
AMM gives him support that he misses 
with current systems (cf. Figure 96). 
 
Figure 97: Perceived impact of airport mov-
ing map on safety 
7   FIELD TRIALS WITH A NAVIGATION TEST VEHICLE 
 300
  
Figure 98: Impact of AMM on pilot involve-
ment 
Figure 99: Capability of AMM to prevent 
flight crew disorientation 
 
As is evident from Figure 98, pilot feedback suggests that the AMM keeps pilots in 
the loop (M = 9.33, SD = 1.29). Only Pilot #15 gave a neutral rating with negative 
tendency on this statement, but did not specify a particular reason for this assess-
ment. 
Thirteen out of fifteen pilots (or 86%) think that it will not be possible to get lost on 
an airfield with an AMM (see Figure 99), while two participants consider this still 
possible, particularly if the crew is distracted by other tasks (M = 8.40, SD = 2.32). 
The slight disagreement of a senior captain (Pilot #11) on this matter is consistent 
with his somewhat more reserved attitude towards the AMM. The young first officer 
(Pilot #14) who clearly disagreed did not give an explicit reason or a comment that 
would elucidate his choice, but it can be speculated that it is due to a healthy level of 
mistrust in human capabilities, since one of the other pilots who eventually rated 
positively also made a comment to that 
effect. In conclusion, therefore, the results 
indicate that the AMM is perceived as a 
potential solution to airport disorienta-
tion, especially in bad weather and on 
large and complex airfields, as the com-
ments taken during the session confirm. 
Furthermore, there is a clear pilot prefer-
ence for an ND-integrated airport mov-
ing map display (see Figure 100), which 
confirms the SMAAS concept (M = 8.80, 
SD = 2.04). Only Pilot #13 favoured the 
standalone AMM as presented. However, 
a concern expressed by some participants 
was that a conventional ND screen in 
today’s glass cockpits might be too small 
for the display to be easily legible. 
 
Figure 100: Pilots’ preferences on ND-
integrated airport moving map 
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Figure 101: Appropriateness of AMM infor-
mation to accomplish ATC instruction 
Figure 102: Relevance of AMM information 
 
Pilot feedback presented in Figure 101 (M = 8.60, SD = 1.30) and Figure 102 (M = 8.80, 
SD = 1.21) suggests that the AMM provides pilots with sufficient and adequate in-
formation to accomplish routine operations in a timely fashion. 
Since the accuracy of the ownship position received exclusively positive feedback 
from participants, as evidenced by Figure 100 (M = 9.20, SD = 0.68), any detrimental 
impact of potential inaccuracies on the evaluation of the AMM functionality per se 
can be safely excluded. Accordingly, Figure 104 indicates that all but one of the par-
ticipants had confidence in the AMM presentation (M = 8.40, SD = 2.23). The strong 
disagreement from Pilot #5 is somewhat puzzling and may be inadvertent, since the 
same pilot made very positive comments on the AMM (“…it is super to assess distances 
and to get orientated…”) and gave high ratings for related questions. 
 
  
Figure 103: Adequacy of position accuracy 
during field trials 
Figure 104: Perceived trustworthiness of 
AMM presentation 
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The questionnaires presented after the evaluation sessions contained further ques-
tions on particular design aspects of the airport moving map, but since an Airbus 
A380 airport moving map prototype and not the design described in Section 5.1 was 
used during the field trials, it is not relevant to discuss the corresponding results, 
which can be found in [EMM07], in this section. Therefore, the analysis in this section 
is limited to the generic characteristics and overall impact of an airport moving map, 
in line with the goals of this thesis. For exactly the same reason, the assessment re-
sults concerning traffic symbology are excluded from the following section. 
 
7.6.2 Airport Moving Map Display with Traffic Display 
7.6.2.1 Overall Impression 
 
Most pilots rate their traffic situational awareness with ADS-B traffic displayed on 
the airport moving map very positively, as shown in Figure 105 (M = 4.93)137. The 
only negative feedback came from Pilot #2, who criticized both the quality of the 
ADS-B data presented as insufficient and the percentage of equipped aircraft (see 
discussion further below for details), which made the display unusable in its present 
form. Nevertheless, he acknowledged the enormous potential of traffic display on 
AMM. Given the flight testing and certification background of this pilot, and the fact 
that he was the only participant from this domain, his criticism needs to be consid-
ered very carefully. Likewise, as can be inferred from Figure 106, participants con-
sidered the traffic presentation to be a definite improvement over systems available 
today (M = 5.36). Again, Pilot #2 gave a negative rating on this question, but reiter-
ated his comment that potential for traffic on this display was enormous, and that his 
                                                 
136 For each questionnaire results diagram shown, the number N of valid answers is given. Occasionally, pilots 
skipped individual questions by error, and sometimes, the presentation of an individual function failed due to 
a system error, rendering certain questions not applicable. 
137  To collect feedback on the traffic presentation, a seven-stage Likert-type rating scale from zero to six was used. 
  
Figure 105: Perceived situational awareness 
with ADS-B traffic on AMM136 
Figure 106: Improvement with respect to 
current systems 
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negative rating was due to the unreliable traffic data. It may therefore be concluded 
that all pilots acknowledged the principle of displaying traffic on an AMM as an im-
provement over current systems. Last but not least, it should be noted that the distri-
bution of results significantly deviates from normality for both questions. 
 
Pilots were also asked to assess the po-
tential contribution of the traffic presen-
tation on safety. The distribution of re-
sults, as presented in Figure 107, is simi-
lar to the previous two questions, with 
Pilot #2 giving a low rating due to his 
already expressed concerns (M = 5.00, 
SD = 1.31). Furthermore, Pilots #7 and 
#13 were a bit more reserved in their 
rating. Again, the results indicate that all 
pilots clearly acknowledge the potential 
of the ground traffic presentation, while 
the technology was not fully deployed 
and mature at the time of the trials. 
 
Concerning the ADS-B traffic data avail-
able for the trials, a majority of pilots 
accepted the accuracy of ADS-B traffic 
with respect to position, see Figure 108 (M = 5.73, SD = 1.39). Disagreement came 
from Pilot #7, and Pilot #4 provided a neutral rating. Pilot #15 erroneously skipped 
the question. In conclusion, therefore, the main issue with ADS-B traffic is not its po-
sitional accuracy, but – as evident from Figure 109 – the sporadic unavailability traf-
fic data as well as the update rate, which resulted in negative feedback and several 
critical comments (M = 4.67, SD = 1.50). 
 
 
Figure 107: Perceived impact of traffic 
presentation on safety 
  
Figure 108: Acceptability of positional accu-
racy of ADS-B traffic data during live trials 
Figure 109: Pilot feedback on operational 
suitability of ADS-B data update rate 
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To explain his strong disagreement on the acceptability of the update rate, Pilot #2 
stated that the refreshment rate of traffic was often too slow for a pilot to build confi-
dence, and that heading and position of traffic were partially unstable. His main con-
cern, however, was that an aircraft symbol not appropriately updated could be per-
ceived as stationary. Since it is essential whether an aircraft is stationary or moving, 
he regarded this as unacceptable. Further negative feedback came from Pilot #1 and 
Pilot #7, but they did not make any comments to elucidate their point of view, which 
can be assumed to be similar to Pilot #2’s. Even pilots who eventually rated posi-
tively made similar comments. Pilot #9 also complained about the position jumps 
due to the non-nominal update rate, but admitted that similar jumps existed on the 
TCAS display today. A further issue during the trials the exclusive use of a direc-
tional traffic symbol, which resulted in an incorrect heading/track presentation for 
those ADS-B targets not supplying this information, or when track information was 
lost for stopped aircraft. In both cases, a default heading of 0° would be used, and 
this incorrect information additionally irritated pilots. 
 
As Figure 110 shows, a majority of the participating pilots agreed that the AMM traf-
fic presentation helped them to establish a correspondence with traffic they saw out-
side the window (M = 5.00, SD = 1.36). Pilot #2 disagreed, but again not in principle, 
but rather due to the deficiencies of ADS-B data coverage and reliability. 
Concerning pilots’ confidence in the presented traffic, the picture becomes more 
complex, which is not surprising in view of the issues with ADS-B traffic discussed 
above. Pilots #2 and #4 did not have any confidence, stating that missing position 
updates while the aircraft was actually moving are not acceptable from an opera-
tional point of view. In addition, Pilot #2 remarked that the display of traffic seemed 
to lack stability, and that the fact that targets were sometimes appearing and disap-
pearing quickly did not help to build confidence. Pilot #1, Pilot #7 and Pilot #11 also 
disagreed, though less vigorously. 
 
  
Figure 110: Support of traffic presentation 
for visual acquisition 
Figure 111: Pilot confidence in traffic pres-
entation 
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The choice of Pilot #7, and probably that of others, might have been influenced by 
the confusing heading information that was presented for those ADS-B intruders that 
did not transmit valid heading or track information. Pilot #9 also referred to the wide 
range of headings and position jumps, but as he found the latter similar to the jumps 
on TCAS today, he most likely did not consider this issue severe enough to give 
negative feedback. Generally, he found traffic information very good. 
 
7.6.2.2 Scope of Traffic Presentation 
 
It is evident from the questionnaire results shown in Figure 112 that a majority of 
pilots considered even a partial visualisation of the surrounding traffic as having a 
positive impact on situational awareness (M = 4.21, SD = 1.81), while two pilots – 
Pilots #2 and #7 – opposed an incomplete representation. Pilot #2 commented that 
all traffic that can visually be acquired has to be presented on the display as well, and 
saw a certification issue if this cannot be guaranteed by a suitable implementation 
process for ADS-B technology. Pilot #4 gave a neutral rating, and Pilot #15 errone-
ously skipped this question. 
At the same time, almost two thirds of the participants also acknowledge the poten-
tial hazards arising from an incomplete traffic presentation, as shown in Figure 113 
(M = 4.20, SD = 1.74). Conversely, Pilot #15 did not regard this as a problem and 
therefore disagreed. Pilots #3, #6 and #14 also rather dissented, while Pilot #5 gave 
the neutral rating. Although the questions in Figure 112 and Figure 113 are some-
what antagonistic, similar or even identical ratings – as provided e.g. by Pilots #8 to 
Pilot #12 – do not necessarily indicate inconsistencies. Apparently, the positive rating 
on questions both given by these pilots indicates that they think a new technology 
with limitations – of which they are aware – is still advantageous over the current 
situation. Conversely, others like Pilot #2 and Pilot #4, demonstrated by their strong 
agreement on the question in Figure 113 that the issues outweigh the benefits in their 
view in the current environment. 
  
Figure 112: Operational usefulness of in-
complete traffic surveillance picture 
Figure 113: Dangers associated with using 
incomplete traffic surveillance picture 
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Pilots’ feedback concerning the necessity of displaying all airport vehicles on the 
AMM is divided in two distinct groups, as shown in Figure 114 on the next page 
(M = 3.20, SD = 2.14). A majority of the experiment participants did not consider a 
visualisation of all airport vehicles on the airport moving map as useful feature; Pilot 
#2 even strongly disagreed on the necessity. Only Pilots #8, #11 and 15 strongly 
agreed that there is a need of presenting all vehicles. 
 
As Figure 115 shows, participants had 
diverging opinions concerning the pres-
entation of parked aircraft (M = 3.50, 
SD = 2.07). Pilot #11 agreed on the need 
for displaying parked aircraft and 
commented that a valid operational rea-
son was the possibility to check whether 
an assigned parking position or gate is 
already vacant or not. 
 
The results presented in Figure 116, 
which significantly deviate from a nor-
mal distribution according to a one-
sided Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, clearly 
illustrate that awareness of traffic in the 
runway environment is indeed the key 
concern for pilots, since all of them 
agree – 60% strongly – that they would 
apply the AMM with its traffic representation to verify that the runway is really clear 
of traffic, especially at night and in low visibility (M = 5.53). In this context, Pilot #14 
commented that checking that the runways are clear was the main use for a traffic 
presentation on the AMM in his eyes. 
  
Figure 114: Operational relevance of dis-
playing airport vehicles 
Figure 115: Importance of visualising parked 
aircraft 
 
Figure 116: Usage of AMM traffic depiction 
for runway surveillance 
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7.6.2.3 Workload and Display Clutter 
 
Pilots were asked to rate the influence of the AMM with additional traffic presenta-
tion on their perceived workload. The results presented in Figure 117 indicate that 
most pilots experienced little or no increase in workload (M = 4.27, SD = 1.53). How-
ever, since these results were not obtained in an environment representative of actual 
pilot tasks and associated workload, it would be premature to draw any definite con-
clusions based on this feedback. Nevertheless, it is encouraging that only two pilots, 
Pilot #7 and Pilot #12, felt their workload increased by the ground traffic presenta-
tion. 
 
Additionally, participants were asked whether they regarded the display as cluttered 
with the additional traffic presentation. It is evident from the results presented in 
Figure 118 that the majority of pilots did not have an impression of display clutter 
(M = 4.27, SD = 1.71). Only Pilots #2 and #7 confirmed the presence of clutter. 
Given the comparatively number of aircraft and vehicles effectively equipped with 
ADS-B during the field trials, however, these results should be treated with care. 
While apparently not a major issue, display clutter caused by traffic should be moni-
tored closely. 
 
  
Figure 117: Perceived impact of ground traf-
fic presentation on workload 
Figure 118: Subjective feeling of display 
clutter 
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7.6.3 Operational Awareness Function (OAF) 
7.6.3.1 FMS-selected runway representation 
After having seen the FMS-selected runway representation on the airport moving 
map display, pilots were asked to rate this feature both in general and with respect to 
the particular implementation chosen in post-run questionnaires, using a Likert-style 
rating scale offering seven distinct steps from “strongly disagree” (0) to “strongly 
agree” (6). The results are presented in the following. First, pilots were asked for the 
operational relevance of the FMS-selected runway presentation on the standalone 
airport moving map application, the so-called “Moving Map Standalone” (MMS). 
 
As can be seen from Figure 119, all pilots appreciated the concept of presenting the 
FMS-selected runway on the airport moving map, thus confirming the assertion that 
this feature has operational relevance (M = 5.40, SD = 0.63). With seven pilots, almost 
half of the participants gave the highest rating, and the same number of pilots chose 
the second-highest rating. Only Pilot #11 was somewhat hesitant in his agreement, 
which is in line with his general reservations towards airport moving map technol-
ogy. 
 
Apart from the general concept, a majority of pilots also liked the particular design 
choice made for the representation of the FMS-selected runway on the airport mov-
ing map display (see Figure 120), although only 36% gave the highest possible rating. 
The level of agreement is both qualitatively and qualitatively slightly lower than for 
the concept itself (M = 5.07, SD = 0.92), with Pilot #8 giving a neutral rating and Pi-
lots #2 and #10 only rather agreeing on the HMI solution for the FMS-selected run-
way. Pilot #11, most likely by error, skipped answering this question. Nonetheless, 
the data suggests that the concept of using the runway outline to represent the FMS-
selected runway on the airport moving map seems valid. 
 
  
Figure 119: Operational relevance of FMS-
selected runway presentation on AMM 
Figure 120: HMI design of FMS-selected 
runway representation on AMM 
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The ratings shown in Figure 121 refers 
to the initial FMS-selected runway rep-
resentation colour concept, the ma-
genta outline as presented in Figure 43 
on p. 168. 
There is no negative feedback, i.e. all 
participants considered the choice of 
colour acceptable. However, only one 
third of the pilots opted for the highest 
possible rating, and Pilot #4 and Pilot 
#11 gave a feedback that is still posi-
tive, but already close to a neutral rat-
ing, indicating that they do not whole-
heartedly agree with the colour choice 
(M = 5.20, SD = 0.68). The colour choice 
thus received a slightly better rating 
than the symbology (cf. Figure 120), 
the runway outline. Nevertheless, this 
might be explained by the fact that the EFIS of current transport category aircraft 
commonly uses magenta to display parameters derived from the FMS. 
 
7.6.3.2 Representation of Closed Runways 
Figure 122 illustrates that all of the par-
ticipating pilots acknowledged the op-
erational relevance of displaying closed 
runways on the airport moving map 
display (M = 5.60). Again, there is a 
complete absence of dissenting feed-
back. With nearly three quarters of the 
participants opting for the highest 
available rating, it is not surprising that 
a one-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 
yields that the results deviate from a 
normal distribution, even at a 1% sig-
nificance level. Only Pilot #1 and Pilot 
#14, who also considered presenting 
closed runways relevant, were more 
reluctant in their feedback and ‘rather’ 
agreed with the statement presented, 
but generally considered presenting 
closed runways relevant. Nevertheless, the overall level of agreement is very high 
and almost achieves the same magnitude as the presentation of the taxi route, cf. 
Figure 128. 
 
 
Figure 121: Colour of FMS-selected runway 
representation on AMM 
 
Figure 122: Operational relevance of closed 
runway representation 
7   FIELD TRIALS WITH A NAVIGATION TEST VEHICLE 
 310
 
Figure 123 illustrates that the majority of pilots found the symbology used to display 
a closed runway intuitive and easy to understand without reservations (M = 4.93,  
SD = 1.58). While Pilot #3 and Pilot #4 still agreed with the symbology, there was 
also some negative feedback. Pilot #10 disagreed on the intuitiveness of the closed 
runway symbology, and Pilot #11 was also rather dissenting. Unfortunately, their 
comments during the sessions did not shed any light on the reasons for their rating. 
 
The choice of amber symbology to represent the closed runway was mostly appreci-
ated, but, as Figure 124 shows, not all of the pilots agreed on this choice (M = 4.27, 
SD = 1.91). Pilot #8, who highly appreciated the symbology itself, even strongly dis-
agreed that the colour used for the representation of closed runways was consistent 
with the overall cockpit colour concept. Pilot #4, who disagreed, commented that red 
would be a better colour for the closed runway symbology, because it creates more 
contrast than orange, which has too little contrast with yellow. Slightly negative and 
neutral feedback on the colour choice came from Pilot #10 and Pilot #11, respec-
tively, which might shed some insight on the reason why they also rated the closed 
runway symbology low. 
 
  
Figure 123: Assessment of closed runway 
representation 
Figure 124: Colour of Closed Runway repre-
sentation 
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7.6.4 Clearance Awareness Function (CAF) 
7.6.4.1 Runway clearance presentation 
 
The results shown in Figure 125 confirm that, from a pilot’s point of view, the presen-
tation of ATC instructions and clearances related to runway operations on the airport 
moving map is operationally relevant (M = 5.29). The level of agreement, with only 
the two highest ratings chosen, and the complete absence of dissent indicate a high 
operational relevance. Again, the normality of the distribution can be rejected at a 1% 
significance level. Pilot #13, probably erroneously, skipped answering the question. 
According to the results presented in 
Figure 126, pilots not only acknowl-
edged the principle, but also appreci-
ated the particular HMI design chosen 
for the implementation of the runway 
clearances on the AMM (M = 5.46, 
SD = 0.66). Only Pilot #2 was agreeing 
to a lesser extent; Pilot #1 and Pilot 
#13 did not provide any rating on this 
question. 
Furthermore, as can be deduced from 
Figure 127, all pilots agreed on the 
colour choice (green) made for 
representing runway-related ATC 
instructions and clearances as 
expected (M = 5.50, SD = 0.52). Pilot 
#13 also skipped this particular 
question. 
 
  
Figure 125: Operational relevance of Run-
way Clearance representation on AMM 
Figure 126: HMI design of Runway Clear-
ance representation 
 
Figure 127: Colour of Runway Clearance repre-
sentation 
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7.6.4.2 Taxi route presentation 
 
The results shown in Figure 128 prove that a presentation of the assigned taxi route 
on an airport moving map display is definitely one of the functions most desired by 
pilots (M = 5.71). Otherwise, there would not be strong agreement on the operational 
relevance of the taxi route from 79% of the participating pilots. Only one pilot (Pilot 
#15) was apparently not fully convinced of the operational relevance, but still rated 
slightly possible, and did not voice any concerns regarding this feature. Again, the 
normality of the results distribution can be rejected at a 1% significance level. 
 
Since the trials did not contain any interactivity with respect to the assigned taxi 
route, which was presented after activation by the experiment leader, several pilots 
raised the question whether the taxi route was envisaged to be up-linked via data 
link or manually entered by the crew, or whether both options would be foreseen. In 
this case, the rationale for not permitting manual entry presented in Section 5.4.1 was 
briefly explained. 
 
The green colour chosen for the assigned and acknowledged taxi route was appar-
ently also accepted by virtually all the participating pilots, because all but one made 
their choice between the two highest available rating options, and almost 60% se-
lected the highest possible rating (M = 5.50, SD = 0.65). Only Pilot #2 was not fully 
convinced of the colour chosen, but still provided a positive rating, see Figure 129 for 
details. 
 
Pilot #6 did not provide a rating on these two questions for unknown reasons. 
 
  
Figure 128: Operational relevance of Taxi 
Route representation on AMM 
Figure 129: Colour of Taxi Route represen-
tation on AMM 
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7.6.5 Preventive Surface Movement Alerting 
7.6.5.1 General aspects of Runway Incursion Alerting 
 
As can be deduced from Figure 130 and Figure 131, an overwhelming majority of 
pilots (86%) strongly agrees that being alerted when in danger of causing a runway 
incursion is an operationally useful feature (M = 5.80) that will contribute to an in-
crease in flight safety (M = 5.87). The only 
tentative agreement on the operational 
usefulness of runway incursion alerting 
was given by Pilot #15, who nonetheless 
commented that the alerting was very 
useful. A one-sided Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
test yields that the distribution of answers 
for both of these questions exhibits a 
strongly significant deviation from a nor-
mal distribution. 
 
It should be noted, though, that only the 
last four pilots, the participants of the 
Prague experiment session, were exposed 
to the full scope of runway incursion 
alerting from Level 0 to Level 3, whereas 
the other pilots commonly only experi-
enced the Level 0 advisory (Runway Prox-
imity Information, see next section). 
Therefore, the results shown here have, at least partially, more the character of a sur-
vey to capture operational needs, at least for caution and warning level. 
 
  
Figure 130: Operational relevance of pre-
ventive Runway Incursion alerting 
Figure 131: Contribution of (preventive) 
Runway Incursion alerting to flight safety 
 
Figure 132: Relevance of Runway Incursion 
Alerting in presence of airport moving 
map, taxi route and runway clearance 
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To differentiate the feedback on Runway Incursion alerting a bit better, additional 
questions on the relation of Runway Incursion alerting to the basic situational 
awareness information (taxi route, runway-related clearances) were asked to obtain 
more insight into the impact of each technology. In the question presented in Figure 
132, pilots were asked to comment on the likeliness of Runway Incursions in the 
presence of an airport moving map with taxi route and clearance information. 60% of 
the participants agreed without limitations that a Runway Incursion would be an 
unlikely event with these onboard functions available (M = 4.47, SD = 1.13). Only one 
pilot rather dissented (Pilot #1), while the rest gave neutral or slightly positive feed-
back. 
 
 
With only the basic airport moving map present, though, all but one of the pilots (Pi-
lot #15, neutral rating) agree that Runway Incursion alerting is a useful feature, cf. 
Figure 133 (M = 5.33, SD = 0.90). Conversely, only Pilot #15 strongly agreed that he 
did not need a Runway Incursion alert even if the display of taxi route and clearances 
failed, because the airport moving map provided him with sufficient information. 
Pilots #5, #6, #11 and #13 expressed some sympathy for this position by rather 
agreeing to it, and Pilot #4 provided a neutral rating. However, as can be seen from 
Figure 134, the majority of the pilots dissents with the statement that the airport 
moving map gives them all the information they need to avoid a Runway Incursion 
(M = 2.40, SD = 1.68). Besides, pilot feedback on these feedback can be regarded as 
strong evidence that, from an operational perspective, Runway Incursion alerts 
should not solely be based on ATC instructions and clearances. 
 
  
Figure 133: Relevance of Runway Incursion 
Alerting in absence of taxi route and run-
way-related clearances 
Figure 134: Sufficiency of airport moving 
map display to prevent runway incursions 
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7.6.5.2 Taxiway Take-off Alerting 
 
With the exception of Pilot #6 and Pilot #13, pilots confirmed the operational rele-
vance of an alert triggered when the crew is attempting to take-off from a taxiway, 
see Figure 135 (M = 5.00, SD = 1.60). Consistently, these two pilots also denied that 
taxiway take-off alerting constitutes a valuable contribution to flight safety, as evi-
denced by Figure 136 (M = 5.13). The distribution of feedback on this latter question 
exhibits a significant deviation from a normal distribution at a 5% level. 
 
The question presented in Figure 137 was 
intended to gather pilots’ opinions as to 
whether the basic airport moving map is 
sufficient to prevent them from taking off 
from a taxiway or not. A majority of the 
participant is indeed of this opinion 
(M = 4.20, SD = 1.42). As could be ex-
pected from his rating on the last two 
questions, Pilot #13 strongly agrees, and 
Pilot #6 rather agrees. However, Pilot #1 
and Pilot #14 rather disagree, and four 
pilots (#7, #8, #9 and #11) provided a 
neutral rating. 
 
This may be taken as evidence that al-
though the presence of an airport moving 
map decreases the likelihood of taking 
off from a taxiway in pilots’ perception, 
an alert as proposed by SMAAS is nevertheless operationally relevant to address 
cases when pilots are not using or the airport moving map or otherwise distracted. 
  
Figure 135: Operational relevance of Taxi-
way Take-off alerting 
Figure 136: Contribution of Taxiway Take-
off alerting to flight safety 
 
Figure 137: Relevance of Taxiway Take-off 
alerting in view of airport moving map 
7   FIELD TRIALS WITH A NAVIGATION TEST VEHICLE 
 316
7.6.5.3 Closed Runway Alerting 
Assuming that most pilots would most likely be more familiar with the FAA defini-
tion of Runway Incursions, which does not include closed runways explicitly, it was 
decided to treat Runway Incursions due to operation on closed runways separately 
in the trials questionnaire. Furthermore, this provides an opportunity of checking 
pilot ratings for consistency, as the principles of alerting for closed runways are ex-
actly the same as for all other Runway Incursion alerts. 
 
 
In comparison to the global Runway Incursion alerting functionality (see Figure 130), 
it is noteworthy that the operational desirability of alerts pertaining to a closed run-
way is somewhat lower with respect to the level of agreement from pilots (M = 5.33, 
SD = 0.82). In terms of mean ratings, Closed Runway alerting is rated by almost 0.5 
rating steps lower than Runway Incursion alerting in general. 
While Pilots #1, #12 and #13 strongly agree on the necessity of global alerting, they 
only rather agree with Closed Runway alerting. Nonetheless, the necessity to provide 
alerts if the crew is about to operate on a closed runway is indisputably acknowl-
edged by pilots, as evidenced by Figure 138. 
 
As Figure 139 indicates, there is also unanimous agreement that a corresponding 
alerting functionality would have a positive impact on safety (M = 5.60, SD = 0.63). 
With two thirds of the pilots strongly agreeing, the safety impact is rated qualita-
tively higher than the operational relevance. 
Only Pilot #13 is somewhat more hesitant in his agreement, consistent with his opin-
ion on operational desirability. Compared to Runway Incursion alerting in general, it 
is noteworthy, though, that the difference between the mean ratings concerning the 
impact on safety is much lower than for the operational relevance. 
 
  
Figure 138: Operational relevance of Closed 
Runway alerting 
Figure 139: Contribution of Closed Runway 
alerting to flight safety 
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The assessment results in Figure 140 exhibit largely the same characteristics as the 
results for the other Surface Movement alerting functions, notably Runway Incursion 
alerting. A majority of pilots is of the opinion that the basic representation of closed 
runways on the airport moving map display will reduce the probability of Runway 
Incursions due to closed runways (M = 4.53, SD = 1.41). However, there is also dis-
sent from Pilot #9 and Pilot #14, whereas Pilot #7 gave a neutral rating. 
 
 
Figure 140: Relevance of Closed Runway alerting in view of closed runway presentation on 
airport moving map 
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7.6.5.4 Taxi Route Conformance Monitoring 
 
Figure 141 indicates that pilots generally considered the Taxi Route Conformance 
Monitoring functionality, which provides a Level 0 alert in case of deviation from an 
assigned taxi route, as a useful feature that attracts the crew’s attention to the display 
(M = 5.13, SD = 0.74). However, it can be inferred from Figure 142 that a majority of 
pilots was also of the opinion that the taxi route presentation on the airport moving 
map is sufficient to enable them to monitor conformance to the assigned route them-
selves (M = 4.73, SD = 1.49). Pilot #5 disagreed, and Pilot #1 rather disagreed on this, 
stating that the crew might be distracted from the moving map by other operational 
and procedural duties. 
 
7.6.6 Detailed Assessment of Runway Incursion Alert Design 
Despite criticism on certain detailed aspects of the Surface Movement Alerting func-
tionality, all pilots participating in the Prague trials considered the concept a valu-
able addition to the flight deck. Only one pilot (Pilot #15) perceived conceptual is-
sues that would apparently necessitate a conceptual and functional refinement in his 
opinion. At the same time, however, he commented that the alerts were very well 
designed. 
Seen altogether, pilots acknowledged the definitions of the alerting functions and 
thought them to be quite mature already, although the level of consent clearly varies. 
Pilot #15 provided, with slight agreement, the lowest albeit still positive rating. The 
overall rating is in line with the pilot comments recorded during the sessions, which 
emphasized that the alerts were very well-designed and that the function itself was 
very useful. In this context, Pilot #12 commented that he would like to have these 
functions on his aircraft even today. 
  
Figure 141: Operational relevance of Taxi 
Route Conformance monitoring advisory 
Figure 142: Relevance of conformance 
monitoring when route is presented on AMM 
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7.6.6.1 Runway Proximity Information 
In a more detailed assessment of the Preventive Runway Incursion Alerting concept 
conducted only with the four pilots participating in the Prague experiment, the vis-
ual Runway Proximity Information function (Level 0) was acknowledged as opera-
tionally relevant and capable of preventing Runway Incursions by all pilots. 
Furthermore, the HMI of the function was liked and the timing of the alerts consid-
ered as appropriate. While pilot feedback indicates that there may still room for im-
proving the precise timing of the Runway Proximity Information advisory, the solu-
tion presented in the experiment sessions seems more or less correct, since partici-
pants were neither clearly in favour of triggering this advisory earlier nor later. Ad-
ditionally, nobody voiced any concern that would hint at the necessity of a funda-
mental revision of the trigger conditions. 
 
7.6.6.2 Runway Incursion Alerting 
As the only pilots in the first evaluation campaign with the Navigation Test Vehicle, 
the four participants of the Prague session had an opportunity to assess the Runway 
Incursion caution and warning alerts provided by the SMAAS. Scenarios contained 
caution and warning alerts for entering a runway without clearance in a CPDLC en-
vironment providing both taxi routing and runway-related clearances, as detailed in 
Section 7.4.2. 
 
Participants reconfirmed the operational necessity of these high-level Runway Incur-
sion alerts. The general design of the alerts was also appreciated very much. With 
respect to HMI design, the high-level Runway Incursion alerting received the same 
positive rating as the basic Runway Proximity Information and was considered to be 
consistent with the latter by all pilots. Except for Pilot #15, pilots acknowledged ad-
ditionally acknowledged the distinction between Level 2 and Level 3 alerts as desir-
able. Irrespective of this feedback, however, the Pilot #15 commented that alerts were 
very well designed. The distance from the stop bars at which the alerts were trig-
gered was found suitable by all pilots except one. Pilot #14 commented that caution 
alerts could be triggered just a bit earlier, but that the system was great otherwise. 
The only aspect that was actually criticised was the alert for the missing clearance for 
the FMS runway; this item should be reviewed. Furthermore, when applying global 
Runway Incursion Alerting to the special case of closed runways, a slight drop in the 
quality of pilot agreement on operational usefulness becomes apparent. However, 
pilots unanimously appreciate not only operational relevance, but also efficiency in 
actually preventing incursions nonetheless. The timing of the alerts receives even 
slightly better feedback compared to the RIA. 
 
Apart from Pilot #15, who perceived a slight tendency towards nuisance alerts, ex-
periment participants denied the existence of nuisance alerts that would reduce sys-
tem usability, which in a way confirms the rating on timing and trigger conditions. 
There is full consensus among all four pilots that the Runway Incursion Alerting 
might actually help to prevent Runway Incursions. 
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7.6.7 Reactive Surface Movement Alerting 
7.6.7.1 Operational Relevance and Desirability of Traffic Alerting 
 
After having seen the basic ADS-B traffic representation without any alerting, pilots 
were asked to rate the operational relevance and desirability of traffic alerting. 
According to the results presented in Figure 143, which are not distributed normally 
(2% significance level), two thirds of the pilots strongly agreed that they would like 
to have an alert if there is conflicting traffic (M = 5.00). Another two pilots (Pilots #5 
and #13) were more hesitant with their agreement, while Pilot #14 apparently did 
not want any alert in case of a traffic conflict. 
Consistently, he thus rather agreed – along with 
Pilot #5 – that traffic alerting is not really 
required, as pilots are able to anticipate conflicts 
due to the basic traffic display (see Figure 144). 
Apart from three neutral ratings (Pilots #11, #13 
and #15), a clear majority of the participants 
disagreed, in various strengths, that the traffic 
display would enable them to detect traffic 
conflicts early enough themselves (M = 1.67, 
SD = 1.45). 
Questionnaire results shown in Figure 145 indi-
cate that pilots are divided into two distinct 
groups concerning the scope of traffic alerting 
(M = 3.20, SD = 2.14). Eight of the participants 
support the position that traffic alerting on the 
ground should be limited to conflicting traffic on the runway. Four pilots disagree on 
this, Pilots #3 and #8 (strongly), as well as Pilot #4 and Pilot #9. Pilots #1, #10 and 
#15 rather disagree on this limitation. 
  
Figure 143: Desirability of traffic alerting Figure 144: Relevance of traffic alerting 
 
Figure 145: Required scope of 
ground traffic alerting 
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7.7 Discussion 
7.7.1 Airport Moving Map 
Both questionnaire results and pilot comments clearly indicate that the AMM corre-
sponds to an operational need, which is confirmed even by those participants who 
were somewhat more reluctant or critical towards the particular implementation 
demonstrated during the evaluation sessions, or who discovered certification con-
cerns. In pilot’s perception, the airport moving map helps to increase their situational 
awareness and provides them with aerodrome mapping support they miss with cur-
rent systems. Accordingly, thirteen out of fifteen pilots think that it is not be possible 
to get lost on an airfield with an airport moving map, while two participants consider 
this is still possible, particularly if the crew is distracted by other tasks. Furthermore, 
there is a preference for an ND-integrated airport moving map display, which con-
firms the approach taken by SMAAS. Additionally, the overall usability of the basic 
AMM was rated very positively with an average of 88.8 out of 100 on a standard Sys-
tem Usability Scale (SUS). 
All of these results demonstrate that the AMM is a viable onboard solution to the 
issue of disorientation and may therefore help to prevent Runway Incursions, since it 
increases positional awareness, especially in bad weather and on large and complex 
airfields, as the comments taken during the session confirm. With respect to the na-
vigation solution, pilot feedback indicates that an ownship position derived from a 
Wiener filter fusion of GPS and INS data provides sufficient positional accuracy; dif-
ferential GPS via GBAS or SBAS is thus not necessarily required. 
 
7.7.2 AMM-based Cockpit Display of Traffic Information 
Assessment results confirm that all pilots acknowledge the large potential of an 
AMM-based traffic visualisation to increase flight crew awareness of the surrounding 
traffic, although several participants expressed concerns about the operational usabil-
ity of the incomplete and partially unreliable traffic data available during the ex-
periment. In principle, though, the traffic presentation is considered as a definite im-
provement over systems available today, and believed to have a beneficial impact on 
safety, particularly when used for traffic surveillance in the runway environment. 
The limitations of the real-time ADS-B traffic data used during the trials had a detri-
mental impact on pilots’ confidence in the presented traffic. The fact that not all air-
craft were equipped with this technology was a major issue for some pilots. Nonethe-
less, a majority of pilots believes that even a partial representation of ground traffic 
on an AMM will result in increased situational awareness and a higher level of 
safety. Virtually all participants were also concerned about the reliability of the ADS-
B traffic data received. It was found that several ADS-B equipped aircraft sent out 
incomplete or unreliable data, the main issue being the update rate with outages of 
more than 20 s. 
The average SUS of the traffic representation on the moving map was 74.2 and thus 
slightly, but significantly lower than for the airport moving map itself. However, this 
result may easily be explained by the issues with the available ADS-B traffic data 
mentioned above. 
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In conclusion, evaluation results confirm the potential of this technology to bring 
relevant surrounding traffic to the attention of flight crews (cf. High-Level Require-
ment II), but both equipment rate and adherence to published standards are still a 
concern with respect to ADS-B. Clearly, a mandatory, standardized ADS-B equip-
ment of aircraft is necessary to use the full potential of this technology, especially 
with respect to the use of traffic data by alerting systems (see Section 7.7.5). It should 
be noted, though, that the level of equipage is not a problem endemic to ADS-B, but 
applicable to any data link used for the exchange of traffic surveillance data.  
 
7.7.3 Information on Operational Environment and ATC Instructions 
Supplementing the AMM with information on the operational status of runways was 
confirmed as important and desirable by pilots, particularly the presentation of 
closed runways with an average rating of 93%138. While the symbology was also ap-
preciated (82%), there is still room for improvement regarding the colour concept 
(71%). The operational relevance of highlighting the FMS-selected take-off or landing 
runway on an airport moving map was confirmed by all participating pilots with an 
average rating of 90%. The HMI design was also generally appreciated (85%). A 
presentation of the FMS-selected runway is a valuable addition to the basic airport 
moving map functionality, and its introduction should be considered for the near 
future, all the more since all the required data are currently available aboard the air-
craft. 
Likewise, the visualisation of ATC instructions and clearances on the AMM was re-
ceived very well by pilots. A presentation of the assigned taxi route is a feature 
which pilots unanimously desire. With an average rating of 95%, it one of the 
SMAAS elements with the highest level of appraisal in this evaluation campaign. 
Due to concerns about the party line effect and the timeliness of CPDLC, the level of 
agreement with respect to take-off and landing clearances is slightly lower, but still at 
an average of 88%. 
In conclusion, the airport moving map has been proven a suitable basis for convey-
ing information – by means of additional symbology – on both the operational status 
and configuration of the aerodrome, as well as ATC instructions and clearances. 
 
7.7.4 Preventive Surface Movement Alerting 
Alerting when pilots are at risk of causing a Runway Incursion themselves, irrespec-
tive of the presence of other traffic, was a rated as an operationally highly desirable 
feature by all pilots participating in the trials. With a mean rating of 97%, it is the 
SMAAS functionality with the best rating concerning operational relevance. Its po-
tential contribution to flight safety, and thus the prevention of Runway Incursions, 
was assessed even slightly higher (98%) on average. 
While most pilots agree that presenting the taxi route and runway clearances on an 
airport moving map will reduce the overall risk of a Runway Incursion, there is also 
clear dissent that this alone eliminates the necessity for alerting, which reconfirms the 
need for alerting. The necessity to address impending infringement of completely 
closed runways by alerts was also acknowledged by participants. However, the level 
                                                 
138  The average rating is given as percentage of the mean rating in relation to the maximum achievable value. 
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of agreement is somewhat lower than for Runway Incursion alerting in general 
(89%). Again, with an average of 93%, the impact on flight safety is estimated higher 
than the operational necessity itself. 
Furthermore, an alert when trying to take off from a taxiway is also desired by a ma-
jority of pilots, although the level agreement is not as unanimous as for Runway In-
cursion Alerting itself and only 83% on average, since pilots consider the risk of tak-
ing off from a taxiway when using an AMM as low. Again, the positive impact on 
safety is rated slightly better (86%) on average than the operational relevance (83%). 
The fact that the safety impact of the high-level alerts is consistently rated higher 
than their operational relevance is an interesting phenomenon, but not necessarily 
contradictory, even if it may seem so at first glance. Operational relevance focuses on 
the overall importance for operations, whereas the safety impact assesses the effi-
ciency to address critical situations. Last but not least, the operational significance of 
Taxi Route Conformance Monitoring was unanimously confirmed by pilots, but most 
of them admitted at the same time that the taxi route presentation in relation to the 
airport moving map would enable them to monitor adherence to the route them-
selves. 
While only four pilots evaluated the full scope of alerts, all of them gave positive 
feedback concerning the capability of the system to prevent incursions, the chosen 
HMI design, and the trigger conditions of the alerts. In conclusion, therefore, it could 
be shown that preventive Surface Movement Alerting is a valid means of mitigating 
the risk of ownship Runway Incursions in the eyes of pilots. 
 
7.7.5 Alerting for conflicting traffic 
Pilots’ ratings on the survey-type questions concerning traffic alerting clearly indi-
cate that participants consider alerts for potentially conflicting ground traffic as use-
ful feature, which is deemed necessary regardless of the basic traffic presentation. 
Since the majority of pilots disagrees that they could detect traffic conflicts them-
selves, the assumption that a mere display of traffic is not sufficient to prevent inci-
dents and accidents can be regarded valid. Conversely, only a minority of eight pilots 
would like to see alerting limited to conflicting traffic on the runway. 
In conclusion, alerting for conflicting traffic in the airport environment is desired, 
focussing on – but not limited to – potentially conflicting traffic in the vicinity of the 
runway and obviously on the runway itself. However, for a more detailed assess-
ment of the scope of traffic alerting, this survey-type evaluation is not sufficient; the 
envisaged traffic alerting functionality must be implemented and evaluated in a real-
istic context (see Chapter 8) to obtain substantiated feedback on this matter. 
 
7.7.6 Summary 
Evaluation results confirm that the approach taken by SMAAS is a valid contribution 
to mitigate the problem of Runway Incursions, because it supplies pilots with opera-
tionally relevant and desirable information. Furthermore, the different levels at 
which information was conveyed, ranging from the mere display of information to 
warning level alerts, were acknowledged and deemed suitable by participants. 
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8 Evaluation on a Research Flight Simulator 
 
 
While the initial evaluation campaign of the Surface Movement Awareness and 
Alerting System (SMAAS) concept with the Institute’s Navigation Test Vehicle fea-
tured the unprecedented realism of field trials, assessments were limited in two as-
pects. First of all, and most importantly, traffic functionality had not evolved beyond 
the mere display of surrounding ground traffic, with reactive Surface Movement 
Alerting already conceived, but yet to be developed. Secondly, apart from the fact 
that an assessment of Runway Incursion alerts involving other traffic in a real airport 
environment is unacceptable from a flight safety point of view, a proper evaluation 
of onboard functionality requires a more sophisticated and representative cockpit 
environment than the setup on the Navigation Test Vehicle, particularly with respect 
to the possibility of pilot interaction. As an example, assessing pilot reactions to 
Runway Incursion alerts during take-off requires both an adequate modelling of air-
craft dynamics and a Pilot Flying (PF) role of the evaluator, as opposed to evaluation 
pilots in the Pilot-Not-Flying (PNF) role on the passenger seat of the van with its ve-
hicle dynamics. Furthermore, for immediately obvious reasons, an assessment of 
landing scenarios with the Navigation Test Vehicle is not possible. 
 
Therefore, the second major evaluation campaign in the frame of this thesis was con-
ducted on the Institute’s modular fixed-base Research Flight Simulator, focussing on, 
but not limited to, an evaluation of the traffic and traffic alerting functionality within 
the SMAAS concept. Once the refinement of the SMAAS system concept based on the 
results of the first evaluation campaign with the Navigation Test Vehicle had been 
completed, the software prototype was upgraded and integrated on the Institute’s 
flight simulator for a detailed human factors assessment with airline pilots.  
Sessions typically lasted seven hours and covered a broad range of the system’s as-
pects from the basic airport moving map to Runway Incursion alerts in the high-
speed regime during take-off. In terms of flight phases, the focus of the evaluation 
was on taxi out and take-off. 
Apart from two shakedown trials (see Section 8.2.1), up to 19 airline pilots from two 
major and one smaller European airlines participated in experiment sessions in two 
phases. Phase one, performed immediately after the initial shakedown in the Spring 
of 2007, encompassed three airline pilots and was intended as a ‘pilot’ experiment to 
validate not only the basic setup, but also the scenarios and the assessment method-
ology, particularly the questionnaires. The second phase commenced with a project 
pilot with system knowledge, followed by external airline pilots from October 2007 
to January 2008. Since the simulator experiment was conducted in the frame of the 
European research project FLYSAFE and aimed at evaluating a broader scope of 
functionality, including Airborne Sequencing and Merging, the evaluation had to 
address traffic functions for use during cruise and approach provided by project 
partners as well. Consequently, to achieve this, the last six participants of the ex-
periment were only exposed to a reduced SMAAS assessment focussing on airport 
moving map and traffic representation, with a brief demonstration of reactive alert-
ing, but did not address Operational and Clearance Awareness functionality. 
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8.1 Evaluation Objectives 
 
As outlined in Section 6.1, the main objectives of the SMAAS evaluation campaign 
were an assessment of the overall operational relevance (domain suitability) and us-
ability of the system (suitability and user acceptability), associated with the identifi-
cation of potential critical design issues, especially in the field of Human-Machine 
Interface (HMI).  
 
The SMAAS onboard functions evaluated were representative software prototypes of 
the envisaged system as detailed in Chapter 5, with the following limitations to the 
Operational Awareness Function (see Section 5.3): 
 
 The visualisation of aerodrome status information derived from D-ATIS was lim-
ited to active runways, runway and taxiway closures. Interaction on the MCDU 
was limited to changing runway status. 
 
 There was no integration with the simulator’s ECAM simulation, i.e. consistency 
advisories and alerts were only displayed on the ND screen and in the MCDU 
scratchpad. 
 
 A notification concept concerning short-term and temporary information becom-
ing effective or expiring during the flight was not implemented; these aspects 
were therefore not addressed in the experiment. 
 
The main reason for these constraints was that the scope of the functionality to be 
assessed by pilots had to be reduced due to the need to limit simulator evaluation 
sessions to one full day. Besides, an in-depth assessment of these more detailed func-
tional aspects is only useful once the fundamental principles of the OAF have been 
validated. 
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8.2 Experimental Design 
8.2.1 Shakedown Trials 
Two shakedown trials were performed by two former experimental flight test pilots, 
assisted by a flight test engineer, a pilot and former air traffic controller working for 
Italian authorities, and a German airline captain. None of these pilots participated 
formally in the subsequent evaluation campaign, i.e. there are no questionnaire re-
sults for these pilots. Only open loop comments were recorded. 
The main purpose of these trials was a fine-tuning of the SMAAS prototype system 
in terms of both functionality and HMI, with a focus on the latter. A further impor-
tant goal of the shakedown was to evaluate the operational realism of the chosen ex-
periment scenarios (see Section 8.4) with pilots. 
 
8.2.2 Experimental Factors 
This section surveys the experimental factors that have been considered in setting up 
the SMAAS evaluation experiment on the Institute’s Research Flight Simulator, and 
discusses the selections eventually made. The experimental factors to be considered 
relate to the external environment (irrespective of whether simulated or real) and the 
participants, and are thus completely independent of the particular design features of 
the system to be evaluated. 
 
8.2.2.1 Airport complexity 
The choice between airports of different complexity was limited by simulator con-
straints, particularly the availability of a suitably detailed and up to date visual data-
base. The visual database for the simulator is typically generated based on a com-
mercially available scenery, which is then merged with AMDB information to ensure 
consistency between the AMM and the outside visual. This process involves a sig-
nificant amount of manual adaptation. 
Another aspect that limits the usability of airport complexity as experimental factor 
is that the effort with respect to the generation of scenarios is doubled. This is par-
ticularly relevant when considering the set-up of traffic scenarios. Therefore, one 
large and complex airport was eventually chosen, Paris Charles-de-Gaulle airport 
(LFPG). To give participants at least an impression of the SMAAS technologies at an 
alternative airport, Frankfurt Airport (EDDF) was chosen for the training scenarios. 
 
8.2.2.2 Airport familiarity 
As discussed in Section 6.4.5, participants’ familiarity with the airport selected for the 
evaluation trials is extremely difficult to control prior to the experiment. Again, the 
choice of Paris Charles-de-Gaulle Airport (LFPG) proved to be adequate in this con-
text, since it is representative of a very complex hub airport, while simultaneously 
ensuring that the trials do not take place at Frankfurt airport (EDDF) as the presum-
able home base of most of the participants. 
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8.2.2.3 Visibility 
Any positive effects on safety and efficiency are expected to be particularly, but not 
exclusively, visible in degraded visual environments. In order to assess this, visibility 
was used as an experimental factor in the simulator validation exercise, and three 
different partially degraded visibility conditions were employed as levels of this ex-
perimental factor. However, a post hoc analysis yielded that visibility did not have a 
measurable influence on pilot feedback. 
 
8.2.2.4 Traffic density 
An operationally meaningful variation of traffic density was very difficult to realise 
in the Institute’s Research Flight Simulator environment, because the outside visual 
based on X-Plane was limited to a maximum of 10 aircraft at a time, see Section 8.3.3 
below for details. 
 
8.2.2.5 Pilot rank and role 
A potential effect of the pilot’s role as PF or PNF in the simulator sessions on evalua-
tion results cannot be ruled out a priori, but is generally believed to be negligible, 
because pilots typically take turns in everyday operations and are thus current with 
respect to the information needs for both roles. This experimental factor is strongly 
linked to the issue of single pilot or crew evaluations (see Section 8.2.3 for details). 
 
8.2.2.6 Conclusion 
In conclusion, the only external environmental experimental factors that are fully 
controllable with reasonable effort in the simulator experiment setup are visibility 
and PF/PNF role. Nevertheless, the PF/PNF role was excluded as experimental fac-
tor due to the single pilot setup that was eventually chosen for the evaluation, see 
Section 8.2.3 below. Since the van trials had been performed with participants in the 
monitoring role, it was therefore decided to conduct the simulator experiment with 
pilots in the PF role. Consequently, as outlined above, only visibility was eventually 
varied as experimental factor during the experiment. 
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8.2.3 Single Pilot vs. Full Cockpit 
This section discusses the advantages and disadvantages of single pilot and full 
cockpit experiments, and relates them to the validation objectives and constraints for 
this particular validation exercise. In essence, there are three options for the valida-
tion exercise: 
 
a) Full Cockpit. Two pilots, preferably from the same airline and with different 
ranks, form an evaluation flight crew: 
 
• Allows – at least in principle - realistic evaluation with respect to crew task shar-
ing, crew resource management and workload (+) 
• Allows the assessment of procedures related to the new system (+) 
• Allows, depending on experiment design, grouping of results according to 
PF/PNF role. 
• Discussion among crew members is likely to lead to more detailed and more ex-
tensive verbal feedback (i.e. pilot comments), since aspects any single pilot might 
not have thought about or considered important are now discussed by both (+) 
• Allows an assessment of how flight crew members influence each other with re-
spect to situational awareness. This is particularly interesting with respect to ac-
cident analyses, because it might help to explain how two or three highly profes-
sional, highly trained and highly skilled crew members fail to maintain adequate 
situational awareness (+) 
• Crew members potentially influence each other, consciously or subconsciously, in 
their subjective ratings and other applicable questionnaire answers. This effect is 
almost impossible to determine; this would require audio/video recordings of the 
experiment for a post-hoc assessment and could then still only give indications 
about the way that crew members influence each other. (-) 
• Double number of pilots or runs, with alternating PF/PNF roles, required for the 
collection of objective data compared to single pilot experiment. Duplication of 
runs does not always work out, especially for the assessment of alerting systems. 
• Pairing of crew members from different airlines that are likely to use different 
procedures may lead to undesirable and hardly controllable side effects or dis-
tractions (e.g. discussion about differences in procedures instead of discussion on 
the system to be evaluated) (-) 
• A higher organisational effort for the trials is required (coordination of crews, 
pairing of captains and first officers preferably from the same airline, cancellation 
of a single pilot requires either cancellation of the whole experiment session or re-
planning) (-) 
• Pairing of two captains or first officers is not considered an issue in this context. 
• Social climate and relationship between pilots forming a flight crew may influ-
ence the outcome of the experiment in a way (both positive and negative) that is 
virtually impossible to control, but this is considered a minor issue in this context. 
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b) Single Pilot. One pilot at a time performs the evaluation in the simulator: 
• Provides the opportunity to collect unbiased single pilot feedback, both in terms 
of comments and questionnaires/rating scales (+) 
• Lower organisational effort with respect to pilot scheduling (+) 
• Pilot will always perform a combination of PF/PNF role 
• Not suitable for assessing workload due to missing crew task sharing etc. (-) 
• Strong limitations with respect to the assessment of procedures related to the new 
system apply; procedures involving crew task sharing cannot be assessed (-) 
 
c) Single Pilot with “Sparring Partner”. The single external pilot who is the experi-
ment subject is aided by a member of the evaluation team (or a certain other pilot 
who is the same for all trials): 
• Provides the opportunity to collect unbiased single pilot feedback, both in terms 
of comments and questionnaires/rating scales (+) 
• Allows – at least in principle - realistic evaluation with respect to crew task shar-
ing, crew resource management and workload, but is greatly dependent on the 
skill of the experimenter pretending to be a pilot (+) 
• Allows the assessment of procedures related to the new system, but is dependent 
on the qualification of the sparring partner (+) 
• Allows the introduction of deliberate flight crew errors by the “sparring partner”, 
which might be particularly helpful when assessing alerting systems; but usage is 
limited to 1-2 occurrences per participating pilot. (+) 
• Lower organisational effort with respect to pilot scheduling (+) 
• Allows controlled variation of PF/PNF role. 
• Requires additional evaluation team member; rehearsal of procedures etc. re-
quired. Insufficient professionalism of sparring partner may negatively influence 
the outcome. 
 
Before crew procedures and task sharing can be developed at the level of detail ex-
pected by airline pilots, any novel onboard functions and their associated HMI have 
to be sufficiently mature. Furthermore, particularly for an assessment of workload in 
a realistic context, the fidelity of the simulation must be high, and both type-ratings 
and airline SOPs become an issue. Otherwise, there is a risk that an eventually in-
separable mix of HMI, usability, task sharing, simulator constraints, procedural and 
design issues influences the results obtained. This is clearly not desirable for the ex-
periment, where one strives to control as many factors as possible in a reproducible 
manner. Furthermore, the objective is to obtain the unbiased opinion of the partici-
pants regarding the novel system. These factors, taken together, suggested not pur-
suing the Full Cockpit approach for the evaluation. Therefore only single evaluators 
were eventually used, aided by a “sparring partner” where necessary from a scenario 
point of view. 
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8.2.4 Conduct of Experiment 
8.2.4.1 Assessment Team 
The author participated in all of the described experiments as experiment leader. On 
some occasions, he was assisted by other research associates from the Institute who 
mainly aided in simulator operation and troubleshooting. Furthermore, an Italian 
Human Factors Specialist attended several sessions and supported the experiment 
leader in taking comments and during the debriefing phase. One session was at-
tended by the Dutch flight test engineer who had already participated in the shake-
down trials. 
 
8.2.4.2 Briefing 
At the beginning of each session, prior to the familiarisation runs in the simulator, 
the briefing for the experiment was conducted in a separate meeting room. The ac-
tual briefing consisted of a series of Power Point slides outlining the objectives and 
characteristics of SMAAS, mainly using screenshots illustrating the various HMI fea-
tures. Pilots were encouraged to ask any questions that they might have during or – 
if they preferred – after the presentation. While the explanation of the display fea-
tures was exhaustive, information about the alerting functionality was deliberately 
kept sparse. Participants were only shown screenshots of the airport moving map 
display with Runway Incursion caution and warning alerts displayed, using the ex-
ample of an intrusion into a completely closed runway. Pilots were also informed 
that these alerts would be accompanied by a callout, which – in the case of a warning 
– could be silenced by pressing the Master Warning Button. There was no review of 
the different alert types with the associated trigger conditions and callouts, since this 
would have preconditioned pilots139, and the slides contained only a single screen-
shot illustrating a Runway Incursion warning with other traffic present. The presen-
tation concluded with a clarification that not pilots’ skills, but rather the performance 
of the new onboard system were being assessed, and an encouragement to be critical. 
Pilots were then asked to fill in a so-called Pilot Intake Questionnaire on their back-
ground in commercial aviation and research project experience. 
 
8.2.4.3 Familiarisation 
After the briefing, pilots were given the opportunity to familiarise themselves with 
the TUD simulator environment and the airport moving map. Once they had ad-
justed their seats in the CM-2 position, familiarisation commenced with a quick 
simulator briefing, focusing on the location of the most important controls. In par-
ticular, the workaround for the airport moving map range selection, using the Ba-
rometer Reference Selector and employing the CSTR pushbutton on the EFIS control 
panel to alternate between QNH and AMM range, was explained with emphasis on 
                                                 
139  With a detailed briefing on trigger conditions and the different callouts, the alerts occurring during evaluation 
sessions would always have been according to pilot expectations, provided that the system worked correctly. 
The objective of the experiment, however, was not to assess whether the system worked as specified, but 
rather whether trigger conditions, visualisation, callouts and alert levels were appropriate and generally con-
sistent with pilot expectations concerning a Runway Incursion alerting system. 
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the fact that this was not the solution envisaged for a real aircraft, and should thus 
not be considered as part of the assessment. Participants were then encouraged to 
make themselves familiar with the airport moving map controls through hands-on 
experience prior to the start of the actual familiarisation runs. 
Once pilots indicated that they felt comfortable with the AMM controls, two succes-
sive familiarisation scenarios set at Frankfurt Airport (EDDF) were performed, as 
described in Section 8.4.2. The familiarisation scenarios could be repeated if desired 
by participants, or when deemed necessary by the experiment leader, e.g. following a 
simulator malfunction. 
 
8.2.4.4 Evaluation sessions 
Upon successful completion of the familiarisation scenarios, pilots were exposed to a 
series of evaluation scenarios set at Paris Charles-de-Gaulle airport (LFPG), which 
was chosen for its complexity, its hub character and the relatively lower level of fa-
miliarity with this airport (compared to Frankfurt) expected from prospective par-
ticipants. Evaluation scenarios, which are described in detail in Section 8.4.3, con-
sisted of a mixture of uneventful, line-oriented taxi out operations and Runway In-
cursion scenarios, with incursions occurring in a wide range of ownship speeds, from 
the setting of take-off power to approximately 100 kts IAS. Wherever possible, line-
oriented and event scenarios were alternated during evaluation sessions. 
 
During the runs, the experiment leader recorded all pertinent pilot comments, along 
with other relevant observations, such as errors made or usage of features beyond 
the scope originally envisaged in the design140. When present, the Human Factors 
Specialist also took notes and additionally made video recordings of the trials for 
subsequent analysis. Apart from this, subjective pilot feedback was collected after the 
runs in the form of customized questionnaires on specific topics and standardized 
rating scales (Cooper-Harper). 
 
After the first evaluation scenario, pilots were guided through the completion of a 
dedicated Airport Moving Map Questionnaire, along with a first Cooper-Harper rat-
ing scale. 
Since the airport moving map is the basis all additional SMAAS functionality is built 
upon, it was deemed important to capture the participants’ unbiased opinion on this 
technology before exposing them to specific SMAAS functionality. While no radically 
new insights on the already well-researched airport moving map itself are expected, 
pilots’ feedback on this topic will subsequently help to contextualise the results on 
the SMAAS itself. As an example, a pilot rejecting the basic airport moving map 
technology for whatever reason is likely to be very critical about the SMAAS add-ons 
as well, and it is crucial to be aware of this when interpreting results. 
 
                                                 
140  The term ‘intended function’ should be avoided in this context, since it is mainly used in the certification of 
systems that have reached product maturity. The description of intended function defines the boundary condi-
tions for certification, with the resulting legal and liability implications. In a research environment, however, 
the distinction between valid use cases the system engineers might have overlooked and potentially hazardous 
alternative usage has yet to be determined. 
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After a minimum of two further scenarios with the surrounding traffic displayed on 
the airport moving map, participants were requested to fill in a questionnaire on the 
traffic presentation, followed by another Cooper-Harper rating scale. After every 
Runway Incursion scenario, pilot comments were triggered where necessary by ask-
ing evaluators for their first impression of the alert and whether they thought the 
alert was appropriate or not. Pilots completed the two questionnaires related to 
SMAAS display features and alerts at the end of the evaluation sessions, along with a 
final Cooper-Harper rating scale concerning the overall system. 
 
8.2.4.5 Debriefing 
In a detailed debriefing session, a consolidated overall pilot feedback on the SMAAS 
was obtained. Along with open loop feedback, which gave participants an opportu-
nity to bring up any specific points they wanted to address, the choices made by pi-
lots in the various questionnaires were discussed in detail to capture both the ration-
ale for pilots’ ratings and potential developments in pilots’ attitude towards the sys-
tem as evaluation sessions progressed. While experimental test pilots are specifically 
trained to comment extensively during evaluation sessions, which enables a subse-
quent correlation of their comments and their questionnaire ratings, airline pilots 
have a tendency to adhere to the sterile cockpit procedure, and often silently focus on 
the scenario task. Therefore, the importance of discussing questionnaire ratings with 
pilots during the debriefing cannot be emphasised enough. 
Finally, specific topics of particular interest were then addressed by going through a 
de-briefing guide with pilots. Pilots were mainly asked about their general impres-
sion of the SMAAS concept and on some flight deck integration aspects. The debrief-
ing guide can be found in the Appendix. 
 
The debriefing had the following main objectives: 
 
• To obtain, after the experiment(s), an overall feedback from pilots on the sys-
tems they have evaluated. This feedback is important because pilots may 
change their attitude towards the systems from the initial scenarios to the end 
of the simulation day, and it is highly relevant to capture both this process of 
attitude change as well as pilots’ consolidated opinion on the system. It is also 
an opportunity to gather ideas and suggestions for improvements to the sys-
tems. 
 
• To capture, by going through the post-exercise questionnaires with pilots 
again, the rationale for the choices they have made, as far as these are not cov-
ered by the comments made during the evaluation session. The feedback ob-
tained by this process was subsequently consolidated. 
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8.3 Assessment Platform 
8.3.1 Overview 
The fixed-base Research Flight Simulator of TUD’s Institute of Flight Systems and 
Automatic Control is a modular research simulator, featuring a sophisticated colli-
mated visual system consisting of a three-channel retro-projection with a viewing 
frustum of 180° horizontally and ± 20° vertically. Pilots perceive the resulting image, 
which seems to be located at infinity, through a mirror. Consequently, refocusing 
occurs whenever pilots change their view from head-down activities inside the cock-
pit to the outside visual, and this approach guarantees an excellent approximation of 
reality for human factors evaluations [Wip05]. 
  
The cockpit is not an exact reproduction of the flight deck of any specific aircraft, but 
deliberately kept at the more generic level of a modern ‘glass cockpit’ with two flight 
crew members. The inside dimensions of the cockpit correspond to those of a mod-
ern widebody aircraft of the Airbus A330/340 family. While the flight simulation 
employs the flight mechanical model of an Airbus A300 B2, a fly-by-wire flight con-
trol system with side sticks was chosen because it represents the state of the art and 
allows an unobstructed view of the flight guidance displays. 
The cockpit features all primary and secondary controls; in some cases actual aircraft 
parts, such as an original A320 Flight Control Unit (FCU), contribute to enhance the 
level of immersion and realism. In other cases, as for the MCDU, parts obtained from 
a commercial supplier of flight simulation equipment have been used, and even 
some developments of the Institute were installed. As an example, the simulator fea-
tures active side-sticks, which can also be operated in a standard mode. Flight guid-
ance and system displays are presented on large 15” LCD screens, which can either 
be arranged in portrait or landscape mode. 
 
 
Figure 146: Flight simulator during night taxi scenario at Frankfurt Airport (EDDF) 
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8.3.2 Experimental Environment for SMAAS Evaluation 
8.3.2.1 Cockpit Configuration 
The First Officer (CM-2) crew station was used for the SMAAS evaluation, mainly 
because this position is already equipped with a MCDU hardware mock-up. The two 
LCD displays for PFD and ND were arranged in portrait configuration, thus resem-
bling the A380 display arrangement. The outer screen was used to display a standard 
Airbus PFD, with the only enhancement compared to the current single aisle and 
long range aircraft families consisting of the additional text messages displayed by 
the SMAAS. The inner screen featured a conventional Airbus ND supplemented by 
the airport moving map and other SMAAS features as described in Chapter 5. 
Display control was achieved via the conventional EFIS Control Panel, which fea-
tured the following workaround for the ranges below 10 NM: When selecting the 
constraints (CSTR) button, pilots could use the Barometric Reference Selector (QNH) 
to control AMM range. Additional software switches on the overhead panel touch-
screen enabled pilots to de-select the airport moving map (except for the runways) 
and to activate or de-activate the display of the surrounding traffic, with separate 
controls for the traffic labels. 
 
8.3.2.2 Research Flight Management System (RFMS) 
In spite of the fact that there have been efforts to develop a corresponding functional-
ity in-house over the past years, the Institute’s Research Flight Simulator was not 
equipped with a Flight Management System (FMS) when the evaluation took place. 
Instead, the Research Flight Management System (RFMS) developed by NLR was 
kindly supplied within the ISAWARE II project [Ver05], and then re-integrated into 
the Institute’s simulation environment in the frame of FLYSAFE. 
The RFMS is a powerful software tool covering virtually all aspects of flight plan and 
performance calculation functionality contained in a real FMS. It can be configured to 
emulate either an Airbus or Boeing-style FMS and the corresponding MCDU pages, 
and is complemented by an application named SoftCDU, which is used to visualize 
the MCDU crew interface, either limited to the MCDU screen itself, or including a 
software keyboard for the respective aircraft family as well.  
According to a specification supplied by the author, which was subsequently refined 
based on NLR feedback (see Appendix III: MCDU Pages), NLR kindly enhanced the 
RFMS to include the ePIB concept and the majority of the dedicated MCDU pages 
defined for ePIB and SMAAS. 
In the scope of the SMAAS evaluation, the RFMS (Version 10.0) and the SoftCDU 
were therefore mainly used to simulate the ePIB supplying the SMAAS prototype 
with runway status information, and the corresponding MCDU pages, including the 
Airport Menu. Furthermore, the RFMS was used to define a flight plan, with SIDs 
adapted to the departure runway selected in the individual scenarios. In order to 
avoid lengthy periods of manual data entry when loading scenarios, the RFMS en-
compasses an intricate batch file system that accomplishes all required crew entries 
to achieve a certain FMS configuration within seconds. The batch files, called ‘key-
stack files’, are automatically loaded when the corresponding pre-defined scenario 
identifier is sent by a simulator control application. 
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8.3.2.3 Traffic Simulation 
The simulation of other traffic is an essential component in the assessment of the traf-
fic-related SMAAS functionality. The first part of this section contains an estimate for 
the number of aircraft that would have to be simulated to achieve a realistic traffic 
density, which is crucial for a usability evaluation, while second part is dedicated to 
a description of the traffic simulation software used for the flight simulator experi-
ment. 
The ICAO manual on A-SMGCS defines traffic density by the mean busy hour 
(arithmetic mean over the busiest hour of the day) and irrespective of visibility con-
ditions. Traffic density is classified as ‘heavy’ whenever there are 26 or more move-
ments per runway or typically more than 35 total aerodrome movements [ICA04a]. 
However, this definition only sets the order of magnitude and is of little value when 
it comes to a particular airport. For representative results, traffic at the hub airports 
chosen for the evaluation would have simulated in a realistic fashion. 
Frankfurt Airport (EDDF) recorded 489,406 aircraft movements in 2006, resulting in 
an average of 1,341 flights per day. September 15, 2006 was the busiest day (“absolute 
peak”) to date, with 1,470 movements on a single day. Since the airport is officially 
closed from 23:00 to 5:00 local time, and neglecting the few exceptions, this corre-
sponds to a maximum of nearly 82 movements per hour [Fra07a]. This figure is al-
most identical to the maximum hourly slot capacity of 81 (forenoon) and 83 (after-
noon) [Fra07]. Paris Charles-de-Gaulle Airport (LFPG) has a significantly higher ca-
pacity with 120+ nominal slots per hour, the maximum capacity achieved to date is 
127 movements per hour [Che05]. 
Assuming a nearly equal distribution of take-offs and landings, and under the fur-
ther constraint that scenarios will be too short to cover the complete turnaround 
process of any of the simulated aircraft, an estimate for the number of distinct aircraft 
that have to be simulated can be derived. However, the number of aircraft to be 
simulated cannot be limited to the number of aircraft movements at the airport itself 
within 20-30 minutes, because this would result in a highly unrealistic traffic pattern, 
with all aircraft scheduled to land within the duration of the scenario still airborne 
and all others taxiing out. At the end of the scenario, there would be no further air-
craft on approach, and all aircraft on the ground would be taxiing to the gate. To 
avoid this, all aircraft taking off or landing 15 minutes prior to the scenario start time 
and after the scenario end time will have to be simulated as well. This means that 130 
aircraft would have to be simulated for realistic traffic density at the hub peaks. 
However, the generation of traffic scenarios of this complexity is obviously beyond 
the scope of this thesis. 
At the time of the evaluation, the in-house traffic simulation capabilities for the Insti-
tute’s flight simulator were limited to the replay of pre-recorded data [Wip05]. This 
means that the tracks to be flown and routes to be taxied have to be recorded real-
time in the simulator for each of the other aircraft, and then combined into a traffic 
recording for every individual scenario. Apart from the tremendous effort this re-
quires, the resulting setup is completely rigid and inflexible, incapable of accounting 
for the inter-individual variations of pilots performing the scenarios, particularly 
with respect to taxi time. A realistic interaction of traffic in the highly dynamic run-
way environment, particularly with respect other departing traffic and the intruders 
causing Runway Incursions, can only be realised at the expense of individually con-
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trolling replay for other aircraft. Consequently, a different solution had to be found. 
While an event-based traffic simulation tool was under development in parallel to 
the evaluation campaign described in this thesis, it was clear that it would not be 
available in time and initially be limited to a simulation of airborne traffic. Therefore, 
NLR’s Traffic Manager (TMX) simulation tool, version 8.1, also supplied in the frame 
of the FLYSAFE project, was used to simulate traffic in this validation exercise. 
 
 
Figure 147: Traffic Manager (TMX) with Paris Charles-de-Gaulle airport layout 
 
The Traffic Manager is a very complex and mighty research tool used, among others, 
to simulate the traffic environment for flight simulator experiments at NLR. Origi-
nally conceived in 1996 for a simulation of high traffic densities in the scope of a Free 
Flight experiment, the TMX is a performance-optimised software capable of simulat-
ing 600+ aircraft both fast-time and real-time, using aircraft models with six degrees 
of freedom (required for a realistic pitch/bank behaviour) based on performance pa-
rameters for over 200 aircraft types obtained from Eurocontrol’s BADA database. 
Aircraft models feature a FMS with route-following capabilities along with a com-
plete autopilot including all basic altitude, speed and heading modes as well as the 
FMS-coupled LNAV and VNAV modes. Besides, there are further components such 
as a pilot model taking into account reaction time and recovery manoeuvres. A 
graphical user interface (ref. Figure 147) visualizes all simulated traffic and any con-
nected simulator aircraft [HHR01]. 
A so-called ‘command stack’ forms the core of the TMX, providing a series of com-
mands to create, manipulate and delete aircraft. These commands do not only enable 
the creation of scripts for scenarios of the desired complexity, but also allow for a 
real-time manipulation of traffic while these scripts are being executed. Conse-
quently, any of the simulated aircraft can be influenced individually by the simulator 
operator/experiment leader during runs whenever necessary from a scenario point 
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of view. As an example, traffic can be stopped to wait for the simulator aircraft141 on 
the ground, and airborne aircraft can be assigned to other flight levels, given heading 
or speed changes and directed to specific waypoints. Besides, traffic is fully interac-
tive, and aircraft react to each other, connected simulator aircraft and airport features 
such as red stop bars. Particularly the latter feature proved to be extremely helpful in 
setting up the Runway Incursion scenarios, because intruders could be released un-
der reproducible conditions simply by switching stop bar status. 
The traffic scenarios created for Paris CDG were based on scenarios originally con-
ceived for ISAWARE II. Scenario-specific traffic was added to these scenarios, which 
served to provide background traffic. 
 
8.3.2.4 ATC Environment 
Interaction with ATC through either conventional Radiotelephony (R/T) or Control-
ler-Pilot Data Link Communication (CPDLC) is one of the essential pilot tasks, which 
virtually always assigned to the Pilot Non-Flying (PNF) in a multi-crew environ-
ment. A realistic simulation of the ATC environment is therefore a crucial factor de-
termining the fidelity of a simulation and the level of immersion pilots experience. 
The main challenge in simulating a Radiotelephony environment is the communica-
tion between the controller and the simulated other traffic, or more precisely, the 
read-back of clearances and the usual requests or reports by these virtual aircraft. For 
a realistic simulation of the resulting mix of voices, several pseudo-pilots142 would 
have been required, which would – apart from a tremendous effort for scripting, 
training and rehearsing of scenarios – have complicated scheduling of experiments 
significantly, and this idea was consequently abandoned. Likewise, the alternative 
approach of pre-recording ATC requests and responses for the simulated other traffic 
and then playing the corresponding sound files when appropriate was not pursued 
any further due to time constraints, but should be seriously considered for future 
experiments. 
As a result, the trials took place in a considerably simplified ATC environment, in 
which the experiment leader also acted as controller. Interaction was limited to the 
simulator aircraft, i.e. no clearances were issued to other traffic, and there was conse-
quently a total absence of voice communication between ATC and these aircraft. 
Whenever a scenario required conventional taxi instructions via R/T, the corre-
sponding clearances were drafted as part of the scenario script, which then served as 
a memory aid to the experiment leader. All runway-related clearances were always 
provided via voice, even in case they were additionally available via CPDLC. 
Although the Institute’s simulator has facilities that enable the use of headsets, it was 
decided that in view of the overall realism of the ATC environment, the additional 
effort to adjust and validate a corresponding setup was not justified. Therefore, the 
pilots evaluating the SMAAS and the experiment leader always communicated di-
rectly. 
                                                 
141  Another tremendous advantage over records is that accurate speed data are sent when stopping an aircraft in 
the TMX, whereas the last known speed values typically persist in the simulation when pausing records. Apart 
from unrealistic dynamics when resuming motion, which may or may not be perceivable by participants, the 
persistence of speed data might lead to nuisance alerts. 
142  Since traffic was simulated by the TMX, the term “pseudo-PNF” would be more appropriate. In the ATM re-
search community, pseudo-pilots usually control their respective “aircraft” as well. 
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Apart from these considerable limitations in the simulation of ATC via R/T, the real-
ism of CPDLC communication with ATC was also significantly reduced due to the 
fact that no DCDU was available. However, the focus of the CPDLC-related features 
of SMAAS is on the visualisation process and operational implications, and not on 
the interaction process between pilot and controller per se. Therefore, the initial as-
sumption was that the absence of the DCDU would not have a significant impact on 
the results. In an attempt to keep pilots in a line-oriented mindset, the following pro-
cedures were used in conjunction with the CPDLC clearance display: Voice and 
CPDLC clearances were always combined, and given simultaneously. For a taxi 
route, the controller would instruct pilots as follows when the taxi route appeared on 
the airport moving map: “Lufthansa Four Tango Uniform, taxi to holding position 
RWY XY via up-linked taxi route.” Apart from this specifically created phraseology, 
standard terminology would be used for all other clearances, accompanied by the 
specific visualisation for the respective clearance described in Section 5.4. 
 
8.3.3 Limitations of Testbed and Simulator Environment 
This section is dedicated to a survey of limitations of the Testbed, i.e. the SMAAS 
prototype and the display, and the simulator environment. It is essential to capture 
these limitations, since they provide the context in which the evaluation results have 
to be seen. 
 
8.3.3.1 Material constraints 
This section summarizes the technical limitations of the evaluation setup, i.e. con-
straints resulting from the hard- and software employed. For each of the items below, 
the impact the constraint may have had on the evaluation is estimated and classified. 
 
8.3.3.1.1 Visual system 
In several ways, the visual was the limiting factor for the evaluation. The main limi-
tations were its performance and stability. The latency issues described below had a 
negative impact on the realism of the simulation, and also confused several pilots. It 
is believed that several of the errors observed during the runs can be attributed to 
conflicting information in the outside visual and on the displays resulting from the 
latency effects. Furthermore, the latency effects might have had a detrimental effect 
on the controllability of the simulator aircraft when flying visual approaches. Since 
the roll axis is the most dynamic, any latency effects in the visual will become most 
obvious during roll motion, which is consistent with the pilot-induced oscillations in 
the roll axis observed during the shakedown trials, which occurred when pilots tried 
to re-capture the localizer. 
 
 Performance. Particularly with other traffic visualized, the performance of the 
simulator visual system was unsatisfactory. Especially during fast turns, the up-
date rate would visibly deteriorate. While this is undesirable, latency effects oc-
curring simultaneously were far more critical in their impact on the evaluation. In 
general, the aircraft position in the outside visual was updated with delay com-
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pared to the core simulation. By corresponding comments made during the runs, 
it is evident that all pilots noticed the latency effects. Most pilots became aware of 
the latency effects when they had brought the aircraft to a stop at a runway hold-
ing position and set the parking brake. At this point, looking outside, they would 
observe that the aircraft still seemed to move forward slowly, and it could take up 
to 10 seconds until the (correct) position on the display and in the visual coin-
cided again. Furthermore, these latency effects resulted in unintended deviations 
from the taxiway centreline during turns. 
 
 Stability. Difficulties of varying severity were encountered when setting up the 
visual for different scenarios. When switching from Frankfurt to Paris, the visual 
software would often crash, sometimes not only necessitating a restart of the 
software on the corresponding machine, but a complete reboot of all computers 
running the visual software. Apart from wasting precious evaluation time (up to 
90 min in one occasion), with the risk of the pilot becoming bored, unmotivated 
and/or frustrated, this put the Experiment Leader/Simulator Operator under 
considerable strain, with the danger of subsequent mistakes in the intricate ex-
periment configuration. 
 
 Conspicuousness of taxiway signs and markings. In daytime VMC conditions, 
the conspicuousness of the taxiway signs and markings in the simulator visual 
was significantly lower than in reality. 
 
 Database consistency. AMDB data can be merged with X-Plane sceneries to cre-
ate consistency between the airport moving map and the simulated reality. The 
existing Frankfurt visual database was therefore updated with the up-to-date 
AMDB provided by Jeppesen, and subsequently validated. For unknown reasons, 
however, a rollback to the previous visual database occurred at some point in 
time between the validation test and the beginning of the trials, resulting in 
smaller inconsistencies between the AMDB and the visual database. 
 
 Stopbars. There was no connection between the Traffic Manager (TMX) stop bar 
settings and the stop bars in the visual.  
 
8.3.3.1.2 Flight Simulator 
 Flight mechanics and flight controls. The handling qualities of the custom-built 
CM-2 sidestick were classified as unrealistic, and most pilots had difficulties in 
controlling the aircraft. 
 
 Autoflight system. Due to the limitations of the flight controls and the autoflight 
system, it was decided – upon recommendation of the former experimental flight 
test pilots participating in the shakedown - not to use any approach scenarios for 
the SMAAS evaluation, since pilot workload in manual flying was found to be ex-
cessive without extended familiarisation, thus limiting the attention participants 
could devote to the system under evaluation. 
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 MCDU keys not fully connected. The keyboard layout of the MCDU mock-up 
installed in the cockpit only partially coincided with the keys used by the 
SoftCDU application provided by NLR, and an application written to map those 
keys proved faulty. Therefore, only the LSKs on the left hand side, the 1R and 2R 
keys, as well as the alphanumerical keys, with the exception of CLR, were opera-
tional. None of the function keys, such as MENU or PROG, was available. 
 
 Missing radio management panels. There are no radio management panels in-
stalled in the cockpit, which means that the transfer to the next control authority 
in an R/T environment, either on ground or in the air, cannot be simulated in a 
realistic fashion. Particularly in the enroute phase, however, the associated fre-
quency changes are a major source of crew workload. 
 
 Missing FANS DCDU. There was not FANS DCDU, either as software mock-up 
or hardware, available for the evaluation. Consequently, HMI aspects related to 
the CPDLC application itself could not be covered. 
 
 Display size. The size of the displays (15”) in the simulator cockpit is significantly 
larger than in current airliners. The 6” x 8” displays of the Airbus A380 have an 
equivalent diagonal of 10”. Only business jets like the Gulfstream G550 feature 
similarly large displays (14”) [Gul10]. This issue was noted by several participat-
ing pilots. 
 
8.3.3.1.3 Traffic Simulation  
The density of the simulated traffic was comparatively low and definitely below the 
usual density at daytime. Apart from that, there were the following other limitations: 
 
 Single aircraft type. All simulated traffic was visualized using an Airbus A380 
model in the Airbus corporate livery as default, because the converter from the 
TUD simulation environment to the visual system was not yet capable of auto-
matically selecting the correct airline livery from the airline code contained in the 
callsign. 
 
 Limited number of aircraft models. The simulator visual can only use 19 distinct 
aircraft models, i.e. there is a limitation to 19 airline/aircraft combinations, while 
the overall number of other aircraft that can be displayed is only limited by per-
formance. Currently, the visual system is limited to 10 other aircraft due to per-
formance limitations of the computers rendering the simulator visual. While the 
limitation in the number of models can be easily compensated by an intelligent 
combination of a larger number of hub airline aircraft of similar type (e.g. Luf-
thansa/Air France A320s at Frankfurt and Paris, respectively), thus leaving suffi-
cient margin for a realistic number of other airlines, the current performance limi-
tation to 10 other aircraft is significant, since it prevents an assessment of high 
traffic densities where display clutter issues might become relevant for the CDTI. 
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 Missing ground vehicles. Due to technical constraints of both the traffic simula-
tion and the simulator visual, a simulation of ground vehicles and aircraft under 
tow was not possible, which mainly decreased operational realism on the apron 
and is therefore believed to be a minor limitation. 
 
Furthermore, the traffic patterns used for Paris CDG were not fully realistic, but this 
was successfully masked. 
 
8.3.3.2 Experimental conditions 
This section is dedicated to a description of the limitations related to the operational 
realism of the evaluation setup that are not necessarily a consequence of the technical 
limitations described in the previous section. 
 
The main operational limitation of the experiment was that a single pilot configura-
tion was used, which, apart from excluding Crew Resource Management (CRM) is-
sues, drastically reduces the realism with respect to workload and procedures. 
Furthermore, the realism of the ATC environment was very limited due to the fact 
that ATC instructions were only given for ownship, resulting in a total absence of all 
radio communications of ATC with simulated other traffic. However, an accurate 
simulation of the ATC environment would have required at least one pseudo-
controller and several pseudo-pilots reading back the clearances issued to the simu-
lated other traffic. 
 
On the one hand, this lowered pilot workload with respect to monitoring a certain 
frequency, but on the other hand, this also resulted in a complete loss of the party 
line effect, with the previously discussed detrimental impact on pilot situational 
awareness. At any rate, in the context of single pilot operations, the added negative 
impact of an incomplete ATC environment can be regarded as small. Of course, the 
fact that no real controllers were used also decreased the realism of the simulation, 
but the associated effect is believed to be negligible compared to the other limitations 
in the ATC setup. 
 
A promising approach towards a more realistic simulation of ATC could consist of 
linking the Institute’s simulator to existing ATC/pseudo pilot environments, such as 
the training tower of DFS at Langen. Furthermore, the Internet has fostered the for-
mation of a wealth of virtual airlines and air traffic control facilities, and it would be 
worthwhile to survey this enthusiast community to assess whether they could poten-
tially be employed in a pseudo controller/pseudo pilot setup for future validation 
exercises. Of course, there is always a trade-off between realism and reproducibility 
when working with many human operators in large-scale simulations, irrespective of 
whether enthusiasts or professionals are used. 
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8.4 Scenarios 
8.4.1 Scenario Rationale 
For practical reasons, individual simulation scenarios were limited to a maximum of 
20-30 minutes. If scenario duration had exceeded this value significantly, the number 
of runs per day would have been too limited to cover an acceptable number of ex-
perimental factors. 
 
8.4.2 Familiarisation Scenarios 
Familiarisation scenarios were set at Frankfurt Airport (EDDF) for several reasons. 
First of all, since the number of different realistic scenarios at Paris Charles-De-
Gaulle is limited due to the fact that the longer inner runways (08L/26R and 
09R/27L, ca. 4200 m) are preferentially used for departures to achieve optimised ar-
rival and departure rates, it was clear that a different airport had to be used for fa-
miliarisation to prevent undesired training effects, such as pilots getting used to 
standard taxi routes etc. 
 
Since it was expected that most of the participating pilots would be from the region, 
with Frankfurt Airport as home base, it seemed reasonable to use an airport they 
would know very well as a familiar ‘anchor point’ in an otherwise new environment 
(flight simulator, novel systems) to facilitate familiarisation. 
Furthermore, the choice of Frankfurt also seemed advantageous from a technical and 
organizational perspective, because Frankfurt Airport is also the virtual home base of 
the Institute’s flight simulator, and thus both an Aerodrome Mapping Database 
(AMDB) and an outside visual were available without further integration effort. 
 
8.4.3 Evaluation Scenarios 
Including familiarisation, sessions typically lasted seven hours and covered a broad 
range of the system’s aspects from the basic airport moving map to runway incursion 
alerts in the high-speed regime during take-off. The focus of the evaluation was on 
the taxi out and take-off phases of flight. 
 
Pilots were exposed to a series of evaluation scenarios set at Paris Charles-de-Gaulle 
airport (LFPG), which was chosen for its complexity, its hub character and the rela-
tively lower level of familiarity with this airport expected from prospective partici-
pants. Evaluation scenarios consisted of uneventful, line-oriented taxi out operations 
alternated with runway incursion scenarios, with incursions occurring in a wide 
range of ownship speeds, from the setting of take-off power to approximately 130 kts 
IAS, slightly less than V1 for the given ownship configuration. In total, there were 
seven different scenarios, which could be conducted in three different visibility con-
ditions and were also varied in sequence for different participants. Typically, 10 - 15 
other aircraft were simulated in these scenarios. 
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8.5 Experiment Participants 
8.5.1 Overview 
A total of 19 male pilots with an average age of 41.7 years (between 27 and 62 years 
old), among them 13 Captains (CPT), two Senior First Officers (SFO) and four First 
Officers (FO), participated in the experiment sessions conducted on the Institute’s 
Research Flight Simulator, see Table 18. All pilots except one, who is an experimental 
test pilot to a European aerospace research centre, had an airline background and 
were working for three different European airlines143 at the time of the trials. 
 
Num Background 
(Flight test, Airlines 
Training) 
Nationality Native 
Language 
Sex 
(F/M) 
Age Hierarchical 
(Captain/ [Senior] 
First Officer) 
Amount 
of flight 
hours 
Application 
knowledge 
1 Airline German German M 58 Captain 20,500 -/RAAS 
2 Airline 
Instructor German German M 27 First Officer 1,600 -/- 
3 Airline German Greek M 40 Captain 12,500 AMM/- 
4 Airline Slovenian Slovenian M 32 Captain 2,500 AMM/- 
5 Airline Flight Test/Technical Dutch Dutch M 40 Senior First Officer 6,000 AMM/RAAS 
6 Airline 
Flight Test/Technical Dutch Dutch M 41 Captain 5,000 AMM/RAAS 
7 Airline German German M 33 First Officer 3,700 -/- 
8 Airline Instructor German German M 53 Captain 15,000 -/- 
9 Airline German German M 40 Captain 7,000 -/RAAS 
10 Airline German German M 43 Captain 10,000 -/RAAS 
11 Airline German German M 42 Captain 10,000 -/- 
12 Airline German German M 37 Senior First Officer 5,000 -/- 
13 Airline Instructor German German M 29 First Officer 1,800 AMM/- 
14 Airline Instructor German German M 42 Captain 14,500 -/RAAS 
15 Airline German German M 44 Captain 10,000 -/- 
16 Airline German German M ** First Officer 4,000 AMM/RAAS 
17 Airline Instructor German German M 62 Captain 20,000 -/- 
18 Airline Flight Test Dutch Dutch M 35 Captain 3,500 -/- 
19 Flight Test Dutch Dutch M 53 Captain 3,500 AMM/- 
Table 18: Background of simulator experiment participants 
During their entire career in commercial aviation, the participating pilots had logged 
between 1,600 and 20,500 hours (ø 8200 h). The distribution of aircraft types currently 
flown was as follows: 
 
 Airbus A300-600:    3 
 Airbus A320 family:    1 
 Airbus A330/A340 family:   4 
 Boeing B-737:     5 
 Boeing B-747-400:    1 
 McDonnell-Douglas MD-11:   2 
 Fokker 70/100:     1 
 Saab 340A:     1 
 Cessna C550 /Fairchild Metro II:  1  
                                                 
143 Cargo and regional divisions of an airline were regarded as belonging to the main airline. 
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Incidentally, there was thus an almost even distribution over Airbus and Boeing air-
craft types. Familiarity/type-specific experience with the current aircraft type ranged 
from 500 to 7,500 h (ø 3000 h). On average, pilots had spent 15.4 years with their cur-
rent airline, with a minimum of 3.5 years and a maximum of 39 years. All of the four 
Dutch participants had a flight test background, with two of them also serving as 
technical pilots to their airline. Five of the pilots were qualified as Instructors. 
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8.6 Evaluation Results and Analysis 
8.6.1 Basic Airport Moving Map 
This section analyses pilot feedback on the AMM functionality, which forms the basis 
of all other visualisation components of SMAAS. The analysis in this section is based 
on the AMM Questionnaire results and pilot comments during the runs in the simu-
lator and in the debriefing session. 
 
8.6.1.1 General Impression 
Overall pilot feedback on the AMM was 
very positive. The AMM was highly 
appreciated by all participants and 
deemed mature from a conceptual point 
of view. 
During the debriefing session, pilots 
stated that having AMM technology 
would greatly support them in the 
every day task of navigating around 
complex airfields, and several pilots 
spontaneously recalled recent opera-
tional situations where it would have 
been of great help. 
Interestingly, virtually all of the pilots 
suggested the introduction of a pan-
ning/scrolling function for AMM, be-
cause this was the only feature they 
missed when interacting with the airport moving map. Some of the participants even 
suggested that, provided they were given a scrolling function, conventional paper 
charts could be completely replaced by the airport moving map. 
In pilots’ perception, the main deficiency of the AMM prototype shown to them from 
an implementation point of view was the fact that some taxiway identifiers were 
missing due to the immature labelling algorithm used. This drastically reduced the 
usability of the AMM prototype for surface navigation, and necessitated the parallel 
use of conventional paper charts. 
 
As can be seen Figure 148, a majority of the pilots was of the opinion that the AMM 
gave them support they missed with current systems when asked to provide a rating 
on a Likert-style scale from 1 to 10 (M = 7.78, SD = 1.77). The pilots who gave feed-
back in the dissenting or only slightly positive domain stated that the current way of 
airport navigation worked out fairly well for them and that they did not really miss 
any technological support. 
Several pilots mentioned that they would now no longer be forced to keep their fin-
ger permanently on the map while taxiing, and that both crew members could now 
share the same map picture. Compared to today, this would not only free resources 
(map tracking with finger no longer required), but additionally give the pilot taxiing 
the aircraft the opportunity to take a brief glimpse down to verify the position on the 
 
Figure 148: AMM operational relevance 
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airfield. Another aspect that was positively mentioned was the fact that the AMM 
relieved pilots of the task of switching between paper airport charts covering differ-
ent levels of details. 
 
As expected, the issue of potentially increased head-down times was raised again by 
many pilots, like in previous AMM-related experiments, e.g. in the frame of 
ISAWARE and ISAWARE II. Pilots feared that eventually both crew members would 
be taxiing head-down. One participant stated that already with the Airbus A340-
600’s video-based Taxi Camera System (TACS), which shows, among others, an 
overview from the aircraft’s tail and a detailed view of the location of the main gear 
with respect to the taxiway, he had sometimes caught himself looking at the head-
down picture with fascination instead of looking outside. Another pilot voiced a con-
cern that particularly the low AMM range settings with the realistic aircraft symbol 
might suggest to pilots that taxiing solely based on the head-down presentation was 
possible. When asked for potential solutions to this problem, participants suggested 
that this issue should be addressed through procedures and training; some were also 
of the opinion that a presentation on a head-up display might be beneficial in this 
context. 
 
 
Figure 149 and Figure 150 illustrate pilots’ subjective feedback on the impact that 
AMM usage has on situational awareness and on safety. Since only the four highest 
ratings were chosen, the pilot feedback presented in Figure 149 confirms that using 
an AMM subjectively helps to increase situational awareness (M = 8.47, SD = 1.02). 
Only the intensity of agreement varies, but, as both the high mean value, the com-
paratively low standard deviation and a median of 8 indicate, at a very high level. 
At first glance, it seems that increased situational awareness does not automatically 
translate into an equal level of safety. As is evident from Figure 150, the distribution 
of feedback on safety is markedly shifted compared to pilots’ rating on situational 
awareness (M = 7.47, SD = 1.35). 
  
Figure 149: Contribution of AMM to situ-
ational awareness 
Figure 150: Perceived impact of AMM on 
safety 
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A closer look at pilot comments reveals 
that the reason for the lower rating on 
the safety question is related to pilot 
concerns about increased head-down 
times. Pilot SIM-#3, who gave the low-
est rating on the safety question, was 
concerned that focussing inside on the 
AMM, pilots might forget to look out-
side and miss e.g. an ambulance car 
crossing their way. Pilot SIM-#2 made a 
similar comment and expressed a con-
cern that the AMM might be a distrac-
tion. Participants generally also ac-
knowledged the potential of the AMM 
to prevent flight crew disorientation, see 
Figure 151 (M = 7.11, SD = 1.88). Those 
pilots dissenting on the statement pre-
sented in the questionnaire commented 
that they would not rule out the possibility of getting lost due to potential distraction 
or inattention. 
The evaluation in the simulator also revealed the importance of an effect that had not 
been given sufficient attention during the design and development phase. In the ini-
tial runs with the AMM, some pilots were slightly irritated by the fact that the cock-
pit cut-off angle gave them a visible position seemingly ahead of the aircraft symbol 
position presentation on the AMM. All of the participants, however, quickly adapted 
to this shift. Nonetheless, this inevitable discrepancy must be addressed in training to 
avoid early turns in AMM operational use. The only mitigation that can be provided 
without adulterating the ownship symbol is borrowing from Synthetic Vision EFIS 
design, where the PFD field of view is indicated on the ND. Likewise, the cockpit 
field of view could be indicated on the AMM on pilot request. 
 
As can be seen from Figure 152, the 
AMM was perceived as keeping pilots 
in the loop (M = 8.05, SD = 1.51), which 
reaffirms the potential support during 
surface movement provided by this 
technology. 
Since the focus of this thesis is safety-
related, it was not attempted to assess 
potential efficiency benefits in a com-
parative analysis of scenarios with 
AMM and with conventional paper 
charts, all the more as it is not the in-
tended function of the AMM to enable 
flight crews to taxi faster, even in low 
visibility. However, it is evident from 
pilot comments on the current situation 
 
Figure 151: Capability of AMM to prevent 
flight crew disorientation 
 
Figure 152: Impact of AMM on pilot 
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and potential disorientation they have experienced in real operations that crews of-
ten have to slow down or even to stop to orientate themselves or to check back with 
ATC. A potential contribution of the AMM to the efficiency of surface movement, 
therefore, might be that it enables crews to maintain a continuous taxi speed through 
better orientation and navigation. 
It was also observed that most pilots, due to the missing audio and motional feed-
back cues from the taxiway centreline lights, were taxiing much faster than they 
would in reality. Most of the pilots realised this themselves (“We are taxiing fast – like 
[Airline name]!”), and subsequently slowed down. 
 
8.6.1.2 Information presentation and accessibility 
 
Figure 153 clearly shows the impact of the immature labelling function. While most 
pilots generally agreed on the fact that the AMM gives the support required to ac-
complish ATC instructions, the fact that some taxiway labels were missing was per-
ceived as a significant deficiency, which is reflected by the fact that the distribution 
of pilot feedback in Figure 153 has its peak at a rating of 7/10, which corresponds to 
agreement with some limitations (M = 6.84, SD = 2.14). Dissenting feedback came 
from pilots who were of the opinion that both a correctly working labelling algo-
rithm and a panning function were necessary to understand and carry out ATC in-
structions. 
The pilot rating shown in Figure 154 addresses the reverse case, the presence of su-
perfluous information. 12 of the 19 participants made their choice among the three 
levels of highest dissent (M = 4.36, SD = 3.08). Interestingly, even the pilots who 
agreed that unnecessary information was sometimes displayed had difficulties in 
giving reasons for their choice. Only two of the pilots explicitly stated that the low-
range presentation with the realistic aircraft symbol gave them information they did 
not really need. 
  
Figure 153: Appropriateness of AMM infor-
mation to accomplish ATC instruction 
Figure 154: Relevance of AMM information 
8.6   EVALUATION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
  349 
 
The questionnaire statement in Figure 155 addresses the same issue, although from a 
slightly different perspective, with a more generic scope and implicit coverage of 
display clutter. The distribution of pilot feedback, which deviates from normality 
(1% significance level), shows that all except two participants found the information 
density on the display acceptable (M = 2.95). 
By contrast, the question presented in Figure 156 addresses the timeliness and ap-
propriateness of information in different situations (M = 6.95, SD = 1.96). Again, the 
slightly broadened feedback can, according to de-briefing comments, be attributed to 
the fact that the sub-optimal labelling did not give pilots sufficient information in 
certain situations. 
 
  
Figure 155: Potential information overload on 
AMM 
Figure 156: Appropriateness of AMM infor-
mation in different situations 
  
Figure 157: Assessment of AMM information 
presentation 
Figure 158: Pilot feedback on information 
accessibility 
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The results presented in Figure 157 and Figure 158 clearly demonstrate that a major-
ity of pilots appreciated the way information was arranged on the airport moving 
map (M = 8.16, SD = 1.17), and that information accessibility was generally perceived 
as good (M = 7.68, SD = 1.42). The only problem pilots reported with respect to in-
formation accessibility was that, in the absence of a panning function, they would 
have trouble in locating a certain gate when taxiing in. In this context, it should be 
noted that all the scenarios in the simulator evaluation were taxi out. 
 
8.6.1.3 Interaction with AMM 
 
As a comparison of the results shown in Figure 159 and Figure 160 shows, the overall 
AMM handling was rated somewhat better (M = 8.58, SD = 1.07) than the interaction 
concept (M = 7.58, SD = 1.22). The reason for this is that the handling rating ad-
dresses existing handling qualities only, whereas the interaction concept rating in-
cludes overall conceptual aspects as well. An analysis of the de-briefing comments 
yielded that, by and large, pilots were satisfied with the way the existing handling 
functions (range, mode) worked, but missed, as previously described, a panning 
function, which may serve as an explanation for the on average lower rating of the 
interaction concept vs. the handling. 
  
Figure 159: AMM handling qualities Figure 160: AMM interaction concept 
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Figure 161 presents the results of the 
survey on the adequacy of the avail-
able moving map ranges (M = 8.79, 
SD = 1.08). Most pilots were of the 
opinion that the number of selectable 
ranges was sufficient; only one pilot 
(Pilot SIM-#10) was more hesitant in 
his rating (6/10), because he thought 
that there were too many ranges, and 
questioned the use of the lowest AMM 
ranges. In this context, he commented 
that inaccurate positional information 
might yield a dangerously misleading 
picture. 
Pilot SIM-#2 stated that the smallest 
AMM ranges contained too much in-
formation in his opinion. In addition, 
Pilot SIM-#5 missed an explicit indica-
tion of the selected range for the smallest AMM ranges. Several of the pilots also re-
marked that a changeover from nautical miles to meters should be considered to in-
dicate the selected range. In fact, a corresponding solution had been considered in 
the design and prototyping phase, but the project test pilots had not been able to 
reach consensus in this matter; the main concern voiced was that the use of two dif-
ferent length scales on the same display might eventually confuse pilots. 
 
8.6.1.4 Symbology and Labels 
 
 
Figure 161: Appropriateness of available AMM 
ranges 
  
Figure 162: Assessment of AMM symbology Figure 163: Assessment of AMM labels 
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Except for Pilot SIM-#13, pilots generally rated the symbols used as easy to interpret, 
as can be inferred from Figure 162. Pilot SIM-#13 stated that he missed a differentia-
tion of CAT I and CAT II/III holding positions on the AMM. This criticism had also 
been voiced by other participants, but with less significant impact on their overall 
rating of AMM symbology (M = 8.32, SD = 1.38). The assessment results regarding 
AMM labels and abbreviations shown in Figure 163 clearly support the design 
choices made in this domain (M = 8.74, SD = 1.24). Pilot SIM-#5 only gave a rating of 
5/10 for this statement because he found that the automatic removal of labels with 
increasing range, i.e. the de-clutter function, was not totally transparent to him. 
 
Pilot ratings and debriefing comments clearly prove that pilots had no problems with 
the size of the textual information presented on the AMM (cf. Figure 164), mostly in 
form of labels. However, several pilots criticised the font used as less legible than the 
fonts they were used to on their aircraft (M = 8.84). Nonetheless, the fact that almost 
74% of the pilots made their choice among the two highest ratings, and that the dis-
tribution of results exhibits a significant deviation from normality, clearly indicates 
that this issue is relatively minor, all the more since the custom TUD font used can 
easily be replaced by a different one. 
 
 
Figure 164: Textual information readability 
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8.6.1.5 Colour 
 
Figure 165 shows how pilots rated the colours employed for the AMM. In the ques-
tionnaire, the term ‘satisfactory’ was deliberately chosen, because differences in per-
sonal taste otherwise easily distort results when participants are asked whether they 
like or appreciate colours. The focus of the question, however, is on usability, consis-
tency and acceptability. 
Given the fact that 13 of 19 pilots (or 68%) chose one of the three highest possible rat-
ings, and with a mean rating of 8.16/10 (SD = 1.68), it is evident that a majority of 
pilots found the AMM colours satisfactory. Additionally, many pilots expressed their 
appreciation for the colours chosen in their comments during the runs and in the de-
briefing session. Particularly the blue colour of the buildings, enabling a good dis-
tinction from taxiways and other airport pavements, and the yellow coding for the 
taxiway guidance lines, were cited. Pilot SIM-#8 commented that the colours chosen 
blended well with the colours he was used to on his current flight deck. 
Only Pilot SIM-#11 gave slightly dissenting feedback, because he felt that the stop 
bars should be displayed in a more prominent fashion. This criticism was shared by 
several other pilots, among others Pilots SIM-#10, #15 and #19, all of whom men-
tioned the colour chosen for the stop bars as a reason for giving a rating of only 6/10. 
They all would have preferred a more alerting colour like red for the visualisation of 
holding positions and stop bars. 
 
The questionnaire results presented in Figure 166 shed a light on colour from a 
slightly different angle, colour coding, which was – on average – rated slightly better 
than the display colours themselves (M = 8.37, SD = 1.30). This may serve as an indi-
cation that the colours chosen, although not undisputed, are nevertheless efficient. 
Apparently, pilots’ criticism with respect to the colours chosen also applies to the 
respective coding. In addition, Pilot SIM-#5 pointed out that the display appeared to 
be very calm and that he liked the colour coding. 
  
Figure 165: Assessment of AMM colours Figure 166: AMM colour coding 
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8.6.1.6 Flight Deck Integration Aspects 
Since the AMM concept chosen for this thesis was an ND-integrated solution, inte-
gration aspects were both surveyed in a questionnaire and discussed in the de-
briefing session following the trials. 
 
The questionnaire results shown in Figure 167 prove that there is a clear pilot prefer-
ence to have the AMM integrated in the Navigation Display (ND), with an average 
rating of 8.63/10 (SD = 1.67). 
Several pilots pointed out the necessity of having the AMM display aligned with the 
aircraft axis, and commented that this solution allowed them a quick glance down on 
the screen while taxiing to check whether they were at the correct location, without 
having to look on a paper chart. According to Pilot SIM-#9, this constitutes a huge 
advantage over the present situation, where the first officer is solely responsible for 
chart-based navigation in low visibility conditions and the captain is exclusively fo-
cussing outside. Consequently, the AMM enables Captain and FO to share essentially 
the same map information, and allows cross-checking even in adverse weather con-
ditions. 
 
Only Pilot SIM-#5 disagreed with the statement presented in the questionnaire. Dur-
ing the debriefing, he stated that the ND screen should either show the AMM display 
or the ‘classic’ ND, i.e. he was in favour of two distinct applications optimised for 
either operation, but did not question the fact that the AMM was presented on the 
EFIS screens – he suggested replacing the PFD, which is not used during taxi any-
how, with the AMM. It should be noted, though, that the problem with this sugges-
tion is that the PFD screen is used for the Taxi Camera System (TACS) on some Air-
bus aircraft while on the ground, and, more importantly, that the PFD is required for 
take-off. Accordingly, all of the participants of the evaluation acknowledge the prin-
ciple of presenting the airport moving map on the EFIS displays. 
 
  
Figure 167: Appropriateness of Navigation 
Display (ND) for AMM integration 
Figure 168: Information density aspects of 
ND integration 
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Figure 168 evidences that, in pilots’ opinion, adding the AMM to the ND does not 
lead to an information overload (M = 1.80 , SD = 0.68). The lower number of answers 
is easily explained by the fact that this question was added to the questionnaire after 
the first four preliminary experiment sessions. 
Simultaneous accessibility of ‘classic’ ND information and AMM information turned 
out to be an issue requiring further attention, though. Due to the fact that the ND is 
needed for the take-off briefing and familiarization with relevant weather and terrain 
in the departure area, Pilot SIM-#5 preferred to have a separate display other than 
the ND for the AMM, e.g. the PFD or a side display. 
Pilot SIM-#8 stated that a combined display of AMM and FMS flight plan was not an 
essential feature due to the different length scales involved. Nonetheless, a corre-
sponding solution would be appreciated if feasible. He classified the risk of confus-
ing FMS flight plan and taxi route as very low. 
 
As can be seen from Figure 169, a clear majority of pilots confirmed the relevance of 
having the “classic” ND modes such as PLAN, ARC and ROSE available for the air-
port moving map as well (M = 8.13, SD = 2.87). Two pilots, however, had a distinctly 
different opinion.  
Pilot SIM-#11, who gave the 2nd-worst 
rating of 2/10, asked for a possibility to 
program a parking position in PLAN 
mode. Since a corresponding feature 
was not yet available, he probably could 
not see any necessity for a PLAN mode, 
and given his MD-11 background, the 
difference between ARC and ROSE was 
probably not sufficiently significant for 
him. The reason for the rating provided 
by Pilot SIM-#17 remains unclear, all 
the more since he selected the highest 
rating for the question regarding ND 
integration. 
With respect to the necessity of different 
display modes, a noteworthy observa-
tion during the evaluation runs was that 
each pilot quickly found a preferred 
mode for himself, and then stuck to this mode for almost the entire assessment. 
 
Pilot SIM-#7 commented that he found the ARC mode most interesting, and that he 
considered the ROSE mode as being less relevant. As for the conventional ND, the 
PLAN mode was only relevant to review a route if available. This explains his com-
paratively low, but still affirmative rating of 6/10. Conversely, Pilot SIM-#10 stated 
that the ROSE mode would be sufficient for him, but acknowledged that other pilots 
might prefer ARC mode. PLAN mode appeared to be altogether irrelevant to him 
initially, which explains his 7/10 rating. In the debriefing, he slightly revised his po-
sition by stating that the PLAN mode was important when planning/reviewing the 
route and for locating parking positions. 
 
Figure 169: Relevance of classic ND modes 
for AMM 
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One pilot who generally agreed on the relevance of different modes was of the opin-
ion that a PLAN for the AMM made only sense in combination with panning func-
tionality. Several pilots also pointed out that the precise mode to be used for taxiing 
was a matter of personal preferences in most cases, and acknowledged that although 
they found a particular mode less relevant for themselves, it might nonetheless be the 
preferred mode for a colleague. 
 
In conclusion, therefore, it appears that the concept of using the typical ND/map 
display modes for the airport moving map is a valid design choice, because it permits 
pilots to adapt the display according to the requirements of the current situation or 
their personal preferences. 
 
Virtually all pilots found the size of the 
display acceptable (see Figure 170), but 
since the screens in the simulator cock-
pit were significantly larger than the 
screens in today’s aircraft, several pilots 
voiced a concern that transferring the 
AMM concept shown to them to the 
smaller screens in their currently flown 
aircraft type might result in legibility 
issues. Nonetheless, the exclusively 
positive feedback shows that the HMI 
design was adequate for the display size 
chosen for the evaluation (M = 9.06, 
SD = 1.00). It is apparent that, for 
smaller screens, some more fine tuning 
or adaptation work would be required. 
It must be kept in mind, though, that 
there has been an almost universal trend towards larger displays in aviation in recent 
years, which culminates in the large screens now used in the Airbus A350 and the 
Boeing 787. 
 
Figure 170: Assessment of AMM display size 
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8.6.2 Airport Moving Map with Traffic Presentation 
8.6.2.1 Overall Impression 
 
Most pilots had a very positive overall impression of the traffic presentation on the 
AMM display. As Figure 171 shows, the participants’ self-assessment on traffic situ-
ational awareness yielded only positive feedback. Some 84% of the pilots chose 
among the two highest ratings on a scale from zero to six (M = 5.16, SD = 0.69). Only 
three pilots were somewhat more reserved in their agreement. Pilot SIM-#3 stated 
that situational awareness was only improved in CAT III conditions with Low Visi-
bility Procedures (LVP) in force. In addition, he considered information on who else 
was on a given taxiway was not that relevant, but pointed out the importance of 
runway-related traffic. Furthermore, he was slightly concerned that pilots might be 
focussed too much inside the cockpit, and miss e.g. an ambulance not captured by 
the available traffic surveillance data. Similarly, Pilot SIM-#12 stated that the display 
improved awareness of traffic to the sides and behind, whereas traffic ahead own-
ship should preferably be acquired visually. To Pilot SIM-#13, the crucial caveat with 
respect to situational awareness was the coverage of all relevant traffic. He stated 
that traffic situational awareness would be good with full coverage, but might be 
treacherous otherwise, and referenced to a similar issue with today’s TCAS.  
Although he chose the second-highest rating for this question, Pilot SIM-#2 was con-
cerned that the traffic presentation with the labels could become a distraction in good 
visibility: “So what’s Air XYZ doing over there?” He also questioned the operational 
significance of presenting the labels, since he was “not an air traffic controller.” 
 
With the exception of Pilot SIM-#3, whose reservations have already been discussed, 
all participants were of the opinion that the traffic presentation on the AMM was an 
improvement over current systems. Figure 172 indicates that almost 58% of the pilots 
opted for the highest rating (M = 5.26); the distribution of results accordingly exhibits 
  
Figure 171: Impact of AMM traffic presenta-
tion on situational awareness 
Figure 172: Operational relevance of AMM 
traffic presentation 
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a significant deviation from normality. Consistent with their rating on traffic situ-
ational awareness and with the same rationale, Pilots SIM-#12 and SIM-#13 gave 
only a slightly positive rating. Pilot SIM-#16 joined them with similar arguments. 
 
Pilots were also asked to assess the potential contribution of the traffic presentation 
on safety. While, by and large, participants agreed there was an impact on the safety 
of ground operations (M = 4.68, SD = 1.00), one pilot dissented (cf. Figure 173). 
Pilot SIM-#11 gave the lowest rating on 
this question, since the impact of the 
traffic presentation alone on safety was 
low with respect to potentially conflict-
ing traffic in his opinion, because he 
found it difficult to anticipate intruder 
speed and movement status, particu-
larly at large range settings. Nonethe-
less, this pilot acknowledged that the 
capability to anticipate where the others 
are was a benefit, though. His opinion 
was certainly influenced by the particu-
lar experiment configuration he experi-
enced, with alerting de-activated during 
a Runway Incursion scenario. 
Pilot SIM-#3, who rated the impact on 
safety as rather high, voiced his concern 
regarding the crew not looking outside 
and missing e.g. an ambulance, as discussed previously. But generally, he stated that 
the traffic display was “of course a contribution to safety”. Furthermore, Pilot SIM-#4 
commented that the traffic presentation would not solve the problem, but reduce the 
accident rate. In his opinion, it was “a contribution, not a salvation”. 
 
Figure 173: Perceived impact of traffic pres-
entation on safety 
  
Figure 174: Support of traffic presentation for 
visual acquisition 
Figure 175: Pilot confidence in traffic pres-
entation 
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Based on the presented traffic, all pilots were able to establish a correspondence be-
tween the traffic displayed on the airport moving map and the simulator outside 
visual, as evidenced by the results Figure 174 (M = 5.31, SD = 0.60). Several partici-
pants commented that the traffic presentation even allowed them to verify precisely 
on which taxiway traffic they saw visually was located, which is, according to these 
pilots, not always very easy to achieve in reality, particularly for parallel taxiways. In 
this context, Pilot SIM-#4 mentioned that in his daily operations, he always found it 
difficult to distinguish whether distant traffic moving in the opposite direction was 
on a parallel taxiways or a head-on conflict on his own taxiway. 
Figure 175 indicates that a majority of pilots had confidence in the presented traffic 
(M = 4.26, SD = 1.41). However, the issue that not all other aircraft and particularly 
vehicles might be equipped (i.e. cooperative) made some pilots give neutral (Pilot 
SIM-#13) or negative ratings on this question; they stated that they would never rely 
solely on the display. During the debriefing, Pilot SIM-#11, who gave the lowest rat-
ing on this question, commented that he missed intent information for other traffic, 
i.e. “what the others are up to”. 
 
8.6.2.2 Symbology and Labels 
The symbology used for the presentation of traffic was found intuitive an acceptable 
by all pilots except Pilots SIM-#11 and SIM-17 (M = 4.95, SD = 1.39). Pilot SIM-#11 
considered the white symbols for other aircraft too dominant, and suggested hollow 
and maybe see-through (transparent) traffic symbols, such that they would not ob-
scure TWY labels on the AMM. Conversely, Pilot SIM-#17 would have wished a 
brighter and more attractive presentation of traffic. As Figure 177 shows, most pilots 
rated the risk of confusing ownship and traffic symbols as low (M = 4.85; not distrib-
uted normally). Pilot SIM-#11, who saw the highest risk of confusion, found the yel-
low ownship symbol difficult to see for range settings with the yellow taxi lines si-
multaneously presented. In the debriefing, he stated that he mistook a traffic symbol 
for ownship once during the runs. 
  
Figure 176: Assessment of traffic symbology Figure 177: Risk of ownship/traffic symbol 
confusion 
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All pilots except Pilots SIM-#6 and SIM-#11 found the presented traffic labels intui-
tive and operationally useful, see Figure 178 (M = 4.42, SD = 1.61). These and several 
other participants stated that information on the aircraft type instead of the callsign 
would be more useful. Conversely, several other pilots considered the callsigns use-
ful as labels, since it allowed them to understand the situation at hub airports, with 
many aircraft of the same airline present, much better. 
 
Effectively, a majority of pilots was in 
favour of displaying traffic labels only 
on request (cf. Figure 179). Accordingly, 
most of the corresponding participants 
made use of the corresponding controls 
provided in the simulator and de-
selected the display of labels. Neverthe-
less, pilots are essentially divided in two 
different fractions concerning this issue 
(M = 3.79, SD = 2.39), which indicates 
that further studies on this subject seem 
to be appropriate. 
 
As Figure 180 shows, a narrow majority 
of participants desired additional in-
formation on other traffic on request, 
while a significant number of pilots had 
no pronounced preference (M = 3.63, 
SD = 1.67). Debriefing feedback on this question yielded that pilots considered intent 
information, aircraft type and registration the most important additional information 
that should be made available. Aircraft type and registration would, according to 
pilots, support visual acquisition and confirmation of the presented traffic. 
 
  
Figure 178: Rating of traffic labels Figure 179: Label display policy 
 
Figure 180: Assessment of additional op-
tional label content 
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8.6.2.3 Scope of Traffic Presentation 
 
The results presented in Figure 181 show that a majority of pilots considered even a 
partial presentation of the surrounding traffic as beneficial for situational awareness 
(M = 4.47), whereas three pilots – Pilots SIM-#4, SIM-#6 and SIM-#13 – strongly op-
posed an incomplete representation, stating that this might eventually be worse than 
no traffic presentation at all. With regard to the overall results of this question, there 
is a significant deviation from a normal distribution. 
 
Furthermore, a majority of pilots also acknowledged that relying on an incomplete 
traffic presentation might be dangerous, as can be inferred from Figure 182 (M = 4.11, 
SD = 2.23). Nevertheless, irrespective of whether they agreed or dissented concerning 
this issue, many of the participants commented that flight crews should never solely 
rely on the traffic displayed. As a potential solution, one pilot suggested to suppress 
the presentation of an incomplete traffic picture, and to use the traffic for generating 
alerts in this case only.  
 
This approach was also suggested as an option to avoid display clutter when pre-
senting vehicles (see Figure 183 on the next page). Although the ratings diverge and 
do not show a clear tendency (M = 2.42, SD = 2.09), most pilots supported the idea of 
only displaying vehicles entitled to operate on the manoeuvring area, such as follow 
me cars, ambulances, fire engines and tow trucks. However, participants were con-
cerned that an indiscriminate presentation of all vehicles operating in the airport en-
vironment would almost certainly result in tremendous clutter and a consequently 
hardly usable traffic display, which may serve as an explanation for the slightly dis-
senting tendency of the results. 
  
Figure 181: Impact of incomplete traffic 
surveillance picture 
Figure 182: Issue of non-cooperative or 
non-detected traffic 
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As Figure 184 shows, participants had diverging opinions on the presentation of 
parked aircraft (M = 2.58, SD = 2.61). While some of the pilots considered only air-
craft manoeuvring under their own power or ready for push-back as relevant, others 
pointed out that a corresponding information would be useful not only since parked 
aircraft might constitute relevant obstacles, but also because this feature could addi-
tionally be used to check gate occupancy, e.g. to check whether the assigned gate was 
already available after landing. 
 
 
  
Figure 183: Vehicle display policy Figure 184: Importance of visualizing parked 
aircraft 
  
Figure 185: Importance of visualizing traffic 
landing and taking off 
Figure 186: Usage of AMM traffic depiction 
for runway surveillance 
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Regarding the scope of the traffic presentation, the results presented in Figure 185 
clearly indicate that pilots confirmed the concept of including traffic taking off or 
landing in the presentation (M = 5.40). Results exhibit a significant deviation from a 
normal distribution, which is not surprising in view of the fact that two thirds of the 
participants opted for the highest available rating. 
Except for Pilot SIM-#13, who dissented for the general concerns already quoted in 
connection with the other questions, pilots confirmed the relevance of using the traf-
fic presentation for runway surveillance in conditions of impaired visibility, as evi-
denced by Figure 186 (M = 4.95, SD = 1.43). In addition, some of the participants re-
marked that they already use TCAS for the same purpose today. That these pilots 
employ TCAS in spite of its limitations once more reaffirms the need for providing 
flight crews with information on pertinent traffic in the runway environment. 
 
8.6.2.4 Workload and Display Clutter 
 
The results presented in Figure 187 show that a majority of pilots perceived the addi-
tional workload caused by the traffic presentation as low (M = 4.37, SD = 1.38). Pilot 
SIM-#19, who rated that the traffic presentation appeared to increase his workload, 
commented that the traffic presentation slightly diverted his attention. As previously 
mentioned, Pilot SIM-#2 was also concerned that the traffic presentation might po-
tentially distract pilots, and therefore also gave the feedback that the presentation 
rather increased workload. 
While many of the pilots did not have a feeling of display clutter with traffic dis-
played on the AMM (M = 4.26, SD = 1.66), Pilots SIM-#6, SIM-#11 and SIM-#13 pro-
vided contrary questionnaire feedback (cf. Figure 188). According to Pilot SIM-#6, 
the fact that the traffic symbols remain at constant size even if display range is in-
creased contributed to the slight clutter he observed. The concerns about the traffic 
representation brought forward by the two other pilots have already been discussed 
earlier in this section. 
  
Figure 187: Perceived workload with traffic 
presentation on AMM 
Figure 188: Subjective feeling of display 
clutter 
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The results presented in Figure 189 indicate that reducing range is not sufficient as a 
strategy for de-cluttering the display if pilots feel that too many other traffic targets 
are shown on the display. Conversely, though, pilots’ opinions also diverge concern-
ing an automatic de-cluttering (see Figure 190). Dissenting feedback is mainly due to 
concerns that the behaviour of the underlying automation might be difficult to pre-
dict for flight crews, which hints at a potential automation awareness problem. 
Pilot feedback on both questions may be regarded as confirmation of the assertion in 
Section 5.2.1 that there is no trivial solution to the issue of traffic-induced display 
clutter at hub airports, and that further research on this matter is required. 
 
8.6.3 Airport Moving Map with Operational Awareness Function 
  
Figure 189: Usage of range selection for 
manual display de-clutter 
Figure 190: Desirability of automatic de-
cluttering 
  
Figure 191: Operational relevance of pre-
senting closed runways on the AMM 
Figure 192: Assessment of symbology for 
closed runway presentation 
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8.6.3.1 Display of runway closures 
All except two pilots confirmed the operational relevance of presenting closed run-
ways on the AMM, as shown in Figure 191 (M = 4.77, SD = 1.79). Both of the dissent-
ing pilots remarked that pilots should anyhow be aware of closed runways due to 
the mandatory pre-flight briefing. Additionally, Pilot SIM-#5 stated that he could live 
with a system merely telling him which RWY he was approaching, and that the im-
portance of the added symbology was marginal compared to the safety benefit 
brought about by the AMM itself. Pilot SIM-#11, who was also dissenting on the op-
erational relevance, commented that he mainly relied on his eyes regarding closed 
runways, and also remarked that NOTAM were often not up to date. This suggests 
that his rating was at least partially motivated by his lack of trust in the NOTAM sys-
tem itself. In this context, it is noteworthy that the aspect of NOTAM data cur-
rency/integrity was also raised by several other participants. 
However, none of the dissenting pilots raised any objections against presenting 
closed runways, and there was consequently only affirmative feedback on the corre-
sponding symbology, as evidenced by Figure 192 (M = 5.69). Since participants only 
chose among the two highest available options, it is not surprising that the results are 
not distributed normally. Furthermore, according to the results in Figure 193, the 
need to distinguish the different levels of runway closure was acknowledged by all 
pilots except Pilot SIM-#11, who, consistent with his rating on the overall operational 
relevance of presenting closed runways, felt that the red crosses were too prominent 
(M= 4.89, SD = 1.96). 
As Figure 194 shows, there was a wider distribution of feedback concerning the col-
ours used (M = 5.15, SD = 1.46), with Pilot SIM-#5 dissenting on the consistency of 
the colour concept employed. Two thirds of the participants once more chose among 
the two highest ratings. In conclusion, there is little room for an optimisation of the 
symbology, and the colour concept also has high degree of maturity already. 
 
  
Figure 193: Relevance of distinguishing 
different levels of runway closure 
Figure 194: Assessment of colour coding em-
ployed for presenting closed runways 
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8.6.3.2 Presentation of FMS-selected runway 
 
Regarding the FMS-selected runway presentation, both the operational relevance and 
the particular HMI design choice made were confirmed by the pilots in the simulator 
trials. With an average rating of 5.69 (out of six), this feature is, along with the taxi 
route, one of the most desired airport moving map add-ons proposed by SMAAS, see 
Figure 195. Due to the fact that only the two highest ratings were chosen, the distri-
bution of ratings significantly deviates from normality. 
Concerning the associated HMI, it is note-
worthy that the selected colour coding (see 
Figure 197) received a somewhat better 
average rating (M = 4.92, SD =1.38) than 
the symbology itself (M = 4.69, SD = 1.60), 
with results presented in Figure 196. How-
ever, it is evident from pilot comments that 
even the pilots who provided negative 
feedback on the HMI generally agreed on 
the symbology chosen, but criticised that 
the present combination of colour and line 
width lacks conspicuousness. Neverthe-
less, this is not critical, because this feature 
constitutes information actively accessed 
when needed, not an advisory. 
Thus, it can be concluded that the FMS-
selected runway presentation would make 
a valuable addition to the basic airport 
moving map functionality. All the data required to support it are available aboard 
virtually all airliners currently in production, no extra sensors are required. There-
fore, its near-term introduction into AMM products is strongly recommended. 
  
Figure 195: Operational relevance of pre-
senting the FMS-selected runway on the AMM 
Figure 196: Assessment of symbology for 
FMS-selected runway presentation 
 
Figure 197: Assessment of FMS-selected 
runway colour coding 
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8.6.3.3 Presentation of active runway information 
 
According to the results shown in Figure 198, it is evident that pilots fully acknowl-
edged the operational need to present active runway information in conjunction with 
the AMM (M = 5.56, SD = 0.53). Concerning the visualisation employing the dimmed 
runway label (see Figure 199), all participants except Pilot SIM-#11, who regarded 
the difference between dimmed and un-dimmed label as too small, agreed that this 
representation was easy to understand (M = 4.78, SD = 1.79), although several other 
pilots also voiced slight concerns about its conspicuity.  
 
8.6.3.4 Interaction with NOTAM and runway status information 
 
  
Figure 198: Operational relevance of active 
runway information integrated with AMM 
Figure 199: Pilot rating on intuitiveness of 
active runway visualisation 
  
Figure 200: Need for synoptic runway status 
information as on MCDU Airport Menu 
Figure 201: Pilot rating of taxi route colour 
coding 
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Since the MCDU keys in the simulator were only partially working at the time of the 
evaluation, it was decided to give participants a demonstration of the MCDU Airport 
Menu in lieu of a hands-on experience. This demonstration was conducted between 
formal scenario runs when appropriate, and encompassed changing the status of one 
runway from open to closed, or vice versa, while pilots could observe both the inter-
action process on the MCDU and the resulting changes on the ND. In addition, the 
ePIB Main Menu was briefly presented. 
As can be seen from Figure 200, all pilots except two agreed on the necessity of hav-
ing a synoptic overview of the runways available at an airport and their operational 
status (M = 4.22, SD = 1.79). Pilot SIM-#11 disagreed on the operational relevance, 
while Pilot SIM-#12 was neutral on this matter. Likewise, apart from Pilot SIM-#11, 
participants agreed that the way information was presented could be easily inter-
preted, see Figure 201 (M = 4.33, SD =1.50). 
A majority of pilots also considered the 
MCDU as an appropriate means of interac-
tion for the purposes demonstrated, as 
shown in Figure 202 (M = 4.11, SD = 2.03). 
Nevertheless, there was dissent from Pilots 
SIM-#11 and SIM-#12, while Pilot SIM-#13 
gave a neutral rating. These and several 
other pilots would have desired a more 
sophisticated graphical user interface for 
interaction with SMAAS. 
However, in view of the well-known ergo-
nomical limitations of the MCDU, and 
given the fact that most aircraft are only 
equipped with a MCDU, all pilots consid-
ered both the choice of the interaction 
means and the HMI realisation as gener-
ally adequate, as comments during the de-
briefing clearly indicate. As an example, 
Pilot SIM-#6 referred to the MCDU as “ergonomical monster”, and stated that he 
would have preferred a direct interaction on the ND to change runway status. 
Even Pilot SIM-#11, whose negative ratings on the use of the MCDU for interaction 
with SMAAS can be mainly attributed to concerns over potential pilot distraction, 
nevertheless acknowledged that the MCDU Airport Menu might be useful to retrieve 
airport information on potential alternate airports in case of emergency. 
 
 
Figure 202: Appropriateness of MCDU as 
means of interacting with ePIB 
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8.6.4 Airport Moving Map with Clearance Awareness Function 
8.6.4.1 Visualisation of taxi routes 
 
As can be seen from Figure 203, a graphical presentation of the assigned taxi route on 
the airport moving map was the most appreciated feature (M = 5.85), and the colour 
coding chosen was rated almost equally high (M = 5.77). Given the number of pilots 
opting for the highest rating, it is not surprising that results exhibit a highly signifi-
cant discrepancy (1% confidence level) from a normal distribution in both cases. 
Concerning the additional support provided, Pilot SIM-#5 remarked that the visuali-
sation of the taxi route was very good in his opinion, because it relieved him from 
keeping his finger on the map. Only Pilot SIM-#12 was a bit hesitant in his agree-
ment, particularly with respect to the operational relevance. Nevertheless, several of 
the participants, among them Pilot SIM-#13, commented that in following the green 
line, they sometimes caught themselves solely relying on the presentation and not 
keeping track of and double-checking their navigation as usual. 
 
8.6.4.2 Display of runway-related clearances 
With the taxi route already presented on an airport moving map display, the logical 
next step is handling all clearances related to surface movement via CPDLC, cf. Sec-
tion 5.4.3. In the simulator experiment, this concept was assessed in scenarios where 
line-up and take-off clearances were simultaneously issued via voice and visualised 
on the airport moving map as CPDLC uplink. While this combination of R/T and 
CPDLC was initially owing to the limitations of the simulation, i.e. the unavailability 
of a DCDU mock-up, it eventually yielded highly interesting results, both with re-
spect to quantitative feedback (see Figure 205) and pilot comments. At the quantita-
tive level, all pilots except two (Pilot SIM-#5 and SIM-#12) acknowledged the opera-
tional relevance of visualising take-off and landing clearances on the AMM, with a 
majority of participants opting for the highest available rating (M = 4.85, SD = 1.86). 
  
Figure 203: Operational relevance of taxi 
route presentation 
Figure 204: Pilot rating of taxi route colour 
coding 
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Pilot SIM-#5 was concerned that using 
CPDLC for take-off and landing clear-
ances, which are tactical by nature, 
might take too long and was therefore 
not desirable in his opinion. This view 
was in principle shared by several other 
pilots. According to Pilot SIM-#12, who 
gave the second lowest rating, he en-
tirely overlooked the visualisation of the 
take-off clearance, which he did not con-
sider operationally relevant. 
Pilot SIM-#10, whose rating was slightly 
positive, commented that runway-
related clearances always need to be ad-
ditionally available via normal R/T, 
since this is the only way of ensuring 
that other pilots have the same informa-
tion. Although the simultaneous use of 
CPLDC and voice violates current ICAO regulations, cf. [ICA01a], pilot acceptance 
for this combined solution was surprisingly high. 
Figure 206 and Figure 207 indicate that the way of presenting take-off or landing 
clearances was generally appreciated by participants, both with respect to symbology 
(M = 5.00, SD = 1.35) and colour coding (M = 5.23; not distributed normally). Pilot 
SIM-#10 provided a neutral rating on these HMI aspects, but since he expressed no 
specific criticism concerning the visualisation, this feedback may be explained by his 
reservations concerning the operational necessity of the feature per se. Dissenting 
feedback concerning these questions came from Pilot SIM-#12, which can also be at-
tributed to his general criticism concerning the presentation of take-off and landing 
clearances. 
 
 
Figure 205: Operational relevance of pre-
senting runway-related clearances on AMM 
  
Figure 206: Assessment of symbology for 
take-off/landing clearances 
Figure 207: Assessment of the colour coding 
used for take-off/landing clearances 
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8.6.5 Preventive Surface Movement Alerting 
8.6.5.1 General impact of preventive Runway Incursion alerting 
 
As can be seen from Figure 208, there is little doubt among participants that there is 
an operational need to alert flight crews when they are in danger of causing Runway 
Incursion (M = 5.68). Only Pilot SIM-#12 agreed to a lesser degree, because he was 
afraid that too sensitive alerts might eventually result in numerous unnecessary re-
jected take-offs in real life, but could not recall any alert that seemed too sensitive 
during simulator evaluation. 
Interestingly, a phenomenon already known from the field trials with the Navigation 
Test Vehicle (cf. Section 7.6.5), a slightly higher rating for the safety impact of preven-
tive alerts than for their operational relevance, reappears in the results of the simula-
tor evaluation campaign in an almost identical fashion. According to Figure 209, all 
but two participants strongly agreed that Runway Incursion alerting contributes to 
an increase in flight safety (M = 5.84). 
At a 1% confidence level, the results for both of these question exhibit a significant 
deviation from a normal distribution, which is not surprising given the accumulation 
of ratings on the right edge of the spectrum of potential answers. 
 
8.6.5.2 Alerting for take-off from non-FMS or closed runway 
The results presented in Figure 210 and Figure 213 on the next page illustrate that 
there was hardly any dispute among pilots that alerts when operating on a complete-
ly closed runway or when taking off from a runway other than the one selected as 
part of the FMS flight plan are operationally relevant and desirable. Alerting related 
to closed runways received a slightly higher average rating (M = 5.77) than the warn-
ing when taking off from a runway other than the one selected as departure runway 
in the FMS (M = 5.40). Again, results are not distributed normally (1% confidence 
level). 
  
Figure 208: Relevance of preventive Runway 
Incursion alerting in general 
Figure 209: Perceived contribution of Run-
way Incursion alerting to flight safety 
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For alerts pertaining to closed runways, the safety impact was rated somewhat lower 
than the operational relevance (M = 5.08, SD = 1.04), cf. Figure 211, probably because 
there was consensus among participants that the presentation of closures on the 
AMM might be sufficient to prevent erroneous operation on closed runways, as 
shown in Figure 212 (M = 4.77, SD = 1.09). Both during post-run discussions and the 
debriefing, pilots acknowledged that Level 3 alerts (warnings) as presented during 
the scenarios were fully justified in these cases. The trigger conditions used were also 
fully accepted by pilots, as well as the presentation of the alerts. Overall feedback on 
preventive Surface Movement alerting was very positive, it was accepted with re-
spect to both scope and alert levels. Some pilots requested a slightly different timing 
for triggering alerts, but there was no clear tendency in any direction. 
 
  
Figure 210: Operational relevance of closed 
runway alerting 
Figure 211: Safety impact of alerting when 
operating on closed runways 
  
Figure 212: Capability of runway closure 
presentation to prevent inadvertent take-off 
Figure 213: Relevance of alerting when tak-
ing off from non-FMS runway 
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8.6.5.3 Alerts protecting against inadvertent take-off from taxiway 
 
The results presented in Figure 214 demonstrate that all participants acknowledged 
the need of a warning protecting flight crews against inadvertent take-off from a 
taxiway (M = 5.38, SD = 0.87), as well as the contribution of this alert to flight safety, 
as shown in Figure 215 (M = 5.62). The distribution of results for this latter question 
exhibits a significant deviation from normality. 
 
Again, to gain insight in the operational need for this alert from a slightly different 
perspective, pilots were also asked to rate the likelihood of taking off when the AMM 
shows that ownship is located on a taxiway (results not shown). The distribution of 
feedback bears a stunning resemblance with the results gathered on the same ques-
tion during the campaign with the Navigation Test Vehicle, see Figure 137 in Section 
7.6.5. A majority of pilots agrees that they would never commence take-off in this 
case (M = 4.46, SD = 1.33). 
In conclusion, pilot feedback confirms the operational necessity and relevance of an 
alert when take-off from a taxiway is attempted, although the basic AMM appears to 
decrease the probability of such occurrences in pilots’ perception. 
 
8.6.5.4 Monitoring of taxi route conformance 
Figure 216 illustrates that there was some dissent on the need for an advisory when 
deviating the assigned taxi route (M = 4.46, SD = 1.39), mainly because a correspond-
ing discrepancy is already sufficiently evident from the basic taxi route presentation 
in pilots’ opinion, as can be inferred from the results shown in Figure 217 (M = 5.85), 
which exhibit a highly significant deviation from a normal distribution (1% confi-
dence level). Besides, several pilots commented that the blinking route was only no-
ticeable when actively looking at the display, and therefore suggested the introduc-
tion of an additional aural advisory. 
 
  
Figure 214: Operational relevance of warn-
ing upon taxiway take-off 
Figure 215: Safety impact of alert when tak-
ing off from a taxiway 
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8.6.6 Reactive Surface Movement Alerting 
As shown in Figure 218, all pilots except one were of the opinion that alerting for 
conflicting traffic in the airport environment is an operationally relevant and desir-
able feature (M = 5.05, SD = 1.43). Several of these pilots remarked that conflict detec-
tion should be limited to conflicting traffic in the runway environment. Only Pilot 
SIM-#13 dissented, because he thought that the detection of conflicting traffic on tax-
iways was a task almost impossible to achieve without nuisance alerts by an onboard 
system. In his opinion, the prevention of traffic conflicts on the taxiways should be 
achieved through the routings assigned by the controller. 
 
 
  
Figure 216: Need for advisory when deviat-
ing from the assigned taxi route 
Figure 217: Suitability of taxi route presen-
tation to detect deviation 
  
Figure 218: Operational relevance of traffic 
alerting 
Figure 219: Assessment of intuitive traffic 
conflict detection (display only) 
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Generally, pilots had differing opinions on whether traffic alerting should be limited 
to conflicting traffic in the runway environment (not shown), as evidenced by the 
exactly neutral average rating (M = 3.00) and a comparatively large standard devia-
tion (SD = 2.26). The current limitation of alerts for conflicting taxiway traffic to cau-
tion level was, however, accepted by all pilots. 
 
The results shown in Figure 219 are, by comparison, less unambiguous. Although a 
majority of 13 pilots rejected the statement that traffic alerting is not really required, 
which is consistent with the distribution of feedback in the previous figure, there was 
one neutral rating, and 5 pilots agreed (M = 2.00, SD = 2.05). Nonetheless, the latter is 
not necessarily inconsistent with the results shown in Figure 218, since it focuses on 
the aspect of desirability, whereas the question in Figure 219 addresses the issue 
whether traffic alerting is required or not. Besides, several pilots commented that traf-
fic alerting was only required for conflicting traffic in the runway environment, while 
conflicts involving other traffic on the taxiways or the aprons could and should be 
prevented or resolved using only the display and visual surveillance. 
 
Pilot comments and the discussion both after alerting scenarios and during the de-
briefing indicate that trigger conditions as well as the timing of the alerts were gen-
erally accepted, as for preventive Surface Movement Alerting. The captain associated 
with Vereinigung Cockpit, who did not participate in the experiment, but was part of 
the prototyping team, suggested to take into account the timing of take-off and land-
ing clearances for traffic-related alerts. When commencing take-off with other traffic 
present on the runway, it was therefore suggested to build in a kind of hysteresis by 
initially limiting the alert level to a caution, to cater for the buffer that is currently 
included in operations, since take-off and landing clearances are often issued while 
the previous aircraft is rotating or vacating the runway. 
Concerning pilot reaction, it could be observed during the experiment scenarios that 
a warning in the low speed regime of take-off virtually always induced a rejected 
take-off. Conversely, in the high speed incursion scenarios, several pilots took the 
decision to take off in spite of the alert, which they successfully accomplished. This 
may be taken as initial evidence that the choice not to provide conflict resolution 
guidance along with the alerts is both acceptable and efficient. 
 
8.6.7 Presentation of Alerts 
In general, the aural and visual presentation of alerts was deemed intuitive and ac-
ceptable by most of the participants. With respect to the visualisation of alerts, there 
was exclusively positive feedback, since the corresponding part of the HMI was in-
tuitively understood by pilots and fully consistent with their expectations. 
 
Concerning the selection of wording for aural alerts, the callouts associated with cau-
tion level alerts were also unanimously appreciated, whereas the choice made for the 
warnings require further discussion. 
In an effort to keep the number of distinct callouts minimal, a global “RUNWAY 
INCURSION” voice alert was associated with all warnings, irrespective of whether 
they related to other traffic or not, while the warning for entering a completely closed 
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runway formed the sole exception. Depending on the display range or mode selected 
by pilots, the precise reason for the alert would only be deducible from the display in 
this case. However, while the attempt to keep the number of different alerts low was 
generally appreciated by pilots, both the ad-hoc reactions of the pilots in the simula-
tor and their comments nevertheless clearly show that the universal “RUNWAY 
INCURSION” callouts for warning alerts are not always sufficient to re-integrate 
pilots in the loop. 
Particularly for the alerts associated with taking off from a runway closed for take-off 
and landing, but usable as taxiway, and with take-off from a runway other than the 
one selected in the FMS, nearly all pilots immediately stated that they found the 
“RUNWAY INCURSION” callout somewhat irritating and proposed a different 
wording. Several participants commented that a flight crew overlooking a runway 
closure or incorrect FMS setting would probably try to locate conflicting traffic when 
confronted with this callout, and then commence take-off anyhow if no traffic was 
detected, rather than re-assessing the situation. Only one pilot (Pilot SIM-#7) stated 
that a general “RUNWAY INCURSION” alert was acceptable, because there should 
not be too many different warnings and since the crucial point was anyhow to warn 
the crew that something is going wrong. 
Consequently, for an attempted takeoff from a runway other than the one selected in 
the FMS, the originally conceived “WRONG RUNWAY” callout should be reintro-
duced, all the more as several pilots suggested precisely this wording in their first 
spontaneous reaction to the alert during the simulator sessions. Likewise, regarding 
take-off from a closed runway still usable as a taxiway, changing the warning callout 
to “CLOSED RUNWAY” as for the completely closed runway is a potential solution 
that should be assessed. 
 
According to pilots, however, the main problem with the universal “RUNWAY 
INCURSION” callout is the missing distinction whether a warning relates to con-
flicting traffic or not, as illustrated by the above example. Therefore, it was proposed 
that any Runway Incursion alert associated with conflicting runway traffic should 
generally contain either the keyword “TRAFFIC” or “INTRUDER” in the callout. 
Consequently, both the callouts “RUNWAY TRAFFIC” and “TRAFFIC ON 
APPROACH” were appreciated as caution alerts in case of traffic hazards, whereas 
using the default “RUNWAY INCURSION” also for traffic-related warnings was 
rejected.  
 
In conclusion, the presentation of alerts was generally considered acceptable, intui-
tive and in line with current cockpit standards except for the global “RUNWAY 
INCURSION” callout for warnings, which has to be supplemented by a key word 
indicating the presence of conflicting runway traffic for reactive Surface Movement 
Alerting. 
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8.7 Discussion 
8.7.1 Airport Moving Map 
The airport moving map in itself was considered a mature function and highly ap-
preciated by pilots, because it increases situational awareness and can thus help to 
prevent disorientation on the airport surface. Since this is a common precursor of 
Runway Incursions, most pilots were of the opinion that an introduction of AMM 
technology would eventually result in a higher level of safety. 
Pilots’ key criticism regarding the AMM related to the positioning of taxiway labels 
and particularly the occasionally missing taxiway designations on the AMM. An-
other point that was criticized was the lack of distinction between CAT I and CAT 
II/III stop bars, which were represented with identical symbols, a straight amber 
line. Consequently, all taxiways need to be labelled unambiguously for an operation-
ally useful AMM. Accordingly, both the real-time labelling algorithm and the sym-
bology for the display of stop bars need to be redesigned taking into account the re-
sults of the separate PhD thesis dedicated exclusively to labelling that was conducted 
largely in parallel to this thesis [Psc08]. 
 
Although some pilots expressed concerns about potentially increased head-down 
times and potential distraction from important real world visual cues, the evaluation 
campaign discussed in this document was not intended to yield any conclusive re-
sults on this issue; other experiments by Biella et al. [Bie04] with eye-tracking equip-
ment have shown, however, that the main effect of the AMM in this context is the 
shift of attentional resources from the conventional paper map to the display. Be-
sides, almost all pilots suggested to introduce panning or slew functionality enabling 
a detailed preview of the assigned taxi route and for locating gates or parking posi-
tions. Apart from minor details to be improved, therefore, the AMM can be regarded 
as valid onboard means of preventing Runway Incursions. 
 
8.7.2 Traffic Presentation on AMM 
The potential of visualising traffic on the AMM was also acknowledged by pilots, but 
usability and user acceptance depend on the completeness of the traffic picture pre-
sented. In fact, the central human factors aspect is the completeness of the traffic sur-
veillance picture presented, i.e. the issue of whether all relevant surrounding traffic 
must be presented to achieve benefits in terms of situational awareness and safety, or 
whether a partial representation is already beneficial with appropriated training. Pi-
lots had diverging opinions on this issue. 
 
For both the case of an incomplete traffic surveillance picture and the issue of airport 
vehicles not covered by the display policy, it seems that the solution of choice might 
be to suppress the display of traffic except in case of alerts, i.e. to use the traffic sur-
veillance information for the creation of alerts only. The rationale for this is not to 
present a potentially misleading traffic picture while simultaneously retaining the 
possibility of presenting clearly identified traffic conflicts based on an incomplete 
surveillance picture, i.e. not to give up the opportunity to use what is already there to 
improve flight safety. 
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Another important issue is symbol scaling. Particularly at large ranges, the display of 
generic traffic symbols with constant size does not allow pilots to judge the precise 
location of the aircraft with respect to the holding positions or stop bars. There is, 
unfortunately, no simple solution to this issue. 
 
8.7.3 Information on Operational Environment 
Enhancing the AMM with information on the operational status of runways, such as 
the presentation of closed runways and other NOTAM, was generally considered as 
operationally important and relevant by participants. Concerning the presentation of 
runway closures, all except two pilots confirmed the operational need, resulting in an 
average rating of 80%. Nevertheless, even the pilots dissenting did not raise any ob-
jections against the presentation, which is also reflected by the fact that the chosen 
symbology received a mean rating of 95%. The distinction of closure levels (82%) and 
the colour concept (86%) were in general also acknowledged by pilots. It is notewor-
thy that both symbology and colour were rated substantially better than in the vali-
dation campaign with the Navigation Test Vehicle, which indicates that the design 
has gained maturity. Nevertheless, a few pilots reported that they were somewhat 
irritated by the use of white crosses to visualise runways or runway segments usable 
for taxiing only, because painted white crosses are sometimes also used to mark 
completely closed sections in reality. 
Although the MCDU pages for manual back-up entry and modification of runway 
closure information were generally considered acceptable, most pilots would have 
preferred direct interaction with the AMM or a more intuitive, graphically oriented 
interface, operated by a Cursor Control Device (CCD) in both cases. 
Regarding the highlighting of the FMS-selected take-off or landing runway on the 
AMM, both the operational relevance (95%) and the particular HMI design choice 
made (78%) were confirmed by the pilots. The same applies to the visualisation of the 
active runway (93%). Due to concerns regarding conspicuity, the HMI solution itself 
received a slightly lower average rating of 80%. In conclusion, these results confirm 
both the necessity and scope of presenting information on the operational environ-
ment on the AMM as well as the particular implementation chosen. 
 
8.7.4 ATC Instructions and Clearances 
Likewise, the visualisation of ATC instructions and clearances on the AMM was re-
ceived very well by pilots. A presentation of the assigned taxi route is a feature 
which pilots unanimously desire. With an average rating of 98%, it is the SMAAS 
element with the highest level of appraisal in this evaluation campaign. The repre-
sentation chosen also exclusively received very positive feedback (96%). However, 
there is a clear need to investigate potential effects of cognitive tunnelling in future 
experiments, since several pilots commented that they sometimes just blindly fol-
lowed the presented route and did not double-check and keep track of navigation as 
usual.  
Due to concerns about the party line effect and the timeliness of CPDLC, the level of 
agreement with respect to the visualisation take-off and landing clearances is slightly 
lower than for taxi instructions, but may still be considered highly relevant from an 
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operational perspective with an average rating of 81%. The HMI realisation was ap-
preciated as well in terms of symbology (83%) and colour (87%). 
A further noteworthy evaluation result is pilots’ immediate acceptance and apprecia-
tion of using data link and conventional R/T in parallel, particularly in the domain of 
runway-related ATC instructions and clearances. There seems substantial reluctance 
to give up the party line effect with respect to runway operations. 
 
8.7.5 Surface Movement Alerting 
The preventive Runway Incursion alerting functions were accepted with respect to 
both scope and alert level. Particularly when pilots are at risk of causing a Runway 
Incursion, the presented caution and warning alerts were considered as operationally 
highly desirable by all participants, resulting in a mean rating of 95%, while the per-
ceived contribution to safety was rated even slightly higher on average (97%). Al-
though the visualisation of the assigned taxi route and runway-related clearances as 
well as the airport moving map itself drastically reduce the risk of an inadvertent 
runway entry in pilots’ perception, this does not eliminate the need for alerting, 
which is also reflected in feedback on the alerts intended to prevent impending in-
fringement of completely closed runways. With a mean rating of 96% on operational 
desirability, these received an even higher level of agreement than Runway Incursion 
alerting in general, whereas the impact on flight safety was considered substantially 
lower (85%) in this case. Likewise, the warnings when attempting to take off from a 
runway not selected in the FMS or a taxiway were also considered highly useful by 
participants, and incidentally achieved the same average rating of 90%. In conclu-
sion, the simulator experiment reconfirmed that preventive Surface Movement Alert-
ing is perceived as capable of mitigating the risk of ownship Runway Incursions. 
Pilot feedback clearly indicates that alerts when encountering conflicting traffic in the 
aerodrome environment are considered as operationally highly relevant; the mean 
rating of 84% can be attributed to concerns regarding potential nuisance alerts out-
side the runways, although participants’ opinions as to whether alerting should be 
limited to conflicting traffic in the runway environment diverge. Nevertheless, a ma-
jority of pilots disagrees that they could detect traffic conflicts themselves based on 
the visualisation of traffic only. 
The alerting HMI was deemed intuitive and acceptable by most of the participants. 
Nonetheless, the reactions of the pilots clearly show that the general “RUNWAY 
INCURSION” callout in case of a warning level alert requires additional clarification 
regarding the event causing the alert to re-integrate pilots in the loop and to induce 
the desired pilot reaction.  
 
8.7.6 Summary 
In conclusion, the airport moving map has been proven a suitable basis for convey-
ing information – by means of additional symbology – on both the operational status 
and configuration of the aerodrome, as well as ATC instructions and clearances. Fur-
thermore, the presented alerting concept was appreciated by all pilots in terms of 
scope and implementation; only the callouts associated with warning alerts require 
refinement. 
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8.8 Comparison of Results from the Two Validation Campaigns 
 
The evaluation of SMAAS consistently yielded positive pilot feedback concerning 
both operational relevance of the presented functionality and the particular imple-
mentation chosen in both the field trials with the Navigation Test Vehicle as well as 
during the experiments using the Institute’s Research Flight Simulator. This section 
compares questionnaire results for both validation campaigns and attempts to eluci-
date potentially significant differences and discusses the possibly underlying rea-
sons. Since questionnaire feedback in both campaigns sometimes exhibited a highly 
significant deviation from a normal distribution, a conservative approach was taken, 
and the comparison of the results of field and simulator trials was conducted using 
the Mann-Whitney U-Test as distribution-free, non-parametric method [Bor05]. 
 
With respect to the basic airport moving map, the corresponding comparison yields 
that both the overall operational support provided and design aspects were consis-
tently rated significantly better during the field trials with the Navigation Test Vehi-
cle. However, this should not necessarily be taken as evidence that the design of the 
prototypic A380 OANS used in these trials is substantially better than that of TUD’s 
AMM, all the more as both designs share many similarities. In view of pilots’ com-
ments, the main reason for the difference is most likely to be found in the issues with 
taxiway identifiers and the missing panning function for the prototypic AMM used 
during the simulator campaign. Besides, potential inter-individual aspects due to the 
different participants in both experiments cannot be excluded with certainty, either. 
 
Conversely, there is no statistically significant difference in the perceived additional 
support provided by the presentation of the surrounding traffic in relation to the 
AMM. The same applies to pilots’ trust in the displayed traffic, although the level of 
confidence in what is presented was on average lower during the field trials. The ob-
served unreliability of the real ADS-B data used during the sessions, as described 
previously, is the most probable explanation. 
However, the traffic symbology used during the simulator trials, as described in Sec-
tion 5.2.2, received a significantly better rating than the alternative set used during 
the field tests. Again, the interpretation of these results appears comparatively easy, 
because the 0° default heading used for this exclusively directional symbology con-
fused and misled the participating pilots, as discussed in Section 7.6.2. 
 
Concerning the Operational Awareness, Clearance Awareness functions and alerting, 
there are no significant differences between both campaigns. Nevertheless, there 
were some minor differences. Compared to the field trials, the necessity of highlight-
ing the FMS-selected runway on the AMM was rated slightly higher during the 
simulator campaign, whereas symbology and colour received somewhat lower ap-
praisal. It is noteworthy that in both experiments, the colour coding consistently 
achieved slightly better ratings than the symbology itself. 
Nonetheless, the absence of significant differences is an important result, because this 
provides clear evidence that any AMM can be extended by the proposed SMAAS 
features, and that the associated HMI design is sufficiently generic and independent 
of a particular AMM basis. 
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9 Conclusion and Outlook 
 
9.1 Conclusion 
Runway Incursions have resulted in numerous fatal accidents within the last three 
decades, among them the Tenerife disaster with 583 fatalities [ICA80], which is still 
the worst airplane accident in history. There is consensus in the world of aviation 
that Runway Incursions constitute a substantial threat to flight safety, and a growing 
or stagnating number of incidents clearly indicates that current measures to get the 
problem of Runway Incursions under control are insufficient, cf. [NTS07]. 
 
In an analysis of 40 selected incidents and accidents, it could be shown that from a 
flight crew perspective, all Runway Incursions can be attributed to at least one of the 
following five core causal factors: disorientation, undetected traffic conflicts, insuffi-
cient airport information, communication deficits, and errors by ATC. Besides, it was 
found that current flight deck instrumentation does not provide pilots with adequate 
support in any of these domains. 
 
Ground-based measures to prevent Runway Incursions, e.g. enhanced airport mark-
ings, typically lack either robustness against weather influences, such as rain and 
snow, or worldwide applicability. By contrast, commercially available onboard solu-
tions such as the airport moving map or RAAS only address individual aspects of the 
problem of Runway Incursions. A holistic onboard approach is still missing, al-
though all the technologies required as cornerstones of a corresponding solution are 
either already available or can be expected to enter service in the near future. Since 
an onboard solution has numerous advantages over ground-based measures, among 
others a consistent level of flight crew support throughout the world, it was decided 
to pursue an onboard solution in this thesis, while bearing in mind the required in-
terfaces with installations on the ground. 
 
Subsequently, this thesis developed the concept for a surveillance-type onboard Sur-
face Movement Awareness and Alerting System (SMAAS), which is intended to ad-
dress the deficiencies in current flight deck instrumentation by supplying pilots with 
the operationally necessary information to mitigate the risk of Runway Incursions at 
different levels, ranging from the mere presentation of information to warning level 
alerts. Based on an airport moving map addressing the issue of disorientation by im-
proved positional awareness, SMAAS is capable of visualising the surrounding traf-
fic, pertinent short-term or temporary information on aerodrome operational status, 
as well as ATC instructions and clearances. These three additional layers of informa-
tion are envisaged to increase flight crew situational awareness, thus enabling pilots 
to detect potential traffic conflicts proactively and to access e.g. NOTAM or ATIS in-
formation in an intuitive, integrated fashion. Besides, the visualisation of ATC in-
structions and clearances based on a CPDLC data link will make these continuously 
accessible to pilots, while simultaneously reflecting controller intentions in an unam-
biguous fashion, which is believed to resolve most current communication issues. 
In case a mere presentation of this information is not sufficient to eliminate hazard-
ous situations, various advisories as well as caution and warning alerts are provided. 
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In particular, potentially conflicting traffic in the runway environment is detected 
based on an analysis of the compatibility with the manoeuvre intended by ownship. 
This does not only provide protection against Runway Incursions caused by other 
traffic or controller error, but also offers protection against potentially inadvertent 
runway entry even when runway-related ATC instructions and clearances are not 
available in machine-readable form via CPDLC. 
 
To validate SMAAS both in a real environment and a representative operational con-
text, two evaluation campaigns were conducted. The evaluation results obtained for 
the Surface Movement Awareness and Alerting System (SMAAS) both in field trials 
and in the simulator clearly demonstrate that the proposed onboard surveillance sys-
tem has the potential to prevent Runway Incursions. 
Virtually all pilots were very positive about the overall SMAAS concept, which was 
in line with their expectations concerning an onboard surveillance system. Apart 
from minor points to be improved, the basic airport moving map was highly appre-
ciated and deemed mature by all participants in both experiments. Most pilots could 
recall a recent operational situation in which an airport moving map would have 
supported them far better than current paper charts. 
 
According to pilots, the usefulness of the traffic display is also very high, but at the 
same time strongly coupled to the percentage of cooperative traffic in the airport en-
vironment. Several pilots had concerns about a partial representation of the sur-
rounding traffic in case the traffic surveillance picture obtained via ADS-B, TIS-B or 
other means is incomplete. Concerning the scope of the traffic presentation, an indis-
criminate visualisation of all airport vehicles is clearly not desired by participants. 
Only vehicles operating on taxiways and runways should always be shown, whereas 
others could be displayed only when causing a conflict and a corresponding alert. 
 
Likewise, the display of the assigned taxi instructions was unanimously praised as a 
highly useful feature, and an introduction of this feature can be recommended with-
out prejudice. By contrast, due to the associated loss of the so-called ‘party line ef-
fect’, using CPDLC as sole means for runway-related clearances was considered un-
acceptable by most of the participants. Conversely, the simultaneous use of CPLDC 
and voice, which violates current ICAO regulations, cf. [ICA01a], found a surpris-
ingly high acceptance among participants, probably because there is already similar 
redundancy in runway-related ATC instructions at airports equipped with stop bars. 
Accordingly, most pilots were in favour of presenting take-off and landing clear-
ances on the airport moving map, and acknowledged the proposed HMI. 
 
Concerning the presentation of information on the aerodrome’s operational configu-
ration typically contained in ATIS broadcasts and pertinent short-term or temporary 
limitations conveyed via NOTAM, pilots generally also provided very affirmative 
feedback on both operational relevance and the particular HMI design. With respect 
to the presentation of active runways and the FMS-selected runway, several partici-
pants expressed slight concerns regarding the conspicuity of the chosen visualisation.  
Consequently, results obtained during both field test and the simulator trials suggest 
that a presentation of the FMS-selected runway would make a valuable addition to 
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the basic AMM. Since all data required to support this feature are available aboard 
the aircraft, it could be realised as a mere software upgrade on those transport cate-
gory or business aircraft already capable of displaying an AMM. Its near-term intro-
duction into existing AMM products is therefore strongly recommended. 
Furthermore, the need to present information on closed runways could also be estab-
lished, since this feature received very positive ratings in terms of operational rele-
vance and safety impact. In the domain of symbology, both the representation chosen 
and the distinction of closure levels can be regarded as validated, all the more since 
distinguishing completely closed runways or runway segments from those still us-
able for taxi operations in the simulator campaign resulted in a marked increase in 
pilot assent on symbology and colours, compared to the field trials. It should be 
noted, though, that the operational benefit gained from a corresponding presentation 
strongly depends on the currency and integrity of the underlying NOTAM data. 
Some special cases, such as temporary RWY length restrictions, need to be evaluated 
by future studies. Besides, while the MCDU pages for manual back-up entry and 
modification of runway closure information were generally considered acceptable, 
most pilots would have preferred direct interaction with the AMM using a Cursor 
Control Device (CCD), or alternatively a more intuitive, graphically oriented inter-
face typically found on multi-functional  displays or an Electronic Flight Back (EFB). 
 
Overall pilot feedback on Surface Movement Alerting leaves hardly any doubts con-
cerning necessity and desirability from an operational perspective. Scope, the distinc-
tion between advisories, caution or warning alerts and the definition of the trigger 
conditions for the preventive alerts addressing the hazard of ownship actively caus-
ing a Runway Incursion were confirmed by pilots, although some saw the need for 
limited fine-tuning with respect to the timing of the alerts. Nevertheless, there were 
no complaints about nuisance alerts.  
The same applies to the possibility to alert flight crews of Runway Incursions caused 
by other aircraft and vehicles or controller errors, both of which manifest themselves 
in the form of conflicting runway traffic. Again both trigger conditions and timing of 
the alerts were generally accepted, and the choice not to provide conflict resolution 
guidance along with the alerts seems valid. Although the HMI and the overall cock-
pit integration were liked, the choice of aural alert messages was criticised by most 
pilots, who wanted a greater diversification of Runway Incursion aural warnings, 
containing more information as to the reason for the alert. In particular, pilots desire 
a different callout for all warnings when conflicting traffic is involved. 
 
In conclusion, an onboard surveillance system such as the prototypic SMAAS de-
vised in the frame of this thesis emerges as the solution of choice to mitigate the risk 
of Runway Incursions by providing pilots with operational information absent or 
inaccessible on current flight decks, supplemented by alerting in case of potentially 
hazardous situations. In this context, the fact that the evaluation results on the 
SMAAS concept are consistent for both evaluation campaigns although the assess-
ment took place with two distinct AMM applications and in two very different envi-
ronments deserves particular appraisal. It demonstrates the independence of SMAAS 
concerning the particular AMM implementation chosen, and may furthermore serve 
as evidence that the SMAAS concept is valid irrespective of a particular HMI design. 
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9.2 Potential Impact on Products 
 
As mentioned already in Section 3.1.3, the Human-Machine Interface (HMI) of Saf-
eRoute has evolved considerably from the initial design presented in Figure 240 to 
the current product shown in Figure 221. There is a remarkable resemblance between 
the current SafeRoute HMI and an intermediate version of the SMAAS HMI design 
that was presented in several publications in 2006 and 2007, cf. [Ver06, Ver06a, 
Ver07]. Figure 220 shows a SMAAS screenshot taken from a paper presented at the 
International Symposium on Enhanced Solutions for Aircraft and Vehicle Surveil-
lance (ESAVS 2007) organised by German Institute of Navigation (DGON), cf. 
[Ver07]. 
When comparing Figure 220 and Figure 221, the most striking resemblance is the use 
of the TCAS proximate traffic symbol in conjunction with an identification label for 
traffic that is apparently (in the case of UPS4 parked at the gate in Figure 221) not 
supplying a valid heading via ADS-B. Additionally, the following further similarities 
can be observed: 
 
 a clear distinction of apron taxiways and other apron areas, 
 the colour chosen for the buildings, 
 the visualisation of touchdown zone markings and painted runway identifiers on 
the airport moving map for a comparable range setting, and 
 a darkened representation of taxiway shoulders in relation to taxiway pavements. 
 
Furthermore, the runway labels used in Figure 221 are virtually identical to those 
used by SMAAS, except for the blue colour. None of these features is present in the 
original SafeRoute design, cf. Figure 240. It is left to the reader to judge whether these 
similarities are coincidence, or whether the present SafeRoute HMI was partially in-
spired by SMAAS. In either case, since SafeRoute is a certified product, the resem-
blance of HMI design features may be taken as further evidence for the validity of 
the SMAAS design presented in this thesis. 
  
Figure 220: SMAAS Prototype (2007) [Ver07] Figure 221: SafeRoute (2008) 
© ACSS 
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9.3 Outlook and Next Steps 
 
With respect to the market perspective of a SMAAS product, it must be noted that 
the economic and operational success of onboard surveillance systems such as ACAS 
and TAWS is not based on the cost savings they deliver to airlines, but rather on the 
fact that aviation legislation has made equipage with these systems mandatory. This 
is an important aspect to consider for any SMAAS-like product. There are of course 
factors that make systems like RAAS and EFB-based AMMs marketable; safety-
minded airlines are likely to buy such tools, particularly if they are packaged, as in 
the case of SafeRoute, with other functionality that creates operational benefits, such 
as an airborne merging application. 
 
SMAAS itself is also modular and could be introduced in increments. Furthermore, 
while the full SMAAS concept requires an airport moving map, a large part of the 
alerting logic could be implemented as a purely callout-based system in current gen-
eration airliners to avoid costly upgrades to the cockpit display system avionics. As 
an example, an extension of the existing take-off configuration warning system to the 
external unsafe conditions discussed in this thesis might be a suitable option instead 
of an additional surveillance system like SMAAS, provided that dedicated callouts 
can be made available. First of all, the alerting concept developed for the prevention 
of an inadvertent take-off from a runway other than the FMS-selected one or a taxi-
way can be implemented in any GPS-equipped aircraft as a largely software-based 
add-on, and would certainly even in this basic configuration have prevented the 
Taipei and Lexington accidents as well as the taxiway take-off incidents at Anchor-
age. This functionality would then only require a reduced set of AMDB data. 
Likewise, provided that a complete AMDB and traffic data are available to the 
SMAAS logic, these sources could be used to generated aural alerts for conflicting 
traffic in the runway environment even without an airport moving map. Certainly, in 
Munich incident and the Paris accident, aural alerts of conflicting traffic might have 
prevented the crews involved from entering the runway. It must be pointed out, 
however, that these solutions would only provide last resort conflict alerting, but not 
enhanced situation awareness. 
 
Due to the need to limit experiment sessions to one day, only a limited part of the 
SMAAS features described in this thesis could be fully evaluated. Particularly with 
respect to the Operational Awareness Functionality, further assessments are neces-
sary to validate the more advanced concepts described, in particular the proposed 
notification concepts. Besides, constraints concerning the simulation environment 
prevented the evaluation of a realistic interaction with CPDLC clearances, which is 
nevertheless highly relevant from a usability perspective. 
Future work will also have to address the fine-tuning of alerting algorithms and call-
outs. This necessitates trials with real ADS-B data or fused traffic data representative 
of current traffic computer output. In this context, it might be worthwhile to develop 
and assess intelligent de-cluttering algorithms for traffic visualisation at airports as 
well, and to evaluate the concepts for vehicle traffic display set forth in this thesis. 
Likewise, several aspects of cockpit integration, particularly concerning the flight 
warning system and the ECAM/EICAS or equivalent functions, require a detailed 
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assessment that was beyond the scope of the initial evaluation described in this the-
sis. The same applies to a coupling of SMAAS to other systems providing support in 
the aerodrome environment, such as the Brake-to-Vacate function available on Air-
bus aircraft. 
 
Last but not least, coordination between SMAAS-equipped aircraft and interoperabil-
ity with similar onboard systems aboard other aircraft should be studied, since this 
might pave the way towards conflict resolution guidance: as with TCAS, conflict 
avoidance manoeuvres could be coordinated, which might be realised by an exten-
sion of existing TCAS coordination messages, by utilizing spare fields in existing Ex-
tended Squitter messages, or by additional Extended Squitter messages. At non-
towered airports or in areas with insufficient ATC coverage, equipped aircraft could 
additionally form a cooperative network, exchanging safety-relevant and operational 
information via data link and VHF Unicom procedures. This way, taxi routes or de-
parture sequences might be exchanged or negotiated. Today, this exchange between 
aircraft is limited to radio telephony. Additionally, as for TCAS, where down-linking 
of resolution advisories is presently studied [Eur06a], and a corresponding flag in the 
ADS-B Aircraft Operational Status Message is foreseen [RTC03], alert information 
could be down-linked to the ground, which might be employed as part of a system to 
alert controllers of potential Runway Incursion hazards. 
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Appendix I: Detailed Accident Analysis 
 
I-1 Worst Accident in Civil Aviation: Tenerife, March 27th, 1977 
During take-off from RWY 30 at Tenerife’s Los Rodeos Airport in dense fog around 
17:06 h (UTC) on March 27th, 1977, a Boeing 747-200 (PH-BUF) operated by KLM as 
Flight 4805 from Amsterdam to Las Palmas, Gran Canaria, collided with a Boeing 
747-100 (N736PA) backtracking the same runway, operated by PanAm as Flight PAA 
1736 from Los Angeles via New York to the same destination. Both aircraft were de-
stroyed by the impact forces and a subsequent fire. All 248 persons aboard the KLM 
aircraft were killed, and only 70 of the 396 people onboard the PanAm aircraft, 
among them 7 crew members, were saved. However, nine of the surviving passen-
gers later succumbed to their injuries, raising the overall death toll to 583 fatalities. 
 
I-1.1 Sequence of events 
This worst accident in civil aviation to date was preceded by a terrorist attack and a 
resulting mass diversion of aircraft. While flights KLM 4805 and PAA 1736 were en 
route to their original destination, Las Palmas, a bomb exploded in the terminal 
building of this airport at 12:30. As a result, the passenger terminal was evacuated, 
and because there was a warning of a potential second bomb, the airport was closed. 
Like most other traffic bound for Las Palmas, KLM 4805 diverted to Los Rodeos Air-
port, where it arrived at 13:38 (UTC). PAA 1736 landed at Los Rodeos, its alternate 
airport, for the same reason at 14:15. The KLM passengers disembarked their aircraft 
approximately 20 minutes after landing, and were ferried to the terminal, while the 
PanAm flight’s passengers remained on board all the time. 
Due to the large number of flights diverted to Tenerife, the airport was congested, 
and the two Boeing 747s had to be parked on a taxiway leading to RWY 12 with three 
other airplanes. Once Las Palmas Airport had been re-opened around 15:00, the flight 
crew of PAA 1736 prepared to proceed to their original destination, but when re-
questing permission to start up the engines, the tower told them that the direct entry 
to the runway might be blocked by the KLM Boeing 747, and that taxiing to the run-
way via an alternative route was also impossible due to aircraft congestion on the 
main apron, since Los Rodeos had never been designed for the amount of traffic it 
was forced to handle that day. The PanAm first officer and flight engineer therefore 
left the aircraft and determined there was indeed insufficient clearance to pass by. 
Consequently, the PanAm flight was forced to wait until the KLM aircraft had left, 
while there was apparently enough room for the three other aircraft parked on the 
taxiway, a Douglas DC-8, a Boeing 727 and a Boeing 737, to bypass the KLM Boeing. 
When the KLM passengers (except one) had re-boarded, the aircraft was refuelled 
with 55,500 l while passengers remained on board, which took approximately 30 
minutes. Eventually, KLM 4805 called the tower at 16:56 requesting permission to 
taxi, and upon authorisation, at 16:58 requested to back-track on RWY 12 for take-off 
on RWY 30. Initially, the controller had planned to have the KLM flight taxi to the 
holding position for RWY 30 via the main runway, then taking the third taxiway 
(C-3) to the left (see Figure 222), to follow the parallel taxiway B-7 to the holding po-
sition. However, the controller then amended this clearance, permitting KLM 4805 to 
back-track over the full length of RWY 12 and making a 180° degree turn at the end. 
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Figure 222: Overview of Tenerife’s Los Rodeos Airport 
Three minutes later, PanAm 1736 was cleared to follow the KLM aircraft. The PanAm 
crew was also instructed to leave the runway at the third taxiway and to report upon 
leaving the runway. 
KLM 4805 had, in the meantime, reached take-off position around 17:05:27, after 
completing a 180° degree turn at the end of the runway, and the first officer finalised 
the take-off checklist only seconds later, at 17:05:36. 
The flight crew reported ready for take-off at 17:05:44 and was given instructions for 
a Papa beacon departure, “KLM eight seven zero five [sic!] - uh - you are cleared to 
the Papa Beacon, climb to and maintain flight level nine zero ... right turn after take-
off proceed with heading zero four zero until intercepting the three two five radial 
from Las Palmas VOR.” The KLM 4805 first officer read back these instructions and 
added, “We are now at take-off”, while the captain commenced the take-off roll. 
Tenerife tower, aware that Pan Am 1736 was still taxiing down the runway replied, 
“OK ...... Stand by for take-off, I will call you.” Unfortunately, the part of the message 
following the “OK…” after a pause of approximately two seconds coincided with the 
PanAm crew’s transmission, “No ... uh we’re still taxiing down the runway, the 
Clipper 1736”. These communications caused a shrill noise in the KLM cockpit for 
approximately 3.7 seconds, rendering both transmissions unintelligible. 
Tenerife tower instructed PAA 1736 to report when they were clear of the runway, 
whereupon the PanAm crew replied: “OK, will report when we’re clear”. This 
transmission caused some concerns with the KLM flight engineer, who asked his 
captain: “Is hij er niet af dan?144” After he had repeated the question, the captain an-
swered emphatically, “Jawel145.” 
A number of seconds before the impact, the KLM crew saw the PanAm Boeing still 
taxiing down the runway. In a desperate attempt to climb away, they became air-
borne after 22 m of tail drag in an excessive rotation. Likewise, to avoid a collision, 
the PanAm crew immediately turned the aircraft to the left and applied full power. 
The KLM aircraft was airborne, but the fuselage skidded over the PanAm’s aft fuse-
lage, destroying it and shearing off the tail. The KLM aircraft flew on and crashed out 
of control 150 m further on, sliding another 300 m bursting into flames [ICA80]. 
                                                 
144  Is he not clear then? 
145  The official report translated this as “Oh, yes.” By meaning, it is closer to “Of course (he is).” 
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I-1.2 Analysis 
What is particularly noteworthy about this accident is that the critical communica-
tions and events that turned KLM 4805 and PAA 1736 from non-routine flights into 
the world’s worst air disaster occurred within less than two minutes, between 
17:05:27 and 17:06:50, and concerned the take-off clearance as the virtually last pro-
cedural safety barrier. Consequently, a significant part of accident investigation was 
devoted to the factors making the KLM flight crew, and particularly the captain, be-
lieve that the flight was indeed cleared for take-off. 
 
In parallel to the official investigation, the Airline Pilots’ Association (ALPA) studied 
the Human Factors aspects of the accident, and concluded that throughout the events 
leading to the accident, it was evident that language difficulties, including accent and 
idiomatic usage, degraded information transfer [ALP78]. Therefore, this section 
commences with a detailed analysis of the communications and the likely interpreta-
tion by the recipients. 
 
Five seconds after the completion of the take-off checklist at 17:05:36, the captain 
slightly opened the throttle, which was, according to Dutch sources, standard proce-
dure to check the engines [ICA80], but has also been interpreted as an indication that 
the captain was under pressure to take off [ALP78]. At this point, anyhow, the KLM 
first officer reminded the captain that they did not have an ATC clearance yet. The 
captain closed the throttles and replied, “Nee, dat weet ik, vraag maar146.” The way 
in which the first officer then reported ready for take-off and asked for the ATC 
clearance implied, according to common practice at the time, a request for both the 
take-off and the initial en-route ATC clearances.  
 
However, the controller’s response, as cited in the previous section, was intended 
only as ATC clearance, but the KLM captain interpreted this as take-off clearance and 
advanced the throttles while the first officer was still reading back the ATC clearance, 
adding “We are, uh, taking off” or “We are at take-off”147. The fact that the ATC 
clearance contained the word ‘take-off’ may have reinforced the captains erroneous 
conclusion that clearance had been given. 
 
Likewise, the controller understood from the first officer’s last statement that the 
KLM flight was holding at the take-off position, but the crucial part of the following 
transmission by the controller that made it clear that he had only replied to the ATC 
clearance request and deferred the take-off clearance, his “standby for take-off ... I 
will call you”, coincided with the PAA 1737’s transmission that they were still taxiing 
down the runway, causing the whistling noise in the KLM cockpit. However, since 
this squeal was only audible in the KLM cockpit, neither the PanAm flight crew nor 
the controller were aware that their respective messages had not been intelligible to 
the intended recipient(s). It is important to note that the controller did not ask KLM 
4805 for confirmation of his important instruction to stand by for take-off. 
                                                 
146 No, I know that, go ahead ask. 
147 After several hours of replaying the CVR tapes, investigators were unable to determine the precise statement 
made by the first officer. 
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Even worse, with the controller’s transmission effectively truncated to “OK”, it may 
have had an affirmative character with respect to the KLM first officer’s comment 
that they were taking off that had never been intended. 
 
Consequently, due to this technical perturbation of radio communication, the crew of 
KLM 4805 understood neither of these critical messages, and commenced take-off in 
the absolute conviction that they were cleared for it and that the PanAm Boeing 747 
had already vacated the runway. Due to the prevailing fog, they had no chance of 
visually acquiring the PanAm aircraft until it was too late, cf. [ICA80]. 
 
In fact, the KLM captain’s emphatic response to the flight engineer’s somewhat hesi-
tant question whether the PanAm aircraft was probably not clear of the runway 
shows how firmly the crew believed the runway to be clear. Unfortunately, the KLM 
flight engineer’s emerging concerns that the runway might not be clear were not sub-
stantial enough (yet) for him to call for a rejected take-off. 
The KLM flight crew’s erroneous perception that the runway was clear may have 
resulted from a misinterpretation of the PanAm’s request to the controller to confirm 
that he wanted them to take the third exit. According to the ALPA report, the KLM 
crew most probably concluded from this statement that the PanAm had already ar-
rived at the exit and was asking for final confirmation before initiating the turn-off, 
whereas the PanAm was actually not sure whether they had just missed the exit. 
In fact, the PanAm crew passed the third taxiway on the left (C-3) in poor visibility 
while concentrating on the ATC clearance being given to the KLM. Given the size of 
the Boeing 747, the geometry of C-3 in relation to the runway must have made it an 
unlikely candidate for the assigned exit in the PanAm crew’s perception, if the rap-
idly changing visibility was sufficient for them to visually acquire it at all at the time. 
 
The investigation considered a number of other factors influencing the KLM flight 
crew’s mindset that might have induced them, particularly the captain, to take off. 
The official report heavily dwells on the hypothesis that the captain was under pres-
sure to take off because the flight crew was approaching a rigid duty time limit, 
which was likely to result in a termination of the flight in Las Palmas, with all the 
unpleasant organisational and economic consequences, if he could not leave Tenerife 
soon. This hypothesis is mainly based on an earlier discussion in the KLM cockpit on 
the recently tightened Dutch duty time regulations, which were so complicated that 
the flight crew themselves were virtually unable to calculate their current duty time. 
Furthermore, it was no longer possible for flight crews to extend the limit at their 
own discretion in order to complete a delayed service. As a result, the captain even 
consulted a company official in Amsterdam on potential duty time implications 
while on the ground in Tenerife. 
This allegedly created stress and anxiety for the Dutch crew, an atmosphere that the 
investigators felt reflected in the Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) tapes in a subtle fash-
ion. Interestingly, it can be inferred from intra-cockpit communication that the 
PanAm flight crew may also have had the impression that the KLM crew was “anx-
ious”, epitomised by the statement of the PanAm first officer referring to the KLM 
flight, “[…] after he held us up for an hour and a half […] now he’s in a rush.” 
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It must be noted, however, that the KLM flight crew adhered to all checklists and 
procedures, i.e. there were no observable lapses that might serve as additional factual 
evidence they were in haste. The only indication that the captain was not fully atten-
tive to controller instructions all the time was that he asked twice at which taxiway 
they would have to turn off the runway, although the ATC instruction had already 
been amended to a full back-track. But since he might have been busy with check-
lists, reviewing charts or other operational matters at the time the controller revised 
the original instruction, this is not necessarily an indication of “absent-mindedness”, 
as the official report claims, cf. [ICA80]. 
 
Additionally, the investigation discussed the potential impact of the KLM captain’s 
role and reputation as a head of the KLM Flight Training Department on the events, 
particularly his function as training captain. The ALPA report claims that there is a 
natural subtle tension in the cockpit atmosphere whenever upper management cap-
tains fly line trips that is not found between regular line crew members [ALP78]. 
Combined with the KLM captain’s role in training and proficiency checks, this im-
plies that the situation might have fostered a larger than usual hesitancy to voice 
concerns [ICA80]. Along these lines, investigators interpreted the KLM first officer’s 
ambiguous and somewhat hurried statement that they were “at take-off” or “taking 
of” as an indication that he was surprised by the captain commencing take-off, felt 
concern that this decision was not correct, and therefore tried to alert everybody on 
the frequency that they were taking off with his statement [ALP78]. However, the 
hurriedness might also be an indication that he wanted to finish the read-back as 
soon as possible to focus his attention on the take-off run as required. 
 
Since the KLM captain was heavily involved in simulator training, and had not per-
formed any airline flights in the 12 weeks prior to the accident, ALPA investigators 
speculated that the borders between simulator training and airline flights might have 
become blurry momentarily (“training syndrome”). One of the arguments given by 
both the ALPA and the official investigation report was that in the simulator, the in-
structor virtually always also acts as controller, typically issuing the take-off clear-
ance as the take-off checklist is completed, and usually responding affirmatively to 
all pilot requests, driven by the need to fit the maximum amount of training into the 
available simulator time. Likewise, training flights are usually much shorter than 
normal line flights, and usually do not encounter operational delays. 
 
While all of these psycho-social factors may have played an important role in the se-
quence of events leading to the accident and should not be easily dismissed, they 
remain somewhat speculative, since unambiguous evidence substantiating the pres-
ence of hurriedness or a “training syndrome” is missing. After 9:21 h of duty, fatigue 
could have played a role as well. 
 
On the ATC side, the unexpectedly large traffic volume caused high workload, and 
with the main apron crammed by diverted aircraft, controllers were facing significant 
challenges. Besides, there was some confusion, because the two controllers were op-
erating three frequencies, and clearances were not always given consistently with the 
function of the associated ATC unit – some aircraft received their start-up clearances 
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on the tower frequency [ALP78]. Additionally, as the Dutch comments on the final 
report point out, the background noises in the tower transmissions suggest that the 
controllers were listening to (or watching) a football match, which would have been a 
significant distraction. 
There is some evidence of either high workload and/or distraction in the communi-
cation of the controller. When addressing the KLM flight with the ATC clearance, he 
used an incorrect callsign, “KLM 8705”, but without effect on the effectiveness of 
communication. However, upon requesting the PanAm crew to report when they 
had vacated the runway, the controller – for the only time – addressed the PanAm as 
“Papa Alpha” instead of using the familiar “Clipper” normally used to address 
PanAm aircraft. While the PanAm crew replied immediately, it is likely that this was 
a missed opportunity to raise the KLM crew’s attention, which was already focussed 
on the take-off run, to the no longer expected presence of the PanAm aircraft. In fact, 
the KLM flight engineer raised his concerns when he overheard the PanAm crew’s 
response to that controller instruction. 
I-1.3 Probable Cause 
The official investigation report concludes that the probable cause of the accident 
was the KLM captain’s decision to take off as soon as he heard the ATC clearance, 
and the failure to comply with the controller’s instruction to stand by for take-off. In 
addition, the report claims that the captain should have aborted take-off when the 
PanAm flight reported they were still on the runway, instead of dismissing the flight 
engineer’s doubts as to whether the other Boeing 747 had vacated the runway. 
The investigation report offers a growing feeling of tension resulting from the poten-
tial duty time limitations, the rapidly changing weather situation and the associated 
prospect of having to terminate the flight as a result of these constraints if not leaving 
Tenerife very soon as primary explanation for the captain’s behaviour, whereas the 
fact that two radio transmissions occurred simultaneously is only mentioned as con-
tributory factor. However, this position was disputed by the Dutch authorities, 
which, as well as the ALPA report, draw a slightly different and more balanced pic-
ture from a Human Factors perspective. Essentially, the cause of the accident was a 
misunderstanding between the flight crew of KLM 4805 and Tenerife tower, due to 
ambiguities in the ATC phraseology in use at the time of the accident. The misunder-
standing was aggravated by the fact that a crucial part of the transmission from Te-
nerife tower, which might have made the intention of the controller more clear and 
prevented the misunderstanding, was rendered unintelligible due to a perturbation 
on the frequency caused by the simultaneous transmission of PAA 1736. There were 
no serious operational errors involved. 
With respect to the refuelling, the investigation found that the captain had probably 
chosen to refuel in Tenerife to save time in Las Palmas, the KLM Boeing 747 had suf-
ficient fuel for this flight, and could even have returned to Amsterdam without refu-
elling. In conjunction with the operationally perfectly valid decision to take off at re-
duced power, this nonetheless raises the obvious question whether, some 50 tons 
lighter and at full take-off thrust, the KLM Boeing 747 would have succeeded in 
climbing free of the PanAm aircraft. However, it must be stressed that refuelling and 
de-rated take-off thrust were not contributing factors, but in retrospect at best missed 
opportunities to mitigate the outcome. 
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I-1.4 Flight Deck Instrumentation Aspects & Conclusion 
The investigation reports explicitly concede that both flight crews suffered from in-
adequate visual information due to low visibility. Consequently, the following can be 
deduced with respect to flight deck instrumentation and situational awareness: 
 
KLM 4805 
 The flight crew of KLM 4805 was at all times aware of their position on the aero-
drome surface. There was no disorientation involved. 
 The flight crew of KLM 4805 was erroneously convinced that the PanAm flight 
had already vacated the runway, and thus unaware of its true position on the 
aerodrome. Consequently, a method of presenting the surrounding traffic in rela-
tion to the airport layout might have helped the crew to establish and maintain 
adequate traffic awareness. 
 There was a breakdown of communication between the flight crew of KLM 4805 
and the controller. While the controller had intended to relay only the ATC clear-
ance, the captain of the KLM aircraft believed that the flight had simultaneously 
also been cleared for take-off. Unambiguous information on the take-off clearance 
could have prevented the KLM 747 from taking off. 
 In the presence of either better traffic or clearance information, it is unlikely that 
the KLM flight crew would have started the take-off roll. 
 
PAA 1736 
 The flight crew was, due to the limited visibility, not fully aware of their location 
with respect to the runway exit C-3 and subsequently missed it. A means of indi-
cation their position with respect to the airport layout would have been beneficial.  
 In parallel, information on the assigned taxi route might have been useful. 
 The flight crew of PAA 1736 was concerned, but not positively sure that KLM 
4805 was going to take off or had already commenced its take-off run. Informa-
tion on traffic activities in the runway environment, independent of visibility 
conditions, could have confirmed their suspicion, leaving more time for an eva-
sive manoeuvre. 
 
As a result of the investigation findings, and in line with ALPA and Dutch recom-
mendations, procedures and phraseology were changed considerably to disambigu-
ate the assignment of clearances. Among the recommendations realised was e.g. that 
an ATC clearance should never contain the word take-off, and further measures were 
taken to prevent confusion of ATC and take-off clearances. Today the initial en-route 
clearance is transmitted to the flight crew before they start taxiing, and the word 
“cleared” is reserved for take-off and landing authorisation. By contrast, lining up or 
crossing a runway is instructed using the word “approved”. While virtually all pro-
cedural issues revealed by the accident investigation have been addressed, the ALPA 
recommendation to provide a redundant means of conforming take-off clearances at 
all airports remains to be realised even more than 30 years later. 
Last but not least, the ALPA’s recommendation to commission research by an appro-
priate institution to “determine optimum crew member interaction to minimize the prob-
ability of human error” can be seen as one of the key milestones leading to the devel-
opment of Crew Resource Management (CRM). 
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I-2 Disorientation in the Fog I: Madrid, December 7th, 1983 
 
During its take-off run on RWY 01 at Madrid-Barajas Airport (LEMB) on December 
7th, 1983, an Iberia Airlines Boeing B-727 (EC-CFJ) bound for Rome collided with an 
Aviaco DC-9 (EC-CGS) bound for Santander, which had inadvertently entered the 
runway in dense fog. 
As a result of the impact and the rapidly developing subsequent fire, all 37 passen-
gers and 5 crew members of the DC-9 perished. The B-727, which was travelling 
down the runway approximately at V1 when the collision occurred, lost its left wing 
and main gear as a result of the impact, and continued to slide down the runway for 
another 460 m. The massive fuel spillage resulted in an almost immediate fire, and 50 
of the 84 passengers on board and one assistant crew member died. Eight crew 
members survived [CIA84]. 
 
I-2.1 Sequence of events 
The DC-9 aircraft which was to carry out Aviaco Flight 134 to Santander was located 
at Parking 8 in the Northern Area of the airport. The flight was 33 min behind sched-
ule due to the weather conditions (fog) and requested start-up at 08:29:10. In re-
sponse, start-up was approved and the ATC en-route clearance was given at 08:30:15. 
At 08:33:20, Aviaco Flight 134 requested taxi instructions and was instructed to pro-
ceed to “holding point RWY 01 through outer taxiway and [to] inform when leaving 
Northern Area and entering the taxiway”. 
 
The Aviaco flight crew read back this instruction and confirmed leaving the North-
ern Area at 08:36:26, upon which ATC instructed the flight “to call entering segment 
Oscar 5, please”.  
Some time after this instruction had been confirmed, the controller asked the Aviaco 
flight crew to confirm their position at 08:39:08, upon which they replied, “Look, we 
cannot see Oscar 5 indicators on the ground, we are taxiing with… heading zero, 
with heading zero nineteen, with heading one hundred and ninety, sorry, and ap-
parently, we are entering the segment.” The collision occurred immediately after the 
end of this transmission at 08:39:29. 
 
In parallel, preparations for Iberia Flight 350 to Rome-Fiumicino had been com-
pleted. The B-727 was parked at Parking Number 56 at the International Terminal of 
Madrid-Barajas airport. IB 350 requested start-up at 08:21:36, but due to the delay 
situation, was not given permission to start the engines until 08:26:20. After taxiing to 
the holding position of RWY 01 and the transfer to the tower frequency, upon which 
the flight crew immediately reported ready, IB 350 was cleared for take-off at 
08:38:32. Around 08:38:45, the B-727 commenced its take-off roll. 44 s into the take-off 
roll, immediately after the V1 callout of the first officer, the aircraft collided with the 
Aviaco DC-9 [CIA84]. 
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Figure 223: Instructed and actual taxi route of Aviaco Flight 134 (after [CIA84]) 
I-2.2 Analysis 
The reconstruction of the Aviaco DC-9’s actual taxi route from the parking position 
to the location approximately 230 m south of the intersection of RWY 01/19 and 
RWY 15/33 where the collision occurred was very difficult, since the FDR was badly 
damaged by fire, limiting the amount of usable data that could be extracted, and be-
cause the DC-9 was not fitted with a CVR, which was not compulsory when aircraft 
was manufactured in 1975. 
Consequently, the accident investigation performed extensive tests based on the sal-
vaged FDR content to determine a likely trajectory for the DC-9. After several post-
accident ground tests with another DC-9, the actual taxi route of Aviaco Flight 134 
could eventually be reconstructed, as presented in Figure 223 (red line). It shows that 
the flight crew opted for a left turn when leaving Parking 8 and eventually exited the 
Northern Area via taxiway J, which was perfectly consistent with the somewhat 
sparse taxi instructions that they had received. Given the fact that both pilots had 
logged in excess of 10,000 flight hours and that Aviaco routinely operated from this 
part of the airport, the controller seems to have referred to an – albeit unwritten – 
“standard” taxi route. Some 37 m prior to reaching the centreline of taxiway Oscar, 
the flight crew reported that they were leaving the Northern Area at 08:36:26, which 
indicates that the flight crew were still well aware of their position despite the fog. 
However, at the shallow-angle intersection of taxiways O-7, J-1 and J-2, the aircraft 
did not make a sufficiently strong right turn to enter into O-7, but eventually crossed 
taxiway Oscar and continued taxiing on J-1. 
 
According to official measurements at 8:30, visibility (determined by direct observa-
tion) was 100 m, and the Runway Visual Range (RVR) for RWY 01, measured by a 
transmissometer, was 300 m. The report concludes, however, that effective visibility 
could easily have been as low as 20…30 m in the area where the Aviaco DC-9 was 
taxiing [CIA84]. 
Instructed Taxi Route 
(Excerpt) 
Actual Taxi Route 
Accident 
Site 
Parking 
Position 
RWY 01-19 
RWY 33-15 
Northern 
Area 
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The investigation later found that the line connecting J and O-7 had not been re-
painted, and was thus somewhat faint, most likely not providing sufficient contrast 
to be clearly perceivable when the pavement was wet, as on the day of the accident. 
Given a visibility of only 20…30 m, it is likely that the flight crew was not able to see 
the lateral limits of the taxiway, and thus unable to realise that while they followed 
the only visible taxiway guidance line, they nonetheless ended up on the wrong 
taxiway. 
 
The actual taxi route in Figure 223 is consistent with the hypothesis that the Aviaco 
flight crew mistook J-1 for O-7, because they passed taxiway H-1, possibly regarding 
it as the O-7/H intersection, and then made a right turn onto RWY 01/19, taxiing 
towards the threshold of RWY 01, which corresponds to the bend in O-6. 
That the flight crew had difficulties to see the taxiway edge and any potential signs 
placed there is consistent with the observation that the captain later taxied the air-
craft off the centreline and close to the left edge of RWY01, allegedly to ensure that he 
did not miss any signs confirming they were indeed on O-6, because the flight crew 
apparently had not seen any signs after entering J-1, according to their exchange with 
ATC at 08:39:08. 
 
It seems that it must have dawned on the flight crew that they had inadvertently en-
tered an active runway approximately eight seconds before this ATC call, because 
the captain initiated a right turn on RWY 01/19, cf. Figure 223. The investigation re-
port speculates that the flight crew might have thought they had entered the runway 
via the unnamed taxiway, and were now desperately trying to vacate the runway via 
the area where taxiways G1 and G3 intersect RWY 01/19. Furthermore, at the time of 
the impact, the DC-9 had a true heading of 274°, which is consistent with this hy-
pothesis. The fact that the flight crew had realised that something was amiss regard-
ing their position would also explain the somewhat erratic and imprecise reply of the 
first officer to the ATC request at 08:39:08 to confirm position – he needed three at-
tempts to report heading correctly. However, the flight crew failed to communicate 
any considerations on their actual position and the reason for the manoeuvre the cap-
tain had obviously initiated to ATC. 
 
I-2.3 Probable Cause 
The undetected incursion of Aviaco Flight 134 onto RWY 01/19 was identified as 
cause of this accident by the investigation board, and bad visibility is cited as poten-
tial reason for the surface navigation error of the Aviaco flight crew.  
Furthermore, the board noted that there were no dedicated low-visibility taxi proce-
dures. The investigation board also criticized that the communication between ATC 
and Aviaco Flight 134 was minimalist, that the flight crew did not reply punctually 
and that the controller did not request clarification. Besides, the flight crew’s decision 
to take action, i.e. to initiate a turn on the runway, without informing ATC about the 
considerations leading to this decision, was disapproved by the board [CIA84]. 
 
 
 
I-2   DISORIENTATION IN THE FOG I: MADRID, DECEMBER 7TH, 1983 
  397 
I-2.4 Flight Deck Instrumentation Aspects & Conclusion 
 
AO 134 
From the preceding analysis, it is obvious that flight crew disorientation due to lim-
ited visibility eventually lead to this Runway Incursion. Disorientation was poten-
tially facilitated by a faded taxiway guidance line on wet pavement at the taxiway 
junction where the flight crew took a wrong turn. Since the DC-9 was not equipped 
with a CVR, it is not possible to determine the precise reasons for the disorientation 
and potential other crew-related factors (distraction, deficiencies in CRM, …) that 
may have influenced decision making. Likewise, any statements on the impact of 
potentially unserviceable airport lights would be highly speculative, because the ac-
tual status of airport lighting at the time of the accident is unknown. 
 
This accident shows how conventional airport navigation techniques fail under ad-
verse visibility conditions, even if the flight crew is familiar with an airport, which 
can be assumed for the Aviaco flight crew due to their background and due to the 
fact that they did not request any clarification of the minimalist taxi instructions they 
received. It is also noteworthy that the heading discrepancy between J-1 and O-7 was 
apparently not sufficiently large to catch the flight crew’s attention. On the runway 
itself, which is parallel to the second part of O-6, no heading discrepancy would be 
observable. 
 
Irrespective of the previous, an independent source of information on the aircraft’s 
position with respect to the airport layout could have supported the DC-9’s flight 
crew in airport navigation and prevented the inadvertent runway entry. 
In addition, a presentation of the assigned taxi route might have made the emerging 
discrepancy between the instructed and the actual taxi route more palpable. Last but 
not least, information or alerting that the runway they were approaching as a result 
of their navigation error was used by another aircraft might have beneficial.  
 
 
IB 350 
By contrast, the Iberia flight crew succeeded in taxiing their aircraft to the threshold 
of RWY01 without incident despite the fog, there was no disorientation involved. 
Nevertheless, due to the huge local variations in visibility that may occur in fog, it is 
possible that IB 350 taxied in visibility conditions still allowing them to maintain 
adequate external visual references to complete the surface navigation task success-
fully. 
 
However, the Iberia flight crew – like the controller – had no means of determining 
the presence of the Aviaco DC-9 on the runway. Consequently, a method of present-
ing the surrounding traffic in relation to the airport layout, potentially supplemented 
by traffic alerts, might have helped the crew to maintain adequate traffic awareness, 
and could have given them ample time to reject take-off and to prevent a collision. 
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I-3 Disorientation in Fog II: Anchorage, December 23rd, 1983 
 
While erroneously attempting to take off from RWY 24R at Anchorage International 
Airport on December 23rd, 1983, Korean Air Lines Flight 084, a scheduled cargo flight 
to Los Angeles, collided head-on with Southcentral Air Flight 59, a scheduled com-
muter flight to Kenai, Alaska, at 14:06 local time in IMC conditions, with fog prevail-
ing. Both aircraft, the Korean Air Lines DC-10 (HL7339) and the Southcentral Air 
Piper PA-31-350 (N35206), were destroyed, but there were no fatalities [NTS84]. 
 
I-3.1 Sequence of events 
At 13:39, the pilot of SCA 59, whose flight had been delayed for over an hour due to 
the weather conditions, requested taxi because the RVR had begun to improve. 
Given the choice between RWY 6L and 6R, the pilot elected the longer runway, 6L. 
At 13:44, the pilot of SCA 59 reported that he was holding short of RWY 6L on W-3 
(see Figure 224) and ready for departure as soon as the RVR had improved to the 
required 1,800 ft (550 m). In reply, the local controller promised that he would advise 
as soon as this condition was fulfilled. 
 
The flight crew of KAL 084 was also given a choice between two runways, RWY 6R 
or RWY 32, and the captain opted for the latter. At 13:57, KAL 084 was instructed to 
taxi to RWY 32. Since the ground controller could not observe KAL 084 taxiing due to 
the fog, he requested the flight to report entering the East-West taxiway, which the 
flight crew did at 14:01. The ground controller then advised KAL 084 to hold short of 
RWY 32 and to change to the local control frequency.  
 
At 14:03:36, the captain of KAL 084 reported to the local controller that he was taxi-
ing on the East-West taxiway and ready for departure, and was instructed to line up 
on RWY 32. Shortly thereafter, at 14:03:39, the local controller confirmed with the 
SCA 59 pilot that he was holding at W-3. After this communication, the local control-
ler cleared KAL 084 for take-off on RWY 32 at 14:04, which the captain acknowl-
edged. One minute and 28 seconds later, SCA 59 was instructed to line up on 
RWY 6R by the local controller, who reported that the RVR had risen to 1,800 ft. At 
14:06:18, the captain of KAL 084 transmitted that he was starting the take-off roll. 
 
Shortly thereafter, the captain of KAL 084, who had erroneously commenced take-off 
on RWY 24R, sighted the Piper aircraft lined up on RWY 6L and tried to evade it by 
rotating and applying left rudder. However, the centre and left main landing gear of 
the DC-10 hit the Piper, pushing it rearward on the runway and shearing off both of 
its wings. The DC-10 continued off the departure end of RWY 24R, demolished sev-
eral approach lights and rushed through a wooded area, down a gully and was de-
stroyed by an immediate fire when it finally came to a rest. 
 
The accident, which resulted in no fatalities, occurred around 14:06:40 during the 
hours of daylight. 
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I-3.2 Analysis 
 
Figure 224: Assigned taxi route and actual track of KAL 084 (after [NTS84]) 
 
In a post-accident interview, the pilot of SCA 59 told investigators that due to his fa-
miliarity with the airport and the slow taxi speed, he had not experienced any undue 
difficulties taxiing his aircraft in spite of the fog. Interestingly, however, other aircraft 
were encountering orientation problems: a Japan Airlines aircraft had erroneously 
started to enter W-3 while SCA 59 was holding there, mistaking it for W-4, the en-
trance to RWY 6R, but realised the error in time and turned back. 
 
Since the captain of KAL 084 had logged 73 take-offs and 78 landings at Anchorage 
International Airport in the 8½ years preceding the accident, he was by no means 
unfamiliar with it. However, due to the heavy ice fog, he experienced significant dif-
ficulties in tracking the taxiway centreline and in seeing the markings. When lining 
up on what he thought was RWY 32, the captain was unsure whether he was on the 
correct runway, and looked for identification markings, but could not see any. The 
first officer, however, felt confident that they were on the correct runway, and after 3 
to 4 minutes of discussion, the captain eventually decided to request clearance and to 
take off. 
After the accident, the first officer, who had accomplished 66 take-offs and landings 
at Anchorage within the previous 3¾ years, stated that he apparently lost his sense of 
direction in the dense fog and confused the East-West taxiway with the North-South 
taxiway. Accordingly, the DC-10 passed the intersection of W-1 and the East-West 
taxiway, with the crew erroneously believing that they were already on the East-
West taxiway, while they were in fact on W-1. 
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The accident investigation revealed that both taxiways W-1, W-2 and N-1 and RWY 
6L/24R were covered with a thin layer of snow, ice and frost at the time of the acci-
dent, rendering most of the markings unreadable. Additionally, the sign designating 
RWY 06L/24R (“D” in Figure 224) was found to be dirty, reducing the contrast be-
tween its background and lettering. Further deficiencies of the airport signage were 
that there was neither a sign designating W-1 nor a specific indication for the East-
West taxiway. Last but not least, one of the taxiway signs along the taxi route of KAL 
084 was unlit, and another sign was only partly lit due to deficient bulbs. Essentially, 
therefore the KAL 084 flight crew operated without external information to assist 
them while taxiing. 
 
With outside visual cues thus degraded and given the size of their aircraft, the Safety 
Board concluded that it was likely that the flight crew could not correctly perceive 
the difference between the 60° turn they actually made onto W-1 and the 100° turn 
required to turn onto the East-West taxiway as instructed. However, the flight crew 
failed to use their heading indicators to orient themselves. In this context, it is par-
ticularly surprising that they did not confirm their heading in the course of their dis-
cussion as to whether they were on the correct runway or not, which is a widely ac-
cepted method of accomplishing the procedurally required pre-take-off runway con-
firmation. The board was unable to obtain an explanation for this error and the poor 
decision making of the captain, who commenced take-off although he was not sure 
whether he was on the correct runway. In doing so, the captain failed to recognise 
that his familiarity with the airport was not sufficient to compensate for the limita-
tions in other sources of information. However, the investigation acknowledged that 
the obscuration of taxiway and runway markings at the airport may have had ad-
verse effects on the performance of the Korean Airlines flight crew by forcing them to 
give disproportionate attention to the location of runway markings. 
The Safety Board also acknowledged that the evasive manoeuvre performed by the 
captain of KAL 084 prevented extensive damage to the fuselage of the other aircraft 
and thus potentially fatal injuries to the occupants of both aircraft. 
 
I-3.3 Probable Cause 
The NTSB determined that the probable cause of the accident was the failure of the 
KAL 084 flight crew to follow accepted procedures during taxi. As a result, they be-
came disoriented while selecting the runway, but failed to use the compass to con-
firm their position, and decided to take off although they were not sure whether their 
aircraft was positioned on the correct runway. The disorientation itself was largely 
caused by the fog, which reduced visibility to a point where the pilots could not as-
certain their position visually, and the control tower personnel could not assist them. 
A further contributing factor was a lack of legible taxiway and runway signs at sev-
eral intersections passed by KAL 084 while taxiing [NTS84]. 
 
It is also noteworthy that, at the time of the accident, taxiway and runway signs were 
identical in both basic and lettering colour, and accordingly, the Safety Board rec-
ommended using a different set of colour for signs designating runways to increase 
the conspicuity of runway-related signs. 
I-3   DISORIENTATION IN FOG II: ANCHORAGE, DECEMBER 23RD, 1983 
  401 
I-3.4 Flight Deck Instrumentation Aspects & Conclusion 
 
Korean Air Lines Flight 084 
An independent source of aerodrome mapping information, indicating their air-
craft’s position in relation to the aerodrome, would almost certainly have prevented 
the disorientation by compensating for the lack of visual information due to visibility 
restrictions and deficiencies with airport signage or markings. 
Additionally, redundant information on the assigned taxi route, potentially including 
an advisory or alert upon deviation, might have been helpful in preventing this acci-
dent. Last but not least, both indications and an alert that the flight crew was com-
mencing take-off on a runway other than the one assigned by ATC could have of-
fered a last-resort opportunity to avoid this accident. While certainly helpful, addi-
tional information on the surrounding traffic would not have prevented an accident 
of KAL 084, since the available take-off distance on the erroneously chosen runway 
segment (2400 ft/730 m from the W-1 intersection to the departure end of RWY 24R) 
was much shorter than the 8150 ft (2500 m) required for a successful take-off. 
 
Southcentral Air Flight 59 
The flight crew of Southcentral Air Flight 59 successfully managed to taxi to the as-
signed runway in spite of the fog, there was no disorientation involved. However, an 
independent source of traffic information might have helped them to detect the in-
trusion of the Korean Airlines DC-10 onto the runway for which they were expected 
to receive a take-off clearance very soon, which would certainly have caused them to 
contact the controller. This, in turn, might have provided all parties involved with 
more margin to avert the emerging collision hazard. 
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I-4 Controller Coordination: Minneapolis, March 31st, 1985 
 
On March 31st, 1985, two Northwest Airlines DC-10’s nearly collided at the Minnea-
polis-St. Paul International Airport in Minnesota. This incident is particularly note-
worthy, since it spawned a special investigation on Runway Incursions by the NTSB 
after reported near-collisions had been on the rise for two years. The results of the 
special investigation are published in ref. [NTS86]. 
 
At around 21:04 (CST), Northwest Airlines Flight 51 (NW51) was cleared for take-off 
on RWY 29L by the local controller. About the same time, Northwest Airlines Flight 
65 (NW65) was instructed to cross RWY 29L at taxiway C, some 6,000 ft (1,830 m) 
from the approach end of the runway, by the ground controller. Both controllers 
failed to recognize the hazardous situation in time to take corrective action. NW51 
was in its take-off roll when the captain saw the other DC-10 crossing RWY 29L. The 
captain of NW51 averted a collision by rotating to a take-off attitude below the rec-
ommended rotation speed, lifting off prematurely and overflying NW65. Because of 
poor braking conditions and too little distance to stop his aircraft, he had no alterna-
tive. According to the captain’s estimate, NW51 cleared the other DC-10 by 50 to 75 
feet (15 to 23 m). 
In total, there were 501 persons aboard the two airplanes. There were no reported 
injuries, and neither airplane was damaged. At the time of the incident, as many as 
13 other air carrier aircraft were operating within 500 ft (150 m) of the intersection of 
RWY 29L and taxiway C [NTS86]. This illustrates the severity of this incident, which 
could easily have lead to a catastrophe surpassing the Tenerife disaster in the num-
ber of casualties. 
 
I-4.1 Sequence of events 
At the time of the incident, a recent snowstorm had passed through the Minneapolis 
area and left 14 inches (36 cm) of wet snow on the airport, and RWY 29R and several 
taxiways were still closed for snow removal. While RWY 4 was used for departures, 
NW51 requested departure from the longer RWY 29L, then in use for arrivals. Visi-
bility was 20 statute miles (32 km), there were a few clouds, and the braking action 
on RWY 29L had been reported as “fair” and “fair-to-poor”; for taxiway D, it had 
been classified as “nil”.  
 
At 20:50, NW65 had contacted the ground controller and been given instructions to 
taxi to RWY 4 and to hold short of RWY 29L. The crew acknowledged, and NW65 
was holding short of RWY 29L on taxiway C at 21:02, waiting to cross behind two 
other flights. NW51 was instructed to line up and wait on RWY 29L at 21:02:03 by the 
local controller. Almost simultaneously, the ground controller authorised NW755 
and Republic Airways Flight 79 to cross RWY 29L at taxiway C, and then NW65 
some 30 s later. Because the captain of NW65 was concerned that another landing 
airplane, NW815, might slide into his aircraft due to the poor braking conditions, he 
delayed crossing an additional 30 s while waiting for NW815 to clear the runway, but 
did not advise the ground controller he had done so. 
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At 21:03:43, the local controller transmitted to NW51, “NW51 heavy, RWY 29L, 
there’s traffic crossing downfield, fly the runway heading, cleared for take-off.” After 
NW755 and the Republic Airlines flight had crossed the runway, NW51 commenced 
its take-off roll. At the same time, NW65 started its delayed runway crossing. 
The captain of NW65 later stated that it appeared to him that another aircraft was 
holding on RWY 29L as his aircraft was entering the runway, and that he attempted 
to expedite the crossing when the second officer alerted him that that the other air-
plane was taking off. 
 
I-4.2 Analysis 
Safety Board investigators interviewed the controllers and determined that the coor-
dination between ground controller and local controller had failed due to incomplete 
or misunderstood communication regarding the runway crossing of NW65. The 
ground controller could neither recall the phraseology used nor whether he con-
veyed the number of airplanes he wanted to cross. The local controller stated that he 
thought that only two airplanes were approved to cross, but could not remember any 
phraseology or specific reason why he believed this. The Safety Board found that 
there were no written procedures for the coordination between controllers at the air-
port. 
The local controller realised the conflict when NW51 was already 500 to 2,000 ft (450 
to 600 m) into its take-off roll, when the ground controller gestured and yelled 
wildly, “Are you rolling?” However, no warning transmission to either aircraft was 
made. 
 
I-4.3 Probable Cause 
The incident was caused by the failure of the ground controller and the local control-
ler to coordinate the runway crossing of NW65 properly; the Safety Board does not 
mention any flight deck-related causal factors in its analysis of this incident. 
Controller workload may have been an issue, since traffic had been “steady, heavy 
and complex” for several hours due to weather-related delays, according to the local 
controller, and the ground controller stated he was “nearing the peak of what he 
could do.” In addition to his controller duties, the local controller also performed su-
pervisory functions as Controller in Command (CIC), and as such was responsible to 
request snow removal from the taxiways. At the time of the incident, two other con-
trollers on duty were permitted to have a break in spite of the high traffic volume. 
For this reason and, among others, because he failed to have a critical taxiway 
cleared from snow, the Safety Board concluded that the Local Controller made poor 
decisions in his CIC role. 
As a result of its investigation, the Safety Board issued safety recommendations, re-
questing the FAA to develop and implement specific procedures and standards for 
coordination between controllers regarding approval to cross active runways. 
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I-4.4 Flight Deck Instrumentation Aspects & Conclusion 
Disorientation was not a factor in this incident. However, this incident highlights 
once more the hazards associated with insufficient traffic awareness both in the 
cockpit and the tower. Furthermore, it shows that even compliance with ATC in-
structions may result in an extremely safety-critical situation, since the risk of a con-
troller error can never be fully excluded. 
 
NW 51 
Due to the prevailing night VMC conditions at the time of the incident, the flight 
crew of NW51 had no chance of visually detecting the other DC-10 sufficiently early 
to abort take-off.  
Present flight deck instrumentation does not offer reliable information on other traf-
fic on the runway. Consequently, an indication or an alert advising the flight crew of 
the presence of other traffic on the runway would have compensated for this defi-
ciency in traffic awareness, allowing the flight crew of NW51 to reject take-off much 
earlier and with more margin to resolve the situation, thus avoiding a potentially 
hazardous early rotation manoeuvre. 
 
NW 65 
The analysis on traffic situational awareness for NW51 generally also applies to 
NW65. When its flight crew first visually acquired the other DC-10, they could not 
positively determine whether the aircraft was lined up for take-off or had already 
commenced its take-off run. An indication or an alert attracting the flight crew’s at-
tention to the other traffic taking off on the runway they were just entering or cross-
ing might have allowed NW65 to expedite vacating RWY 29L earlier on. 
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I-5 Disorientation in the Fog III: Detroit, December 3rd, 1990 
 
On December 3rd, 1990, at 13:45 EST, Northwest Airlines (NWA) Flight 1482, a 
McDonnell Douglas DC-9, collided with NWA Flight 299, a Boeing 727, near the in-
tersection of runways 09/27 and 03C/21C in dense fog at Detroit Metropoli-
tan/Wayne County Airport (KDTW). The B-727 was on its take-off roll on RWY 3C, 
bound for Memphis, Tennessee, when it collided with the DC-9, which had inadver-
tently entered the runway when taxiing to departure for Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. 
Although the B-727 sustained substantial damage, none its 146 passengers and 8 
crew members were injured, but the DC-9 was destroyed by the collision and subse-
quent fire. Seven of its 40 passengers and one of its four crew members, a flight at-
tendant, were fatally injured [NTS91]. 
I-5.1 Sequence of events 
Due to an aircraft change, Flight 299 could not depart as scheduled at 12:10, but was 
delayed until 13:31, when pushback from Gate F11 commenced. The flight was ini-
tially instructed to taxi to RWY 3C via right turn from the gate, and to hold short of 
O-7, a taxiway short of the C concourse. Visibility was initially ¾ mile (1,200 m), but 
started deteriorating as the flight commenced taxiing. After transfer to the east 
ground controller near O-9, Flight 299 was instructed to taxi to RWY 3C via O-6 and 
Foxtrot, and to advise the controller when crossing RWY 9/27 (see Figure 225). Since 
the deteriorating weather was a concern, the flight crew checked the take-off mini-
mum for RWY 3C, which was ¼ mile (400 m) and thus coincided with the updated 
visibility information from ATIS Information Echo. While taxiing through the O-6 
area, they observed an NWA DC-9 taxiing eastbound on the Outer Taxiway toward 
O-4, which seemed to disappear into an area of even lower visibility. Shortly thereaf-
ter, they heard a discussion on their frequency concerning a taxiing aircraft missing 
the O-6 intersection. After crossing RWY 9/27 and reporting to the ground control-
ler, the B-727 continued on taxiway Foxtrot and started the No. 3 engine. Upon turn-
ing on taxiway X-Ray, ground control requested their position and transferred Flight 
299 to the local controller. At this time, the captain noted that he could see the end of 
the apron of RWY 3C, which was located approximately at a distance of 1,800 ft (550 
m). Simultaneously, the second officer commented that the weather was deteriorat-
ing significantly. The B-727 then stopped at the hold line for RWY 3C and reported 
ready for take-off at 13:44:08, for which they were cleared 7 seconds later. 
Since the Automatic Terminal Information Service (ATIS) reported the required visi-
bility and the captain had adequate visual reference of the runway centreline, the 
captain believed it was the correct decision to take off, and power was advanced at 
13:45:03, 48 s after the receipt of the take-off clearance. Five seconds into the take-off 
roll, the first officer remarked that visibility was definitely lower than a quarter mile. 
According to the flight crew, the aircraft entered an area of reduced visibility ap-
proximately as it accelerated through 100 knots. Suddenly, the DC-9 appeared on the 
right side of the runway ahead of the right wing of the B-727, and the captain forced 
the yoke to the left and slightly aft in a desperate attempt to avoid the collision. After 
the impact at 13:45:40, Flight 299 rejected take-off and stopped the aircraft with 
maximum braking. The collision occurred 1:20 min after the tower had cleared the B-
727 for take-off, and 32 seconds into the take-off roll. 
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Figure 225: Instructed and actual taxi route of Northwest Airlines 1482 (after [NTS91]) 
The DC-9’s captain had been off duty for an extended period of time due to medical 
reasons, and the accident flight was his first without supervision. After completing 
pre-start activities 40 minutes before the scheduled departure, the flight crew dis-
cussed their aviation backgrounds, expected flight duties and briefed for take-off. 
At 13:35:31, the DC-9, which was parked at Gate C18, was instructed to taxi to RWY 
3C, exiting the ramp at Oscar 6 (O-6). Like the B-727 flight crew, the DC-9’s pilots 
also experienced a further deterioration of visibility as they started to taxi. According 
to a statement by the first officer, visibility was very close to zero-zero, but the crew 
were able to intercept the taxiway centreline and to identify that they were abeam the 
fire station when ground control requested their position. At this point, the ground 
controller issued the following additional taxi instruction: “Roger, Northwest 1482, 
taxi Inner, Oscar 6, Fox, report making the, ah, right turn on X-Ray”. As the green 
dashed line in Figure 225 shows, NWA 1482 was thus instructed to take essentially 
the same route to the runway as NWA 299. 
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Approximately 30 seconds later, the first officer advised the captain to make a left 
turn (see “1” in Figure 225), but although the captain expressed some doubts, the air-
craft made a swerve to the left to intercept the Inner Taxiway. The flight crew, at 
13:39:22, configured flaps for take-off and read the first six items of the take-off 
checklist (2).  
 
At some point, however, the DC-9’s flight crew became increasingly uncertain of 
their position and eventually realised they had missed taxiway O-6 when the first 
officer saw a sign pointing to O-6 behind him. From the subsequent communication 
with ATC, it is obvious that there was disorientation, since the first officer stated (3) 
that they “… see a sign here that says, a, the arrows to Oscar 5. I think we are on Fox-
trot now.” The controller replied, “Northwest 1482, ah, you just approach[ed] Oscar 5 
and you are on the Outer?”, which the first officer confirmed. Ground control then 
amended the original taxi route and instructed Northwest 1482 to continue to Oscar 4 
and to make a right turn on X-Ray. Taxiing very slowly, the captain then continued 
to taxi eastbound on the Outer TWY in a visibility of approximately 500 … 600 ft. As 
the airplane was nearing the Outer/Oscar 4 intersection around 13:42, the conversa-
tion between the flight crew reveals that they were increasingly confused about their 
position (4). Eventually, somewhat misled by the directions of the first officer, the 
captain did not turn right onto X-Ray, but ended up on O-4 instead. With doubts 
about their position, the captain of the DC-9 eventually set the parking brake (5) and 
told the first officer at 13:43:35 to contact the ground controller, “Give him a call and 
tell him that, ah, we can’t see nothin’ out here.” However, the first officer failed to 
comply with this request, and reported that he believed they were holding short of 
RWY 9/27 on taxiway X-Ray when the controller asked the flight to confirm its posi-
tion 10 seconds later. In spite of the positional uncertainty, the crew continued taxi-
ing and eventually intruded into the runway intersection inadvertently, confused 
where RWY 9/27 they were supposed to cross actually was and where they actually 
were, but the first officer did not react to a second request of the captain to tell the 
controller they were stuck, either (6). 
When the captain observed a white light to his left, he realised that they might be on 
an active runway, taxied the aircraft to the left edge of the runway, and decided to 
call the ground controller himself at 13:44:47, approximately 17 seconds before the 
other aircraft started its take-off run. After an unsuccessful first attempt, the captain 
related his concern that they might be on RWY 21C, but were not sure due to the fog, 
to the ground controller (7), who instructed them to vacate the runway immediately 
at 13:45:33, seven seconds prior to the collision. Simultaneously, by checking the 
heading indicator, the first officer realised that they were indeed on RWY 21C, and 
made affirmative statements while the captain talked to the ground controller. 
 
I-5.2 Analysis 
Given the actual visibility conditions, which were below minimums, the Boeing 727 
(NWA 299) should not have taken off. The fact that the visibility was actually lower 
than specified in the ATIS was independently observed by both an off-duty control-
ler and the B-727’s first officer. Due to her observation, the off-duty controller asked 
the local controller whether he wanted to change the visibility. The local controller, 
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however, who had made his observation without the required reference chart, re-
fused. Likewise, five seconds after the take-off roll had begun, the first officer re-
marked, “Definitely not a quarter mile, but ah, at least they’re callin’ it.” In fact, the 
NTSB investigation revealed that visibility was varying and partially as low as 100 ft 
(30 m). 
 
Along with low visibility, inadequate signage and markings significantly contributed 
to the DC-9 flight crew’s disorientation. The taxiway centreline of the Inner Taxiway 
was observed to be “very faded” to “not visible” in the Oscar 6 (O-6) area by the inves-
tigation even in daytime VFR conditions. Likewise, on the Outer Taxiway, the centre-
line was also faded between O-6 and O-4, and due to recent pavement works, 50 ft 
(15 m) were entirely missing in the vicinity of O-5; it turned out that repainting only 
took place twice a year. Nonetheless, the first officer’s remark that he believed they 
were on taxiway F shows serious deficiencies in his familiarity with the airport lay-
out, because there is no intersection of F and O-5; a close look at the airport diagram 
would have told him so. In this context, the Safety Board argued that the pilots could 
have studied the airport diagram more thoroughly prior to taxi. 
Unfortunately, the ground controller’s instruction to continue to O-4 and to make a 
right turn on X-Ray was imprecise and thus potentially confusing to the already 
somewhat disorientated DC-9 flight crew, because it was not necessary to proceed up 
to the centreline of O-4 to accomplish the right turn onto X-Ray. Moreover, it would 
have been more prudent of the ground controller, given the visibility and the appar-
ent orientation problems of the flight crew, to keep the DC-9 away from the O-4 area, 
which was known as a Runway Incursion hotspot. In fact, as a result of the accident, 
the part of O-4 between the Outer Taxiway and the runway intersection was perma-
nently removed in September 1991. 
Near O-4, in the area where the critical disorientation leading to the accident oc-
curred, even the investigators were unable to agree on the precise taxiway segment 
identifications after reading the available signs in daytime VFR conditions and in the 
absence of any time pressure. Furthermore, since the so-called wig-wag, a pair of al-
ternating lights on the edge of the taxiway at the runway holding position, was un-
serviceable, it could not serve as a warning to the DC-9’s flight crew that they were 
about to enter an active runway. Additionally, the large spacing of RWY 3C/21C 
edge lights - 584 ft (178 m) near the runway intersection with O-4 - and the fact that 
centreline lights were not illuminated at the time of the accident initially prevented 
the DC-9’s flight crew from realising they had intruded an active runway. 
In conclusion, compliance with the controller’s instruction to proceed to O-4 almost 
necessarily lead the DC-9’s flight crew to the runway intersection. However, both the 
captain and the first officer consistently failed to cross-check their aircraft’s heading 
with the headings of their taxiway routing. Consequently, neither pilot realised that 
their heading of 160° could only mean they were on O-4, heading for the runway in-
tersection, and not on X-Ray.  
 
Potentially due to his long absence, the captain overly relied on the first officer, 
which eventually led to a de-facto roll reversal and a breakdown of CRM. The first 
officer encouraged this reversal by misleading the captain regarding his familiarity 
with the airport, and by somewhat exaggerating his accomplishments during his 
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previous career as a military pilot. While he had been an experienced B-52 com-
mander and instructor, his claims that he had ejected from airplanes twice and re-
tired from the Air Force as a Lieutenant Colonel could not be substantiated by his 
military records, which showed that he retired in the rank of a Major. 
Additionally, he failed to follow the captain’s instructions three times. As an exam-
ple, when the captain started asking the first officer, noticing the latter’s uncertainty 
about their position, to tell ATC that they were not sure where they were (5), the first 
officer simply interrupted him with additional directions and did not comply. This 
non-compliance of the first officer with the captain’s requests possibly prevented 
timely controller action to advise the Boeing 727 to abort its take-off run. Likewise, 
although the first officer was not sure of their position, he did not advise the captain 
of his concerns, but rather continued giving directions to the captain, thus suggesting 
that he knew what he was doing. 
On the other hand, the captain could have realised particularly from the aforemen-
tioned statement on taxiway Foxtrot that they were lost, and stopped the aircraft to 
request detailed and progressive taxi instructions. But the captain was probably fully 
occupied steering the aircraft, maintaining the centreline and looking for airport 
signs. The Safety Board believes that the flight crew eventually totally relied on the 
airport signage, and made no further attempt to consult the airport diagram. Al-
though the captain had a Jeppesen airport diagram on his left side panel, it was diffi-
cult or impossible for him to consult it in this sub-optimum location while using the 
nose wheel tiller to steer the airplane. 
 
Visibility was so poor at the runway intersection that neither airplane had a chance 
to visually acquire and avoid the other prior to the collision. But although the DC-9’s 
captain questioned his position a full 53 seconds before the collision, i.e. several sec-
onds before the other aircraft initiated its take-off roll, neither he or the first officer 
advised the ground controller of their uncertainty. 
Likewise, the ground controller missed several options to resolved the flight crew’s 
confusion, and did not take timely action to alert his colleagues once he had realised 
the DC-9 might have taxied onto the active runway. When the ground controller is-
sued his warning that there was probably an aircraft on the active runway, the local 
controller decided not to issue a warning because he (erroneously) assumed that the 
B-727 was already airborne. The Safety Board also concluded that the presence of 
advanced surface radar might have prevented the accident. 
 
I-5.3 Probable Cause 
The NTSB determined that the probable cause of the accident was a lack of proper 
crew coordination, including a virtual role reversal by the DC-9 pilots, which led to 
their failure to stop taxiing their airplane and alert the ground controller of their po-
sitional uncertainty in a timely manner, both before and after intruding onto the ac-
tive runway. Deficiencies in ATC services were cited as contributory factors, such as 
inadequate visibility observations, the failure to use progressive taxi instructions in a 
low-visibility environment, the issuance of inappropriate and confusing taxi instruc-
tions, and the ground controller’s failure to advise the local controller of the potential 
Runway Incursion in a timely fashion. Furthermore, deficiencies in surface markings, 
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signs and lightings as well as the absence of CRM training at Northwest Airlines con-
tributed to the accident. In particular, the Safety Board concluded that the placement 
of taxiway signs, the conspicuity of taxiway markings and runway lighting were in-
adequate at the time of the accident, particularly at the intersection of O-4 and the 
two runways, which had been recognised as a danger before. 
In the wake of the accident, the NTSB issued several safety recommendations in the 
domain of airport markings and lighting, crew resource management and the more 
widespread use of progressive taxi instructions. Among others, the NTSB recom-
mended the use of reflective paint for all airport markings and a better designation of 
complex runway intersections. 
 
I-5.4 Flight Deck Instrumentation Aspects & Conclusion 
 
NWA 1482 
Deficient signage in the area where the DC-9 eventually entered the active runway 
deprived the flight crew of essential information required to detect their incursion 
and to regain position awareness. An unserviceable wig-wag, a gap in RWY edge 
lighting and a non-illuminated RWY centreline made it virtually impossible for the 
flight crew to detect their error on time. 
Although the controller noticed very early that the DC-9’s flight crew had difficulties 
in finding their way under these foggy conditions, he complicated the already disori-
ented crew’s surface navigation task by routing them through one of the most com-
plex intersections of the airport, instead of attempting to find a more simple routing. 
Of course, the deficiencies in Crew Resource Management (CRM) and the role rever-
sion between the captain and the first officer were significant factors facilitating dis-
orientation. 
Irrespective of the previous, an independent source of aerodrome mapping informa-
tion could have supported the DC-9’s flight crew in airport navigation and prevented 
the inadvertent runway entry. Additionally, information on the assigned taxi route 
and potential deviations from it might have been helpful. Last but not least, an advi-
sory or alert of some form indicating that another aircraft was taking off on the run-
way they had just entered could potentially have contributed to preventing the colli-
sion by giving the DC-9’s flight crew more time to vacate the runway. 
 
NWA 299 
The flight crew of the B727 succeeded in maintaining awareness of their position de-
spite the visibility at all times, but in the prevailing conditions had no chance of de-
tecting the presence of the DC-9 early enough to avert a collision. 
A function providing them with information on other traffic, indicating the presence 
of the disoriented DC-9 on the runway they intended to use for take-off, would most 
certainly have lead to a different decision whether to commence take-off or not. 
Essentially, this accident is exemplary of how conventional surface navigation and 
traffic acquisition are prone to failure once external references are no longer available 
due to visibility limitations. This accident also serves as a reminder that visibility in 
fog is not homogeneous, but may show significant variations over relatively small 
distances. 
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I-6 Fatal Controller Error: Los Angeles, February 1st, 1991 
 
While landing on RWY 24L at Los Angeles International Airport (KLAX) on Febru-
ary 1st, 1991, USAir Flight 1493 from Columbus/Ohio, a Boeing 737-300 (N388US), 
collided with Skywest Flight 5569 to Palmdale/California, a Fairchild Metroliner 
(N683AV), which was lined up on the same runway at the intersection with taxiway 
45, waiting for its take-off clearance. The accident occurred in night VMC conditions 
at 18:07 local time, and killed all 12 persons aboard the Metroliner. Moreover, the 
captain, a flight attendant and 20 of the 89 passengers aboard the Boeing 737 sus-
tained fatal injuries. Both aircraft were destroyed by the impact forces and a post-
crash fire [NTS91a]. 
 
I-6.1 Sequence of events 
Upon arrival into the Los Angeles area after an uneventful flight, USA 1493 was 
cleared for the CIVET Two Profile Descent to KLAX, and, while descending on this 
profile, instructed to perform an Instrument Landing System (ILS) approach to RWY 
24R at 17:57:28. When, at 17:59, ATC inquired whether they had the airport in sight, 
the captain confirmed. Both flight crew members were able to distinguish the airport 
environment and some runways from a distance of approximately 25 miles (40 km). 
At 17:59:06, therefore, the approach radar controller cleared USA 1493 for a visual 
approach to RWY 24L. The captain acknowledged and, at 17:59:57, asked ATC to re-
confirm that “the visual approach for USA 1493 is to 24L.” Using the ILS of RWY 24R 
for vertical flight path guidance, the first officer then performed the visual approach 
to RWY 24L, for which neither Visual Approach Slope Indicator (VASI) nor ILS were 
available at the time. At 18:03:05, when approximately 10 km from the threshold of 
RWY 24L, USA 1493 was transferred to Los Angeles tower. 
Approximately 5 minutes earlier, around 17:58, Skywest Flight 5569 had commenced 
taxiing from Gate 32 at Terminal 6 to RWY 24L, as shown in Figure 226. At 18:03:38, 
SKW 5569 contacted Los Angeles Tower to request take-off on RWY 24L from the 
intersection with taxiway 45. Intersection take-offs were commonly used by com-
muter aircraft at KLAX, and the local controller advised the flight to “taxi up to and 
hold short of two four left.” SKW 5569 acknowledged and proceeded to the hold-
short line. 
 
Less than a minute later, at 18:04:33, the captain of USA 1493 initiated radio commu-
nication with the tower and reported the flight’s position. His transmission, although 
received, was not acknowledged by the local controller, who at 18:04:44 approved the 
Skywest flight to line up and wait, “Skywest five sixty nine taxi into position and 
hold RWY 24L, traffic will cross downfield.” The Skywest flight crew acknowledged 
and complied with this instruction. 
The traffic the local controller was referring to was Wings West 5006, which was 
waiting for approval to cross RWY 24L at taxiway 52, but the flight crew had unin-
tentionally departed from the tower frequency, resulting in a delay to the planned 
crossing until the Wings West crew had discovered their error and returned to the 
tower frequency. Wings West 5006 was eventually approved to cross RWY 24L at 
18:05:16. 
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At 18:05:29, the captain of USA 1493 made a second radio call to the local controller. 
After an exchange with Skywest Flight 246, which had just taken off, the controller 
confirmed with Southwest Flight 725 that they were still holding short off RWY 24L, 
before she eventually cleared USA 1493 to land on RWY 24L at 18:05:53. Two seconds 
later, the USAir captain acknowledged. At this time, Skywest Flight 5569 was still 
waiting for its take-off clearance on RWY 24L. The local controller, however, diverted 
her attention to another landing US Airways flight (USA 2858), the Southwest B-737 
(SWA 725) and Wings West Flight 5072 (see Figure 226), which had reported ready 
for take-off at 18:06:08. By error, the controller had received no flight progress strip 
for WW 5072, requiring her to communicate with both WW 5072 and her supervisor 
to resolve the issue. 
 
 
Figure 226: Location of the accident site at Los Angeles Airport [NTS91a] 
In the meantime, the first officer had landed USA 1493 on RWY 24L, and while de-
ploying thrust reversers and slowly de-rotating, he suddenly observed another air-
craft on the runway immediately in front of and below him. There was insufficient 
time for evasive action, and although he immediately applied the brakes, his B-737 
collided with the Metroliner when its nose wheel made contact with the runway, re-
sulting in an immediate explosion and fire upon impact. 
After the collision, the Boeing 737 and the part of the Metroliner that had been 
crushed beneath the left side of the B-737 slid 600 ft (180 m) down the runway before 
veering left, off the runway and across a taxiway, eventually impacting an unoccu-
pied fire station, approximately 1,200 ft (365 m) from the collision site. The collision 
with the building destroyed the left side of the Boeing’s cockpit, killing the captain. 
N 
WW 5072 SWA 725 
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I-6.2 Analysis 
At the time of the accident, the local controller had seven aircraft on her frequency, 
resulting, according to herself, in a light to moderate traffic workload and complex-
ity. However, the repeated attempts of the controller to re-establish contact with 
Wings West 5006 created additional workload, and subsequent unnecessary commu-
nication with the flight was apparently distracting. The Safety Board concluded that 
the controller became preoccupied during communication with Wings West 5006 and 
forgot that the Skywest Metroliner was still waiting for the take-off clearance. From 
the controller’s communication with Wings West 5072, which called for take-off at 
18:06:08, it is apparent that she confused this other Metroliner with Skywest Flight 
5569, because she immediately asked the Wings West flight crew whether they were 
“at forty-seven or full length.” Due to the misidentification of Wings West 5072, and 
the reconfirmation with Southwest Flight 725 that they were still holding short, the 
local controller believed RWY 24L was clear, and the search for the flight strip of 
WW 5072 she initiated resulted in further distraction from scanning the runway. 
 
Besides, because the corresponding indicator at her position was out of service, the 
Airport Surface Detection Equipment (ASDE) radar system was not available to the 
local controller, although the FAA Air Traffic Service had mandated in 1986 that 
ASDE – where available – should be used between sunset and sunrise, irrespective of 
visibility conditions. The investigation revealed, however, that the ASDE at KLAX 
had been plagued by several prolonged outages due to the spare parts and support 
situation in the year prior to the accident. Furthermore, visibility of the collision site 
from the tower cab was impaired due to light pollution from Terminal 2 light fixtures 
producing glare. 
While the NTSB investigation was unable to determine whether ASDE availability 
would have prevented the accident, the facility procedures in place at Los Angeles 
International Airport at the time of the accident were severely criticised, because they 
“did not allow for lapses in judgement and decision making and removed human performance 
redundancies,” resulting in a situation with compelling distractions that was “abnor-
mally burdensome.” As an example, the procedures in effect at the time of the accident 
allowed taxiing aircraft to communicate randomly with the local controller on the 
tower frequency, precluding prior notification from the ground controller. The local 
controller would then have to select the flight strip of the calling aircraft and to de-
termine its position. 
 
I-6.3 Probable Cause 
In determining the probable cause, the Safety Board was driven by the spirit that de-
signers and operators of complex systems who fail to fully implement required de-
sign features and operating procedures, thus allowing a single individual to assume 
the full burden for safety-critical operations, must share responsibility for occasional 
human performance errors. 
 
Consequently, the NTSB determined that the probable cause of the accident was the 
failure of the Los Angeles Air Traffic Facility Management to implement procedures 
providing redundancy as required by the applicable U.S. standards. Combined with 
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additional organisational deficiencies, this created an environment in the tower that 
ultimately led to the failure of the local controller to maintain awareness of the traffic 
situation, “culminating in the inappropriate clearances and the subsequent collision of the 
USAir and Skywest aircraft.” 
 
I-6.4 Flight Deck Instrumentation Aspects & Conclusion 
There was no disorientation involved in this accident, and airport familiarity was not 
an issue for either flight crew, because both crews routinely flew to Los Angeles Air-
port. The most important conclusion to be drawn with respect to flight crew human 
factors and flight deck instrumentation concerns aircraft conspicuity. Post-accident 
aircraft lighting tests performed on RWY 24L with an identical Metroliner revealed 
that the aircraft’s white tail navigation light blended with the runway centreline 
lighting, and that the red anti-collision beacon was not as conspicuous as anticipated. 
Due to variety of lights on the airport surface, combined with the runway lights, air-
craft and runway lights tended to blend together perceptually, making the aircraft 
virtually indistinguishable particularly from directly behind and above, i.e. another 
approaching aircraft. Consequently, the USAir flight crew had virtually no chance of 
detecting the other aircraft through visual observation.  
The investigation found that aircraft external lighting standards are primarily driven 
by and tailored to in-flight conspicuity needs, and that no effort had been made by 
the FAA to address aircraft conspicuity on airport surfaces. Therefore, the NTSB rec-
ommended to study potential aircraft conspicuity enhancements, such as the general 
use of high-intensity strobe and logo lighting [NTS91a]. However, although the 
Metroliner was not equipped with the high-energy strobes used in most air carrier 
aircraft, which might have increased its conspicuity, it must be noted that strobes 
may be turned off when their reflections are deemed disturbing, e.g. particularly in 
fog. 
 
Therefore, a method of providing independent information on traffic in the runway 
environment, potentially supplemented by alerting, might have prevented this acci-
dent. Likewise, a traffic awareness or advisory device might have enabled the Metro-
liner flight crew to realise that another aircraft was on the approach to the same run-
way they were lined up on. 
A procedural change after the accident, forbidding intersection take-offs between 
sunset and sunrise, or whenever the intersection is not visible from tower, may help 
to prevent copycat accidents, but does not resolve the aircraft conspicuity and associ-
ated traffic awareness issue. 
 
Another aspect relates to the use of phraseology. The Safety Board found that several 
of the pilot transmissions at Los Angeles International Airport around the time of the 
accident lacked the specificity required, and voiced a concern that the use of non-
standard words and conversational phraseology precipitates misunderstanding be-
tween pilots and controllers. In this context, the NTSB also observed a lack of stan-
dard phraseology for requesting and instructing intersection take-offs in the corre-
sponding standards. 
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I-7 On the Wrong Runway: St. Louis, November 22nd, 1994 
 
In a clear night on November 22nd, 1994, at 22:03 local time, Trans World Airlines 
(TWA) Flight 427, a McDonnell Douglas DC-9-82 (MD-82), registered N954U, col-
lided with a Cessna 441, N441KM, at the intersection of RWY 30R and taxiway R at 
the Lambert-St. Louis International Airport (KSTL) in Bridgeton, Missouri. While all 
132 passengers and eight flight crew members aboard the MD-82 survived and only 
eight passengers incurred minor injuries during the evacuation after the accident, 
both occupants aboard the Cessna, the commercial pilot and a colleague of his in the 
co-pilot seat, who was rated as a private pilot, sustained fatal traumatic injuries. 
I-7.1 Sequence of events 
The MD-82 was scheduled to depart St. Louis for Denver at 21:34, but due to a small 
delay at the gate, the airplane was pushed back approximately 15 minutes late. Oth-
erwise ground operations were routine, and the flight crew received instructions to 
taxi to RWY 30R for departure. At 22:01, while the MD-82 was taxiing southeast on 
taxiway P (see Figure 227), the first officer advised local controller that they were 
ready for take-off on RWY 30R. Shortly thereafter, at 22:01:23, the local controller 
cleared the MD-82 for take-off on RWY 30R, with instructions to fly a heading of 
335°. The TWA first officer confirmed the assigned heading, and the airplane lined 
up on RWY 30R. 
The Cessna had arrived from Iron Mountain with a single revenue passenger around 
21:40 on RWY 30R, and after dropping her off at Midcoast on the General Aviation 
ramp and preparing the repositioning flight back to Iron Mountain, the Cessna pilot 
reported ready for taxi at 21:58. The ground controller instructed him to “back-taxi 
into position hold RWY 31” and to advise on the ground control frequency when 
ready for departure, which the pilot acknowledged. At 22:02:29, the Cessna pilot ad-
vised the local controller that he was ready for departure “on the right side” without 
specifying a runway. 
About the same time, the MD-82 began its take-off roll with the first officer at the 
controls. Approximately 2-3 seconds after the captain had made the 80-knot callout, 
an additional crew member occupying the jumpseat yelled, “There’s an airplane!” 
Both the captain and the first officer later stated that they saw the aircraft on the 
runway in front of them at almost the same instant that the additional crew member 
alerted them, and applied brakes. Additionally, the captain applied the rudder to 
steer the airplane to the left in a last-resort attempt to avoid the Cessna 441. How-
ever, another 2-3 seconds after spotting the other aircraft, they felt an impact on the 
right side and aborted take-off [NTS95]. 
 
I-7.2 Analysis 
According to the three flight crew members aboard the MD-82, they did not observe 
the other airplane or its position lights at any point during their take-off roll. Rather, 
they first saw the Cessna when it was illuminated by the lights from their aircraft. In 
accordance with normal procedures, the MD-82 had all external lighting on at the 
time of the accident. Runway lighting was normal for RWY 30R at STL, and included 
runway edge, centreline, and touchdown zone lighting. 
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Ground scars and physical 
evidence indicated that the 
Cessna 441 was located al-
most directly on the runway 
centreline, whereas the MD-82 
had veered slightly to its left 
when the collision occurred. 
The right wing of the MD-82 
struck the tail cone and fuse-
lage structure of the Cessna 
441, separating the horizontal 
and vertical stabilizers, and 
shearing off the top of cockpit 
and fuselage. 
Airplane conspicuity tests performed as part of the investigation revealed that both 
aircraft navigation and taxi lights often blended with other airport lights, rendering 
visual acquisition difficult. Only the wing-mounted high-energy anticollision/strobe 
lights were effective at improving airplane conspicuity. Likewise, the landing lights 
were found to be effective for visibility in any situation. However, when these were 
turned off, even observers who knew its approximate position had difficulties in 
visually acquiring it. 
Nonetheless, the key question in this accident is why the Cessna pilot taxied to RWY 
30R instead of RWY 31 as instructed, all the more as the pilot was described as con-
scientious and safety-oriented. 
Therefore, the Safety Board studied various scenarios why the Cessna pilot eventu-
ally intruded into RWY 30R. While the late time of the day and his expressed desire 
to go home may have played a role, the board dismissed the idea that the Cessna pi-
lot was disoriented, because he had been to the airport once before, in January 1994 
during a daytime flight. Additionally, the revenue passenger, who had flown with 
the pilot several times, reported that the pilot always taxied with an airport diagram 
and stopped his aircraft when uncertain of his position. Consequently, according to 
the NTSB, the pilot was probably rather pre-occupied by the idea that he would de-
part from RWY 30R, the runway he had landed on, than disoriented. 
Factors that may have encouraged this belief include that the ATIS broadcast at the 
time of the accident did not contain any reference to the occasional usage of RWY 31 
for departures. Additionally, all aircraft taking off or landing during the brief turn-
around of the Cessna used either RWY 30L or RWY 30R. Since RWY 13/31 was actu-
ally a converted taxiway and still mainly used for that purpose, and only occasion-
ally used as a “reliever” runway for General Aviation and commuter operations, it 
had the same width as the taxiways, and its lighting was dimmed compared to RWY 
30L and RWY 30R. When he taxied to the Midcoast facilities after arrival on RWY 
30R, the Cessna pilot did not receive any approval to cross RWY 31, which was, 
unlike the other runways, typically under the ground controller’s responsibility until 
an aircraft required a take-off clearance. Furthermore, the investigation revealed that 
the displayed threshold markings of RWY 31 could have misled the pilot. 
All of this may have fostered the Cessna pilot’s erroneous impression that he was 
supposed to take off from RWY 30R. However, since he had neither requested nor 
  
Figure 227: Taxi routes of TWA 427 and N441KM 
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been advised of an intersection take-off, the NTSB believes that he should not have 
entered RWY 30R at the intersection without confirming with the controller. 
A further aspect is that the ground controller used non-standard phraseology when 
instructing the Cessna pilot to taxi to RWY 31, thus potentially allowing for ambigui-
ties. Nonetheless, he clearly mentioned RWY 31 in two transmissions. Although the 
Cessna pilot failed to read back the assigned runway both times, he did not give any 
indication of uncertainty, thus creating an illusion of effective communication, when 
in fact he had apparently misunderstood the ground controller’s intentions and acted 
on the preconceived idea that he was to take off from RWY 30R. 
The investigation determined that an operational ground radar would have given the 
local controller an opportunity to detect the Cessna near the intersection of RWY 30R 
and R before issuing a take-off clearance to the TWA flight and might thus have pre-
vented the accident by compensation for the Cessna’s poor visual conspicuity. 
 
I-7.3 Probable Cause 
The NTSB dismissed the idea that the Cessna pilot was disoriented and thus deter-
mined that the probable cause of this accident was the Cessna 441 pilot’s mistaken 
belief that RWY 30R was his assigned departure runway, which eventually resulted 
in his undetected intrusion onto that runway while the MD-82 was taking off.  
Contributing to the accident was the lack of ATIS and other ATC information regard-
ing the occasional use of RWY 31 for departure. 
 
I-7.4 Flight Deck Instrumentation Aspects & Conclusion 
While disorientation cannot be fully excluded in this accident, it is rather improbable 
that it played a substantial role. Traffic visual detectability and traffic awareness, 
ATC intentions and operational configuration of the aerodrome are the essential 
flight-deck related factors in this accident. 
 
TWA 427 
 The TWA flight crew was fully aware of their position on the airport and the as-
signed taxi route. 
 The TWA flight crew had only minimal chances to detect the Cessna on the run-
way due to the relative intensities of aircraft and runway lighting as well as the 
low cross-section of the Cessna when viewed from behind along the runway axis. 
 Consequently, a presentation of runway traffic in the cockpit and/or an alerting 
system indicating the presence of traffic on the runway would most likely have 
prevented the TWA crew from commencing take-off. 
 
N441KM 
 A way of conveying information on the intended take-off runway from the con-
troller to the pilot in an intuitive, unambiguous fashion could have prevented this 
accident; the present method failed in this case, eventually causing the accident. 
 An indication and/or alert that another aircraft was attempting take-off from the 
same runway might potentially have prompted the pilot to vacate the runway on 
time to avoid a collision. 
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I-8 Communication Problems: Paris CDG, May 25th, 2000 
 
While lining up for an intersection take-off on RWY 27 at Paris Charles-de-Gaulle 
Airport (LFPG) in night visual meteorological conditions, a Streamline Aviation 
Shorts 330 (G-SSWN) operating on a mail flight to Luton collided with an Air Liberté 
McDonnell Douglas MD-83 (F-GHED), which was in its take-off roll as Flight 8807 to 
Madrid. At 0:52, at a speed of about 155 knots, the left wing of MD-83 slashed 
through the cockpit of the Shorts plane, immediately killing first officer and injuring 
the captain. After the collision, the MD-83 successfully rejected take-off; none of its 6 
crew members or 151 passengers were injured. The left wingtip of the MD-83 was 
damaged; the cockpit of the Shorts 330 was partially destroyed [BEA01]. 
 
I-8.1 Sequence of events 
The MD-83, call sign Liberté 8807, left its parking stand Y4 at Terminal 1 and was 
instructed to taxi to holding point RWY 27 at 0:12:40 (UTC). However, a technical 
problem resulting in the loss of auto-throttle forced the flight crew to wait on taxi-
way Q. 
While the MD-83’s crew was attempting to solve its problem, the Shorts 330, callsign 
Streamline 200, was departing cargo stand N51 and instructed to proceed to RWY 27 
at 0:38:25. Six minutes later, the ground controller asked the Shorts flight crew 
whether they wished to perform an intersection take-off. The crew requested taxiway 
16, which was granted and noted on the appropriate flight strip, but the ground con-
troller did not verbally coordinate this with the local controller, an ENAC148 instruc-
tor re-familiarizing himself with LFPG operations to maintain proficiency. 
 
With the technical problem under control, the Air Liberté flight was instructed to 
contact the local controller at 0:47:10, while the aircraft was taxiing down taxiway Q 
towards the threshold of RWY 27. After several exchanges with the local controller 
regarding the departure to be used, the Liberté 8807 was approved to line up and 
wait on RWY 27 after a Boeing 737 (AEA 941) on final approach at 0:48:37. Three sec-
onds later, Streamline 200 was also transferred to the tower frequency. 
 
Shortly after, at 0:50:45, the B-737 vacated RWY 27 via taxiway 10, thus passing in 
front of the Shorts 330. At 0:50:52 the tower controller cleared the MD-83 for take-off 
in French, “Liberté 8807, autorisé au décollage 27, 230, 10 à 15 kts.” Immediately af-
terwards, at 0:50:57, the Shorts 330 received the instruction to line up on RWY 27, 
“Stream Line 200, line up RWY 27 and wait, number two.” 
The Streamline crew taxied onto the runway, looking for “number 1” just as the 
MD-83 was approaching. Shortly before impact, the Shorts 330 Captain noticed the 
other aircraft’s beacon lights and braked. Approximately two seconds before the im-
pact, the Air Liberté crew also noticed the Shorts 330 on the edge of the runway as 
the aircraft was passing VR. At 0:52:01, the left wing of the MD-83 collided with the 
right propeller and subsequently cut through the Shorts 330 cockpit. Aborting take-
off, the Air Liberté flight informed ATC that they had just hit another aircraft. 
                                                 
148 École Nationale de l’Aviation Civile, a national French aviation academy offering, among others, basic training 
courses for ATC controllers. 
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I-8.2 Analysis 
 
Figure 228: Radar-derived trajectories of Shorts 330 and MD-83 (after [BEA01]) 
 
As a result of the incomplete coordination between controllers, the local controller 
developed an erroneous mental picture of the traffic situation, and believed that 
Streamline 200 was somewhere behind the Air Liberté flight, assuming Streamline 
200 would line up behind - instead of in front of - the MD-83 upon his instruction. 
 
Figure 228 shows the radar-derived trajectories of the aircraft operating in the RWY 
27 environment at the time of the accident. Due to the ongoing airport expansion, 
several taxiways in the vicinity of RWY 27 were closed (marked by red crosses). Ad-
ditional lighting in the construction area to enable work at night, as well as approxi-
mately ten construction vehicles, all equipped with orange rotating lights, created 
light pollution that, according to investigators, made it difficult for the MD-83 flight 
crew to observe the Shorts 330 on taxiway 16, if not specifically looking for it. The 
cyan triangles in Figure 228, corresponding to the approximate positions of the air-
craft at the time the take-off clearance, confirm this. When the Air Liberté flight crew 
had completed take-off preparations, which were more demanding due to the loss of 
auto-throttle, and initiated the take-off roll, the runway was clear of traffic [BEA01]. 
The trajectories presented in Figure 228 also enable a reconstruction of the accident 
dynamics. As is evident from the blue diamonds, corresponding to the positions of 
both aircraft at 0:51:49, the Shorts 330 was still clear of the runway 12 seconds prior to 
the collision. According to FDR information, the MD-83 had already passed 100 kts at 
this time. The fact that both aircraft were converging, unaware of each other, made 
the collision almost unavoidable. 
 
Although the Shorts 330 cockpit offers a field of view of 120° on each side, the shal-
low angle of the high-speed taxiway 16 with RWY 27 made it physically impossible 
to acquire the approaching MD-83 visually before entering the runway surface. 
Since the take-off clearance to the MD-83 was in French, the crew of the Shorts did 
not realise that there was an aircraft taking off, and entered the runway while still 
trying to identify the “number one” aircraft, and eventually apparently believed that 
the controller had referred to the landing Boeing 737. Given the circumstances, the 
flight crew of the MD-83 saw the Shorts too late to initiate any manoeuvre to prevent 
a collision [BEA01]. 
N 
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I-8.3 Probable Cause 
The BEA concluded that the probable cause of the accident was the local controller’s 
erroneous perception of the position of the aircraft, which led him to approve the 
Shorts 330 to line up on the runway. The inadequacy of systematic ATC verification 
procedures made it impossible to detect and correct the error, which had its origin in 
the lack of coordination between the ground and the local controller. 
Furthermore, the Shorts 300 flight crew was criticised for not fully dispelling the 
doubts they had as to the position of the “number one” aircraft mentioned in their 
conditional clearance before commencing line-up. 
Contributory factors were light pollution in the area of RWY 27 and the use of two 
languages for radio communications, with the result that the Shorts crew were not 
conscious that the MD-83 was going to take off. In addition, the angle between 
taxiway 16 and the runway made it impossible for the Shorts crew to perform a vis-
ual check before entering the runway. As a consequence of the accident, the high-
speed exits are no longer used for intersection take-offs. Last but not least, there were 
issues with availability and readability of the radar for the controller [BEA01]. 
 
I-8.4 Flight Deck Instrumentation Aspects & Conclusion 
Neither flight crew experienced difficulties with surface navigation, since visibility 
was sufficient for paper charts and visual observation to be successful. However, the 
accident clearly demonstrates that, apart from weather-related degradation of visibil-
ity, view restrictions resulting from either airport or cockpit geometry – or a combi-
nation of both, as for the Shorts 330 flight crew – can also lead to the breakdown of 
collision avoidance by “see and avoid” through visual observation. 
Likewise, light pollution from the construction area and Terminal 1, aggravated by 
wet ground, once more raises the issue of aircraft conspicuity in a night-time airport 
environment, particularly for smaller airplanes. Accordingly, the BEA report con-
cludes that it was very difficult for the Air Liberté flight crew, if not impossible, to 
detect the Shorts 330 moving on the taxiway if not specifically looking for it. How-
ever, given the conversation on the tower frequency, the MD-83’s flight could only 
get the impression that the other aircraft was waiting somewhere behind them, and 
had thus no reason to suspect that another aircraft would attempt lining up in front 
of them. 
In summary, this accident illustrates the need for better information on the surround-
ing traffic. They dynamics of the situation, along with the fact that both crews were 
busy performing check-lists and finalizing take-off preparations, thus limiting the 
share of attention available for traffic surveillance, suggests that not only traffic in-
formation, but also alerting might be required to prevent accidents like this. 
The use of two different ATC languages had the effect that the Shorts’ flight crew, 
not capable of understanding French, had no chance of realising that a take-off clear-
ance had been issued to another aircraft on RWY 27, thus providing them cues to 
identify the “number one” in their line-up approval they were searching. While the 
use of different languages is mainly an ATC organisational issue, it emphasises the 
vulnerability of runway-related ATC instructions and clearances to a breakdown of 
communication. In consequence, additional and readily accessible information on 
clearances certainly has the potential to prevent misunderstanding. 
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I-9 Take-off from a Closed Runway: Taipei, October 31st, 2000  
 
On October 31st, 2000, at 23:17 Taiwan time (15:17 UTC), Singapore Airlines Flight 
SQ006, a Boeing 747-400 with the Singapore registration 9V-SPK, crashed while tak-
ing off from a partially closed runway at Chiang Kai-Shek (CKS) International Air-
port, Taiwan. 
Instead of taking off from RWY 05L for a night flight to Los Angeles as scheduled, 
the flight crew of SQ006 inadvertently lined up on the parallel RWY 05R, which was 
only available for taxiing due to a construction area between taxiways N4 and N5 
some 1200 m from the threshold. The airplane was destroyed by its collision with 
construction equipment on Runway 05R and a subsequent fire caused by the impact. 
There were a total of 179 people aboard the aircraft, including 159 passengers, 3 flight 
crew members and 17 cabin attendants. The accident resulted in 83 fatalities, among 
them four cabin crew members, and 39 serious injuries, including four flight atten-
dants. The remaining cabin crew, one of the pilots and 22 passengers incurred minor 
injuries. Heavy rain and strong winds from typhoon “Xangsane” prevailed at the 
time of the accident [ASC02]. 
I-9.1 Sequence of events 
The pilots reported for duty at 21:53 to collect their dispatch documents and to pre-
pare the flight. The pre-flight briefing was a self-briefing conducted in the corridor 
leading to the aircraft’s parking bay B5. Nonetheless, the EVA dispatcher149 was pre-
sent in case the crew might have had any questions. During the briefing, the pilots 
also reviewed the NOTAM on the partial closure of RWY 05R between N4 and N5 
and on the closure of the section of the northern ramp between and behind parking 
bays A1 and A2 (see Figure 229). 
 
Flight preparations in the cockpit were without incident, although the approaching 
typhoon “Xangsane”, centred approximately 360 km south of the airport at the time 
and closing in, required particular focus on the weather situation, including the fre-
quent re-calculation of crosswind components with the latest wind data. The flight 
crew received their ATC enroute clearance at 22:57. After pushback, at 23:05:57, the 
first officer requested taxi, and ATC instructed, “Singapore 6, taxi to runway six, via 
taxiway, correction, runway zero five left, via taxiway Sierra Sierra, West Cross and 
November Papa.” After acknowledging the assigned route, the crew started to taxi. 
During taxi, the weather situation was again in the focus of the flight crew’s atten-
tion. They engaged in a brief discussion on the designated alternate airport because 
both Kaohsiung and Hong Kong had closed. Around 23:10, the relief crew member 
(CM-3) made a statement to the effect that the typhoon was coming in and that it 
would be worse with increasing delay. However, the captain only responded that he 
was going to taxi very slowly because of the wet and potentially slippery pavement. 
Shortly after the aircraft had turned left onto taxiway NP, the flight crew was in-
structed to transfer to the tower frequency at 23:12:58. 
                                                 
149  At Taipei, Singapore Airlines (SIA) operates a station in charge of passenger handling, cargo loading, catering 
services and gate checking, using SIA personnel. Flight operation aspects, which include flight dispatch, flight 
planning, fuel, and freighter loading, are handled by EVA Airways, while engineering and maintenance are 
provided by China Airlines. 
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Figure 229: Chiang Kai-Shek International Airport with SQ006 taxi route (after [ASC02]) 
While SQ006 was still proceeding along taxiway NP, the first officer (CM-2) stated at 
23:14:41, “Next one is November one.” The captain cordially reminded him of the 
potential ambiguities associated with “next”, stating that it was more precise to say 
“second right”. Immediately afterwards, at 23:14:58, the captain instructed the first 
officer to tell ATC that they were ready for take-off. The controller initially approved 
line-up on RWY 05L, then shortly thereafter cleared the flight for take-off while the 
aircraft was approaching the south-western end of taxiway NP (see Figure 229), 
“Singapore six, runway zero five left, wind zero two zero at two eight, gust to five 
zero, cleared for take-off.” According to FDR data, the aircraft turned from taxiway 
NP onto N1, but then did not completely pass the threshold marking area of RWY 
05R to continue to RWY 05L as instructed, but entered RWY 05R in a continuous 
turn, apparently following the only visible green guidance lights in the pavement. 
At 23:16:07, the first officer noticed that the Para-Visual Display (PVD) 150 had not yet 
become active (cf. Figure 230). Both the captain and the relief crew member attrib-
uted the shuttered PVD to the fact that they had not yet fully lined up with the run-
way. However, at 23:16:23, when line-up was complete, the PVD still had not acti-
vated, and captain remarked, “… not on yet er PVD huh never mind we can see the 
runway.” After the captain had set the windscreen wipers to “high”, the Boeing 747-
400 erroneously commenced its take-off roll on RWY 05R at 23:16:44 in heavy rain, 
strong crosswinds and with only approximately 450 m RVR. It hit a first concrete 
barrier at the construction site approximately 33 seconds later at a ground speed of 
131 kts. The aircraft subsequently collided with excavators, a bulldozer and other 
construction equipment, and was destroyed by impact forces and fire. 
                                                 
150  The PVD is an optional glareshield-mounted indicator using the ILS localizer signal. It is used as an aid to 
tracking and maintaining the runway centreline in low visibility take-offs (CAT III). The PVD is normally shut-
tered and only reveals the actual indicator, a cylindrical barber-pole as shown in the inset, when it is active and 
acquiring a valid localizer signal. If the aircraft diverges from the centreline, the indicator is rotated such that it 
exhibits a lateral motion cue (left/right) to guide the aircraft back to the centreline. 
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Figure 230: Boeing 747-400 flight deck with Para-Visual Display (PVD) 
I-9.2 Analysis 
The flight crew took off from the partially closed RWY 05R in the absolute conviction 
that they were on the correct runway. According to the official accident investigation, 
all crew members were well-rested, thus rendering fatigue an unlikely factor. Fur-
thermore, there were neither behavioural, physiological nor medical anomalies that 
could have impaired crew performance. 
The captain of the flight was very experienced and had logged a total flying time of 
11,235 hours; he taxied the aircraft and was also to assume the role of the pilot flying 
(PF). The first officer had only accumulated 2,442 hours, whereas the relief first offi-
cer was more experienced with 5,508 hours and had of all crew members by far the 
greatest experience with the Boeing B747-400 (4,518 hours)151. Generally, the crew 
members were regarded as average to above average pilots. This analysis therefore 
focuses on the factors misleading all three flight crew members in the cockpit into 
believing they were on the assigned runway. 
 
After the accident, the three members of the flight crew of SQ006, all of whom sur-
vived the accident, stated they had been fully aware that Runway 05R was partially 
closed due to ongoing construction work, and that the remainder of the runway was 
only available for taxiing, since they had reviewed the corresponding NOTAM along 
with their dispatch documents. The investigation determined that the crew had suffi-
cient time to complete the checklists and to prepare for the departure. According to 
the captain, he had felt no time pressure, and advised the other crew members to be 
diligent with their checks. 
                                                 
151 Generally, SIA employs up to two flight crews for relief, depending on the distance and duration of the flight. 
However, there are no defined roles or duties for the relief crew when they are in the cockpit and not occupy-
ing a control seat. Rather, the precise role of relief crew will at the discretion of the PIC for the trip. The inves-
tigation report was unable to establish the influence of a SIA relief crewmember on decision making. Rather, 
an interview with a senior company pilot indicated that “the effective interaction and use of resources on the flight 
deck between relief crewmembers and the primary crew may depend upon the individual aircraft commanders.” 
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The captain also reported that his focus was mainly on the strong cross winds and 
the low visibility. He wanted to determine if these were within company limits and 
therefore performed calculations with the other two pilots. This is confirmed by the 
CVR transcript, which reveals that the pilots were occupied with weather-related 
tasks, such as the calculation of cross winds and corresponding discussion, and con-
siderations on alternate airports during taxi. 
 
At Taipei, Singapore Airlines flights commonly use RWY 06, since this runway is 
closer to the parking positions typically used by the company. On the evening of the 
accident, however, with the RVR limited, the captain had chosen RWY 05L, because 
it may be used for CAT II operations and thus permits a lower visibility minimum. 
Besides, RWY 05L is longer and therefore provided better margins for the prevailing 
wet runway conditions. However, while the captain had been in Taipei roughly 2-3 
weeks prior to the accident, he had not used RWY 05L for about 2-3 years. The first 
officer had not been to the airport recently. Since he was concerned about how he 
would support the captain, the first officer already familiarised himself with the air-
port layout in the hotel the night before the flight. 
 
While still at the gate, the captain anticipated and briefed an expected taxi route via 
East Cross, as indicated by the dashed line in Figure 229, including a small section of 
back-tracking on RWY 05R due to the closure in the ramp area between bays A1 and 
A2. During this taxi route briefing, the first officer initially thought that RWY 05R 
was completely closed, but the relief crew member clarified. It is important to note 
that the actually assigned taxi route coincided with this expected taxi route in the 
critical last part where the runway confusion occurred, but was otherwise different. 
Therefore, the fact that neither N1 nor the crossing of RWY 05R were explicitly men-
tioned in the ATC taxi instructions to SQ006 was probably of little significance for the 
sequence of events. 
 
Initially, both the first officer and the relief crew member, who took a spare copy of 
the Taipei Airport chart, monitored the progress along the taxi route. When ap-
proaching the N2 turn while on taxiway NP, the first officer had to attend to radio 
communication for the ATC line-up and take-off clearance. Likewise, upon receipt of 
the latest wind information via ATIS, the relief crew member put the taxi chart aside 
as the aircraft approached taxiways N1 and N2 to calculate the crosswind component 
for take-off, thus relocating his mental focus inside the aircraft. Captain and first offi-
cer then completed the take-off checklist. Effectively, therefore, the flight crew did 
not appropriately monitor the taxi route by using the available paper charts in the 
final stage of taxiing. 
 
Irrespective of the previous, deficient airport lighting played a major role in the re-
sulting disorientation which eventually caused the line-up on the wrong runway. 
Apparently, the flight crew was mislead by the compelling taxiway centreline light-
ing that guided them onto RWY 05R. From taxiway N1, lights with a spacing of 7.5 m 
continued into RWY 05R. In contrast to this, the green centreline lights straight ahead 
on N1 across the threshold towards RWY 05L were unevenly spaced at 30, 55, 116 
and 138 m from the point of tangency with the lights leading into RWY 05R.  
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At the time of the accident, the minimum permissible RVR for RWY 05L was 200 m, 
and ICAO Annex 14 prescribes that on taxiways intended to be used for operations 
below 350 m RVR, centreline lights on straight segments should not be spaced by 
more than 15 m [ICA04b]. Additionally, the FAA recommends that alternating green 
and yellow lights should be used for taxiway centreline lighting across runways.  
 
Consequently, the lighting along the critical part where the disorientation occurred 
did not meet ICAO standards or FAA recommendations. In addition to the inappro-
priately large spacing, the on-site investigation revealed that the second taxiway cen-
treline light on the straight segment towards RWY 05L was unserviceable, and that 
the third was substantially reduced in its intensity. Last but not least, RWY 05L was 
not equipped with either runway guard lights (also referred to as wig-wag) or stop 
bar lighting as appropriate for a CAT II runway, which could have served as another 
cue to the flight crew that RWY 05L was still ahead of them. Furthermore, on N1, the 
taxiway centreline straight across RWY 05R towards was RWY 05L missing, but 
given the night conditions, this was probably without impact. 
 
While the investigation determined that there were no physical restrictions to the 
visibility of taxiway and runway signs, several crew members remarked in their 
post-accident statements that because of rain and visibility, they were unable to see 
taxiway and runway signage. According to the relief first officer, the rain was very 
heavy, but the wipers were able to clear the windshield. Nonetheless, the visibility 
from the side windows was substantially degraded, forcing the crew to rely solely on 
the lighting. In line with the above findings, the crew reported not observing any 
taxiway centreline lights across RWY 05R on N1, but only the curved lights directly 
leading onto RWY 05R, which they then believed to be RWY05L. 
 
The Taiwanese Air Safety Council, which conducted the investigation, explains this 
apparent contradiction by the fact that the flight crew’s attentional resources were 
probably expended by pre-occupation with the take-off checklist and taxiing the air-
craft on a slippery pavement. Consequently, the captain was attracted by salient vis-
ual cues, i.e. the more prominent lights leading onto RWY 05R. The investigation also 
revealed that the crew had not received training on low-visibility taxi procedures, 
which may serve as an explanation why they did not distribute tasks and their atten-
tional resources more efficiently, particularly with a third crew member present. 
 
Another explanation for the strong reliance on taxiway centreline lighting offered by 
the Safety Council relates to the surface guidance system employed by the flight 
crew’s home base, Changi. The airport features a “follow the greens” system, i.e. 
taxiway centreline lights are illuminated along the assigned taxi route and dimmed, 
switched off or “blocked” by stop bars elsewhere. Given the additional workload 
induced by the meteorological conditions, the crew could have been susceptible to 
the latent misconception that they would automatically be guided to the correct take-
off runway just by following the green centreline. In this context, however, it is sur-
prising that the fact that they had not passed the partially closed parallel runway ap-
parently did not alert the flight crew. 
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After erroneously lining up on RWY 05R, the flight crew also failed to correctly in-
terpret the available visual cues that they were on the wrong runway. RWY 05R, 
originally conceived as a taxiway, was scheduled to be re-designated as taxiway NC. 
Due to its origins, it had green centreline lighting, but white edge lights and was only 
45 m wide, whereas the other two runways featured a width of 60 m. At the time of 
the accident, the RWY edge lights were off. But neither this fact, the green centreline 
lighting, the absence of touchdown zone lighting nor the small width raised any con-
cern with the flight crew. Apparently, the visual cues were strong enough that the 
flight crew erroneously believed they were on the active RWY 05L. This impression 
was facilitated by the fact the runway identifier could not be observed from the 
cockpit of a Boeing 747 lined up on RWY 05R, and that the lighted concrete jersey 
barricades delineating the construction area down the runway were not visible from 
the threshold even in VFR conditions during a re-enactment after the accident. 
Indeed, an MD-11 captain departing from RWY 05L eight days prior to the accident 
confirmed that RWY 05R looked compelling with centreline and, on this day, also 
edge lights illuminated. However, in contrast to the accident flight crew, this particu-
lar pilot was able to resolve the conflicting visual information because of the missing 
touchdown zone lighting, the narrowness and the green centreline. 
 
Unfortunately, the pre-occupation with pre-take-off tasks and crosswind calculations 
may have impeded the SQ006 flight crew’s processing of runway configuration in-
formation, all the more since there was no immediate and salient indication that the 
runway in front of them was closed. All crew members unanimously stated in post-
accident interviews that they were expecting a closed RWY 05R to be “black”, i.e. to 
have an unlit centreline, and to feature warning signs or markings indicating the clo-
sure. Consequently, the centreline lighting on RWY 05R, contrary to crew expecta-
tions for a closed runway, proved to be deceptive for the flight crew, creating the il-
lusion of an active runway. This misconception was aggravated by the fact that no 
signs of the obstruction down the runway were visible. Accordingly, the investiga-
tion concluded that lack of adequate closure warnings at the entrance of RWY 05R 
resulted in a failure to provide a potential last defence. 
 
Apart from the misinterpretation of external cues, the flight was not alerted by indi-
cations on the flight deck that might have given rise to doubts as to whether they 
were on the correct runway or not, either. 
The fact that the PVD, which was usually a very reliable instrument, had not unshut-
tered, was an indication that something might be inconsistent. However, since the 
PVD was not required because the visibility was sufficient for a visual take-off, and 
its check therefore not required, this was a missed opportunity to realise the mistake 
rather than a procedural oversight. From the captain’s statement, it is clear that he 
gave priority to the visual information, and the runway picture seemed correct. 
Likewise, on the head-down displays, the ILS indication on the PFD and an accord-
ingly shifted “rising runway symbol” or misalignment of the aircraft symbol and the 
runway symbol on the ND in low range settings were subtle cues indicating the 
choice of the wrong runway. But again, this was merely a missed opportunity to 
catch the error, in contrast to the procedurally required external visual cues and 
cross-checks for positive confirmation that the crew was on the correct runway. 
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A psychological phenomenon known as ‘confirmation bias’ may have affected the 
flight crew’s decision making, in that they were directing their attention towards in-
formation confirming their expectations and assumptions, and rejecting conflicting 
information. This bias facilitates errors in the search for information.  
Another aspect was the timing of ATC instructions. For some reason, the captain ap-
peared to have the wrong impression that the aircraft was visible from the tower, 
and that it was already very close to the take-off runway when they received the 
take-off clearance. 
 
I-9.3 Probable Cause 
The probable cause of this accident was a lack of flight crew situational awareness 
resulting in disorientation and a take-off from the wrong runway. The Safety Council 
concluded that the flight crew did not review the taxi route in a manner sufficient to 
ensure they all understood that the route to RWY 05L included the need to cross 
RWY 05R, and that in particular none of the flight crew members verified the taxi 
route when the aircraft turned from taxiway NP onto N1 and eventually RWY 05R. 
Likewise, none of the pilots orally confirmed which runway they had entered. Fur-
thermore, the Safety Council believes that moderate time pressure to take off before 
the typhoon closed in, the concern about the strong crosswinds, low visibility and the 
slippery runway subtly influenced the flight crew’s ability in decision-making and 
maintaining situational awareness [ASC02]. 
 
It is interesting to note that the identified deficiencies of the airport infrastructure are 
not listed as contributing factors, but merely as “findings related to risk”, i.e. as is-
sues potentially compromising aviation safety, but without proven impact on the 
sequence of events. While the potential confusion caused by sub-standard airport 
lighting is documented at least by flight crew statements, there is only ambiguous 
evidence concerning the purported time pressure. When the relief crew member 
mentioned the potentially deteriorating weather situation, the captain acknowledged 
but immediately commented that he would taxi very slowly nonetheless. 
 
Further risks identified were the fact that Singapore Airlines had neither low visibil-
ity taxi procedures nor corresponding crew training for its Boeing 747-400 flight 
crews. Given the precipitation at the time of the accident and the resulting signal at-
tenuation, the Safety Council was also unable to determine whether a surface radar, 
not yet installed at Taipei at the time of the accident because of a lengthy acquisition 
process, would have been able to aid controllers in detecting the erroneous line-up. 
 
Last but not least, it is noteworthy that the Aviation Safety Council, inspired by a 
NTSB comment on the draft report, suggested to consider incorporating cockpit sur-
face guidance and navigation technologies, such as an electronic moving map dis-
play for use during airport surface movement, in commercial airliners as a recom-
mendation to both ICAO, IATA and Boeing. 
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I-9.4 Flight Deck Instrumentation Aspects & Conclusion 
From the post-accident statements of the crew, it is obvious that their main concern 
during taxiing was the developing wind situation. Although part of the weather 
monitoring part had been delegated to the relief crew member, this secondary task 
provided a considerable distraction, shifting attentional resources from airport navi-
gation. Position awareness was also made difficult by the fact that visibility was sig-
nificantly impaired by the heavy rain. Additionally, the erroneous line-up was cata-
lysed by the deficient and thus deceptive taxiway centreline lighting on taxiway N1 
near RWY 05R. Likewise, insufficient familiarity with the airport environment in the 
area where the critical disorientation occurred may have played a crucial role in the 
accident, although this is not explicitly stated by the official accident investigation 
report.  
This leads to the important conclusion that familiarity and currency with a certain 
aerodrome environment may very well be limited to certain areas of that airport, i.e. 
the parts commonly used by a certain airline. 
Due to the nature of the runway closure and the way the construction area was barri-
caded and marked, the flight crew was deprived of any chance to acquire the con-
struction area visually, and could therefore not employ their awareness of the partial 
runway closure of RWY 05R to ascertain they were on the wrong runway. 
 
In conclusion, an independent source of information on their position at the airport 
would almost with certainty have enabled the flight crew to realise that they had 
lined up on the wrong runway, if not prevented them from being mislead by the de-
ficient airport lighting on taxiway N1 in the first place. Likewise, an adequate indica-
tion of pertinent runway closures on the flight deck would have supported the flight 
crew’s awareness of the precise nature and location of the closure irrespective of the 
presence of real-world markings, signs and barricades, thus serving as an additional 
information that their choice of runway was not correct. 
 
Additionally, given the shift of attention away from the paper charts to weather and 
ATC communication that occurred in the cockpit of SQ006, an alert that the flight 
crew was commencing take-off on runway closed for take-off operations might have 
mitigated the outcome of the events considerably by permitting the flight crew to 
abort take-off in a timely fashion. Even in the absence of runway closure information, 
an indication and/or alert regarding an attempt to take off from a runway other than 
the pre-planned one would have served the same purpose. 
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I-10 Take-off from a Closed Runway II: Denver, September 2001 
 
On September 25, 2001, around 03:48 local time, a United Parcel Service (UPS) cargo 
flight bound for Reno, Nevada, took off from the closed RWY 8 at Denver Interna-
tional Airport in Colorado, USA. 
UPS Flight 896, a Boeing 757 with two crew members aboard, eventually passed 
within 32 feet (~ 10 m) of a temporary light fixture near the adjacent taxiway R7, 
which was undergoing construction. At the time of the incident, night visual mete-
orological conditions prevailed. Fortunately, no injuries were reported, neither on the 
ground nor aboard the airplane, and the flight continued uneventfully to its destina-
tion. 
RWY 8 had been closed at 22:00 local time on the previous day because of construc-
tion work on taxiway R7. The construction area on taxiway R7 was clearly marked, 
lighted, and barricaded. However, RWY 8 and the runway entrances (other than 
those at R7) were not marked as closed or obstructed in any way, and the lights on 
RWY 8 were illuminated. 
 
I-10.1 Sequence of events 
The flight crew of UPS flight 896 contacted the Denver tower local controller for taxi 
instructions around 03:40, advising that they had arrival ATIS information “Ho-
tel.”152 At the time of flight 896’s departure, information Hotel was the current arrival 
ATIS and information Victor was the current departure ATIS. Both stated that RWY 8 
was closed. About 03:42, the tower controller acknowledged that departure ATIS in-
formation “Victor” was current. At 03:42:16, the tower controller instructed the flight 
crew to taxi to RWY 35L and to advise her when it was ready for departure. At 
03:43:57, the pilots requested a change to RWY 8 because they did not have the nec-
essary departure data aboard to use RWY 35L. The tower controller responded, “UPS 
896 no problem, continue northbound to RWY 8.” 
According to post-incident statements provided by the crewmembers of flight 896, 
they noticed construction activity on taxiway R7 as they approached RWY 8 and es-
timated that it was about 5,000 feet (1,500 m) away. While the aircraft was lining up, 
the captain asked the first officer “what all the lights were about.” At 03:47:45, the 
flight crew reported ready to depart at RWY 8, and the tower controller erroneously 
cleared the flight for take-off153. 
 
The crewmembers indicated that the runway appeared to be clear, so they proceeded 
with the take-off. They reported that the aircraft passed through a cloud of dust next 
to the construction area but that the take-off was otherwise normal. Both crewmem-
bers remained unaware that the runway was closed until the next day when UPS 
notified them that the aircraft had nearly struck a barricade. The captain stated that 
he did not recall if the runway closure information was on the ATIS broadcast. 
                                                 
152  ATIS is the continuous broadcast of recorded non-control information in selected terminal areas. Each broad-
cast has a coded identifier that is used to confirm that flight crews have the correct ATIS data. Pilots are re-
sponsible for obtaining the appropriate ATIS information; controllers are responsible for either verifying pilots 
have done so or providing the information. 
153  Authorising UPS flight 896 to depart on a closed runway was contrary to Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) procedures. 
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About 03:51, a person identifying himself as “Engineering 567”154 transmitted, “En-
gineering 567, 8-26 is believed closed?” The tower controller responded, “Agent air 
526 [sic] affirmative.” She then transmitted, “Oh!” At 03:51:51, Engineering 567 
asked, “why did a plane take off from 8-26?” The controller did not respond. After 
the construction crew had notified airport management of the incident, it terminated 
construction activity for the night. 
 
According to Denver airport management and local Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) air traffic management, the runway closure was coordinated with the tower 
and was part of a construction project that spanned several nights. However, a notice 
to airmen (NOTAM) about the closure was not issued because the communications 
system connecting the Denver airport operations office and the FAA’s Denver auto-
mated flight service station (FSS) failed. 
Although a NOTAM was transmitted from the airport operations office to the FSS, 
no acknowledgement of the transmitted NOTAM message was received, and the op-
erations office did not follow up. However, the tower was notified directly by airport 
operations personnel when the closure went into effect [NTS03]. 
 
I-10.2 Flight Deck Instrumentation Aspects & Conclusion 
The flight crew was aware of their position on the airport at all times, and had no 
difficulties in following the instructions of the controller. Other traffic was not a fac-
tor. However, an indication of the runways-in-use and, on the other hand, closed 
runways on the flight deck might have prevented this incident. 
                                                 
154 Engineering 567 was a member of the construction crew at taxiway R7. 
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I-11 Disorientation in the Fog IV: Milano-Linate, 2001 
 
During its take-off run at 8:10 local time (6:10 UTC) on October 8th, 2001, a McDon-
nell Douglas MD-87 (SE-DMA) operated by Scandinavian Airline System (SAS) as 
flight SK 686 from Milano-Linate (LIML) to Copenhagen-Kastrup (EKCH) collided 
with a Cessna Citation 525-A (D-IEVX) which had, in dense fog, inadvertently taxied 
into the active runway from the West Apron designated for General Aviation. After 
the collision, the MD-87 continued travelling down the runway, became airborne for 
a short time, but then fell back to the ground where it impacted a baggage handling 
building after an uncontrolled slide. It was destroyed by impact forces and fire. The 
Cessna was destroyed on the runway by a post-impact fire. 
All 104 passengers and 6 crew aboard the MD-87, all four people aboard the Cessna 
and four people of the ground staff working in the baggage handling building suf-
fered fatal injuries. Four more persons on the ground suffered injuries and burns of 
various degrees [ANS04]. 
I-11.1 Sequence of events 
Earlier on the morning of the accident, the privately owned Cessna Citation 525-A 
had arrived from Cologne (EDDK) and landed on RWY 36R at 04:59. It then taxied to 
the West Apron via taxiway R6 to pick up two passengers, the first an employee of 
Cessna Aircraft and the second a potential Citation 525-A customer, for a demonstra-
tion flight to Paris-Le Bourget (LFBP). 
SAS fight SK 686 was scheduled to depart from Milano-Linate at 5:35 with destina-
tion Copenhagen-Kastrup. When the boarding of the 104 passengers had been com-
pleted, the flight crew requested approval to start the engines, which was granted 
with the remark that their departure slot was at 6:16. At 5:54, the flight crew re-
quested taxi, and was instructed to taxi to the ILS CAT III holding position of RWY 
36R and to advise when entering the main taxiway (see Figure 231). Subsequently, 
when passing the fire station, it was transferred to the tower frequency at 5:59 as 
number four in the departure sequence. 
In the meantime, at 5:58, the Cessna flight crew contacted the ground controller for 
engine start-up. Their request was approved and they were advised of their depar-
ture slot at 6:19. At 6:05:44, the pilots of the Cessna received their taxi instructions, 
“Delta Victor X-Ray, taxi north via Romeo 5, QNH 1013, call me back at the stop bar 
of the … main runway extension.” Immediately afterwards, the ground controller 
instructed another aircraft in Italian to follow the Cessna on the same taxiway. 
When leaving its parking position on the West Apron, the Cessna made two left 
turns and eventually reached a position where the taxi line splits into R5 and R6. 
Contrary to the instructions, the Cessna followed the southeast-bound taxiway R6. 
On this taxiway, the aircraft successively reached two holding positions designated 
S5 and S4. At the latter, at 6:08:23, the pilot reported, “D-IEVX is approaching S4.” 
The controller asked the flight to confirm its position, which the Cessna flight crew 
did, and then instructed crew to maintain its position. 
After confirming, again in Italian, position with an Air One flight, the ground con-
troller returned to the Cessna at 6:09:09, “Delta Victor X-Ray, continue your taxi on 
the main apron, follow the Alpha line.” The Cessna flight crew acknowledged and 
proceeded through a third stopping area 180 m short of RWY 36R, including a white 
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“STOP” marking painted on the asphalt, another yellow holding position marking 
and red stop bar lights accompanied by a CAT III sign. Eventually, it passed the last 
holding yellow holding position marking on R6 and entered the runway, following 
the green centreline lighting of R6 towards the runway centreline. 
Simultaneously, at 6:09:28, the tower controller cleared the MD-87 for take-off, 
“Scandinavian 686 Linate, clear for take-off 36, the wind is calm, report rolling, when 
airborne squawk ident155.” SK 686 promptly acknowledged and complied. The 
Cessna entered the runway when the MD-87 was already in its take-off run. At 
6:10:21, while rotating at an indicated airspeed of 146 kts (270 km/h), the MD-87 col-
lided with the Cessna, which had reached the middle of the runway by then. An ex-
clamation on the MD-87’s CVR and an additional nose-up elevator command on the 
FDR indicate that the Scandinavian flight crew spotted and attempted to avoid the 
Cessna within 1 s of the collision. 
I-11.2 Analysis 
In the hour preceding the accident, ATC 
served 21 departing and three arriving 
aircraft. CAT III operations were in effect 
since 5:24, with visibility between 50 and 
100 m and the RVR around 200 m with a 
minimum at 175 m. Since there were no 
technical aids, such as a ground radar, to 
monitor the position of aircraft, control-
ler workload was high. 
The accident investigation revealed that 
the Cessna flight crew was only qualified 
for CAT I operations, i.e. down to a 
minimum RVR of 550 m, and should, 
given the prevailing visibility conditions, 
not have initiated or been authorised to 
conduct the flight to Le Bourget in the 
first place. 
The fact that the Cessna pilots were con-
sequently not properly trained for low-
visibility operations may serve as an ex-
planation for their failure to comply with 
the assigned taxi route and to realise 
their error based on the sparse available 
visual cues. Nonetheless, since both pi-
lots were professionals (one with more 
than 12,000 h experience) who had been to Milano-Linate several times before, it re-
mains difficult to understand why they did not realise that they were going southeast 
rather than north as explicitly instructed, or ask the controller for clarification when 
they were approaching an active runway, which was inconsistent with their assigned 
taxi route. It is also possible that the Cessna pilots were preoccupied with the idea 
                                                 
155  On the ATC transponder control panel in the cockpit, there is an IDENT button which, when pressed, will 
cause the aircraft thus “squawking ident” to be highlighted on the controller’s radar screen. 
 
Figure 231: Accident at Milano-Linate 
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that they would taxi back to departure using largely the same route they had used 
after landing. This might explain why they crossed the runway when instructed to 
proceed, although it must be noted that this crossing occurred without the control-
ler’s explicit approval, and involved passing a red stop bar. At any rate, since the 
Cessna was neither fitted with a CVR nor was required to have one, it is not possible 
to infer more about the reasons for its flight crew’s behaviour. 
However, the investigation revealed numerous deficiencies in the state of implemen-
tation and maintenance of airport standard signage, particularly in relation to taxi-
ways R5 and R6, which may shed some light on this matter. On the West Apron, at 
the location where the taxiway centreline splits, yellow R5 and R6 markings were 
painted on the pavement to the left of the respective centrelines. However, the mark-
ings were worn, did not conform to any ICAO specification and could be easily con-
fused. Apart from this surface-painted marking, there were no further signs or mark-
ings identifying taxiway R6 throughout its length until the intersection with RWY 
18L/36R156, thus depriving the Cessna pilots of any chance to realise their mistake 
based on airport signs. Additionally, there was a difference between the actual and 
the published taxi lines on the West Apron, and the holding markings S1, S2 on taxi-
way R5 and S4, S5 on taxiway R6 were not documented. In particular, the Linate con-
trollers were not aware of their existence, and since they were not documented in the 
Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP), they were not published on the airport 
charts available at the time of the accident, either (cf. Figure 231157). 
Furthermore, the stop bar associated with the CAT III holding position (but devoid 
of any runway identification) was permanently lit, because its controls had been de-
activated three years prior to the accident, and an electronic device to detect runway 
intrusions at the intersection of RWY 18L/36R and taxiway R6 had been discon-
nected at the same time, also for unknown reasons. Likewise, runway guard lights 
had been removed in 1992. Last but not least, the old existing ground radar equip-
ment had been decommissioned in 1999, with the replacement process still ongoing 
at the time of the accident. 
On top of this, the documented ATC procedures were inconsistent both with the AIP 
information and operational practice at Linate. As an example, controllers used inac-
curate phraseology and always employed the word “stop bar” irrespective of 
whether they referred to the yellow lights on R5 or the white “STOP” marking on R6. 
In his taxi instructions to the Cessna, the ground controller re-designated the “North 
Apron” as “Main Apron”. Moreover, pilots were routinely instructed to cross the 
permanently illuminated red stop bar on R6. The investigation also revealed issues 
with the training of ATC personnel. As an example, the supervisory controller had 
not received any recurrent training within the past 20 years. 
The discrepancies between actual signage and markings, the available documenta-
tion and operational procedures resulted in a situation in which neither the Cessna 
flight crew nor the ground controller had sufficient information or visual cues for 
meaningful position reporting and monitoring. Consequently, because the controller 
                                                 
156  On taxiway R6, RWY 18L/36R was only indirectly identified through the “CAT III” sign, because it was the 
only CAT III runway at the airport. 
157  In this context, it must be noted that Figure 231 is based on a chart of the airport published in 2005. Taxiways 
are re-labelled as they were signed at the time of the accident, and the markings S1 to S5 were added by the au-
thor for clarification; there were no holding markings whatsoever in the chart current at the time of the acci-
dent. 
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was unaware of the existence of the S4 holding marking, he was unable to decode the 
Cessna flight crew’s position report appropriately and realise their error, but he did 
not ask for clarification, either. Instead, he instructed the aircraft to proceed, unaware 
that compliance with this instruction would lead to a Runway Incursion. 
 
I-11.3 Probable Cause 
The accident occurred due to the unauthorised entry of the Cessna Citation into the 
active RWY 36R while the MD-87 was in its take-off roll. Among the imminent and 
systemic causes quoted by the official investigation were the low visibility of only 
50…100 m, the lack of adequate visual aids, deficiencies in radio communications, 
inadequate operational procedures and a faulty and poorly documented airport lay-
out at Milano-Linate. Additionally, there were “blatant human errors”, such as the 
Cessna crew using the wrong taxiway and the failure of the authorities to check the 
qualification of the Cessna crew. Last but not least, the nature of the flight might 
have exerted a certain pressure on the Cessna crew to commence the flight despite 
the prevailing weather conditions. 
Contributing factors were the high traffic volume, inadequate technical equipment, 
the use of both Italian and English in communications, and inappropriate training of 
ATC personnel. The combination of all these causal and contributing factors neutral-
ized any possibility for corrective action and thus resulted in the accident [ANS04]. 
 
I-11.4 Flight Deck Instrumentation Aspects & Conclusion 
D-IEVX 
Low visibility, the lack of appropriate taxiway signage, markings and other visual 
aids resulted in a substantial disorientation of the Cessna flight crew, who was not 
qualified to conduct the flight under the prevailing meteorological conditions. An 
independent indication of their position with respect to the airport layout would cer-
tainly have supported them in realising they were on the wrong taxiway, and could 
have offered positive confirmation that they were approaching RWY 18L/36R. Addi-
tionally, information on the taxi route assigned to them could have dispelled any po-
tential doubts about the controller’s intention.  
Due to the visibility conditions, the Cessna pilots had no chance of detecting that the 
MD-87 was in its take-off roll on the runway they were entering. An indication or 
alert that RWY 36R was used for take-off by another aircraft could have triggered 
remedial action on behalf of the Cessna crew. 
 
SK 686 
In spite of the low visibility, the Scandinavian Airlines flight crew did not experience 
any difficulties in airport navigation, and successfully taxied to the runway holding 
position. However, due to the visibility conditions, they did not have the slightest 
chance of acquiring the intruding Cessna aircraft sufficiently early to take successful 
remedial action. An indication of the surrounding traffic, potentially supplemented 
by an alert, might therefore have been beneficial in preventing a collision, or at least 
mitigating its consequences, by allowing the MD-87’s flight crew to anticipate the 
incursion, and to reject take-off sufficiently early. 
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I-12 Wrong Runway Take-off: Lexington, August 27th, 2006 
 
On August 27, 2006, at 06:07 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT), Comair Flight 5191 to At-
lanta, a Bombardier CRJ-100 with the registration N431CA, crashed upon take-off 
from Blue Grass Airport in Lexington (KLEX), Kentucky, in night VMC conditions 
[NTS07]. 
 
While the flight had been instructed to taxi to RWY 22, the runway intended for de-
parture, the crew erroneously lined up and eventually took off from the much 
shorter RWY 26, which is only half as long as RWY 22. Approximately 20 seconds 
after the take-off run had commenced, and immediately after the V1 callout, the air-
craft reached the end of RWY 26, but continued to traverse the grass beyond the 
runway’s end until the landing gear hit an earth berm approximately 300 ft (90 m) 
behind the runway end. After becoming airborne briefly, the aircraft struck trees and 
descended, hitting more trees, and crashed into a meadow less than 2000 ft (600 m) 
from the end of the runway, where it was destroyed by impact forces and a signifi-
cant post-crash fire. All of the 47 passengers aboard and two of the three crewmem-
bers were killed. Only the first officer survived in critical condition [NTS07, ALP07]. 
 
I-12.1 Sequence of events 
After collecting their flight release documents, the pilots proceeded to the air carrier 
ramp, where two Comair CRJ 200s were parked. A ramp agent performing the secu-
rity check of the accident aircraft noted the flight crew boarding the wrong aircraft. 
When advised that they were on the wrong plane, the pilots shut down the already 
started Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) and went to the correct airplane [NTS07]. 
 
At the time of the accident, Lexington Tower was operating with a single FAA air 
traffic controller on duty, who was responsible for performing clearance delivery, 
ground control, local control, and departure control duties. While finishing flight 
preparations in the cockpit, the flight crew received their ATC en-route clearance at 
5:49, and reported ready for taxi at 6:02. The controller then instructed the flight, 
“Comair one ninety one, taxi to RWY 22,” which implicitly included approval to 
cross the non-active RWY 26. 
However, at 06:04:33, the captain brought the aircraft to a stop at the holding position 
for RWY 26 (see Figure 232). Afterward, the first officer made a welcome address to 
the passengers and completed the before take-off checklist. With the aircraft still 
holding, the first officer reported to the controller at 6:05:15 that, at his leisure, “Co-
mair one twenty one [sic]” was “ready to go.” 
The controller responded immediately and cleared the flight for take-off two seconds 
later, “Comair one ninety one, Lexington uh, tower, fly runway heading, cleared for 
take-off.” After a brief exchange with another flight, the controller turned his back on 
the departing aircraft and proceeded to administrative duties. Subsequently, the cap-
tain erroneously lined up the aircraft on RWY 26 and transferred the flight controls to 
the first officer for take-off at 06:05:57. Approximately 43 seconds after receiving the 
take-off clearance, Comair 5191 began its fatal take-off roll on RWY 26 [ALP07, 
NTS07]. 
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I-12.2 Analysis 
 
Figure 232: Lexington Blue Grass Airport with Comair 5191 ground track 
At the time of the accident, Blue Grass Airport was approaching the end of a major 
five-year construction phase aimed at extending the non-standard 100 ft (30 m) run-
way safety area of RWY 4/22 to the required 1,000 ft (300 m). To achieve this, the 
threshold of RWY 22 was shifted by 325 ft (99 m) to the southwest. Simultaneously, 
the previously two taxiways north of RWY 8/26, A-5 and A, were to be eliminated in 
favour of a single new taxiway A-7 [ALP07, NTS07]. The consequences of these con-
struction activities are depicted in Figure 232: the former taxiways A-3 and A-4 had 
already been re-designated as A-5 and A-6, respectively, in accordance with the new 
airport layout. Furthermore, to enable the construction of taxiway A-7, taxiway A 
had been closed and barricaded north of RWY 26. As an interim solution until the 
completion of A-7, the original taxiway A-5 was signed as taxiway A to avoid having 
duplicate taxiway names158. 
 
In June 2006, the airport construction plan was modified one day before changes had 
to be submitted to the National Flight Data Center (NFDC), which forms a central 
part of the FAA’s Aeronautical Information Services Division. Due to the time pres-
sure, Lexington’s airport authority eventually decided to submit charting informa-
tion reflecting the final airport configuration after construction to the NFDC, and to 
cover any discrepancies by NOTAM in the meantime [ALP07]. 
However, due to a limitation of an automatic change notification software at Jeppe-
sen, the company supplying airport charts to Comair, the NFDC information on the 
chart revision for Lexington, which arrived after office hours on a Friday, went unno-
                                                 
158  As a convention, in  REF _Ref233026697 Figure 232, the rectangular taxiway designator signs reflect the actual 
signage situation at the time of the accident, whereas the original situation is indicated by the “former ….” text 
labels. 
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ticed. As a result, the Jeppesen airport diagram current at the time of the accident (cf. 
inset in Figure 232) reflected the situation before the shift of RWY 22, whereas charts 
produced by the National Aeronautical Charting Office (NACO) reflected the final 
airport configuration after the shift. This left Blue Grass Airport in the uncomfortable 
situation of having to correct two sets of airport charts inaccurate in different ways 
by NOTAM. 
As an example, NOTAM A-1682 stated that taxiway A was closed north of RWY 
8/26. For unknown reasons, this NOTAM was neither part of the Comair 5191 dis-
patch documents (like three further relevant NOTAM) nor on the ATIS on the day of 
the accident, whereas it had been broadcast during the six previous days [ALP07]. It 
is worth mentioning that the NOTAM itself was problematic, since it could only be 
decoded with the Jeppesen chart. Irrespective of the chart used, however, the 
NOTAM was inconsistent with the actual airport signage, because there was an open 
segment of taxiway A north of RWY 8/26 due to the re-designation of taxiway A-5. 
 
In conclusion, the pilots of Comair 5191 were provided inaccurate charts, incomplete 
NOTAM and consequently confusing signage. Numerous changes to the airport lay-
out were not accurately presented on the charts, and some of the NOTAM advising 
of construction activities and reflecting the changes to the airport were not available; 
all of this may adversely have affected their situational awareness and eventually 
fuelled disorientation [ALP07]. In view of the above facts, it is not surprising that 
several other flight crews interviewed by the investigators also experienced confu-
sion while taxiing to RWY 22 in August 2006, particularly during hours of darkness, 
mainly due to the airport charting discrepancies and because of a rapidly changing 
airport environment as a result of the construction activities. 
 
There are no indications that the flight crew was rushed; all pre-flight checklists and 
briefings were conducted. From a flight crew performance perspective, however, 
there were nonetheless some deficiencies. When the first officer read the checklists, a 
number of minor inconsequential lapses occurred, most of them undetected. This 
may be taken as an indication that the first officer was mildly fatigued. Additionally, 
the flight crew made two procedural errors, which investigators believe to be rele-
vant for the events. First of all, the first officer did the taxi briefing in lieu of the cap-
tain, and the briefing was not a full one as required, but abbreviated and omitted the 
crucial fact that crossing of RWY 8/26 was required to reach RWY 22. Furthermore, 
when taxiing the first officer engaged in non-pertinent conversation with the captain, 
continuing an earlier discussion at the gate and thus violating the FAA’s regulations 
on the sterile cockpit procedure during critical flight phases. 
Seen by themselves, neither the fact that the crew initially entered the wrong aircraft 
(although the correct tailsign was in their documents), nor the minor lapses during 
checklist reading, the use of an incorrect callsign (121 instead of 191) when reporting 
ready for take-off or the brief non-pertinent conversation seem to be particularly sig-
nificant. However, when combined, these events create the impression that the pilots 
were, for whatever reason, not as attentive as required for a safe conduct of the flight. 
Fatigue is a potential explanation, but a slightly too relaxed attitude, evidenced most 
prominently by the non-pertinent conversation, is also plausible. Due to the missing 
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NOTAM information, the crew was largely unaware of the challenges resulting from 
the construction activities, and probably anticipated a brief and easy taxi out. 
The Comair flight crew commenced take-off on RWY 26 in the firm belief that they 
were on the correct runway, RWY 22 [NTS07]. This can be inferred from the fact that 
the aircraft was brought to a stop at the holding position of RWY 26, the finalisation 
of checklists, the welcome address to the passengers and reporting ready for take-off 
to ATC. There is no indication of any positional uncertainty on the CVR transcript. If 
the flight crew had any serious doubts as to their location, they would certainly not 
have made the passenger announcement and reported ready for take-off. 
 
In conclusion, therefore, this accident was caused by disorientation, but the accident 
investigation was unable to determine why and how precisely the situational aware-
ness disconnect occurred. It can only be said that the disorientation occurred some-
time before the aircraft was brought to a stop at the holding position of RWY 26 (in 
the belief that it was RWY 22). During the short taxi out, the first officer was mainly 
head-down performing checklist duties, reducing possibilities for him to keep track 
of the aircraft’s position on the airport surface [ALP07, NTS07]. It is entirely plausible 
that on passing the taxiway signed as A-6, which was still designated as A-4 on his 
chart, the flight crew got the erroneous impression that they were already north of 
RWY26 and approaching RWY 22 – according to the taxiway naming logic at Lexing-
ton, A-6 could only be north of the taxiway A-5 depicted on the flight crew’s charts. 
Consequently, it is legitimate to assume that the charting inaccuracies contributed to 
the disorientation. Additionally, the fact that the controller cleared the flight for take-
off may have had an affirmative character for the flight crew that they were indeed 
holding short of their take-off runway. However, there is no conclusive objective 
evidence that this is indeed what happened. 
 
Additionally, ineffective mitigation strategies allowed this misconception to persist, 
most notably the flight crew’s failure to check aircraft heading for consistency with 
direction of the desired take-off runway after line-up, a slight misinterpretation of 
the NOTAM concerning the lighting system of RWY 22, and a generally similar ap-
pearance of RWY 22 and RWY 26 when viewed from the threshold. RWY 22 was 
sloped with a bulge in the middle, and therefore not visible full length. When viewed 
from the threshold, this visually shortened it, creating similarities with RWY 26. 
When the first officer flew into Lexington on the day before the accident, most of the 
runway lighting of RWY 22 had been out of service due to construction work, an ap-
parently impressive experience that the first officer related to the captain during the 
take-off briefing with the words that “the other night it was like lights are out all over 
the place.” But only runway centreline and touchdown zone lights of RWY 22 were 
still out of service on August 27th, whereas runway edge lights were available again, 
and the NOTAM concerning the edge lights had been cancelled and was not part of 
the dispatch documents. Nonetheless, the first officer’s personal experience of land-
ing on the partially unlit RWY 22 the night before was an important factor, because it 
formed the flight crew’s expectations what their take-off runway should look like, 
and thus made it acceptable to them to commence take-off on an runway without 
lighting. Consequently, there was apparently insufficient visual stimulus for the 
flight crew to question their position on the airport, and thus their decision to take 
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off, since they expected a largely unlit RWY 22, and thus the actually unlit RWY 26 
did not raise any suspicions, and the erroneous line-up remained undetected. 
Again, it appears that the behavioural phenomenon known as confirmation bias in 
psychology and cognitive science played a major role. 
The hypothetical V1 speed for RWY 26 was approximately 103 knots. It was reached 
shortly after the crossing of RWY 22, the runway actually intended for take-off, and 
several seconds after the first officer’s statement, “It’s weird with no light!”, which 
most NTSB board members believe was made with an inflection in the voice indicat-
ing that it eventually dawned upon the speaker that something was wrong [NTS07]. 
 
At the time of the accident, the tower at Blue Grass Airport operated at less than the 
required staffing due to budget and personnel constraints. Because the controller 
proceeded to administrative paperwork after issuing the take-off clearance to Comair 
Flight 5191, ATC did not notice the flight crew’s error, and thus had no chance to 
warn the crew. Apart from workload issues, diverting the controller’s attention away 
from his primary task of controlling traffic, scheduling rotations had also prevented 
the controller from maintaining adequate rest, and he was therefore fatigued after 
only 2h of sleep when the accident happened. 
The controller was legally not required to monitor the flight until take-off, but the 
NTSB found that delaying the take-off clearance until confirming that an airplane 
had crossed all intersecting runways to a departure runway could reduce the risk of 
erroneous take-offs from the wrong runway. 
 
I-12.3 Probable Cause 
The official NTSB investigation, which consumed approximately 13,000 hours, en-
countered difficulties in determining the probable cause of the accident because of 
the human performance issues involved. 
Eventually, the Safety Board determined that the probable cause of the accident was 
the flight crew’s failure to use available cues and aids to identify the airplane’s loca-
tion on the airport surface during taxi and their failure to cross-check and verify that 
the airplane was on the correct runway before take-off.  
Since it was, according to the Safety Board, likely that the 40 seconds of non-pertinent 
conversation led to “a loss of positional awareness” [sic], the flight crew’s non-pertinent 
conversation and the Federal Aviation Administration’s failure to require that all 
runway crossings be authorised by specific ATC clearances were given as the two 
factors contributing to the accident. Safety Board Member Hersman, who led the in-
vestigation, filed a concurring statement on the investigation report, but criticised the 
narrow focus of the findings on crew performance [NTS07]. 
The NTSB also concluded that the implementation of cockpit moving map displays 
or cockpit runway alerting systems on air carrier aircraft “would enhance flight safety 
by providing pilots with additional awareness about the runway and taxiway environment.” 
Consequently, one of the safety recommendations made by the NTSB to the FAA was 
that air carrier aircraft should be fitted with cockpit moving map displays or an 
automatic system alerting pilots “when take-off is attempted on a taxiway or a runway 
other than the one intended.” In addition, the board recommended enhanced taxiway 
centreline markings near holding positions and procedural changes, most notably a 
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crew procedure for positive confirmation and cross-checking an airplane’s location at 
the assigned departure runway. On the ATC side, the board recommended prohibit-
ing performing administrative duties for controllers while aircraft are moving in 
their area of responsibility, and issuing take-off clearances to taxiing aircraft before 
the aircraft has crossed all intersecting runways. 
 
I-12.4 Flight Deck Instrumentation Aspects & Conclusion 
In this accident, at first glance human error seems so egregious that it appears to of-
fer an easy explanation of the events [ALP07]. For a meaningful conclusion with re-
spect to flight deck instrumentation, however, it is essential to understand why the 
perceptions and decisions of the flight crew appeared to make sense at the time (local 
rationality), and what prevented the flight crew from maintaining adequate situ-
ational awareness. Therefore, based on the investigation results, the analysis section 
has attempted to reveal the complexity of the situation and the potentially conflicting 
information that eventually mislead the Comair flight crew into believing they were 
on the correct runway. 
 
Doubtlessly, non-pertinent conversation is a distraction and may thus be detrimental 
to maintaining adequate situational awareness. However, there are no indications 
that pilots were completely absorbed by this conversation, which occurred on a vir-
tually straight segment of taxiway A while passing the intersection with the taxiway 
signed as A-6 (see Figure 232), and the NTSB does not provide any detailed explana-
tion on how the non-pertinent conversation contributed to disorientation, or why this 
should be given any more weight than the apparent airport charting and NOTAM 
deficiencies. Of course, a potential scenario is that the non-pertinent discussion initi-
ated by the first officer disturbed the captain in resolving the apparent conflict result-
ing from the fact that this taxiway was not documented on their charts, and thus fos-
tered disorientation. But even then, inaccurate airport charting information would 
still be at the root of disorientation. 
In summary, there is no conclusive factual evidence to what extent the non-pertinent 
conversation was a factor leading to the erroneous line-up on RWY 26, and it is there-
fore not fully satisfactory as main explanation for the disorientation. Besides, the fact 
that other flight crews experienced confusion at Lexington as well may serve as an 
indication that this accident is less related to individual flight crew performance, but 
more to systemic issues such as inaccurate airport charting and inadequate NOTAM 
information. 
 
Another concern with respect to non-pertinent conversation as a key factor leading to 
disorientation is that maintaining a cockpit environment completely free of distrac-
tions or parallel tasks is virtually impossible. Surprisingly, performing checklist ac-
tivities, which kept the first officer head-down for most of the taxiing, is not even 
mentioned in the findings of the NTSB investigation. Besides, there are several fur-
ther valid operational reasons, such as cabin readiness, slot discussions with ATC, 
weather concerns or technical problems that might equally divert a flight crew’s at-
tention during taxiing. In fact, distraction by weather-related considerations has also 
been identified as a potential reason for the disorientation in the Taipei accident (cf. 
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Appendix I-9). Therefore, the Lexington accident once more documents the vulner-
ability of an adequate level of situational awareness towards degradation in an air-
port environment under less than optimum circumstances. 
 
Consequently, the main systemic issue is not the occurrence of distraction or disori-
entation, but the inadequacy of current flight deck instrumentation and procedures 
to reliably detect, manage and resolve surface navigation errors, irrespective of their 
cause, i.e. independent of whether they result from e.g. low visibility, operational 
distractions, non-pertinent conversation or erroneous aeronautical information. In 
conclusion, the underlying cause of the Lexington accident was not that distraction 
and disorientation occurred, but that this problem was not detected and corrected. 
 
From a flight deck instrumentation perspective, it is unlikely that the flight crew of 
Comair Flight 5191 would have opted for take-off in the presence of a device provid-
ing them with continuously updated information on their current position on the 
airport, such as an airport moving map as recommended by the NTSB. Even if the 
flight crew had not paid any attention to this device, the accident could still have 
been prevented if the crew had been made aware of the fact that they were lined up 
and attempting take-off on the wrong runway by an alerting system of some kind. 
 
An aspect not explicitly addressed by the NTSB recommendations is that an airport 
moving map display would have shown airport information based on largely the 
same sources of information as the conventional charts. Consequently, an airport 
moving map would not automatically have addressed the charting discrepancies or 
missing NOTAM information, which the author believes played a significant role in 
the disorientation causing this accident. 
However, for the purpose of Runway Incursion avoidance, an airport moving map is 
believed to be more robust against taxiway charting discrepancies than paper charts, 
provided that it offers sufficient positional integrity and as long as the runway in-
formation presented is correct. Provided that the flight crew can trust the presented 
ownship position, this will probably enable pilots to detect the perceived inconsis-
tencies as charting discrepancies, rather than attempting to fit the inconsistent infor-
mation somehow in the perception of their position. 
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I-13 Erroneous Take-offs from a Taxiway 
I-13.1 China Airlines Flight 011, Anchorage International Airport (1/25/2002) 
 
Figure 233: Instructed and actual path of Dynasty 011 
On January 25th, 2002, at 02:43 local time, a China Airlines Airbus A340-300 (B-18805), 
callsign Dynasty 011, erroneously took off from taxiway K instead of RWY 32 at Ted 
Stevens Anchorage International Airport (PANC). None of the three flight crew 
members, 12 cabin crew members, and 237 passengers was injured, and the airplane, 
which was bound for Taipei (Taiwan) sustained no damage, and continued its flight 
uneventfully. At the time of the incident, dark night visual meteorological conditions 
prevailed. 
 
After the Dynasty 011 had been pushed back from gate N4, the first officer contacted 
ATC for taxi instructions at 02:32. In return, the controller gave the following instruc-
tion, “Dynasty 011 heavy, taxi RWY 32 at Kilo, taxi via Mike, Romeo, Kilo.” The inci-
dent airplane correctly followed the assigned route. As it was taxiing southbound on 
taxiway R and preparing for the right turn onto taxiway K at 02:40:06, the controller 
already cleared the flight for take-off on RWY 32. The flight crew acknowledged and, 
at 02:41:58, stopped the aircraft on taxiway K at the hold line, east of the extended 
portion of RWY 32. However, instead of turning right (north) onto RWY 32 to line 
up, Dynasty 011 began accelerating west on taxiway K at 02:42:10. 
The controllers, upon noticing the mistake some 35 s later, did not instruct the flight 
crew to abort take-off, but activated the emergency phone to the airport fire brigade. 
However, the A340-300 managed to take off successfully, reporting airborne at 02:43. 
Members of the airport authority later discovered tyre impressions from the aircraft‘s 
main landing gear in a snow bank at the west end of taxiway K. 
The subsequent investigation revealed that all three crew members had used Jeppe-
sen airport diagrams during taxiing, and both captain and first officer used the Navi-
gation Display (ND) in ARC mode and with a range of 10 NM, in which the runway 
symbol is visible. Although it had been the captain’s first flight to Anchorage, the 
first officer and relief captain had been there before. Both captain and first officer re-
called very bright centreline lights on TWY K, which they apparently mistook for 
runway lights. Specifically, the first officer stated that, while he initially (and more 
appropriately) thought the aircraft had only turned 100°, the bright centreline lights 
then made him think he was already on the runway when the captain transferred 
Actual Path 
Instructed 
Path 
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control to him. Likewise, the relief captain, a China Airlines check airman occupying 
the jumpseat, described TWY K centreline lights as white, contrary to a previous 
visit, where he had clearly perceived them as green. Consequently, all three crew 
members, neither of whom checked the aircraft’s heading, were in the firm belief 
they were indeed on RWY 32 when the first officer commenced take-off, apparently 
deceived by the airport lighting. 
However, subsequent night taxi tests with another China Airlines A340 revealed no 
anomalies with taxiway K lighting in all three intensity settings; it thus remains un-
clear what caused the misperception and disorientation of the incident flight crew. 
As a result of this incident, China Airlines revised its Airbus A340 AOM to include 
verbalization and verification of the runway in use [NTS02]. 
 
I-13.2 EVA Air Flight BR635, Anchorage International Airport (11/05/2005) 
On November 5th, 2005, EVA Air Flight BR635, a McDonnell-Douglas MD-11F, acci-
dentally took off from taxiway Y at Anchorage International Airport (PANC) instead 
of the parallel RWY 32 for a cargo flight to Taipei. Although the taxiway is shorter 
than RWY 32, the aircraft managed to take off successfully and continued to Taipei 
without further incident. 
This incident was reported in the news media in 2005, referencing an investigation by 
the FAA or the NTSB. However, neither the NTSB incident/accident database nor 
the Taiwanese Air Safety Council (ASC) list of investigated occurrences contain any 
reference to this incident. 
It seems, however, that BR635 with a crew of three (including a relief captain) was 
initially cleared to RWY 32 via taxiway K. Subsequently, the flight crew was advised 
of a runway change, and instructed to taxi to RWY 07L via taxiway K, cf. Figure 233. 
Shortly afterwards, while still taxiing on taxiway K – and presumably after having 
crossed RWY 32 – ATC informed the flight crew of yet another runway change, and 
requested them to taxi to the extension of RWY 32 via RWY 07L. Upon line-up, all 
three flight crew members believed that they were on RWY 32, and commenced take-
off. Apparently, though, there was some disorientation, and the aircraft had made a 
premature left turn, lining up and taking off on taxiway Y instead. 
While Anchorage tower was unaware of any infringement of taxiway Y, a radar trace 
showed the aircraft departing from the taxiway, and the flight crew was eventually 
instructed to contact Anchorage ARTCC. 
Neither the precise time of the incident nor the prevailing meteorological and visibil-
ity conditions are known, and there is – unfortunately – insufficient information 
available to draw any conclusions on the reasons why this apparent crew disorienta-
tion occurred. Since both the pilot-in-command and the relief captain had, within the 
previous 48 h, flown Anchorage – New York (KJFK) – Anchorage and effectively had 
only had 21 h of rest between November 3 and November 5, 2005, fatigue may have 
been an issue, although all three crew members met the minimum CAA rest re-
quirements159. 
                                                 
159  The presentation of the event in this thesis is based on discussions in an EVA Air flight crew forum, 
http://nankantraz.org, incident information obtained via the Aviation Safety Network (http://www.aviation-
safety.net) and the website of the Flight International magazine, http://www.flightglobal.com.  
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I-14 Runway Incursions Caused by Vehicles 
I-14.1 Anchorage International Airport (12/19/1983) 
A Japan Airlines Boeing 747-200F (J8151) sustained substantial damage when collid-
ing with a pick-up truck during landing on RWY 6R shortly after midnight on De-
cember 19th, 1983. With the RVR between 600 and 800 ft, and the nose gear still in the 
air when the collision occurred, the flight crew stated that they did not see the vehi-
cle. It turned out that the local controller, potentially due to workload issues, could 
not remember whether he had acknowledged the ground controller’s request to cross 
the vehicle. The three flight crew members received minor injuries in the accident, 
whereas the driver was severely injured and lost both legs [NTS84]. 
 
I-14.2 Sioux Falls Airport (12/20/1983) 
An Ozark Air Lines DC-9 struck a snow sweeper while landing on RWY 03 at Sioux 
Falls, Dakota. When clearing the aircraft to land, the controller did not advise the 
flight crew of the snow removal operation in progress on the runway. Thus, since the 
ATIS reported blowing snow but did not mention any snow removal, either, the 
flight crew attributed what they saw to the weather, and did not realise that they 
were actually perceiving the snow removal. 
The collision destroyed the snow sweeper, killing its driver, and broke off the DC-9’s 
right wing. None of the flight crew or the 77 passengers aboard the DC-9 were in-
jured, and the impact fire extinguished itself as the airplane spun through 180° after 
the collision [NTS85]. 
 
I-14.3 Amsterdam Airport Schiphol (12/10/1998) 
A Delta Airlines Boeing 767-300 (N193DN), operating as Flight DAL 39, aborted take-
off on RWY 24 at Amsterdam Airport Schiphol when observing a KLM Boeing 
747-400 being towed across the runway, accompanied by an airport authority van. 
The incident occurred at 10:32 local time in low visibility, with the RVR between 1600 
and 1800 m. Due to a low cloud base, the visibility from the tower was close to zero. 
 
Because of a misunderstanding when coordinating with the assistant controller han-
dling the aircraft under tow, the controller clearing the Delta Boeing 767 for take-off 
was in a wrong mindset as to the direction in which the tow would cross, and there-
fore, based on the ground radar picture, considered the crossing complete before it 
had actually begun. Additionally, difficulties with stop bar operation and associated 
discussions in the tower created both distraction and confusion, delaying the runway 
crossing of the aircraft under tow. 
 
The investigation concluded that a catastrophic accident was only prevented due to 
the quick and proficient action by the flight crew, which had sufficient visibility to 
acquire the conflicting traffic visually [RVT01]. Since the vehicles were handled on a 
different frequency, the Delta flight crew had no chance of noticing the emerging 
conflict in advance. 
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I-14.4 Denver International Airport (2/2/2007) 
On February 2nd, 2007, at 17:38 local time, a United Airlines Boeing 737-500 
(N928UA), operating as flight UAL1193, nearly collided with a snowplough while in 
its landing rollout on RWY 8. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time 
of the incident. 
 
The investigation revealed that the snowplough driver had proceeded across the 
runway without clearance from air traffic control or airport operations. The driver 
stated that he saw the landing airplane while crossing the runway and increased ac-
celeration. 
The flight crew had initially observed the snowplough holding short of a taxiway, 
but after landing, they suddenly observed the snowplough crossing the runway in 
front of them. Employing significant reverse thrust and brakes, they managed to 
bring the aircraft to a halt on the runway. The controller apparently did not see the 
snowplough; he was alerted to the Runway Incursion by the flight crew’s report. 
While the Airport Movement Area Safety System (AMASS) was operational, no 
alarm had sounded [NTS07b]. 
 
 
I-15  Collisions on Taxiways 
I-15.1 Newark Liberty International Airport (10/31/2006) 
At 18:30 local time, a Lufthansa Boeing 747-400 (D-ABVY) operated as Flight DLH 
403 to Frankfurt, Germany, incurred substantial damage when its left wing contacted 
the right wing of a Boeing 757-200 that was under tow, but stopped, at Newark Lib-
erty International Airport (EWR), Newark, New Jersey. None of the 18 crewmembers 
and 294 passengers onboard the Boeing 747 was injured, and there was no one on-
board the Boeing 757. The accident occurred in the vicinity of the intersection of 
taxiways A and S; night visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the 
accident. 
The investigation revealed that the B747 flight crew was not aware of the aircraft un-
der tow. The captain reported that the accident occurred in an area where the B757 in 
tow was backlit by apron lights blinding him, and that the crew’s attention was di-
verted to another B757 ahead that they had been instructed to follow. Furthermore, 
the B757 in tow had been taxiing ahead of the B747 prior to reaching the diverging 
taxiways, and had received its taxi instructions prior to the B747 crew being on the 
frequency [NTS07c]. 
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I-16 Noteworthy Recent Incidents 
I-16.1 Munich Franz-Josef-Strauß Airport (5/3/2004) 
On May 3rd, 2004, at 21:39 local time, a Boeing 737-300 landing on RWY 08R at Mu-
nich Airport (EDDM) nearly collided with an ATR 42-500 lining up on the same 
runway from high-speed taxiway B4. A catastrophic accident was only prevented 
because the flight crew of the Boeing 737 visually acquired the other aircraft suffi-
ciently early to initiate an evasive manoeuvre; they eventually passed the ATR 42-500 
within metres at a speed of 110 kts (204 km/h). 
 
Around 21:39, the ATR 42-500 was ready for take-off to its destination Villafranca 
(LIPX) with 25 passengers and four crew members. It was holding short of RWY 08R 
at the CAT I holding position on taxiway B4, which was designed as a high-speed 
exit for RWY 26L. About the same time, the Boeing 737 arriving from Amsterdam 
(EHAM) with 26 passengers and a crew of five was approximately two NM (3.7 km) 
from the threshold; its flight crew had contacted tower at 21:37:20 and been advised 
that landing clearance would be given on short final due to another departing air-
craft, an Airbus A321 lined up on RWY 08R at the intersection with taxiway B2 near 
the runway threshold. It was cleared for take-off at 21:38:03 and commenced its take-
off run 20 seconds later. 
Shortly thereafter, the controller issued the following conditional clearance to the 
ATR flight crew, “[…] behind next landing short final line up 08 right behind.” The 
ATR flight crew acknowledged, and commenced line-up after the departing A321 
had passed the intersection B4 some 16 seconds later. Two seconds before the depart-
ing A321 lifted off, at 21:39:01, the Boeing 737 was cleared to land on RWY 08R, and 
crossed the threshold 11 seconds later. At this time, the ATR was moving very slowly 
and still 70 m from the runway centreline. During touchdown at 21:38, this distance 
had decreased to 40 m. Two seconds later, the flight crew aboard the Boeing 737 saw 
that there was another aircraft on the runway. They used the thrust reversers, maxi-
mum auto-brake and made a swerve to the right to avoid a collision with the ATR, 
which was approximately 10 m from the runway centreline when the Boeing 737 
passed it at 21:39:26. Neither aircraft was damaged, and there were no injuries. 
 
Post-incident interviews showed that the ATR flight crew had commenced line-up in 
the conviction that the A321 which had just passed on RWY 08R was the landing air-
craft the controller was referring to in her conditional clearance. In fact, experiments 
conducted by the investigators revealed that in darkness, an aircraft passing B4 on 
RWY 08R could not unambiguously be identified as departing or landing. Due to the 
shallow angle (~ 30°) of B4 with RWY 08R, the approach sector could, contrary to the 
controller’s assumption, not be surveyed visually by the ATR crew, who conse-
quently had no chance of seeing the approaching Boeing 737 until it passed in front 
of them. 
In conclusion, therefore, a fundamental pre-requisite for conditional clearances in 
ICAO Doc. 4444, that all of “the aircraft or vehicles concerned are seen by the appropriate 
controller and pilot” [ICA01a], was not fulfilled. Furthermore, the controller did not 
provide the ATR flight crew with required additional information, such as airline or 
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aircraft type, that could have enabled them to positively identify the aircraft she was 
referring to. Merely using ‘next’ in the conditional clearance proved to be ambiguous. 
 
In the 30 min preceding the incident, there were 24 movements, and 9 aircraft were 
on the controller’s frequency when the incident occurred. Due to the high traffic vol-
ume, the controller attended to other traffic immediately after clearing the Boeing 737 
for landing, and therefore did not observe the emerging conflict situation visually or 
on the radar screen. It is particularly noteworthy that a so-called Runway Incursion 
Monitoring function based on surface movement radar data was available at Munich 
tower, but the system was not working properly, producing an unacceptable number 
of false and spurious alerts. Therefore, the controller had turned it off at her working 
position [BFU09]. 
In conclusion, this incident is remarkably similar to the accident in Paris in 2000 (cf. 
Appendix I-8), because line-up via a high-speed taxiway resulted in limited visibility 
of runway traffic, and there was also confusion about which aircraft a conditional 
clearance referred to. 
 
I-16.2 Boston Logan International Airport (6/9/2005) 
On June 9, 2005, about 19:40 local time, an Airbus A330-300 (EI-ORD) operated by 
Aer Lingus as Flight 132 (EIN132), and a Boeing 737-300, N394US, operated by US 
Airways as Flight 1170 (USA1170) were involved in a Runway Incursion at Boston 
Logan International Airport (KBOS) in daytime VMC conditions. There were neither 
injuries nor aircraft damage, and both airplanes proceeded to their respective desti-
nations without further incident. 
 
At the time of the incident, aircraft operating at KBOS were landing on runways 4R 
and 4L, and departing from runways 15R and 9. The KBOS Local East Controller 
(LCE) was responsible for aircraft operating on runways 4R and 9, and the KBOS Lo-
cal West Controller (LCW) was responsible for aircraft operating on runways 15R 
and 4L. RWY 15R intersected three active runways: 4L, 4R, and 9. Because runways 
4R and 9 were under the control of the LCE, the LCW was required to obtain a re-
lease from the LCE before authorising departures from RWY 15R. 
At 1939:10, the LCW cleared EIN132 for take-off from RWY 15R. Five seconds later, 
the LCE cleared USA1170 for departure from RWY 9, although he had released RWY 
15R for the Aer Lingus flight in an exchange with the LCW less than a minute before, 
and both aircraft commenced take-off. 
Shortly after the V1 callout, the first officer of USA1170 noticed the Aer Lingus A330 
rotating just prior to the intersection of RWY 15R and RWY 9. Keeping their Boeing’s 
nose down by pushing the control column forward, the US Airways flight crew man-
aged to prevent a collision with the Airbus A330, which passed overhead their air-
craft with very little separation, and to lift off towards the end of the runway. 
 
The subsequent investigation concluded that the probable cause of this Runway In-
cursion, which was classified as “Category A” according to the FAA severity scheme, 
was that the LCE had forgotten he had released RWY 15R for the Aer Lingus flight, 
most likely due to workload issues [NTS05]. 
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I-16.3 Frankfurt/Main Airport (1/12/2006) 
At 19:11 on January 12th, 2006, a Boeing 747-200B freighter that had arrived on RWY 
07R from Beijing crossed RWY 07L while an Airbus A320 arriving from Dublin was 
landing on the same runway. The A320 was able to decelerate sufficiently to prevent 
a collision hazard. The incident, which occurred in night IMC conditions with visibil-
ity around 4,800 m, did not result in any damage or injuries. 
 
During rollout on RWY 07R, the flight crew of the Boeing 747 had been instructed to 
“taxi Golf and hold short of runway 07L” at 19:08. However, since the readback, 
“Taxi Golf and Hotel eh hold short of runway 07L,” was inaccurate with respect to 
the taxiways to be used, the controller repeated his instruction, “Yes on Golf hold 
short of runway 07L.” Again, the flight crew’s readback was incorrect, since they 
answered, “On Golf eh cross runway 07L.” However, this breakdown of communica-
tion went unnoticed by the controller, who cleared the Irish Airbus A320 to land on 
RWY 07L immediately afterwards. 
While decelerating after landing, and at a speed of approximately 100 kts (185 
km/h), the flight crew aboard the Airbus observed a Boeing 747 entering and cross-
ing the runway approximately 800 m downfield. The crew increased pressure on the 
brakes, immediately notified ATC at 19:11, and left the runway via taxiway G, thus 
following the Boeing 747 which had just crossed. 
 
Since it corresponded to their expectations on the next instruction to be received from 
ATC, it appears that the Boeing 747 flight crew erroneously interpreted the control-
ler’s repeated instruction as new or updated, and therefore made a readback to the 
effect that they were approved to cross RWY 07L. The controller did not notice this 
error, and his landing clearance to another aircraft failed to raise any concern with 
the Boeing 747’s flight crew, although this clearance was in contradiction to the in-
struction they believed to have received. 
 
The controller did not observe the Runway Incursion. Although the surface move-
ment radar at Frankfurt was supplemented by a Runway Incursion Monitoring func-
tion, it had been de-activated due to the frequent false alerts [BFU09a]. 
 
I-16.4 Newark Liberty International Airport (10/28/2006) 
On October 28th, 2006, at 18:31 local time, a Continental Airlines Boeing 757-200 
(N17105), inbound from Orlando as Flight 1883, erroneously landed on taxiway Z at 
Newark Liberty International Airport (KEWR) in night visual meteorological condi-
tions after a circling approach to RWY 29. There were no injuries to the 154 persons 
aboard, and the aircraft was not damaged.  
 
While inbound to Newark for a circling approach to RWY 29, ATC initially cleared 
Flight 1883 to the ILS approach of RWY 22L by default procedure. At an altitude of 
approximately 8,000 - 9,000 ft (2,700 - 2,400 m), the flight crew was then instructed to 
“circle to land on RWY29” as planned. The first officer, who had not performed a 
RWY 29 approach at Newark before, disconnected the autopilot at the glide slope 
intercept at an altitude of 3,000 feet (900 m), and manually flew the airplane to the 
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outer marker on the ILS Runway 22L approach. At an altitude of 900 ft (270 m), the 
first officer turned the airplane onto the final approach for RWY 29, observing four 
white lights on the PAPI visible on the left when rolling level, and consequently 
pitching the airplane nose down to capture the proper glide path.  
 
Apparently not remembering that the PAPI of RWY 29 was in a non-standard con-
figuration on the right side of the runway (instead of the left), the flight crew be-
lieved they were established on the proper glide path, and had the runway centreline 
lights in view. As the airplane descended below 300 ft (90 m), it passed an intermit-
tent rain shower, briefly reducing the flight crew's visibility of the runway. After 
clearing the rain shower, the flight crew confirmed final glide path alignment and 
noted that the PAPI appeared extremely bright compared to other lights. Moreover, 
lighting that appeared to be runway centreline lights were in view, and green high-
speed turnoff lights were observed further down the “runway”. The airplane 
touched down on taxiway Z, near the intersection with R, at about 140 kts with a 
normal sink rate. When the first officer deployed the thrust reversers, the captain re-
alised they had landed on taxiway Z, took control of the aircraft, and taxied to the 
gate without incident. Both the intensity of RWY 29 and taxiway Z lighting could be 
controlled in five steps. Interestingly, the runway lights were only on step 1, with the 
taxiway lights set to step 3; lighting procedures were later changed to have runway 
lighting always one step brighter than taxiway lights [NTS07d]. 
 
This incident indicates that erroneous landings on airport surfaces other than run-
ways must be considered in the context of incursion avoidance, since non-standard 
approach aids – even if they are properly described by available airport information - 
may easily deceive even highly experienced flight crews – the captain of the incident 
flight had accumulated approximately 24,000 flight hours, and the first officer 
6,202 h. Once more, this incident demonstrates how easily airport lighting can be 
misperceived under less than ideal visibility conditions. 
 
I-16.5 Denver International Airport (1/5/2007) 
A Swearingen Metroliner (N425MA), operating as Key Lime Air (LYM) Flight 4216 
and a Frontier Airbus A319 (N915FR), Flight 297, were involved in a Runway Incur-
sion at Denver International Airport (KDEN), on January 5th, 2007, at 07:28 local time. 
 
LYM4216 had been instructed to taxi to RWY 34 from taxiway SC, via M and AA. 
According to the Metroliner pilot, however, blowing snow reduced his visibility, and 
taxiway SC was covered with snow, preventing him from seeing the centreline light-
ing. While attempting to find the centreline lighting, he saw blue taxiway edge lights 
and followed them. Instead of turning left onto taxiway M as intended, this brought 
him further straight ahead on taxiway M-2, and he eventually turned left onto RWY 
35L at 07:27:06. At 07:28:10, the ground controller asked LYM4216 to confirm is loca-
tion. Upon this question, the pilot noticed that he was on a runway. 
 
In the meantime, FFT297 had been cleared to land on RWY 35L, and broke out of the 
clouds around 600 ft (180 m). Both pilots perceived the runway as clear at the time, 
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and did not see the other aircraft, which was then approximately 2,000 ft (600 m) or 
more down the runway, until they were about 100 to 50 feet (30 to 15 m) above the 
runway. The first officer immediately commenced a go-around, missing the other 
aircraft by roughly 50 ft (15 m). Blowing snow and winds combined with the propel-
ler wash from the Metroliner had obscured the aircraft from the Frontier flight crew. 
After the FFT297 flight crew initiated a go-around upon seeing the Metroliner, the 
Airport Movement Area Safety System (AMASS) activated at 07:28:17, and 4 seconds 
later, the tower controller instructed FFT297 to “go around” [NTS07e]. 
 
Two aspects of this incident are particularly noteworthy. The first is that snow may 
easily cover airport lights and markings, rendering them virtually unusable for air-
port navigation. Besides, blowing snow, irrespective of whether it is of natural origin 
or originating from jet or propeller wash, can easily create whiteout-like conditions, 
making visual acquisition of both airport features and other traffic exceedingly diffi-
cult. The second aspect is the timeliness of AMASS alerts, which apparently need 
fine-tuning although the system is already operational at many US airports. Given 
that both aircraft missed each other by only 15 m, and that the go-around instruction 
based on the AMASS alert reached the flight crew several seconds after they had al-
ready initiated it by themselves, it is somewhat questionable whether AMASS would 
have prevented an accident in this particular situation. 
 
I-16.6 Almost a Runway Incursion? 
On a night in November 2005, around 20:50 UTC, a Bombardier CRJ 700 was ap-
proaching Toulouse airport in night VMC. As visibility was excellent and the 
weather was calm, the captain turned of the autopilot and intercepted the ILS of 
RWY 14R manually. Between 3000 and 2000 ft, the crew asked ATC whether they 
could use RWY 14L, which has no centreline lighting, instead. The controller replied 
positively and immediately added “cleared to land RWY 14L”. However, as the air-
craft continued its descend, another aircraft which had apparently landed on RWY 
14R could be seen taxiing slowly towards a RWY 14L. Around 500 ft radio altitude, it 
was obvious that the other aircraft was going to cross RWY 14L, which it had accom-
plished roughly at 400 ft radio altitude. At the same time, the controller asked the 
CRJ 700 to confirm that they were on final. When the crew confirmed, the controller 
said again “cleared to land RWY 14L”, which the CRJ pilot non-flying acknowledged 
by replying “we were already cleared to land”. The controller chose not to comment 
on this160. 
Although the situation was perfectly safe at all times, this incident was technically a 
Runway Incursion, because the controller cleared two aircraft for the runway at the 
same time without being fully aware of this situation, apparently. According to 
[ICA01a], section §7.9.3, an aircraft can be cleared to land provided there is “reason-
able assurance that the separation […] will exist when the aircraft crosses the runway thresh-
old.” But in the context of the sequence of events, the double clearance seems unusual 
and suggests that the controller was probably in the wrong mindset, obviously still 
expecting the CRJ 700 on RWY 14R. 
                                                 
160 The sequence of events is reported based on a credible personal account available to the author. 
I-17   FURTHER INCIDENTS AND ACCIDENTS 
  451 
I-17 Further Incidents and Accidents 
 
The following Runway Incursion incidents and accidents were also analysed for this 
thesis, but are not presented in detail, because they do not provide any significantly 
new aspects and insights with respect to crew human factors and flight deck instru-
mentation, compared to those already discussed in the previous sections: 
 
 Chicago O’Hare International Airport (2/15/1979): The ground controller cleared 
a Delta Boeing 727-200 across RWY 9R because he overlooked an approaching 
Flying Tiger Boeing 747-F on the radar screen. To avoid a collision, the B-747 
veered off the runway and was substantially damaged. According to the Safety 
Board, both the controller’s error and a lack of vigilance of the Delta flight crew 
for approaching traffic were causal factors in this accident. However, due to a fog 
bank at the approach end of the runway and a restricted field of view from the 
cockpit, the Delta crew could not have seen the B-747 until 4 s prior to the near-
collision [NTS79]. 
 Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport (3/31/1985): Earlier on the day of the 
incident described in Appendix I-4, another local controller failed to provide suf-
ficient separation and to promptly recognise that an Eastern Airlines DC-9 had re-
jected take-off on RWY 29L due to an engine failure, and cleared another aircraft 
to land on the same runway [NTS86]. 
 Philadelphia International Airport (5/8/1985): Lufthansa Flight 403, a McDonnell 
Douglas DC-10, successfully rejected take-off from RWY 27R when the flight crew 
observed a DC-9 crossing the runway. This Runway Incursion was again the re-
sult of a coordination breakdown between local and ground controller [NTS86]. 
 Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport (6/12/1985): A Learjet taxied across 
RWY 29R while a Bemidji Airlines Beech 80 was in its take-off roll after an error 
in coordination between the local controller and the ground controller; the 
Bemidji aircraft continued take-off and eventually crossed the Learjet at an alti-
tude of 200 ft (60 m) [NTS86]. 
 Chicago Midway Airport (7/3/1985): The ground controller forgot to instruct a 
B-737 to hold short of RWY 13, which was occasionally being used for take-off 
and landing, but not listed as active runway on the ATIS. As a result, the B-737 
taxied across RWY 13 while a DC-9 was taking off from the same runway, even-
tually overflying the B-737 at an altitude of 200 ft (60 m) [NTS86]. 
 Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport (2/27/1995): In night VMC conditions, 
the local controller erroneously instructed a Swearingen SA227 (N355AE) to line 
up and wait on RWY 35L only seven seconds after clearing an American Airlines 
MD-11 (N1763) to land on the same runway. The supervisor, subsequently notic-
ing the conflict, alerted the local controller. Because he did not remember the pre-
cise callsign of the American Airlines flight, and since the identification of aircraft 
on his radar screen had failed, the local controller issued emergency go-around 
instructions to the non-existing flights AA1251 and AA1261. Eventually, the MD-
11 passed the other aircraft with 35 ft (11 m) vertical clearance [NTS95a]; the sce-
nario resembles the Los Angeles Accident (Appendix I-6). 
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 Atlanta-Hartsfield International Airport (1/18/ 1990): An Eastern Airlines Boeing 
727-200 (N8867E) landing on RWY 26R crashed into a Beechcraft King Air A100 
(N44UE), which had landed on RWY 26R shortly before and was turning off the 
runway. While the pilot of the King Air was killed and his co-pilot severely in-
jured, none of the 149 passengers and 8 crew members aboard the B-727 were 
harmed. The accident, which occurred around 19:04 local time in average traffic 
density and night IMC conditions, i.e. three miles (4828 m) visibility with haze, 
left the King Air totally destroyed and the Boeing 727 substantially damaged. The 
Eastern Airlines flight crew only saw the other airplane when their landing lights 
illuminated it, and although they attempted an evasive manoeuvre, it was too 
late, and the right wing of the B-727 hit the King Air. The investigation revealed 
that some of the King Air’s strobes and red anti-collision lights had been inopera-
tive, making it virtually impossible for the Eastern Airlines crew to see the other 
aircraft. It is particularly noteworthy that the NTSB determined “the failure of the 
Federal Aviation Administration to provide air traffic control procedures that adequately 
take into consideration human performance factors such as those which resulted in the 
failure of the north local controller to detect the developing conflict between N44UE and 
EA 111” as the first of two probable cause items, the second being the failure of 
the controller to ensure separation [NTS91b]. 
 Paris Charles-de-Gaulle Airport (10/6/1998): In a scenario remarkably similar to 
the accident in 2000 (cf. Appendix I-8), Streamline Flight 200 to Luton, a Shorts 
330, erroneously lined up from a high-speed taxiway on the then single southern 
RWY 10 (now RWY 08L) while an Air France Boeing 747-400, bound for Tokyo, 
had been cleared for take-off from the threshold of the same runway. The Stream-
line flight crew, when requesting line-up, had neither specified its position nor 
requested an intersection take-off before, and the controller – erroneously believ-
ing the Shorts 330 was behind the Air France Boeing 747 as instructed, approved 
line-up. When the Shorts 330 entered the runway, the Air France crew saw the 
other aircraft, delayed initiating its take-off roll, and reported the incursion to 
ATC for clarification [BEA01]. 
 Paris Charles-de-Gaulle Airport (9/26/2000): At 19:50, a Lufthansa flight errone-
ously taxied onto RWY 26R via taxiway W7 in front of a FedEx flight, which had 
lined up via W10. DLH 4177 entered the runway at the same moment as FDX8A 
was cleared for take-off. According to the Lufthansa flight crew and other sur-
rounding aircraft, the stop bar on W7 was not illuminated [BEA01]. 
 Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport (8/16/2001): During their take-off run on 
RWY 18L, the flight crew of Delta Airlines Flight 1521 observed another aircraft, a 
Continental Airlines Boeing 737, taxiing across the runway. They succeeded in 
avoiding a collision by applying full power and rotating early, but their aircraft 
sustained minor damage due to a slight tailstrike. The incident occurred in day-
time VMC conditions. The NTSB investigation revealed that the controller had er-
roneously approved Continental Airlines Flight 1487 to cross RWY 18L although 
he had previously cleared Delta Airlines Flight 1521 for take-off on the same 
runway. When initiating the runway crossing, the Continental flight crew had 
perceived the other aircraft waiting lined up on the runway [NTS01].  
 
I-17   FURTHER INCIDENTS AND ACCIDENTS 
  453 
For a number of further incidents, the available data does not provide sufficient de-
tail to analyse Human Factors aspects involved and associated causal factors: 
 
 Newark Liberty International Airport (2/11/1993): In night VMC conditions, the 
captain of a Continental Airlines Boeing B-727 became disoriented as to whether 
he was on the inner or outer taxiway, and made a wrong turn towards RWY 4L. 
Upon recognizing the runway edge lights, he realised his error and turned 
around in time to avoid collision with a departing Boeing B-737 [NTS93]. 
 Chicago O'Hare International Airport (4/1/1999): Shortly after 2 a.m., Korean Air 
Flight 36 and Air China 9018, both Boeing 747s, nearly collided on RWY 14R. Air 
China had just landed and was rolling out on RWY 14R when the tower controller 
instructed Korean Air to line up and wait. After Air China exited the runway at 
taxiway T10, the tower controller instructed the flight to turn left on taxiway K 
and cross RWY 27L, and then cleared KAL36 for take-off. As the airplane was 
rolling down the runway, Air China erroneously taxied onto RWY 14R. The Ko-
rean Air captain saw the 747 taxiing on to the runway, but since it was too late to 
abort, he lifted off earlier than normal and banked left to avoid striking Air China. 
The two aircraft, carrying 382 people, missed colliding by about 80 ft (24 m)161. 
 Hamburg Airport (1/29/2004): In CAT I conditions, after landing on RWY 23, a 
Fokker F50 crossed RWY 33 without authorisation while an Airbus A319 was on 
its take-off run on the same runway. Since the Fokker flight crew had already 
switched to the ground control frequency by its own initiative, it could not hear 
the controller’s repeated warnings to hold short of RWY 33, and the A319 had to 
reject take-off at a speed of approximately 60 kts [BFU04b]. 
 Seattle-Tacoma International Airport (10/30/2006): Alaska Airlines Flight 61, a 
Boeing 737-200 (N740AS) took off from RWY 34R instead of the assigned RWY 
34C. There were neither injuries to the 71 passengers or 5 crew members nor 
damage to the airplane, which continued uneventfully to its destination of Juneau 
International Airport, Juneau, Alaska [NTS07f]. 
 Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood Airport (7/11/2007): UAL1544, an Airbus A320, 
missed a turn onto taxiway B, instructed as part of the taxi route, for unknown 
reasons and consequently headed for RWY 9L, on which a Delta Airlines Boeing 
B-757 was cleared to land. The controllers noticed and resolved the Runway In-
cursion by instructing the United flight to stop immediately and the Delta aircraft 
to go around. The incident occurred in daytime VMC [NTS07g]. 
 Los Angeles International Airport (8/16/2007): When visually acquiring West Jet 
Flight 900 after landing, the responsible ground controller failed to recognize that 
the flight was north of RWY 24L and needed to cross the active runway to taxi to 
the gate. The West Jet flight crew proceeded to cross RWY 24L without explicit 
approval, and stopped beyond the holding line only when they noticed other traf-
fic (NWA180) taking off [NTS07h]. 
                                                 
161  As sole reference, an animation of the incident is available on the NTSB website. 
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Appendix II: Visual Aids to Surface Navigation 
 
Airport signs, markings and lights convey information that is essential for surface 
navigation. The following sections give a brief introduction to the most important 
signs, markings and lights as detailed by ICAO Annex 14 [ICA04b]. 
 
 
II-1 Airport Signs 
 
The perhaps most concise overview of airport signs can be found in the FAA’s Pilot’s 
Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge [FAA08a], as shown in Figure 234. Although it 
reflects the application of the ICAO standard in the United States rather than the 
standard itself, it is shown here for its brevity and clarity, and to illustrate diversity 
of airport signs due to both airport and national specifics. 
 
Airport signs fall in two general categories. Signs with white text on a red back-
ground are referred to as Mandatory Instruction Signs, cf. Figure 235. They are used 
to identify a location beyond which an aircraft taxiing or vehicle must not proceed 
unless authorised by the aerodrome control tower, or not at all, as in the case of the 
‘NO ENTRY’ sign. 
The most important Mandatory Instruction Sign is the so-called runway holding po-
sition sign, which is located at holding positions on taxiways where they lead onto or 
cross a runway, and on intersecting runways. The signs contain the designation of 
the intersecting runway as shown in Figure 234 and Figure 235. The arrangement of 
runway numbers on the sign reflects the relative location of the corresponding run-
way threshold. As an example, “25-07” indicates that the threshold for Runway 25 is 
to the left and the threshold for Runway 07 is to the right. 
 
 
Figure 234: Overview of the most important airport signs [FAA08a] 
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Where taxiways intersect run-
ways close to the threshold, only 
the designation of the corre-
sponding take-off runway may 
appear on the sign as shown in 
Figure 235 c, while all other signs 
typically feature the designation 
of both runway directions.  
Mandatory Instruction Signs are 
also used in case it is necessary 
to hold aircraft on a taxiway at a 
location other than the previ-
ously described holding position to prevent interference with the Instrument Land-
ing System (ILS) or with approach operations in general. The so-called ILS critical 
area is marked by a simple “ILS” sign or a reference to the corresponding approach 
category, i.e. by Category I, II or III holding position signs (cf. Figure 235), as appro-
priate [ICA04b]. Where basic geometrical considerations necessitate an additional 
holding position, “APCH” is used [FAA09]. Due to the criticality of the information 
they convey, holding position signs are placed on each side of the taxiway at inter-
sections with runways. 
 
The second category encompasses the 
so-called Information Signs, which use 
a black and yellow colour coding, cf. 
Figure 236. 
Location signs identify the taxiway or 
runway the aircraft is currently located 
on by a yellow designator on a black 
background. Runway exit signs iden-
tify taxiways suitable to vacate the 
runway and exhibit the corresponding 
designator in black on a yellow back-
ground. Where runway exit taxiways 
do not feature centreline lighting, loca-
tion signs are accompanied by signs 
indicating that the runway or the ILS 
critical area have been vacated; these 
signs mirror the corresponding surface 
marking. Direction signs also feature a 
yellow background with a black in-
scription identifying the designation(s) 
of the intersecting taxiway(s), accom-
panied by an arrow indicating the direction of the turn. Destination signs look like 
direction signs, but guide aircraft to specific airport destinations or facilities, such as 
terminals or the cargo area. 
Information signs are typically placed at least 60 m ahead of the intersection; for cer-
tain taxiway-taxiway intersections, this may be reduced to 40 m. Direction and desti-
 
Figure 235: Mandatory Instruction Signs [ICA04b] 
 
Figure 236: Information Signs [ICA04b] 
a) 
 
 
b) 
 
 
c) 
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nation signs are placed to the left or to the right of location signs. All signs indicating 
left turns are located left of the location sign, all others on the opposite side, where 
the inner right side is reserved for directions/destinations straight ahead (where ap-
plicable) [ICA04b]. Most airport signs are lighted at night. 
 
 
II-2 Airport Markings 
 
Runway markings, which have priority over any other airport markings, are painted 
in white, whereas the colour for taxiway markings is yellow. Typically, reflective 
paint is used for airport markings to enhance their conspicuity during nighttime. 
 
As a minimum, runway markings on paved runways consist of a dashed centreline 
marking and a painted two-digit runway designator (see Figure 237), which is sup-
plemented by ‘L’ (left), ‘C’ (centre) or ‘R’ (right) for multiple parallel runways where 
required. These markings are generally sufficient for a runway intended for visual 
operations. However, additional markings are required for non-precision or preci-
sion instrument runways. Both require the white-striped threshold markings some-
times referred to as ‘piano keys’, which are also mandatory for visual runways used 
for international air transport. The number of stripes is used to code the runway 
width. 
 
Additionally, rectangular aiming 
point markings located between 
150 and 400 m from the threshold 
are required for instrument run-
ways and visual runways either 
longer than 1,200 m or used by jet 
aircraft. Depending on runway 
length and width, these markings 
are between 30 and 60 m long and 
4 to 10 m wide [ICA04b]. 
 
A continuous side stripe marking 
outlining the runway edge is 
mandatory for precision instru-
ment runways or whenever there 
is a lack of contrast between the 
runway edges and the shoulders 
or the surrounding terrain. Preci-
sion instrument runways also re-
quire touchdown zone markings 
consisting of up to six pairs of rectangular bars symmetrically arranged about the 
runway centreline to identify the touchdown zone for landing operations. The num-
ber of pairs is related to the landing distance available and codes distance informa-
tion in 150 m increments. The basic pattern consists of single bars, but alternatively, 
groups three, two and then single bars are used, as shown in Figure 237. 
 
Figure 237: Sample application of airport markings 
in the United States [FAA08] 
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Continuous taxiway centre-
line markings are required 
on all paved taxiways, de-
icing facilities and aprons to 
provide continuous guidance 
between the runway centre-
line and aircraft stands, ex-
cept where the centreline in-
tersects with a runway-
holding position marking or 
an intermediate holding posi-
tion marking as shown in 
Figure 238. At an intersection 
of a taxiway and a runway, 
the centreline of a taxiway serving as runway exit should be curved into the runway 
centreline marking as shown in Figure 237 and be extended parallel to the runway 
centreline marking for a distance of at least 30…60 m beyond the point of tangency. 
Taxiway centreline markings have to be at least 15 cm wide [ICA04b]. Taxiway edge 
markings are used when the taxiway edge does not correspond with the edge of the 
pavement [FAA09]. 
 
Runway holding positions are estab-
lished at the intersection of a taxiway 
and a runway and at the intersection of 
two runways, if one runway is part of a 
standard taxi-route. Additional runway 
holding positions are necessary if the 
location or alignment of the taxiway is 
such that a taxiing aircraft or vehicle can 
infringe an obstacle limitation surface or 
interfere with the operation of radio 
navigation aids. 
For non-precision approaches and take-
off operations, runway holding posi-
tions are typically located 75 m from the centreline of the runway types commonly 
used for air transport operations. Whenever a taxiway and a non-instrument, non-
precision approach or take-off runway intersect, the runway holding position mark-
ing shown in Figure 238, Pattern A, is used. 
If the intersecting runway is a precision approach Category I, II or III runway, two or 
three runway holding positions at least 90 or 107.5 m from the runway centreline 
may be necessary, depending on the precise geometry and elevation of the intersec-
tion162. In this case, the runway holding position marking closest to the runway is 
always painted as shown in Figure 238, Pattern A, whereas the markings farther 
                                                 
162  The distance may be decreased if the holding position is lower than the runway and has to be increased by 5 m 
for every metre that the holding position is above the threshold elevation. Additionally, airfield elevation may 
necessitate an additional increase of the distance, e.g. by one metre for every 100 m above 700 m for airports at 
elevations up to 2,000 m. For aerodromes located at elevations of 4,000 m or higher, a supplement of 43 m plus 
two metres for every 100 m above 4,000 m is required [ICA04b]. 
 
Figure 238: Runway holding position markings [ICA04b] 
 
Figure 239: Enhanced taxiway holding posi-
tion markings proposed by the FAA [FAA05a] 
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from the runway correspond to Pattern B [ICA04b]. To enhance the conspicuity of 
holding position markings in an effort to reduce the number of Runway Incursions, 
the FAA has proposed to supplement the Pattern A holding position markings by 
painted runway designators and an enhanced taxiway centreline as shown in Figure 
239, which is now part of the standards for aerodrome markings [FAA05a]. 
 
II-2.1 Designation and Marking of Closed Runways 
According to ICAO Annex 14, “a closed marking shall be displayed on a runway or taxi-
way, or portion thereof, which is permanently closed to the use of all aircraft” [ICA04b]. The 
same applies to temporarily closed runways (and taxiways) as well; markings may 
only be omitted if the closure is of short duration and adequate warning is provided 
by air traffic services163. The markings to be used are specified in detail by Annex 14. 
Closed runways have to be marked by a cross resembling a capital “X” of 36 m 
length and 14.5 m width that must be positioned on the runway centreline. The lines 
of the X should have a width of 1.8 m. Likewise, closed taxiways must be marked 
with a smaller, quadratic cross of 9 m in size, painted with a line width of 1.5 m; see 
Figure 240 for details164. The aerial photo inset shows an exemplary application of the 
ICAO guidelines at Vienna International Airport (LOWW). 
 
 
Figure 240: ICAO runway and taxiway closure markings [ICA04b] 
 
The closure marking must be placed at each end of a closed runway or runway seg-
ment. Additional markings have to be placed in between, and the maximum permis-
                                                 
163  After the incident described in [NTS03], the NTSB questioned the practice of leaving the decision to omit tem-
porary closure markings to the airport operator in a Safety Recommendation to the FAA, but the paragraph in 
question was not changed in the new version of AC 150/5340-1 [FAA05a], which gives guidance on airport 
markings.  
164  In the Unites States, alternatively, closed runways may be marked with a quadratic cross twice the size of the 
ICAO closed taxiway marking shown in Figure 240. Likewise, closed taxiways may alternatively be indicated 
by an elongated cross half the size of the ICAO closed runway marking [FAA05a]. 
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sible interval between markings is 300 m. On closed taxiways, markings shall be 
placed at least at each end of the closed taxiway or taxiway segment. 
Regarding the colour of the markings, ICAO prescribes that runway closure mark-
ings must be white, while those for taxiways have to be painted in yellow, i.e. the 
closure markings are painted in the predominant marking colours of runways and 
taxiways, respectively. In the United States, both closure markings are applied in yel-
low [FAA05a]. 
For permanently closed runways or taxiways, ICAO mandates additionally that the 
normal markings should be obliterated, which is a requirement that cannot be ful-
filled for temporary closures, all the more as frangible barriers or markings utilizing 
materials other than paint or “other suitable means” may be used to identify the closed 
area in this case. For temporary closures, often only one cross is placed on each 
threshold on top of the runway designation markings [FAA05], and some airports 
reportedly use electrically lighted, X-shaped markers placed on the threshold. 
Any other lighting on a closed runway, closed taxiway or any portion thereof should 
not be operated, except for maintenance purposes. During Low Visibility Operations, 
such lighting should not be operated under any circumstances [ICA08]. 
 
 
II-3 Airport Lights 
II-3.1 Runway Lights 
Runway edge lights are used to outline the edges of runways during periods of 
darkness or restricted visibility conditions. They are required for night operations or 
on precision approach runways, and should be provided whenever take-off opera-
tions in RVR conditions of less than 800 m are performed. Runway edge lights are 
generally white, but on instrument runways, yellow may replace white on the last 
600 m or within the last third of the runway, whichever is less, to form a caution zone 
for landings. For instrument runways, spacing should not exceed 60 m. The thresh-
old lights at the end of the runway emit red light toward the runway to indicate the 
end of runway, whereas green light is emitted outward from the runway in the direc-
tion of the approach to indicate the threshold to landing aircraft. 
 
Runway centreline lights are required for Category II/III approach operations and 
take-off in RVR conditions below 400 m, but installed with a spacing of 15 m on most 
precision approach runways to facilitate landing under adverse visibility conditions. 
From the landing threshold, runway centreline lights are white until the last 900 m of 
the runway. The white lights begin to alternate with red for the next 600 m, and for 
the last 300 m of the runway, all centreline lights are red. 
 
Touchdown zone lights are required for Category II/III approach operations and are 
available on many precision approach runways, consisting of two rows of transverse 
white light bars disposed symmetrically about the runway centreline, extending 900 
m beyond the landing threshold or to the midpoint of the runway, whichever is less. 
 
Taxiway centreline lead-off lights provide visual guidance to aircraft or vehicles 
exiting the runway. They are colour-coded to warn pilots and vehicle drivers that 
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they are within the runway environment or landing system critical area, whichever is 
more restrictive. Alternate green and yellow lights are installed, beginning with 
green, from the runway centreline to the perimeter of the ILS/MLS critical or sensi-
tive area. In the opposite direction, the same lights serve as lead-on lights with the 
same intention, cf. Figure 237. On runways approved for Land and Hold Short Op-
erations (LAHSO), Land and hold short lights indicate the hold short point by a row 
of pulsing white lights across the runway when LAHSO is in effect. 
 
A description of the various approach lighting systems is beyond the scope of this 
thesis; details can be found in ICAO Annex 14 [ICA04b] or the FAA Aeronautical 
Information Manual (AIM) [FAA09]. 
 
II-3.2 Taxiway Lights 
To facilitate operations at night and under low visibility conditions, taxiway centre-
line lights are illuminated in green, whereas taxiway edge lights outline the edges of 
taxiways by blue lights. Taxiway centreline lights with 15 m spacing are required for 
operations below 350 m RVR; 30 m spacing is sufficient in most other cases. At hold-
ing positions on taxiways, yellow clearance bar or intermediate holding position 
lights are installed to increase the conspicuity of the holding position during periods 
of darkness or in low visibility (see Figure 237). 
 
At the intersection of taxiways and runways, two alternately flashing yellow Run-
way Guard Lights are installed to enhance the conspicuity of the taxiway/runway 
intersection. While originally intended for low visibility conditions, they are typically 
operated regardless of the meteorological conditions [ICA04b]. 
 
Stop bar lights are typically required below 350 m RVR and used to confirm the 
ATC clearance to enter or cross the active runway in low visibility conditions. A stop 
bar consists of a row of red, unidirectional, in-pavement lights installed across the 
entire taxiway at the runway holding position, and elevated red lights on each side. 
A controlled stop bar is operated in conjunction with the taxiway centreline lead-on 
lights, which are extinguished for at least 90 m behind a lighted stop bar. Following 
the ATC clearance to proceed, the stop bar is turned off and the lead-on lights are 
turned on. Typically, the stop bar and lead-on lights are automatically reset by a sen-
sor or backup timer. Pilots should never cross a red illuminated stop bar, even if an 
ATC clearance has been given to proceed onto or across the runway [ICA04b, 
FAA09]. 
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Appendix III: MCDU Pages 
 
III-1 MCDU Pages for ePIB 
 
       
   ePIB MAIN    
   FLIGHT DATE TIME    
 –  DLH8385 09-AUG-06 19:30  –  
         
 –  < ORIGIN DESTINATION >  –  
       
 –   ALTERNATE >  –  
       
 –   ENROUTE >  –  
       
 –  < REQUEST   –  
       
 –  < RETURN LOAD >  –  
       
       
Figure 241: ePIB Main page (MCDU), first design 
Figure 241 illustrates the initial design proposal for the ePIB main menu, imple-
mented as a MCDU page. The first line specifies the flight number/flight plan call-
sign, the ePIB creation date (in most cases this will be identical with the flight date) 
and the time at which the current bulletin was produced. By pressing the keys adja-
cent to ORIGIN, DESTINATION, ALTERNATE and ENROUTE, the crew can review 
the PIB content for the respective airport or flight segment on dedicated pages, with 
examples given in Figure 244/Figure 245. The link to the LOAD page may be used to 
upload a different ePIB, e.g. if AOCC sends an update while still on the ground. By 
default, any available ePIB is always loaded in the most recent version as soon as the 
appropriate flight number or callsign has been entered on the INIT page. Touching 
the key next to REQUEST will open a new menu page on which the crew can request 
updated NOTAM information from AOCC. Depending on the available means of 
communication with AOCC, this might be a shortcut to the corresponding ACARS 
page. In the future, this function could be extended by requests directly to the AIS 
provider. As usual, the RETURN key will re-call the previous page. 
As it should be beneficial from an operational point of view to visualize the selec-
tions for origin, destination and alternate airport as a reminder, the menu was rear-
ranged slightly in the first implementation for the FLYSAFE project (in cooperation 
with NLR) to enable a display of the corresponding ICAO identifiers adjacent to the 
respective items, as shown in Figure 242. Data are from an actual Lufthansa Cargo 
flight from Tselinograd/Aqmola (UACC) in Kazakhstan to Frankfurt/Main (EDDF), 
with Frankfurt-Hahn (EDFH) set as a destination alternate [DLH06a]. Nevertheless, 
since it is not desirable that the crew can alter selections already made on the INIT 
page, this layout should be improved further, all the more as it requires to merge the 
LOAD/REQUEST item and does not leave any room for potential future extensions. 
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   ePIB MAIN    
   FLIGHT DATE TIME    
 –  DLH8385 09-AUG-06 19:30  –  
         
 –  < ORIGIN UACC  –  
       
 –  < DESTINATION EDDF  –  
       
 –  < ALTERNATE EDFH  –  
       
 –  < EN-ROUTE UACC/EDDF  –  
       
 –  < RETURN LOAD/REQEST >  –  
       
       
Figure 242: Alternative ePIB Main page (MCDU) 
 
Figure 243 presents a combination of both solutions, which uses the structure of the 
initial design from Figure 241, but indicates the current airport selections as fixed 
data below the corresponding menu items to address the issues mentioned above. 
 
       
   ePIB MAIN    
   FLIGHT DATE TIME    
 –  DLH8385 09-AUG-06 19:30  –  
         
 –  < ORIGIN DESTINATION >  –  
      UACC EDDF       
 –   ALTERNATE >  –  
    EDFH     
 –   ENROUTE >  –  
       
 –  < REQUEST   –  
       
 –  < RETURN LOAD >  –  
       
       
Figure 243: Final ePIB Main page (MCDU) 
 
Any PIB is created for a specific combination of origin and destination. However, 
since information on several alternate airports is usually contained as well, and thus 
also in the corresponding ePIB, any change of destination or alternate airport on the 
INIT page could automatically be reflected on the ePIB Main page as long as the cor-
responding data are available. If the original ePIB package does not contain informa-
tion on a selected airport, its ICAO identifier will change to amber. If no flight num-
ber has been entered yet, amber dashes in lieu of flight number, date, time and air-
port identifiers will indicate this. 
III-1   MCDU PAGES FOR EPIB 
  463 
An amber flight number and the removal of all menu options except RETURN and 
LOAD, along with a text message such as “LOADING FAILURE” (also in amber) 
will announce an ePIB failure. 
From a usability perspective, flight crews may not want to go back to the INIT page 
and change the alternate airport just to review NOTAM information for a different 
alternate airport. This aspect is addressed by the design of the respective ePIB 
NOTAM page shown in Figure 244, which is called for the respective airport if the 
line select keys adjacent to ORIGIN, DESTINATION or ALTERNATE in Figure 243 
are pressed. Below the airport name and its ICAO identifier, this ePIB NOTAM page 
lists the NOTAMs contained in the ePIB for this airport. Furthermore, there is a direct 
link to the Airport Menu (see next section) of the respective airport. 
 
       
   ePIB NOTAM    
       
 –   PULKOVO ULLI  –  
    A3435/07 
RWY 28L/10R CLSD FOR ACFT TKOF AND 
LDG, AVBL FOR ACFT PARKING AND 
TAXIING ONLY. 
 
A3295/07 
TWY A2 CLSD. 
 
A2151/07 
ACFT TAXIING OUT OF/INTO STANDS 58, 
59, 60 CARRIED OUT BY TOWING TRACTOR 
   
 –   –  
      
 –   –  
      
 –   –  
      
 –   –  
      
 –  < RETURN AIRPORT MENU >  –  
   ↑↓    
       
Figure 244: ePIB NOTAM page (MCDU) for airports 
 
By entering a different ICAO identifier using the 1R key, the flight crew can review 
NOTAM information for any other airport contained in the ePIB, which gives quick 
access to NOTAM for different (alternate) airports. “NO CURRENT NOTAM” will 
be displayed in white for any airport covered by the ePIB which does not have any 
current NOTAMs. By contrast, “NO DATA AVAILABLE” will be indicated in amber 
for any airport not covered by the ePIB, and likewise, “NOT IN DATABASE”, also in 
amber, will be shown for any airport not covered by the current navigation database 
of the aircraft. 
 
Any NOTAM which has expired during the flight will be displayed in amber to re-
flect the fact that it is no longer active, and moved to the end of the active NOTAM 
list. Furthermore, NOTAM information that is applicable only for a certain period of 
time during the day will be presented in yellow outside the hours in which it is ap-
plicable. To determine this, depending on the distance and the type of NOTAM, ei-
ther local time or the estimated time of arrival (ETA) are used, potentially combined 
with a hysteresis of several minutes, as discussed in Section 5.3.4.1. 
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If an airport is not covered by the ePIB of the current flight, but NOTAM files from 
previous ePIBs for a different flight are still available and valid, these might be 
shown as well, but with an amber reminder like “NOT IN CURRENT EPIB” on the 
ePIB NOTAM page to indicate that the information shown may not be complete.  
While the design shown in Figure 244 might give quick access to all NOTAM infor-
mation, it could become increasingly inefficient with a growing number of applicable 
NOTAM. Figure 245 shows an alternative approach permitting a more structured 
review of NOTAM information based on the categories used in conventional PIBs 
issued by Lufthansa Systems, cf. [DLH06a]. However, this requires an additional pi-
lot selection by pilots before individual NOTAM can be reviewed. However, this so-
lution might be complementary to the solution above, and could e.g. be employed 
only if the ePIB contains the corresponding structure, which the latter would by de-
fault in case there are e.g. 10+ applicable NOTAM for an airport. This might allow 
the flight crew to access the information of interest in a more structured way. 
 
       
   ePIB NOTAM    
       
 –  NEWARK LIBERTY INTL KEWR  –  
       
 –  < RUNWAY AIRPORT >  –  
       
 –  < DEPARTURE APPROACH >  –  
       
 –   OTHER >  –  
       
 –     –  
       
 –  < RETURN AIRPORT MENU >  –  
       
       
Figure 245: ePIB NOTAM page (MCDU) for airports, alternative design  
 
A potential further drawback of the scrollable plain-text presentation of NOTAM 
information in Figure 244 is the lack of a possibility to interact with individual 
NOTAM. However, it is difficult to find a suitable approach to interactivity. With 
NOTAM serial numbers, which are virtually meaningless to pilots, as sole menu 
items, the flight crew would successively have to call up several NOTAM to locate 
the information they are looking for, which does not seem desirable. A way of avoid-
ing this drawback could be listing the first couple of characters below the corre-
sponding identifier for each NOTAM, as shown in Figure 246. In this approach, the 
full NOTAM text and further details could be accessed through the line-select keys 
adjacent to the NOTAM number where required. For the NOTAM relating to the 
runway closures at Frankfurt Airport, A1977/06 and A1970/06, the main informa-
tion is already visible on this summary page. The colour-coding of the text indicates 
that these two NOTAM are currently not applicable, since the estimated ETA is out-
side the time of daily validity, as discussed above. 
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   ePIB NOTAM    
   RUNWAY    
 –  FRANKFURT MAIN EDDF  –  
       
 –  < A1977/06   –  
     RWY 18 CLOSED.    
 –  < A1970/06   –  
     RWY 07L/25R CLOSED.    
 –  < A1266/06   –  
     WINDSHIFT AND TURBULENCE ON RWY ...    
 –     –  
       
 –  < RETURN AIRPORT MENU >  –  
   ↑↓    
       
Figure 246: ePIB MCDU page for runway-related NOTAM 
 
For NOTAM A1266/06, three dots at the end of the line indicate that more text is 
available. Figure 247 presents the review page for an individual NOTAM, which is 
titled with the NOTAM number and, once more, the airport or FIR name and the cor-
responding ICAO identifier, which takes into account that NOTAM numbers are not 
unique; cf. [ICA04]. 
 
       
   A1266/06    
   FRANKFURT MAIN EDDF    
 –  VALID: 08-AUG 21:00 - 10-AUG 04:00  –  
        
 –  WINDSHIFT AND TURBULENCE ON RWY 18: 
WITH WINDS BETWEEN DIRECTION 200DEG 
AND 160DEG CLOCKWISE AND SPEEDS OF 
15KT AND MORE ON RWY 18 GUSTS AND 
STRONG WINDSHIFTS UP TO TAIL WIND 
COMPONENTS MAY OCCUR. 
 –  
      
 –   –  
      
 –   –  
      
 –   –  
      
 –  < RETURN DE-ACTIVATE *  –  
       
       
Figure 247: ePIB NOTAM review page 
 
Immediately below the airport/FIR name, the period of validity is given. The re-
mainder of the page is dedicated to a display of the plain-text information contained 
in the corresponding NOTAM file. In case the crew learns via radio or other means 
that a NOTAM has been cancelled, they can manually de-activate the corresponding 
NOTAM. This will not only change the text to amber, but more importantly disconti-
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nue the use of the machine-readable part of the NOTAM by any other avionics sys-
tem. Thus, if a runway closure NOTAM is manually de-activated, the closure crosses 
will be removed from the corresponding runway on the airport moving map, and 
there will be no longer any alerting related to runway closure on that particular run-
way. Likewise, the inverse process should also be possible at least for expired 
NOTAM having only an estimated end of validity. These could be re-activated using 
this same page, for which the 6R line caption would then change to “RE-
ACTIVATE”. 
 
       
   A1865/07    
    FRANKFURT MAIN EDDF    
 –  VALID: 23-JUL 20:00 – 28-JUL 04:00  –  
   DAILY: 20:00 - 04:00    
 –  RWY 07R/25L CLOSED.  –  
      
 –   –  
      
 –   –  
      
 –   HIGHLIGHT *  –  
       
 –  < RETURN DE-ACTIVATE *  –  
   ↑↓    
       
Figure 248: ePIB NOTAM review page with highlight function  
 
Daily limitations of validity should also be indicated for any NOTAM containing a 
corresponding restriction, as illustrated by Figure 248. For NOTAM referring to an 
AMDB or navigation database element or any other item with a defined geographical 
location, such as a temporary obstacle, the corresponding features could be hig-
hlighted on the ND if the “HIGHLIGHT” function is activated. The operational value 
of this highlighting feature will, however, have to be evaluated by further studies. 
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III-2 MCDU Pages for SMAAS 
 
       
   AIRPORT MENU    
    ATIS J 14:30     
 –  FRANKFURT MAIN EDDF  –  
   RUNWAY ACTIVE/STATUS    
 –  07L/25R 25R/ALL OPS  –  
       
 –  07R/25L 25L/LANDING*  –  
       
 –  18 /--- 18 /TAKEOFF  –  
       
 –  TAXIWAYS >  –  
       
 –  < RETURN EPIB-NOTAM >  –  
       
       
Figure 249: Airport Menu, the main SMAAS MCDU page  
 
The proposed MCDU Airport Menu (Figure 249) provides a synoptic overview of the 
runways available at a certain airport and their status. This enables the flight crew to 
review, complete and amend ePIB and D-ATIS information regarding the operational 
status of the runways for any given airport. 
The official name of the airport and its ICAO identifier are displayed adjacent to the 
1L and 1R key, respectively. This is required for an unambiguous identification of the 
aerodrome concerned. Otherwise, there is a risk of confusing airports with similar 
ICAO identifiers and identical runway designators. As an example, both Munich 
(EDDM) and Berlin-Tegel (EDDT) have two parallel runways named 08L/26R and 
08R/26L, respectively. Using the 1R key, the crew can retrieve data for a different 
airport by entering its ICAO identifier. Airport name and available runways are ex-
tracted from the ARINC 424 FMS Navigation Database [ARI02], or alternatively as 
back-up, the Airport Database (ADB), for each airport. 
Since a possibility to indicate both the runway-in-use (if applicable) and the general 
runway status is required, the runways available at the corresponding airport are 
displayed adjacent to the left hand side LSKs 2L to 4L. Like for any other fix informa-
tion that may not be modified, a green font colour is used. As shown in the figure, 
runway identifiers are presented with the lower magnetic runway heading first, and 
listed by increasing runway heading. For parallel runways, the sequence is Left, Cen-
tre, Right. Runway status information is partially obtained from the ePIB, partially 
from D-ATIS, which is used to retrieve active runway information. To indicate on 
which ATIS transmission the information presented is based, ATIS code letter and 
the associated release time are indicated. The FMS-selected runway will always be 
indicated in white, irrespective of whether active runway information is available. If 
the status of the FMS-selected runway is not compatible with the desired type of op-
eration, it is presented in amber, as shown in Figure 250. 
If there are specific restrictions to a runway, e.g. regarding the available length, the 
corresponding status indication is supplemented by an asterisk, as shown for RWY 
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25L in Figure 249. Detailed runway information, with a possibility to review and 
manually adapt restriction information, could then be accessed by pressing the line-
select keys on the left adjacent to the corresponding runway designators.  
Apart from the default RETURN option, the Airport Menu features a direct link to 
the ePIB NOTAM page (see previous section) for the corresponding airport, which 
the crew can use to obtain more detailed information, e.g. on the reasons for a run-
way closure, and for a review of other pertinent airport information. 
 
Since pilots might want to preview the airport moving map for a specific airport in 
flight, e.g. during the approach briefing or when considering a diversion to an alter-
nate airport, it is envisaged that the MCDU Airport Menu can also be used to select 
any airport contained in the ADB for display on the ND screens. By slewing the posi-
tion reference to the ARP of the airport currently entered on the MCDU Airport 
Menu, the corresponding airport moving map is shown on the ND irrespective of 
ownship position165, provided that the Airport Menu is the active MCDU page and 
that the ND on the same cockpit side is in PLAN mode (and has a suitable range set-
ting). 
 
Future studies will have to reveal whether a dedicated page for the review and po-
tential amendment of taxiway closures and limitations, as indicated by the caption 
TAXIWAYS (5R) in Figure 249, is required or desirable. It is likely, though, that a 
synoptic overview will not be necessary, since taxiway closures and restrictions are 
neither as time- nor safety critical as those of runways. At any rate, the absence of the 
TAXIWAY menu item will provide more room to review runway information for 
complex airports.  
 
       
   AIRPORT MENU    
   ATIS W 22:03    
 –  DALLAS-FT WORTH INTL KDFW  –  
   RUNWAY ACTIVE/STATUS    
 –  13L/31R 13L/TAKEOFF  –  
       
 –  13R/31L 13R/LANDING  –  
       
 –  17L/35R 17L/ALL OPS  –  
       
 –  17C/35C 17C/CLOSED  –  
       
 –  < RETURN EPIB-NOTAM >  –  
   CHECK FMS FLIGHT PLAN   ↑↓    
       
Figure 250: Airport Menu for Dallas-Fort Worth International (KDFW), Part A 
 
 
                                                 
165  It should be noted, however, that although the airport selection influences only the EFIS on the CPT or FO side, 
respectively, any amendments made to the runway status data will affect the overall system. 
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   AIRPORT MENU    
   ATIS W 22:03    
 –  DALLAS-FT WORTH INTL KDFW  –  
   RUNWAY ACTIVE/STATUS    
 –  17R/35L ---/NOT ACTIVE  –  
       
 –  18L/36R 18L/LANDING  –  
       
 –  18R/36L ---/TAXIWAY  –  
       
 –     –  
       
 –  < RETURN EPIB-NOTAM >  –  
   CHECK FMS FLIGHT PLAN   ↑↓    
       
Figure 251: Airport Menu for Dallas-Fort Worth International (KDFW), Part B 
 
Figure 250 and Figure 251 illustrate the behaviour of the Airport Menu for airports 
with more than four runways, such as Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport 
(KDFW), which has seven runways. In this special case, the crew has to use the verti-
cal slew keys (↑ and ↓, cf. Figure 59) to scroll through all the runway information 
available. At the same time, this example is used to demonstrate further envisaged 
features of the Airport Menu. In Figure 250, the crew has selected RWY 17C as take-
off or landing runway in the FMS flight plan. However, since the runway is closed 
according to ePIB information, the status is displayed in amber instead of blue. Addi-
tionally, a message “CHECK FMS FLIGHT PLAN” in the scratchpad advises pilots of 
this inconsistency, which might result in a dangerous situation if not resolved. As 
Figure 251 indicates, the message is shown irrespective of whether the corresponding 
runway is in view on the screen or not. In this example, RWY 17R/35L is neither ac-
tive nor closed, which is indicated by the dashes and the “NOT ACTIVE”. Techni-
cally, the crew could request this runway for take-off or landing, provided there are 
significant operational reasons [ICA01a]. By contrast, RWY 18R/36L is closed and 
may only be used as a taxiway, and depending on the precise nature of the closure, it 
may not be possible for the airport authority to make this runway available on flight 
crew request, however valid the operational reason might be. 
 
Figure 252 once more uses the example of Frankfurt/Main Airport (EDDF). It is as-
sumed that the ePIB for the flight contains the NOTAM A1970/06 already shown in 
Figure 246, which effects a daily closure of RWY 07R/25L between 20:30h – 04:00h. 
Consider the following scenario: A cargo flight taxiing out for departure on taxiway 
S from the south apron at 03:45h learns from ATC that the runway is already open 
again, and might elect to use RWY 07R instead of the planned RWY 07L because of 
the shorter taxi route. In this case, the existing runway status information must be 
amended. One way of achieving this would be to search and deactivate the corre-
sponding NOTAM as described in the previous section. It appears more convenient, 
however, to amend runway status information manually. 
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   AIRPORT MENU    
   ATIS B 03:29    
 –  FRANKFURT MAIN EDDF  –  
   RUNWAY ACTIVE/STATUS    
 –  07L/25R 07L/ALL OPS  –  
       
 –  07R/25L ---/CLOSED  –  
       
 –  18 /--- 18 /TAKE-OFF  –  
       
 –    –  
       
 –  < RETURN EPIB-NOTAM >  –  
   07R/ALL OPS    
       
Figure 252: Airport Menu page with runway closure 
 
Therefore, the flight crew has entered “07R/ALL OPS” in the MCDU scratchpad. The 
result of inserting this information using the 3R key is shown in Figure 253. Manually 
amended status and active runway information are shown in a larger font to reflect 
the manual revision, cf. [Tha05]. Since this updated information does not reflect a 
specific ATIS information any longer, the corresponding indication is removed. 
 
       
   AIRPORT MENU    
         
 –  FRANKFURT MAIN EDDF  –  
   RUNWAY ACTIVE/STATUS    
 –  07L/25R 07L/ALL OPS  –  
       
 –  07R/25L 07R/ALL OPS  –  
       
 –  18 /--- 18 /TAKEOFF  –  
       
 –    –  
       
 –  < RETURN EPIB-NOTAM >  –  
       
       
Figure 253: Airport Menu page with manual revision of runway status 
 
Figure 254 shows the Airport Menu page for a manually selected airport (ICAO iden-
tifier in large font) for which no ePIB or D-ATIS information is available. Information 
on active runways and runway status can be entered manually. Of course, a full en-
try of all runway-related data by hand is not desirable, since it puts extra workload 
on the crew in the flight preparation phase. 
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   AIRPORT MENU    
         
 –  BERLIN-TEGEL EDDT  –  
   RUNWAY ACTIVE/STATUS    
 –  08L/26R [--]/[-----]  –  
       
 –  08R/26L [--]/[-----]  –  
       
 –      –  
       
 –    –  
       
 –  < RETURN EPIB-NOTAM >  –  
       
       
Figure 254: Airport Menu page for manually selected airport without ePIB and D-ATIS 
 
In principle, the crew could limit manual entries to any runway closures known to 
them. It should be stressed once more that the basic runway closure display and 
alerting functions do not require active runway and status information for all run-
ways; one entry for a single closed runway is sufficient. 
Figure 255 illustrates the behaviour of the Airport Menu page for airports for which, 
for whatever reason, no runway data is available. In the example below, the airfield 
in question, Fuldatal Heliport (EDVZ), is obviously used for helicopters only. The 
same behaviour could be applied to all minor airfields that do not have paved run-
ways. By contrast, for an airport not in the customized navigation database of an air-
craft, or an incorrect ICAO identifier, the airport name in the above example will re-
main blank, with just three amber dashes, and the third line will show “NOT IN 
DATABASE” in amber. 
 
       
   AIRPORT MENU    
         
 –  FULDATAL HELIPORT EDVZ  –  
   RUNWAY ACTIVE/STATUS    
 –      –  
       
 –  NO DATA AVAILABLE  –  
       
 –      –  
       
 –    –  
       
 –  < RETURN    –  
       
       
Figure 255: Airport Menu page in case of airport data unavailability  
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